State of West Virginia ex rel. Historic Arms Corporation v. The Honorable C. Carter Williams, Judge of the Circuit Court of Hardy County, Darrick J. Gust, and Emily Gust

FILED

October 26, 2022

released at 3:00 p.m.

STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA

State of West Virginia ex rel.

Historic Arms Corporation,

Petitioner,

vs.) No. 22-0217 (Hardy County 20-C-25)

The Hon. C. Carter Williams,

Judge of the Circuit Court of Hardy County,

Darrick J. Gust, and Emily Gust,

Respondents.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Darrick J. and Emily Gust have brought claims against Historic Arms Corporation, 1 among

others, in the Circuit Court of Hardy County, stemming from injuries Mr. Gust sustained in 2019

when an explosive device malfunctioned and detonated in his hand. Historic Arms—a Virginia

limited liability company with a principal place of business in Virginia—moved the circuit court

to dismiss the Gusts’ claims, arguing that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over it. The court

denied that motion and later denied Historic Arms’s motion to amend its prior ruling. Now,

Historic Arms petitions this Court to issue a writ prohibiting the circuit court from enforcing that

order and continuing to exercise personal jurisdiction over it. The Gusts oppose issuance of the

writ.

Upon a thorough review of the record, the arguments of counsel and applicable precedent,

we conclude that the circuit court properly denied Historic Arms’s motion to amend its earlier

order denying the motion to dismiss the Gusts’ claims. Furthermore, because this case does not

present a new or significant issue of law, we find this matter to be proper for disposition in

accordance with Rule 21 of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate Procedure.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

In September 2019, Darrick J. Gust was training employees of the federal Drug

Enforcement Agency on earthquake protocols at a combat training facility located in Hardy

1

Historic Arms is represented by Douglas E. Kahle, Esq., and Nathan H. Walters, Esq.

The Gusts are represented by L. Lee Javins II, Esq., D. Blake Carter, Jr., Esq., David A. Bosak,

Esq., M. Bryan Slaughter, Esq., and Kyle McNew, Esq.

1

County, West Virginia. The training called for Mr. Gust, an employee of Panthera Training, LLC,

to detonate an explosive. The explosive malfunctioned and detonated while Mr. Gust held the

device in his right hand, six seconds earlier than he expected. Mr. Gust alleges that the premature

explosion “obliterated” his hand. According to Mr. Gust, Panthera Training conducted the

earthquake training for the DEA as a subcontractor to Panthera Enterprises, LLC, which also

owned the Hardy County facility. 2

Mr. Gust’s employer, Panthera Training, is a Virginia limited liability company with its

principal place of business in Hardy County, West Virginia. Historic Arms Corporation, the sole

member of Panthera Training, is a Virginia corporation with its principal place of business in Cape

Charles, Virginia. And Robert Starer is both the managing member of Panthera Training and Vice

President of Historic Arms.

In 2020, Mr. Gust and his wife, Emily, filed a suit in the Circuit Court of Hardy County

seeking damages related to injuries Mr. Gust sustained when the explosive malfunctioned at the

Hardy County facility. 3 In June 2021, the Gusts amended their complaint to plead six claims

against Mr. Starer and Historic Arms, among other defendants 4: strict liability – ultrahazardous

activity; negligence; negligent hiring, retention, and/or supervision; vicarious liability; joint

venture; and loss of consortium. According to the amended complaint, Panthera Training

manufactured and assembled the explosives necessary to conduct the earthquake protocol training

with black powder and fuse assemblies (the Fuses) provided to it by Historic Arms 5 and/or Mr.

Starer.

On July 15, 2021, Historic Arms (again, a Virginia corporation with a principal place of

business in Virginia) moved to dismiss the amended complaint under West Virginia Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(2), for lack of personal jurisdiction. 6 In support of that motion, Mr. Starer stated

2

According to the Gusts, Panthera Enterprises leased the training facility to Panthera

Training.

3

The Gusts’ original complaint is not included in the appendix record.

4

The Gusts also named Panthera Enterprises, LLC; Panthera Worldwide, LLC; Panthera

Training Center, LLC; and Mr. Wilmer C. Bahr as defendants.

5

Specifically, the Gusts alleged that Historic Arms is “primarily a seller of custom assault

rifles and training programs for firearms owners; however, it also possessed and supplied /

distributed components of explosives, including the components used to create explosive devices

at issue in this litigation, to its subsidiary entity,” Panthera Training. The Gusts levy other

allegations against Historic Arms, along with the other defendants, including that they were

engaged in an ultrahazardous activity and so are strictly liable for the harm to Mr. Gust resulting

from that activity and that the components of the explosive were improperly maintained or stored.

6

Rule 12(b)(2) provides in pertinent part that “the following defenses may at the option of

the pleader be made by motion: . . . (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person . . . .” Historic Arms

first filed a motion to dismiss the Gusts’ original complaint in September 2020, along with the

2

that Historic Arms did not do business in West Virginia and was not in the business of

manufacturing, assembling, distributing, testing, or using explosives. 7 In response, the Gusts

submitted six exhibits, including an affidavit by Mr. Gust and documents relating to the corporate

structures of Panthera Training and Historic Arms. The Gusts later supplemented their response

with excerpts of the deposition of William White, former Vice President of Operations and General

Manager of Panthera Training. 8

On July 30, 2021, Mr. Starer moved for summary judgment of the claims against him,

individually. Mr. Starer argued that he shared in the immunity afforded to Panthera as Mr. Gust’s

employer under West Virginia Code § 23-2-6 (2003) 9 because he—Mr. Starer—was also

employed by Panthera Training when Mr. Gust was injured. 10 The court granted Mr. Starer’s

motion, finding that “Mr. Starer brought the [F]uses to the [Hardy County facility] specifically for

use in the explosive devices that were necessary tools in the earthquake concussion protocol

training offered by Panthera.” The court went on: “[i]n short, the [c]ourt can discern no

alternative, practical or logical reason for Mr. Starer’s (the manager’s) actions regarding the

[Fuses] other than acting in furtherance of Panthera’s business . . . .” The court also found that

affidavit of Mr. Starer. The Gusts filed their amended complaint in June 2021, and Historic Arms

renewed its motion to dismiss. In large part, the motion to dismiss the amended complaint was

premised on the Gusts’ alleged failure to support their response to Historic Arms’s initial motion

with affidavits or other evidence. Neither Historic Arms’s original motion to dismiss nor the

Gusts’ response is included in the appendix record.

7

Mr. Starer made these statements in a September 2020 affidavit offered in support of

Historic Arms’s motion to dismiss the Gusts’ original complaint. That affidavit is not attached to

Historic Arms’s motion to dismiss the Gusts’ amended complaint, although pertinent portions are

reproduced in the memorandum accompanying the second motion to dismiss. Mr. Starer supported

his motion for summary judgment with an additional affidavit, dated July 30, 2021.

8

This response was not included in the appendix filed with Historic Arms’s petition. The

Gusts moved to supplement that appendix to include various material, including their supplemental

opposition to Historic Arms’s motion to dismiss and Mr. Starer’s motion for summary judgment.

On September 23, 2022, the Court denied the Gusts’ motion as moot, see W. Va. R. App. Pro. 16,

and ordered the supplemental appendix filed.

9

W. Va. Code § 23-2-6 (2022) (stating, in pertinent part, that “[a]ny employer subject to

this chapter who procures and continuously maintains workers’ compensation insurance as

required by this chapter or who elects to make direct payments of compensation as provided in

this section is not liable to respond in damages at common law or by statute for the injury or death

of any employee. . . .”).

10

See W. Va. Code § 23-2-6a (1949) (“The immunity from liability set out in the preceding

section [§ 23-2-6] shall extend to every officer, manager, agent, representative or employee of

such employer when he is acting in furtherance of the employer’s business and does not inflict an

injury with deliberate intention.”). The Gusts did not allege a “deliberate intent” claim. See W.

Va. Code § 23-4-2(d)(2) (2015).

3

“[c]learly, Defendant Starer may have been wearing more than one hat during the time in question”

as he “was not only the manager of Panthera . . . but also Historic Arms’ [sic] Vice President.”

In December 2021, the circuit court denied Historic Arms’s motion to dismiss the amended

complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court found that its exercise of jurisdiction over

Historic Arms, as the supplier 11 of the Fuses, was proper under this State’s long-arm statutes.

Federal due process requirements were also satisfied by Historic Arms’s contact with this State.

The court also found that Mr. Gust’s injuries arose from Historic Arms’s contact with West

Virginia, and that traditional notions of fair play and justice were not offended by requiring

Historic Arms to defend itself in a West Virginia court.

Later, Historic Arms moved the circuit court to amend its earlier order denying its motion

to dismiss. 12 Historic Arms contended that the circuit court had erred when it found that Historic

Arms’s contacts with West Virginia satisfied federal due process. According to Historic Arms,

the court’s earlier findings in its order granting summary judgment to Mr. Starer necessarily

estopped the court from later finding that Historic Arms supplied the Fuses. Specifically, Historic

Arms contended that “[t]he adjudicated false allegation that Starer was acting as an agent for

Historic Arms when he brought the Fuse[s] into West Virginia . . . is precluded and barred by

West Virginia’s Doctrine of Issue Preclusion.” 13 The Gusts responded with an additional affidavit

from Mr. Gust and Mr. White’s deposition testimony to the effect that Historic Arms had supplied

the Fuses to Panthera Training.

The court denied Historic Arms’s latest motion in February 2022. The court reasoned that

the Gusts had alleged that Historic Arms had possessed, supplied, and distributed the Fuses before

they entered this State—acts distinct from the transport of the Fuses into West Virginia. The court

further found that Historic Arms had placed the Fuses in the stream of commerce, so that it had

established minimum contacts with West Virginia by distributing them to Mr. Starer who then

brought them to West Virginia.

Historic Arms now petitions this Court for a writ prohibiting the circuit court from

enforcing its order denying Historic Arms’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.

11

The court noted that it had “not address[ed] the matter of what entity was the owner, and

therefore the supplier of the defective fuses or component parts” in the order granting summary

judgment to Mr. Starer.

12

Historic Arms brought this motion under West Virginia Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e).

This rule provides that “[a]ny motion to alter or amend the judgment shall be filed not later than

ten days after entry of the judgment.” Plainly, the circuit court’s order denying Historic Arms’s

motion to dismiss the amended complaint is not a final judgment, so Rule 59(e) was inapplicable

in those circumstances. The Gusts did not raise this issue in their response to Historic Arms’s

motion.

13

Issue preclusion” is another name for “collateral estoppel.” See Holloman v. Nationwide

Mut. Ins. Co., 217 W. Va. 269, 277, 617 S.E.2d 816, 824 (2005) (Starcher, J., concurring) (stating

that the doctrine of collateral estoppel is also called the doctrine of issue preclusion).

4

II. Writ Standard

“A writ of prohibition will not issue to prevent a simple abuse of discretion by a trial court.

It will only issue where the trial court has no jurisdiction or having such jurisdiction exceeds its

legitimate powers. W. Va. Code 53-1-1.” 14 “When a court is attempting to proceed in a cause

without jurisdiction, prohibition will issue as a matter of right regardless of the existence of other

remedies.” 15 Stated otherwise, “[w]here a court lacks jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant,

prohibition is the appropriate remedy to prevent further prosecution of the suit.” 16 Despite this,

“relief in prohibition is inappropriate where jurisdiction turns on contested issues of fact.” 17

III. Analysis

The personal jurisdiction inquiry usually requires a two-step analysis: (1) have the

defendant’s actions satisfied this State’s long-arm statutes, and, if so, (2) do the defendant’s

contacts with West Virginia satisfy federal due process? 18 But Historic Arms does not challenge

the circuit court’s finding that this State’s long-arm statutes are satisfied in this case, so our analysis

is limited to the question of federal due process. 19

As the Supreme Court of the United States has explained, “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment’s

Due Process Clause limits a state court’s power to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant.” 20 It

“sets the outer boundaries of a state court’s authority to proceed against a defendant because the

assertion of jurisdiction subjects defendants to the state’s coercive power.” 21 Due process

requirements are satisfied, and a nonresident defendant is subject to the forum state’s jurisdiction,

if the nonresident defendant has “certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the

maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” 22

A nonresident defendant is subject to the general jurisdiction of the forum state if its contacts with

14

Syl. Pt. 2, State ex rel. Peacher v. Sencindiver, 160 W. Va. 314, 233 S.E.2d 425 (1977).

15

Syl., Jennings v. McDougle, 83 W. Va. 186, 98 S.E. 162 (1919).

16

Pries v. Watt, 186 W. Va. 49, 53, 410 S.E.2d 285, 289 (1991).

17

State ex rel. Ford Motor Co. v. McGraw, 237 W. Va. 573, 580, 788 S.E.2d 319, 326

(2016).

18

See Syl. Pt. 3, id.

19

See W. Va. Code §§ 56-3-33(a)(2) (2020), 31D-15-1501(d)(3) (2008).

20

Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1024 (2021).

21

State ex rel. Ford Motor Co., 237 W. Va. at 582, 788 S.E.2d at 328.

22

Int’l Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., Off. of Unemployment Comp. & Placement, 326 U.S.

310, 316 (1945) (internal quotation omitted).

5

that state are “so substantial, continuous, and systematic as to render [it] essentially at home”

there. 23

On the other hand, if the nonresident’s contacts with the forum state are not substantial

enough to grant the forum state general jurisdiction over him, the question becomes whether the

forum state can exercise specific jurisdiction. A court may do that if the claims against the

nonresident “aris[e] out of or relat[e] to the [nonresident] defendant’s contacts or activities in the

state by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of conducting activities in the state so long

as the exercise of jurisdiction is constitutionally fair and reasonable.” 24 To weigh in favor of the

exercise of specific jurisdiction, the nonresident defendant’s contacts

must be the defendant’s own choice and not “random, isolated, or

fortuitous.” Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774,

104 S.Ct. 1473, 79 L.Ed.2d 790 (1984). They must show that the

defendant deliberately “reached out beyond” its home—by, for

example, “exploi[ting] a market” in the forum State or entering a

contractual relationship centered there. Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S.

277, 285, 134 S.Ct. 1115, 188 L.Ed.2d 12 (2014) (internal quotation

marks and alterations omitted).[25]

“Two general methods for assessing minimum contacts for purposes of specific personal

jurisdiction are stream of commerce and stream of commerce plus.” 26 This Court employs the

“stream of commerce” method, rather than the “stream of commerce plus” method. Specifically,

we have held that

[p]ersonal jurisdiction “premised on the placement of a

product into the stream of commerce is consistent with the Due

Process Clause” and can be exercised without the need to show

additional conduct by the defendant aimed at the forum state. Asahi

Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102,

117, 107 S.Ct. 1026, 1034, 94 L.Ed.2d 92 (1987).[27]

23

Syl. Pt. 5, in part, State ex rel. Ford Motor Co., 237 W. Va. at 573, 788 S.E.2d at 319.

24

Syl. Pt. 8, in part, id.

25

Ford Motor Co., 141 S. Ct. at 1025.

26

State ex rel. Ford Motor Co., 237 W. Va. at 589, 788 S.E.2d at 335.

27

Syl. Pt. 2, Hill by Hill v. Showa Denko, K.K., 188 W. Va. 654, 425 S.E.2d 609 (1992);

see also State ex rel. Ford Motor Co., 237 W. Va. at 594, 788 S.E.2d at 340 (stating that

“[f]ollowing Asahi, this Court adopted Justice Brennan’s World–Wide Volkswagen approach to

stream of commerce as a method of establishing purposeful availment”). Contrary to Historic

Arms’s argument, this Court did not discard the Hill “stream of commerce” approach in Griffith

v. ConAgra Brands, Inc., 229 W. Va. 190, 728 S.E.2d 74 (2012). See State ex rel. Ford Motor

6

With that substantive foundation laid, we next outline the mechanics of a motion to dismiss

under Rule12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction. As we have held:

“When a defendant files a motion to dismiss for lack of

personal jurisdiction under W. Va. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2), the circuit

court may rule on the motion upon the pleadings, affidavits and

other documentary evidence or the court may permit discovery to

aid in its decision. At this stage, the party asserting jurisdiction need

only make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction in order to

survive the motion to dismiss. In determining whether a party has

made a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction, the court must

view the allegations in the light most favorable to such party,

drawing all inferences in favor of jurisdiction. If, however, the court

conducts a pretrial evidentiary hearing on the motion, or if the

personal jurisdiction issue is litigated at trial, the party asserting

jurisdiction must prove jurisdiction by a preponderance of the

evidence.”[28]

When a nonresident defendant supports his Rule 12(b)(2) motion with “affidavits or

depositions,”—like Historic Arms did here—the proponent of jurisdiction “may not stand on its

pleadings but must come forward with affidavits or other proper evidence detailing specific facts

demonstrating that the court has jurisdiction over the defendant.” 29

Historic Arms presents two arguments in opposition to the circuit court’s conclusion that

the Gusts have made a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction. First, Historic Arms contends

that the circuit court is collaterally estopped from finding that its contact with West Virginia (if

any) satisfies federal due process standards because the court had already found that Mr. Starer

transported the Fuses into the West Virginia in his capacity as manager of Panthera Training.

Second, Historic Arms contends that even if it did supply the Fuses to Panthera Training in West

Virginia it did so only once, and one contact is not enough to permit a West Virginia court to

exercise specific jurisdiction over it.

We resolve Historic Arms’s first argument—that the circuit court is collaterally estopped

from finding that it brought, provided, distributed, or supplied the Fuses to Panthera Training in

Co., 237 W. Va. at 595, 788 S.E.2d at 341 (petitioner’s argument that in Griffith, this Court

“rejected the Hill stream of commerce approach” was “a misreading of the facts, analysis and

holding of” Griffith).

28

Syl. Pt. 6, State ex rel. Ford Motor Co., 237 W. Va. at 573, 788 S.E.2d at 319 (quoting

Syl. Pt. 4, State ex rel. Bell Atlantic-West Virginia, Inc. v. Ranson, 201 W. Va. 402, 497 S.E.2d

755 (1997)).

29

State ex rel. Bell Atl.-W. Va., Inc., 201 W. Va. at 415, 497 S.E.2d at 768 (internal

quotation and alteration omitted). Neither party maintains that the circuit court conducted an

evidentiary hearing on Historic Arms’s motion to dismiss.

7

West Virginia—summarily. 30 “The application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel is

discretionary with the trial court and rests upon a number of factual predicates, therefore, a writ of

prohibition will not issue on the basis that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to enforce

collateral estoppe[l].” 31

Even if that were not the case, the Gusts are correct that the findings underlying the grant

of summary judgment to Mr. Starer, individually, are not determinative of the question of whether

he also acted as agent of Historic Arms at some point in the journey of the Fuses to the Hardy

County training facility. Historic Arms focuses on the circuit court’s finding that it could “discern

no alternative, practical or logical reasons for Mr. Starer’s (the manager’s) actions regarding the

fuse assemblies other than acting in furtherance of Panthera’s business,” and that “no genuine issue

of material fact exists that Defendant Starer was acting as manager of Panthera during the time in

question.” But the circuit court qualified those findings and expressly recognized that “Defendant

Starer may have been wearing more than one hat during the time in question. Specifically, he was

not only the manager of Panthera . . . but also Historic Arms’ [sic] Vice President.” Further, in its

order denying Historic Arms’s motion to dismiss, the court noted the outer limits of its earlier

findings: that is, that it had “not address[ed] the matter of what entity was the owner, and therefore

the supplier of the defective fuses or component parts.” That distinction begs factual questions

that this Court will not resolve by way of a petition for extraordinary relief.

Historic Arms next takes issue with the circuit court’s conclusion that it may exercise

specific jurisdiction over Historic Arms because it made sufficient contact with this State so that

federal due process is not offended by haling the company into court here. 32 The circuit concluded

that, “[a]t a minimum,” the amended complaint includes allegations that “Historic Arms placed

the component parts into the stream of commerce by distributing them to Mr. Starer,” so that

jurisdiction over Historic Arms is proper even if Historic Arms were

[sic] correct in its conclusion that Mr. Starer acted solely in his

capacity as manager of Panthera during the transport of the

component parts, as knowing and intentional distribution of a

30

See Syl. Pt. 1, State v. Miller, 194 W. Va. 3, 459 S.E.2d 114 (1995) (“Collateral estoppel

will bar a claim if four conditions are met: (1) The issue previously decided is identical to the one

presented in the action in question; (2) there is a final adjudication on the merits of the prior action;

(3) the party against whom the doctrine is invoked was a party or in privity with a party to a prior

action; and (4) the party against whom the doctrine is raised had a full and fair opportunity to

litigate the issue in the prior action.”).

31

Syl. Pt. 7, Conley v. Spillers, 171 W. Va. 584, 301 S.E.2d 216 (1983).

32

Historic Arms only challenges the circuit court’s conclusion that it has minimum contacts

to West Virginia for purposes of specific personal jurisdiction. It does not challenge the circuit

court’s findings that the Gusts’ injuries “arise[e] out of or relat[e] to [its] contacts or activities in

the state” and that “the exercise of jurisdiction is constitutionally fair and reasonable.” Syl. Pt. 8,

in part, State ex rel. Ford Motor Co., 237 W. Va. at 573, 788 S.E.2d at 319.

8

product into West Virginia constitutes conduct in the State of West

Virginia for personal jurisdiction purposes.

Historic Arms contends that even if it did distribute the Fuses to Panthera Training, that

was an “isolated occurrence,” not a contact sufficient to allow the circuit court to exercise personal

jurisdiction over it. The Gusts respond that this is not a traditional stream of commerce case

because Historic Arms purposefully and intentionally sent the Fuses to West Virginia via Panthera

Training, rather than merely placing them in the stream of commerce. But even if this is a stream

of commerce case, the Gusts argue, the circuit court correctly applied that doctrine.

Setting aside the parties’ dispute as to whether this is a stream of commerce case, we see

no error in the circuit court’s conclusion that the Gusts have made a prima facie showing of

personal jurisdiction over Historic Arms at this stage of the litigation. As noted by the circuit

court, the question of Historic Arms’s role as the owner, and so supplier or distributor of the Fuses

to Panthera Training, remains open. Mr. White, a former executive with Historic Arms, testified

repeatedly that the Fuses had been stored at Historic Arms’s place of business in Cape Charles,

Virginia, before they were brought to West Virginia. Mr. Gust states the same in his affidavit. In

fact, Mr. White testified that Mr. Starer told him that the Fuses were being stored at Historic Arms.

Further, according to Mr. White, the Fuses were brought into West Virginia for the specific

purpose of assembling flash bang explosives, which Panthera needed—but could not obtain,

otherwise—to fulfill its obligations under the DEA contract.

“‘[W]hether due process is satisfied must depend rather upon the quality and nature of the

activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws.’” 33 That due process inquiry

is neither “mechanical” nor, and important to this case, “quantitative.” 34 Mr. White’s testimony

raises the inference that, at the very least, Historic Arms stored the Fuses for Panthera Training to

enable Panthera Training (its wholly owned subsidiary) to meet its obligations under the DEA

contract even though, as Mr. Starer has attested, Historic Arms did not deal in explosives. In turn,

that inference supports the conclusion that, even if Historic Arms’s sole act was to store the Fuses

before they were transported to West Virginia, Historic Arms stored them knowing that they would

come to West Virginia and then be assembled into explosive devices in West Virginia which would

then be detonated, here—all to enable Panthera Training to train DEA employees at the Hardy

County facility. We recently observed that when it comes to determining whether a nonresident

has sufficient contact to the forum state, “[t]he proper question is not where the plaintiff

experienced a particular injury or effect but whether the defendant’s conduct connects him to the

forum in a meaningful way.’” 35 Making all inferences in favor of the Gusts, we conclude that they

33

Id. at 584, 788 S.E.2d at 330 (quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318).

34

Id.

35

State ex rel. Third-Party Defendant Health Plans v. Nines, 244 W. Va. 184, 196, 852

S.E.2d 251, 263 (2020) (emphasis in original) (quoting Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 290

(2014)).

9

have offered sufficient evidence to demonstrate that Historic Arms’s conduct is connected to this

State in a meaningful way, at this point in the proceedings.

We are not convinced by Historic Arms’s argument that the number of its contacts to West

Virginia is all that this Court may consider when determining whether the Gusts have made a

prima facie case of jurisdiction—as we stated above, the due process inquiry is neither

“mechanical” nor “quantitative.” 36 Any conflict between Mr. Starer’s affidavits, Mr. White’s

testimony, and statements in Mr. Gust’s affidavits only underscores that Historic Arms is not

entitled to extraordinary relief for the straightforward reason that “relief in prohibition is

inappropriate where jurisdiction turns on contested issues of fact.” 37 For those reasons, we decline

to grant extraordinary relief to Historic Arms. 38

Writ denied.

ISSUED: October 26, 2022

CONCURRED IN BY:

Chief Justice John A. Hutchison

Justice Elizabeth D. Walker

Justice Tim Armstead

Justice William R. Wooton

Justice C. Haley Bunn

36

State ex rel. Ford Motor Co., 237 W. Va. at 573, 788 S.E.2d at 319.

37

Id. at 580, 788 S.E.2d at 326.

38

Historic Arms also argues that the Gusts did not properly support their response to its

initial motion to dismiss with “affidavits or other proper evidence detailing specific facts

demonstrating that the court has jurisdiction over the defendant.” State ex rel. Bell Atl.-W.

Virginia, Inc., 201 W. Va. at 415, 497 S.E.2d at 768 (quotation and alteration omitted). Historic

Arms overlooks that the Gusts offered several exhibits to support their response to Historic Arms’s

motion to dismiss the amended complaint. So, we find Historic Arms’s argument on this point to

be moot in view of the procedural history of this case.

10