United States v. Julio Rolon

USCA11 Case: 22-10970 Date Filed: 11/16/2022 Page: 1 of 8

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-10970

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JULIO ROLON,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 1:09-cr-20710-JAL-2

____________________

USCA11 Case: 22-10970 Date Filed: 11/16/2022 Page: 2 of 8

2 Opinion of the Court 22-10970

Before WILSON, BRANCH, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Julio Rolon, proceeding pro se, appeals the denial of his

motion for appointment of counsel and motion for compassionate

release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). 1 He argues that the district

court abused its discretion in failing to appoint counsel to represent

him, as counsel would have been able to obtain necessary medical

records to support his claim. He also argues that the district court

erred in denying his motion for compassionate release for various

reasons. The government, in turn, moves for summary affirmance

and a stay of the briefing schedule.

Summary disposition is appropriate where “the position of

one of the parties is clearly right as a matter of law so that there can

be no substantial question as to the outcome of the case, or where,

1

Rolon is serving multiple terms of life imprisonment following his

convictions for (1) conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five

kilograms or more of a mixture containing a detectable amount of cocaine; (2)

attempt to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of a mixture

containing a detectable amount of cocaine; (3) conspiracy to commit Hobbs

Act robbery; (4) attempted Hobbs Act robbery; (5) conspiracy to use, carry, or

possess a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence or drug-

trafficking crime; (6) using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a

drug-trafficking crime; and (7) possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.

USCA11 Case: 22-10970 Date Filed: 11/16/2022 Page: 3 of 8

22-10970 Opinion of the Court 3

as is more frequently the case, the appeal is frivolous.” Groendyke

Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969). 2

As an initial matter, the district court did not abuse its

discretion in denying Rolon’s motion for appointment of counsel.3

There is no constitutional or statutory right to counsel in

§ 3582(c)(2) proceedings. United States v. Webb, 565 F.3d 789,

794–95 (11th Cir. 2009). As a result, “the decision to appoint an

attorney is left to the discretion of the district court.” Id. The

district court concluded that Rolon was capable of requesting

compassionate release without the assistance of counsel and that

he had not shown that the interests of justice required appointment

of counsel in this case. We agree. The only basis for appointment

of counsel that Rolon asserted in his motion was his pro se status

and that he was “not versed in the complexities of the law,” but pro

se status alone and lack of legal knowledge does not establish that

appointment of counsel is necessary. Rather, appointment of

counsel in this context is “a privilege justified only by exceptional

circumstances, such as the presence of facts and legal issues so

novel or complex as to require the assistance of a trained

2

Decisions decided by the former Fifth Circuit before October 1, 1981, are

binding precedent. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir.

1981) (en banc).

3

We review a district court’s denial of a motion for appointment of counsel

for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Webb, 565 F.3d 789, 793 (11th

Cir. 2009).

USCA11 Case: 22-10970 Date Filed: 11/16/2022 Page: 4 of 8

4 Opinion of the Court 22-10970

practitioner.” Kilgo v. Ricks, 983 F.2d 189, 193 (11th Cir. 1993)

(quotation omitted). Such circumstances are not present in this

case. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in

denying appointment of counsel.

As to Rolon’s motion for compassionate release, generally,

a court “may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been

imposed.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). Section 3582(c)(1)(A), however,

provides the following limited exception:

the court, upon motion of the Director of the [BOP],

or upon motion of the defendant after the defendant

has fully exhausted all administrative rights . . . may

reduce the term of imprisonment . . ., after

considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to

the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that . . .

extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a

reduction . . . and that such a reduction is consistent

with applicable policy statements issued by the

Sentencing Commission.

Id. § 3582(c)(1)(A). 4 Thus, under § 3582(c)(1)(A), the district court

may reduce a movant’s imprisonment term if: (1) there are

“extraordinary and compelling reasons” for doing so,

4

We review de novo whether a defendant is eligible for an 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)

sentence reduction. United States v. Bryant, 996 F.3d 1243, 1251 (11th Cir.

2021). We review the district court’s denial of a compassionate release motion

for abuse of discretion. United States v. Harris, 989 F.3d 908, 911 (11th Cir.

2021).

USCA11 Case: 22-10970 Date Filed: 11/16/2022 Page: 5 of 8

22-10970 Opinion of the Court 5

(2) the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) favor doing so, and

(3) doing so is consistent with the policy statements in U.S.S.G.

§ 1B1.13. United States v. Tinker, 14 F.4th 1234, 1237 (11th Cir.

2021) (quotation omitted). If the district court finds against the

movant on any one of these requirements, it cannot grant relief,

and need not analyze the other requirements. United States v.

Giron, 15 F.4th 1343, 1347–48 (11th Cir. 2021); Tinker, 14 F.4th at

1237–38 (explaining that “nothing on the face of 18 U.S.C.

§ 3582(c)(1)(A) requires a court to conduct the compassionate-

release analysis in any particular order”).

The Sentencing Commission defines “extraordinary and

compelling reasons” for purposes of § 3582(c)(1)(A) in Application

Note 1 to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. Pursuant to this definition, there are

four circumstances under which “extraordinary and compelling

reasons exist”: (A) the defendant suffers from (i) “a terminal

illness,” or (ii) a permanent health condition “that substantially

diminishes the ability of the defendant to provide self-care within

the environment of a correctional facility from which he or she is

not expected to recover”; (B) the defendant is “at least 65 years

old,” “is experiencing a serious [age-related] deterioration in

physical or mental health,” and “has served at least 10 years or 75

percent of his or her term of imprisonment, whichever is less”;

(C) the defendant’s assistance is needed in caring for the

defendant’s minor child, spouse, or registered partner due to

(i) “[t]he death or incapacitation of the caregiver of the defendant’s

minor child or minor children” or (ii) “[t]he incapacitation of the

USCA11 Case: 22-10970 Date Filed: 11/16/2022 Page: 6 of 8

6 Opinion of the Court 22-10970

defendant’s spouse or registered partner”; and (D) there exist

“other” extraordinary and compelling reasons “[a]s determined by

the Director of the Bureau of Prisons.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 cmt. (n.1

(A)–(D)).

In Bryant, we held that “district courts are bound by the

Commission’s definition of ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons’

found in [§] 1B1.13.” 996 F.3d at 1262. Furthermore, we held that

although the catchall “other” extraordinary and compelling

reasons provision set forth in Application Note 1(D) gives

discretion to the Director of the BOP to identify other qualifying

reasons, it “does not grant discretion to courts to develop ‘other

reasons’ that might justify a reduction in a defendant’s sentence.”

Id. at 1248, 1263–1265.

Here, the district court did not err in denying Rolon’s

motion for compassionate release. In his motion, Rolon argued

that his sentence should be reduced to time served because he “is

chronically ill from various illnesses that cannot be properly treated

or care[d] for amid the Covid-19/Delta variant in a prison setting.”

He did not state what his various illnesses were 5 or assert that any

of the illnesses were terminal or otherwise substantially diminished

his ability to provide self-care. Instead, he discussed risks associated

5 Although Rolon did not state in his complaint what his illnesses were, we

note that he attached to his complaint his administrative application to prison

authorities for a reduction in sentence, in which he asserted that he suffered

from asthma, diabetes, and obesity.

USCA11 Case: 22-10970 Date Filed: 11/16/2022 Page: 7 of 8

22-10970 Opinion of the Court 7

with the Covid-19 pandemic at great length. Thus, the district

court did not err in concluding that Rolon failed to demonstrate

extraordinary and compelling reasons as defined in U.S.S.G.

§ 1B1.13, Application Note 1. See Bryant, 996 F.3d at 1262

(“[D]istrict courts are bound by the Commission’s definition of

‘extraordinary and compelling reasons’ found in [§] 1B1.13.”).

Regardless, even assuming that Rolon established

extraordinary and compelling reasons for a sentence reduction, the

district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion

because a sentence reduction would be inappropriate in light of the

§ 3553(a) factors. As the district court noted, “the nature and

circumstances of [the] offense [were] very serious”6 and Rolon had

a lengthy and violent criminal history.7 We agree that those

6 Rolon and his codefendants planned to impersonate police officers and

federal agents in order to steal 25 kilograms of cocaine using multiple firearms

and other weapons.

7 Rolon had prior Florida convictions for aggravated battery, robbery with a

deadly weapon, grand theft in the third degree (motor vehicle), possession of

burglary tools, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, attempted second-

degree murder, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony,

possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, attempted first-degree murder,

attempted kidnapping with a weapon, shooting into an occupied vehicle,

unlawful possession of a firearm while engaged in a criminal offense, and

aggravated battery with a deadly weapon. United States v. Rolon, 445 F. App’x

314, 318 (11th Cir. 2011).

USCA11 Case: 22-10970 Date Filed: 11/16/2022 Page: 8 of 8

8 Opinion of the Court 22-10970

factors weighed against a sentence reduction. 8 Lastly, a sentence

reduction would have been inconsistent with § 1B1.13’s policy

statement based on the district court’s determination that Rolon

remained a danger to society—which was reasonable given his

criminal history. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(2) (providing that to be

eligible for a reduction under § 3582(c)(1)(A), the court must

determine that “[t]he defendant is not a danger to the safety of any

other person or to the community”); Tinker, 14 F.4th at 1237

(explaining that district courts may not reduce a sentence unless

the reduction would be consistent with U.S.S.G. 1B1.13’s policy

statement).

Accordingly, because the government’s position is clearly

correct as a matter of law, we GRANT the government’s motion

for summary affirmance and DENY as moot its motion to stay the

briefing schedule.

8 To the extent Rolon quarrels with how the district court weighed the

relevant factors, the weight to be accorded any given § 3553(a) factor is a

matter “committed to the sound discretion of the district court.” See Tinker,

14 F.4th at 1241 (quotation omitted).