People v. Murphy

Filed 7/7/11

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, )

)

Plaintiff and Respondent, )

) S180181

v. )

) Ct.App. 4 E046742

MELISSA KAY MURPHY, )

) San Bernardino County

Defendant and Appellant. ) Super. Ct. No. FSB060016

____________________________________)

Defendant, Melissa Kay Murphy, submitted a false report to a deputy

sheriff, stating that her vehicle had been stolen. We granted review to decide

whether defendant‟s felony conviction under a general statute governing the

offering of a false instrument for filing in a public office (Pen. Code, § 115,

subd. (a)) is precluded by special statutes in the Vehicle Code that make it a

misdemeanor to make or file a false report of vehicle theft (Veh. Code, § 10501,

subd. (a)) or to file a false statement with the Department of Motor Vehicles (Veh.

Code, § 20). We conclude the Legislature intended that defendant‟s conduct be

prosecuted as a misdemeanor under Vehicle Code section 10501 and not under the

more general statute.

I. Facts and Procedure

As relevant to the issues presented here, the facts are as follows: A San

Bernardino County sheriff‟s deputy discovered defendant‟s Chevrolet Malibu

crashed into a hillside. Based on the license plate number, the officer obtained the

owner‟s name and address and went to defendant‟s home to inquire about the

vehicle. Defendant told the officer that the car had been stolen, and the officer

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completed a stolen vehicle report on California Highway Patrol (CHP) form

No. 180. Defendant signed the completed form under penalty of perjury. The

information on a form No. 180 is routinely entered into a national stolen vehicle

database. Two days after the accident, defendant filed a claim with her insurance

company, stating under penalty of perjury that her vehicle had been stolen.

Defendant was charged with three felonies: procuring or offering a false or

forged instrument for filing or recording (Pen. Code, § 115, subd. (a)), knowingly

presenting a false or fraudulent insurance claim (id., § 550, subd. (a)(4)), and

knowingly presenting a false statement in an insurance claim (id., § 550,

subd. (b)(1)). Evidence presented at trial established that the car had not been

stolen and that defendant had been driving the car herself when the accident

occurred. A jury convicted defendant on all three counts, and the trial court

sentenced her to three years‟ formal probation, conditioned upon her service of a

180-day jail term. On appeal, defendant challenged her conviction on the first

count, asserting that prosecution under Penal Code section 115 was precluded by

either of two more specific statutes applicable to her conduct, Vehicle Code

sections 20 or 10501, each of which establishes a misdemeanor offense. The

Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of the trial court, and we granted

defendant‟s petition for review.

II. Discussion

The Legislature has adopted a statute, Vehicle Code section 10501, that

specifically and narrowly addresses defendant‟s conduct of filing a false vehicle

theft report, and makes that conduct a misdemeanor. Defendant contends that by

enacting that statute, the Legislature intended to preclude prosecution for this

conduct under a more general statute that imposes a more severe penalty.

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A. The Williamson Rule

Defendant‟s challenge is premised on a doctrine often referred to as the

Williamson rule, based on our decision in In re Williamson (1954) 43 Cal.2d 651,

654 (Williamson). Under the Williamson rule, if a general statute includes the

same conduct as a special statute, the court infers that the Legislature intended that

conduct to be prosecuted exclusively under the special statute. In effect, the

special statute is interpreted as creating an exception to the general statute for

conduct that otherwise could be prosecuted under either statute. (Ibid.) “The rule

is not one of constitutional or statutory mandate, but serves as an aid to judicial

interpretation when two statutes conflict.” (People v. Walker (2002) 29 Cal.4th

577, 586.) “The doctrine that a specific statute precludes any prosecution under a

general statute is a rule designed to ascertain and carry out legislative intent. The

fact that the Legislature has enacted a specific statute covering much the same

ground as a more general law is a powerful indication that the Legislature intended

the specific provision alone to apply. Indeed, in most instances, an overlap of

provisions is determinative of the issue of legislative intent and „requires us to

give effect to the special provision alone in the face of the dual applicability of the

general provision . . . and the special provision . . . . ‟ (People v. Gilbert [(1969)]

1 Cal.3d [475,] 481.)” (People v. Jenkins (1980) 28 Cal.3d 494, 505-506

(Jenkins), fn. omitted.)

Absent some indication of legislative intent to the contrary, the Williamson

rule applies when (1) “each element of the general statute corresponds to an

element on the face of the special statute” or (2) when “it appears from the

statutory context that a violation of the special statute will necessarily or

commonly result in a violation of the general statute.” (People v. Watson (1981)

30 Cal.3d 290, 295-296 (Watson).) In its clearest application, the rule is triggered

when a violation of a provision of the special statute would inevitably constitute a

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violation of the general statute. In Williamson, for example, the defendant was

convicted under the general conspiracy statute, Penal Code section 182, of

conspiring to commit the crime of contracting without a license in violation of

section 7028 of the Business and Professions Code. A violation of Penal Code

section 182 was punishable as either a misdemeanor or a felony. The defendant

argued that his conduct was punishable only under a special statute, Business and

Professions Code former section 7030 (added by Stats. 1939, ch. 37, p. 384;

repealed by Stats. 1963, ch. 1883, § 2, p. 3867), which made it a misdemeanor to

“conspire[] with another person to violate any of the provisions of this chapter.”

This court agreed. We explained, “To conclude that the punishment for the

violation of section 7030 of the Business and Professions Code is stated in section

182 of the Penal Code, which deals with conspiracies in general, would be

inconsistent with the designation of the particular conspiracy as a misdemeanor.”

(Williamson, supra, 43 Cal.2d at p. 655; see also People v. Gilbert, supra, 1 Cal.3d

at p. 481 [prosecution for theft barred by special statute prohibiting use of false

statement to obtain welfare, because “any conduct which violated [the welfare

fraud statute] would also constitute a violation of the theft provision of the Penal

Code”].)

On the other hand, if the more general statute contains an element that is

not contained in the special statute and that element would not commonly occur in

the context of a violation of the special statute, we do not assume that the

Legislature intended to preclude prosecution under the general statute. In such

situations, because the general statute contemplates more culpable conduct, it is

reasonable to infer that the Legislature intended to punish such conduct more

severely. For example, in Watson, supra, 30 Cal.3d 290, the defendant was

charged with second degree implied malice murder based on a fatal automobile

collision that occurred when the defendant was intoxicated and had been driving at

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excessive speeds. On appeal, the defendant argued that he could be convicted

only of vehicular manslaughter under Penal Code section 192 because that statute

specifically addressed killing while driving a vehicle, whereas the murder statute

was a more general statute that addressed a broad range of unlawful killings. We

rejected that argument because a murder conviction requires a finding of malice,

while vehicular manslaughter requires only gross negligence. Because of the

different mental state required, “a violation of the vehicular manslaughter statute

would not necessarily or commonly result in a violation of the general murder

statute. Thus, the Williamson rule is inapplicable.” (Watson, supra, at p. 296.)

However, that the general statute contains an element not within the special

statute does not necessarily mean that the Williamson rule does not apply. “It is

not correct to assume that the [Williamson] rule is inapplicable whenever the

general statute contains an element not found within the four corners of the

„special‟ law. Rather, the courts must consider the context in which the statutes

are placed. If it appears from the entire context that a violation of the „special‟

statute will necessarily or commonly result in a violation of the „general‟ statute,

the Williamson rule may apply even though the elements of the general statute are

not mirrored on the face of the special statute.” (Jenkins, supra, 28 Cal.3d at

p. 502.)

For example, in People v. Ruster (1976) 16 Cal.3d 690 (Ruster), this court

compared the general statute prohibiting forgery with the special misdemeanor

statute prohibiting unemployment insurance fraud. In Ruster, the defendant filed

claims for unemployment benefits using a false name and Social Security number.

He was prosecuted under the general forgery statute, Penal Code section 470. The

defendant argued that his actions could be prosecuted only under section 2101 of

the Unemployment Insurance Code, which made it a misdemeanor to “willfully

make a false statement [or] representation or knowingly fail to disclose a material

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fact . . . to obtain . . . any benefit or payment” for unemployment insurance.

(Unemp. Ins. Code, former § 2101, subd. (a).) The People argued that because

one element of forgery — the signing of the name of another — is not an element

of Unemployment Insurance Code section 2101, that statute “does not supplant”

Penal Code section 470 when unemployment fraud involves forgery. (Ruster,

supra, at p. 695.) We rejected the People‟s argument and applied the Williamson

rule to preclude the forgery prosecution. We stated that “the Legislature

unquestionably contemplated that the special statute might be violated by means

of forgery. Indeed, applying for aid under a false identity, which entails signing

eligibility questionnaires and pay certification cards with a false name, is

apparently one of the most common forms of unemployment insurance fraud.”

(Ruster, supra, at p. 699.)

B. Application of the Williamson Rule to the Facts of the Present Case

Applying these principles, defendant contends that her conviction under

Penal Code section 115 was precluded by Vehicle Code section 10501, which

makes it “unlawful for any person to make or file a false or fraudulent report of

theft of a vehicle required to be registered under this code with any law

enforcement agency with intent to deceive.” (Veh. Code, § 10501, subd. (a).)

This offense is a misdemeanor unless the person has been previously convicted of

the same offense, in which case it is punishable as either a misdemeanor or a

felony. (Veh. Code, §§ 10501, subd. (b), 40000.9.) Defendant‟s conduct plainly

comes within the terms of Vehicle Code section 10501. By comparison, the

statute under which she was convicted, Penal Code section 115, provides: “Every

person who knowingly procures or offers any false or forged instrument to be

filed, registered, or recorded in any public office within this state, which

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instrument, if genuine, might be filed, registered, or recorded under any law of this

state or of the United States, is guilty of a felony.” (Pen. Code, § 115, subd. (a).)

Penal Code section 115 is more general than Vehicle Code section 10501

because it applies to a broader range of documents that may be filed in any public

office. Each element of section 10501 has a counterpart in section 115. A vehicle

theft report that has been filed necessarily was “offer[ed]” for filing. A report that

has been filed with a law enforcement agency necessarily has been filed with a

“public office.” If the report has been filed, it is necessarily a document that “if

genuine, might be filed, registered, or recorded.” And if it has been filed with

intent to deceive, it has been filed “knowingly.” The main issue in dispute in the

present case is whether a violation of section 10501 would necessarily or

commonly include the filing of an “instrument.”

1. Application of the Williamson Rule When a Special Statute Can

be Violated in Two Different Ways, One of Which Does Not Violate

the General Statute

The People argue that a violation of Vehicle Code section 10501 would not

commonly result in a violation of Penal Code section 115 because the making of a

false oral report is just as common a means of violating section 10501 as the filing

of a written report — and the former would never violate section 115. A violation

of section 115 requires the offering of an “instrument.” An instrument is, at a

minimum, a type of document. Vehicle Code section 10501, on the other hand,

applies to any false stolen vehicle report that is “ma[d]e” or “file[d].” The plain

language of section 10501 does not require that the report be in writing. Although

no published case has interpreted section 10501, its use of the phrase “make or

file” a false report indicates an intent to include both an oral report — which can

be “ma[d]e” — and a written report — which can be “file[d].”

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The People contend that when applying the Williamson rule to a special

statute that may be violated in two different ways, we should take into account

both means of violating the statute. Defendant, on the other hand, contends that

we should focus only on the phrase in Vehicle Code section 10501 that applies to

the filing of a false vehicle theft report and we should determine whether the

present conduct commonly would violate Penal Code section 115. For the reasons

explained below, defendant is correct.

Our cases have applied the Williamson rule without giving any

consideration to the circumstance that a different clause of the special statute at

issue could have been violated without violating the general statute. In

Williamson itself, the special statute at issue contained two clauses; it applied to

“any person who acts in the capacity of a contractor without a license, and any

person who conspires with another person to violate any of the provisions of this

chapter.” (Bus. & Prof. Code, former § 7030; quoted in Williamson, supra, 43

Cal.2d at p. 653, fn. 2.) We held that a defendant who violated the second clause

could not be prosecuted under the general conspiracy statute, and we reached that

conclusion without regard for the circumstance that a violation of the first clause

would not violate the conspiracy statute. (Williamson, supra, at pp. 654-655.)

Similarly, as noted above, we concluded in Ruster, supra, 16 Cal.3d at page

699, that former section 2101 of the Unemployment Insurance Code, which made

it a “misdemeanor to „willfully make a false statement or representation or

knowingly fail to disclose a material fact to obtain . . . any benefit or payment‟ ”

(Ruster, at p. 695, italics omitted) for unemployment insurance precluded a

prosecution for forgery based on the defendant‟s signing a false name to his

application for unemployment benefits. We held that the special statute precluded

application of the general statute because the Legislature clearly contemplated that

unemployment insurance fraud would be committed by forgery and “applying for

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aid under a false identity, which entails signing eligibility questionnaires and pay

certification cards with a false name, is apparently one of the most common forms

of unemployment insurance fraud.” (Ruster, supra, at p. 699.) We applied the

Williamson rule without concern for the fact that the unemployment fraud statute

could be violated by making a material omission, which would not violate the

forgery statute.

Likewise, in People v. Gilbert, supra, 1 Cal.3d 475, we concluded that a

special statute dealing with welfare fraud precluded prosecution for theft under the

general theft statute. The welfare fraud statute contained two clauses, one

applicable to persons who fraudulently obtain aid and one applicable to persons

who fraudulently attempt to obtain aid. We applied the Williamson rule to a

defendant who had fraudulently obtained aid, even though the alternative means of

violating the statute would not constitute theft. (Gilbert, supra, at pp. 479-481.)

The People rely on two Court of Appeal cases to support its argument that

if the specific statute can be violated in two different ways, only one of which

violates the general statute, the Williamson rule does not apply. In People v.

Chardon (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 205, the defendant was stopped for a traffic

violation and signed her sister‟s name to a notice to appear. She was prosecuted

under Penal Code section 529, which prohibits false impersonation. She argued

that prosecution under that statute was precluded by a special statute, Vehicle

Code section 40504, subdivision (b), which prohibits signing a false or fictitious

name on a promise to appear. The court rejected the defendant‟s argument,

reasoning that whereas signing a false name — someone else‟s name — on a

promise to appear would commonly violate both statutes, signing a fictitious name

on the promise to appear is an equally common violation of the Vehicle Code

statute that does not result in a violation of the Penal Code statute. (People v.

Chardon, supra, at p. 214.) Thus, the court concluded that a violation of the

9

special statute would not necessarily or commonly result in a violation of the more

general statute.

In People v. Powers (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 291 (Powers), the defendant

filed a false fishing activity report with the Department of Fish and Game. He was

charged with violating Penal Code section 115 which, as noted above, prohibits

the offering of a false instrument for filing in a public office. The defendant

argued that prosecution under section 115 was precluded because his conduct

violated a regulation requiring him to keep and submit a complete and accurate

record of fishing activities, and a violation of that regulation constituted a

misdemeanor. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 190; Fish & G. Code, § 12000,

subd. (a).) The court rejected defendant‟s argument, concluding that a violation of

the recordkeeping regulation would not commonly result in a violation of section

115, for two reasons. First, section 115 required that the defendant “knowingly”

offer a false instrument, whereas the regulation contained no scienter requirement.

Thus, a person could be guilty of the misdemeanor offense if he or she

unknowingly filed an inaccurate fishing report. Second, section 115 required

filing a false document, whereas a person could be guilty of the misdemeanor

offense for failing to file a fishing report altogether. In this situation, the person

would be guilty of violating the special statute but would not have violated section

115. (Powers, supra, at p. 299.)

It is debatable whether these appellate court cases actually support the

approach the People urge us to adopt, because, as noted earlier, each situation

requires a determination of legislative intent based on “the entire context” of the

statutes at issue. (Jenkins, supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 502.) In any event, our own

decisions, described earlier, are inconsistent with the People‟s position. The sole

focus in Williamson, Ruster, and Gilbert on the clause in the special statute that is

reflected in the general statute supports defendant‟s position: even though the

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making of a false oral report of vehicle theft would not violate the general statute,

our analysis should focus on the question of whether the filing of a false vehicle

theft report would necessarily or commonly result in a violation of Penal Code

section 115.

This approach is consistent with the rationale underlying the Williamson

rule. In adopting a specific statute, the Legislature has focused its attention on a

particular type of conduct and has identified that conduct as deserving a particular

punishment. Consequently, we infer that the Legislature intended that such

conduct should be punished under the special statute and not under a more general

statute which, although broad enough to include such conduct, was adopted

without particular consideration of such conduct. Whether the Legislature has

addressed the specific conduct in a separate statute rather than in a clause or

subdivision of a statute that includes other conduct is not determinative in our

effort to discern the Legislature‟s intent.

2. Does a False Vehicle Theft Report Necessarily or Commonly

Constitute a False Instrument?

The People contend that even if our analysis focuses on the filing of a false

written report, such conduct would not necessarily or commonly violate Penal

Code section 115 because a written vehicle theft report is not necessarily an

“instrument” within the meaning of section 115. The People assert that the vehicle

theft report in the present case qualifies as an instrument only because it includes

certain formalities — specifically, it was signed by defendant under penalty of

perjury. On the other hand a less formal document (such as a handwritten letter,

not signed under penalty of perjury), according to the People, would not constitute

an “instrument.” Thus, the People argue, the Legislature did not intend to

11

preclude the more severe punishment for the filing of a false vehicle theft report

that does constitute an “instrument.”1 Defendant, on the other hand, contends that

under the definition of “instrument” established in recent Court of Appeal

decisions, any written vehicle theft report constitutes an instrument.

There currently is no precise, generally accepted definition of the term

“instrument” for purposes of Penal Code section 115. Early decisions interpreted

the term narrowly. People v. Fraser (1913) 23 Cal.App. 82, 85 (Fraser), defined

an instrument, as used in section 115, as a written and signed agreement,

“delivered by one person to another, transferring the title to or creating a lien on

real property, or giving a right to a debt or duty.” Cases following Fraser

concluded that a variety of documents not meeting this definition were not

“instruments” within the meaning of section 115. (See, e.g., People v. Fox (1977)

73 Cal.App.3d 178, 180-182 [affidavit of voter registration]; People v. Olf (1961)

195 Cal.App.2d 97, 101 [application for a permit to issue securities]; see also

People v. Wood (1958) 161 Cal.App.2d 24, 28-29 [questioning whether documents

containing false information filed with the Department of Motor Vehicles were

instruments under § 115, but holding that even if they were, prosecution under

§ 115 was precluded by special Veh. Code section making the filing of such

documents a misdemeanor].)

More recent cases construing Penal Code section 115, however, have

rejected Fraser‟s definition and have expanded the meaning of “instrument” to

1 The People also suggest that because defendant‟s conduct in signing the

report under penalty of perjury makes her crime more egregious than that of a

person who submits a false report without a signature under penalty of perjury, the

greater punishment is justified. We do not address the entirely different issue of

whether the filing of a false vehicle theft report could be the basis of a prosecution

under Penal Code section 118, the statute that specifically addresses perjury, if the

elements of that offense were established. (Cf. Jenkins, supra, 28 Cal.3d 494.)

12

include a broader range of documents that are filed or registered with a public

entity. (See, e.g., People v. Hassan (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1306, 1315-1316

[confidential marriage certificates]; Powers, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at pp. 294-

295 [fishing activity records filed with Dept. of Fish & Game]; People v. Tate

(1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 663, 667 [work referral forms documenting hours worked

by probationer on community service project]; People v. Parks (1992) 7

Cal.App.4th 883, 885 [temporary restraining order]; Generes v. Justice Court

(1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 678, 682 [deed filed by defendant, purporting to convey an

easement to herself].)

These cases have rejected Fraser’s restrictive definition of “instrument”

without attempting to create an alternative, comprehensive definition of that term.

(See, e.g., People v. Parks, supra, 7 Cal.App.4th at p. 887 [“Whatever else may be

meant by the word „instrument,‟ on these facts we find that protection of judicial

and public records such as the documents in this case was clearly within the

legislative intent of section 115.”].) Defendant cites a definition that was quoted,

but not explicitly adopted, in Powers, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at page 297: a

document is an instrument if “ „the information contained in the document is of

such a nature that the government is required or permitted by law, statute or valid

regulation to act in reliance thereon; or . . . the information contained in the

document materially affects significant rights or duties of third persons, when this

effect is reasonably contemplated by the express or implied intent of the statute or

valid regulation which requires the filing, registration, or recording of the

document.‟ ([State v. Price (Wn. 1980) 620 P.2d 994,] 999.)” The People, on the

other hand, cite other definitions that also were quoted, but not explicitly adopted,

in Powers, supra, at pages 294-295: an instrument is “a „formal legal document

whereby a right is created or confirmed, or a fact recorded; a formal writing of any

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kind . . . drawn up and executed in technical legal form, so as to be of legal

validity.‟ (Oxford English Dict. (2d ed. CD-ROM 1994).”2

Although it has been observed that “the word [instrument] is usually

limited to more formalized documents” (Powers, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at

p. 294), no case has identified what formalities are required in order to qualify a

document as an instrument. Rather, in deciding whether Penal Code section 115

applies, the more recent cases have focused on the purpose of the statute, which is

the “protection of judicial and public records.” (People v. Parks, supra, 7

Cal.App.4th at p. 887; see also People v. Tate, supra, 55 Cal.App.4th at p. 667.)3

The People do not identify what formalities would be required, at a minimum, to

render a vehicle theft report an instrument, but take the position that a signature

under penalty of perjury is sufficient. The People‟s position is that as long as

some forms of vehicle theft reports — such as, for example, a handwritten note not

presented under penalty of perjury — would be considered too informal to qualify

as instruments, the Williamson rule does not apply.

2 The jury instructions given in defendant‟s case referred to a “false

document,” and did not use the term “instrument.” (See 2 Judicial Council of Cal.,

Crim. Jury Instns. (2011) Related Issues to CALCRIM No. 1945, Meaning of

Instrument, p. 53 [“Modern cases have interpreted the term „instrument‟

expansively, including any type of document that is filed or recorded with a public

agency that, if acted on as genuine, would have the effect of deceiving

someone”].)

3 For example, in Powers, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at page 297, the court

reasoned that legally mandated fishing records filed with the Department of Fish

and Game should be considered instruments because the department relies upon

them to set fishing limits and manage fisheries. In People v. Hassan, supra, 168

Cal.App.4th at page 1316, the court concluded that confidential marriage

certificates are instruments “given the requirement that they be recorded, their

importance, and the vast legal consequences that flow from them.”

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We need not resolve the question of how the term “instrument” should be

defined in order to resolve the issue before us. Even assuming, as the People

contend, that a certain level of formality is necessary to render a vehicle theft

report an instrument, the filing of a false vehicle theft report would commonly

violate Penal Code section 115. The form used for the written report in the present

case, CHP form No. 180, calls for a signature under penalty of perjury. Although

the record does not reveal how frequently the form is used, the form itself states

that it is “furnished to all peace officers by the California Highway Patrol,”

presumably to provide a uniform format for the filing of such reports. The deputy

sheriff who took the report from defendant testified that he would fill out such a

form whenever someone reported a stolen vehicle. We may reasonably infer that

other law enforcement agencies routinely use this form or a similar one.

The present case is analogous to Ruster, supra, 16 Cal.3d 690. In Ruster

we held that a prosecution for forgery was precluded by a specific statute that

made it a misdemeanor to make a false statement or representation to obtain any

unemployment insurance payment. Although this provision in the unemployment

insurance fraud statute could be violated without committing a forgery, we

concluded that “applying for aid under a false identity, which entails signing

eligibility questionnaires and pay certification cards with a false name, is

apparently one of the most common forms of unemployment insurance fraud.”

(Id. at p. 699.) Here, even if a false vehicle theft report may on occasion be filed

in other, less formal formats, it seems safe to assume that the filing of CHP form

No. 180 or a comparable form is one of the most common means of violating

Vehicle Code section 10501.

Consequently, the filing of a false vehicle theft report in violation of

Vehicle Code section 10501 would commonly result in a violation of Penal Code

section 115. Accordingly, under the Williamson rule, we infer that the Legislature,

15

in specifying that such conduct constitutes a misdemeanor, intended to create an

exception to the felony punishment specified in the more general statute. It

follows that defendant should not have been charged with violating section 115

and her conviction on that charge must be reversed.4

III. Conclusion

The judgment of the Court of Appeal affirming defendant‟s conviction on

count I is reversed.

CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.

WE CONCUR:

KENNARD, J.

BAXTER, J.

WERDEGAR, J.

CHIN, J.

CORRIGAN, J.

*HUFFMAN, J.P.T.

4 Because defendant‟s conviction must be reversed, we need not reach the

issue of whether defendant‟s prosecution under Penal Code section 115 is also

precluded by Vehicle Code section 20.

* Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District,

Division One, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the

California Constitution.

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See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion People v. Murphy

__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion

Original Appeal

Original Proceeding

Review Granted XXX 180 Cal.App.4th 905

Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No. S180181

Date Filed: July 7, 2011

__________________________________________________________________________________

Court: Superior

County: San Bernardino

Judge: Bryan Foster

__________________________________________________________________________________

Counsel:

Helen S. Irza, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.

Edmund G. Brown, Jr., and Kamala D. Harris, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant

Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Steve Oetting and Meredith A. Strong,

Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Helen S. Irza

Law Offices of Helen Simkins Irza

3525A Del Mar Heights Rd. #216

San Diego, CA 92130

(858) 366-2680

Meredith A. Strong

Deputy Attorney General

110 West A Street, Suite 1100

San Deigo, CA 92101

9619) 645-2297