Morgan v. Sisters School District 6

No. 5 January 17, 2013 189

553 Or 17,Sisters School District #6

3

Morgan v. 2013

2013

January

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

STATE OF OREGON

Mike MORGAN,

Petitioner on Review,

v.

SISTERS SCHOOL DISTRICT #6

and its Board of Directors,

Respondent on Review.

(CC 08-CV-0423AB; CA A142252; SC S059465)

On review from the Court of Appeals.*

Argued and submitted March 5, 2012.

Ross A. Day of The Day Law Group, P.C., Portland,

argued the cause and filed the brief for petitioner on review.

Peter R. Mersereau of Mersereau & Shannon, LLP,

Portland, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent

on review. With him on the brief was Thomas W. McPherson.

Before Balmer, Chief Justice, Kistler, Walters, Linder,

and Landau, Justices, and Durham and De Muniz, Senior

Judges, Justices pro tempore.**

LANDAU, J.

The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of

the circuit court are affirmed.

Plaintiff Morgan filed suit under ORS 28.020, seeking declaratory and injunc-

tive relief addressing certain financial obligations assumed by defendants, Sisters

School District #6 and its Board of Directors. Defendants sought dismissal of the

suit, alleging that plaintiff lacked statutory standing. Plaintiff countered that he

has standing in three ways: (1) as a voter, (2) as a taxpayer, and (3) under a hybrid

voter-taxpayer theory. Held: (1) Plaintiff lacks standing as a voter because his

complaint does not request relief that would have the practical effect of remedying

the denial of his right to vote; (2) Plaintiff alleged injuries too speculative to sup-

port standing under a taxpayer theory or a potential hybrid theory.

The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the circuit court are

affirmed.

______________

** Appeal from Deschutes County Circuit Court, Alta Jean Brady, Judge. 241

Or App 483, 251 P3d 207 (2011).

** Brewer and Baldwin, JJ., did not participate in the consideration or

decision of this case.

190 Morgan v. Sisters School District #6

LANDAU, J.

At issue in this case is whether plaintiff has

standing under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act,

ORS 28.020, to seek a declaration that defendant Sisters

School District #6 and its Board of Directors (board) lacked

authority to enter into a particular form of financing

arrangement without a vote of the people. Plaintiff alleged

that he has standing because his “status as a taxpayer and

voter within the district will or may be adversely affected[.]”

More specifically, plaintiff alleged that entering into the

challenged form of financing arrangement might, in some

unspecified way, “jeopardize the district[‘]s ability to provide

for the daily operation of the district” and, if that should

come to pass, increase the likelihood that the district will

have to seek additional financing to cover its obligations.

The trial court concluded that those allegations were

insufficient to satisfy the requirement of ORS 28.020 that

only persons “whose rights, status or other legal relations

are affected” by the challenged ordinance have standing.

The Court of Appeals likewise concluded that the harm that

plaintiff alleges is too attenuated and speculative to satisfy

the standing requirement of the Uniform Declaratory

Judgments Act. Morgan v. Sisters School District #6, 241

Or App 483, 251 P3d 207 (2011). We agree and affirm.

The relevant facts are uncontested. On March 12,

2007, the board adopted Resolution No #FY 06-07-06, which

authorized the issuance and negotiated sale of “Full Faith

and Credit Obligations, Series 2007” in an amount not to

exceed $2.1 million. The resolution stated that the obligations

were to be issued as “certificates of participation” under

ORS 271.390, which authorizes public bodies to issue that

type of obligation to fund the acquisition or improvement of

certain property, secured by any or all “lawfully available

funds of the public body or council of governments”—in

essence, the full faith and credit of the governmental unit.

The stated purpose of the obligation was to finance the cost

of improvements to district property, including classrooms,

furniture, fixtures, building system upgrades, and the like.

On May 22, 2007, Wells Fargo Bank, acting as escrow

agent, issued the certificates of participation for purchase

by investors.

Cite as 353 Or 189 (2013) 191

One year later, in May 2008, plaintiff filed a

complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against the

district and the board. Plaintiff alleged that the obligations

that had been denominated “certificates of participation”

actually were bonds, which, under ORS 328.205 to 328.230,

may be issued only after approval by a majority of the

electors in the school district. Plaintiff alleged that his

“status as a taxpayer and voter within the district will or

may be adversely affected by the actions of the school district

as alleged in paragraph 16(e) and 16(f)” of his complaint. In

those paragraphs, he alleged:

“(e) The issuance of ‘bonds’ without the approval of the

electorate, may jeopardize the district[‘]s ability to provide

for the daily operation of the district.

“(f) The issuance of the ‘bonds’ by the district without

voter approval increases the likelihood that the district

will have to seek voter approval of additional bonds

either as local option bonds or general obligation bonds.

ORS 328.205 et seq. is intended to initially require voter

approval and thus avoid the prospect of spending too much

money in the form of full faith and credit obligations and

then seeking voter approval.”

In his prayer for relief, plaintiff requested that the

court declare that the certificates of participation at issue

actually are bonds and that “the district wrongfully failed to

obtain the approval of the voters within the school district”

before issuing those bonds. Notably, plaintiff did not ask

for a declaration that the certificates of participation are

invalid. Nor did he request an order that the matter be put

to a vote. He asked that the court prohibit the district from

making any further payments on the obligations; that is, he

requested that the court order the district simply to default

on the obligations.

Plaintiff moved for summary judgment, arguing

that the certificates of participation issued by the district

were bonds that should not have been issued without prior

voter approval.

Defendants filed their own motion for summary

judgment that responded to plaintiff’s arguments on the

merits, but they also requested dismissal of the action

192 Morgan v. Sisters School District #6

for want of justiciability. Pointing to the allegations of

standing in paragraphs 16(e) and 16(f) of the complaint,

defendants argued that, at best, plaintiff had alleged only

a remote possibility that the issuance of the certificates of

participation would affect him in any way. Such a remote

possibility of harm, defendants argued, was not sufficient

to establish the concrete stake in the outcome of a case that

the law requires.

Plaintiff responded that he need only allege a

“potential impact” to proceed on a taxpayer standing

theory and that he had made such an allegation by arguing

“ultimate facts, which, if established, would demonstrate

that plaintiff would be required to pay proportionately more

taxes for the same or less educational services.”

The trial court denied plaintiff’s motion for

summary judgment, granted defendants’ motion, and

entered judgment dismissing the case. In a memorandum

opinion, the trial court explained that plaintiff lacks standing

because the “potential impact” of the district’s actions that

plaintiff had described is “attenuated and speculative.”

Plaintiff appealed, assigning error to the trial

court’s denial of his motion for summary judgment and

to the granting of defendants’ motion. He argued that the

trial court had erred in concluding that he lacks standing

and that the court should have ruled in his favor on the

merits. On appeal, plaintiff’s arguments on standing were

rather more elaborate than those advanced before the trial

court. He argued that he has standing both as a voter and

as a taxpayer. Regarding his standing as a voter, plaintiff

argued that he alleged that he is a voter within the school

district and that he had been deprived of the right to vote

on the issuance of the financial obligations that are at issue.

That, he contended, is all that the law requires to establish

standing. As for his standing as a taxpayer, he argued that

documents in the summary judgment record show that the

certificates of participation that the district issued require

it to pay as much as $240,400 per year in principal and

interest payments until 2022. According to plaintiff, “[i]f

the district was unable to make its payments of principal

and interest[,]” then the purchasers of those certificates of

Cite as 353 Or 189 (2013) 193

participation “would have both the contractual and statutory

right to force the district to levy a tax to pay the money due

to them.”

In response, defendants argued first that plaintiff

had failed to preserve his contention that he has standing as

a voter. According to defendants, plaintiff’s only argument

to the trial court was that he has taxpayer standing, based

on the potential financial impact of a possible default on

the financial obligations. Regarding the issue of taxpayer

standing, defendants argued that the trial court correctly

concluded that the allegations of potential injury are simply

too speculative to satisfy the more direct interest that the

law requires.

The Court of Appeals affirmed. The court began

with plaintiff’s argument that he has standing as a voter,

separate and distinct from his standing as a taxpayer.

The court concluded that plaintiff had failed to raise that

particular theory before the trial court and was therefore

precluded from asserting it for the first time on appeal.

Morgan, 241 Or App at 488. In any event, the court noted,

under existing case law, voter standing is limited to those

cases in which it is alleged that the deprivation of the right

to vote would have affected the outcome of the election at

issue, and no such allegation had been made in this case. Id.

at 487-88.

Turning to taxpayer standing, the court concluded

that the connection between the approval of the certificates

of participation and any possible harm to plaintiff was too

speculative to demonstrate that his rights are “affected”

for purposes of ORS 28.020. The court explained that a

long chain of uncertain events would have to occur before

plaintiff would experience actual harm as a result of the

issuance of the certificates of participation:

“First, the district must find itself unable to pay back the

principal and interest on the [certificates of participation]

from available revenues. Second, some authoritative

tribunal must determine that the district has no discretion

in deciding how to remedy the default on its own: it must

raise taxes by floating a bond (instead of, for example,

declaring bankruptcy or liquidating assets). Third, the bond

194 Morgan v. Sisters School District #6

issue must pass. Fourth, plaintiff must still be a resident

of the district when the bond issue passes. Fifth, plaintiff

must have resources that are affected by the bond issue.”

Id. at 490.

Before this court, plaintiff contends that the Court

of Appeals erred in concluding that he lacks standing. As he

argued before that court, he now argues on review that he

has standing both because he is a voter who has alleged the

loss of the right to vote and because he is a taxpayer who

may be adversely affected should the district be unable to

pay its obligations. In addition, he advances a new argument

that he denominates “hybrid” standing; that is, even if he

lacks standing as a voter or a taxpayer, he still has standing

because of the combination of both those interests.

“Standing” is a term of art that is used to describe

when a party “possesses a status or qualification necessary

for the assertion, enforcement, or adjudication of legal rights

or duties.” Kellas v. Dept. of Corrections, 341 Or 471, 476-

77, 145 P3d 139 (2006). Whether a plaintiff has standing

depends on the particular requirements of the statute under

which he or she is seeking relief. Local No. 290 v. Dept. of

Environ. Quality, 323 Or 559, 566, 919 P2d 1168 (1996).

In this case, plaintiff seeks declaratory relief under

the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, ORS 28.020,

and also injunctive relief. We begin with his request for

declaratory relief under ORS 28.020, which provides:

“Any person interested under a deed, will, written

contract or other writing constituting a contract, or

whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected

by a constitution, statute, municipal charter, ordinance,

contract or franchise may have determined any question of

construction or validity arising under any such instrument,

constitution, statute, municipal charter, ordinance,

contract or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights,

status or other legal relations thereunder.”

Thus, to seek relief under the Uniform Declaratory

Judgments Act, a plaintiff must establish that his or her

“rights, status, or other legal relations” are “affected by” the

relevant instrument. This court’s prior cases have variously

Cite as 353 Or 189 (2013) 195

described the test for establishing that a plaintiff’s rights

are affected under that provision. We draw from those cases

three related but separate considerations.

The first consideration is that there must be “some

injury or other impact upon a legally recognized interest

beyond an abstract interest in the correct application or the

validity of a law.” League of Oregon Cities v. State of Oregon,

334 Or 645, 658, 56 P3d 892 (2002). It is not sufficient that

a party thinks an enactment or a decision of a government

entity to be unlawful. The standing requirements of ORS

28.020 require that the challenged law must affect that

party’s rights, status, or legal relations.

Thus, for example, in Eacret et ux v. Holmes, 215 Or

121, 333 P2d 741 (1958), the plaintiffs initiated an action

under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, requesting

a declaration that the Governor lacked the constitutional

authority to commute the sentence of death that had been

imposed on the defendant, who had been convicted of

murdering their son. This court affirmed the dismissal of

the action for want of standing. The court explained that

“[t]he wrong of which they complain—if there be a wrong—

is public in character. The complaint discloses no special

injury affecting the plaintiffs differently from other citizens.”

Id. at 124. “There is no case for declaratory relief,” the court

concluded, “where the plaintiff seeks merely to vindicate a

public right to have the laws of the state properly enforced

and administered.” Id. at 125 (internal quotation marks

omitted). See also League of Oregon Cities, 334 Or at 658

(plaintiff must show “ ‘some injury or other impact upon a

legally recognized interest beyond an abstract interest in

the correct application or the validity of a law’ ”); Cummings

Constr. v. School District No. 9, 242 Or 106, 110, 408 P2d

80 (1965) (construction contractors lacked standing to

challenge school district construction bidding practices

when they did not bid for school district construction work).

The second consideration is that the injury must

be real or probable, not hypothetical or speculative. As this

court explained in TVKO v. Howland, 335 Or 527, 534,

73 P3d 905 (2003), “This court consistently has held that

courts cannot issue declaratory judgments in a vacuum;

196 Morgan v. Sisters School District #6

they must resolve an actual or justiciable controversy. To

be justiciable, a controversy must involve a dispute based

on present facts rather than on contingent or hypothetical

events.” (Citations omitted.)

Gruber v. Lincoln Hospital District, 285 Or 3, 588

P2d 1281 (1979), illustrates that principle. In that case, the

plaintiff initiated an action for a declaration that a contract

between the municipal health district and a physician was

unlawful. The trial court dismissed the action for lack of

standing. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that he had

standing as a taxpayer, entitled to challenge actions of

the municipal health district that amounted to a misuse of

public funds. This court rejected the argument, explaining

that the plaintiff had failed to describe how the actions of

the municipal health district led to any “actual or potential

adverse fiscal consequences” as to him personally. Id. at 8.

“When the potential fiscal implications of a public contract

are not apparent on its face,” the court explained, “they

should not be left to judicial speculation; they need to be

asserted, if a plaintiff relies on his interest as a taxpayer” to

proceed under ORS 28.020. Id. at 9.

Savage v. Munn, 317 Or 283, 856 P2d 298

(1993), also is instructive. In that case, the plaintiffs

initiated a declaratory judgment action, challenging the

constitutionality of a property tax limitation enacted in 1990

as Ballot Measure 5. Plaintiffs alleged that the measure

would have the effect of making them pay proportionally

more for the same services than others who owned similar

properties. The defendants argued that the case should

be dismissed for want of standing because the plaintiffs’

claims were based on the hypothetical operation of the

ballot measure and because they had failed to demonstrate

a “direct effect” of the challenged law on their personal

tax bills. The court rejected the argument, explaining that

the gravamen of the plaintiffs’ claim in that case was not

the unconstitutionality of the amount of their taxes, but

rather the manner in which taxes were capped under Ballot

Measure 5, which, the court stated, “are ‘present facts,’

not simply possible future events.” Id. at 292. Under those

circumstances, the court explained, specifying how the

Cite as 353 Or 189 (2013) 197

law would affect the amount of plaintiffs’ tax bills was not

required. Id.

The third and final consideration is that the court’s

decision must have a practical effect on the rights that the

plaintiff is seeking to vindicate. Kellas, 341 Or at 484-85

(discussing practical effects requirement of ORS 28.020).

That is to say, a connection must exist between the rights

that a plaintiff seeks to vindicate and the relief requested.

The relief that the plaintiff seeks, if granted, must redress

the injury that is the subject of the declaratory judgment

action. As this court explained in Cummings Constr., 242

Or at 110, there must be “a real and substantial controversy

admitting of specific relief through a decree of conclusive

character.” Otherwise, the court’s decision will amount to

no more than an advisory opinion.

Thus, for example, in Hazell v. Brown, 352 Or

455, 467, 287 P3d 1079 (2012), the plaintiffs initiated an

action under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act,

challenging the Secretary of State’s determination that a

voter-approved ballot measure was “dormant” and had not

yet gone into effect. On appeal, they also asked the court to

declare specific provisions of the measure unconstitutional.

This court declined to do that. The court began by noting

that the parties had standing to challenge whether the

statute had gone into effect; they alleged the requisite

interest and sought a remedy to effectuate that interest.

Id. But, the court noted, they had neglected “to seek any

specific relief connected to the application or nonapplication

of the individual provisions in question.” Id. Consequently,

their complaint was insufficient “to allege a justiciable

controversy under the declaratory judgment act, as to

the individual provisions” of the ballot measure. Id. An

opinion on the constitutionality of the individual provisions,

the court concluded, would amount to an impermissible

advisory opinion. Id. at 468. See also Strunk v. PERB, 338

Or 145, 153, 108 P3d 1058 (2005) (standing requires “some

practical effect on [a] party’s rights”); Barcik v. Kubiaczyk,

321 Or 174, 188, 895 P2d 765 (1995) (declaratory relief is

available “only when it can affect * * * some rights between

the parties”); Brown v. Oregon State Bar, 293 Or 446, 449,

198 Morgan v. Sisters School District #6

648 P2d 1289 (1982) (“A justiciable controversy results in

specific relief through a binding decree as opposed to an

advisory opinion[.]”); Gortmaker v. Seaton, 252 Or 440,

443, 450 P2d 547 (1969) (plaintiff lacked standing under

Declaratory Judgments Act because a decision would not

affect his rights).

With the foregoing principles in mind, we turn to

the parties’ arguments about plaintiff’s standing in this

case, beginning with plaintiff’s contention that he has

standing as a voter who has been denied the right to vote

on the financial obligations that the district issued. As we

have noted, defendants argue—and the Court of Appeals

agreed—that plaintiff failed to preserve that particular

theory of standing. Plaintiff argues that the Court of Appeals

erred in concluding that he failed to preserve that theory

of standing. He contends that, by alleging in his complaint

that his “status as a taxpayer and voter” was adversely

affected, he alerted the trial court and defendants that he

was relying on voter standing.

We are doubtful that the bare allegation in the

complaint that plaintiff was adversely affected as a voter,

without more, suffices to preserve his current contention

that he has standing as a voter who was deprived of the

right to vote. See, e.g., Gruber, 285 Or at 7-8 (“[A] complaint

under this section [ORS 28.020] must show how plaintiff’s

‘rights, status, or other legal relations are affected’ by an

instrument or enactment.” (Emphasis added.)). Indeed,

although the complaint does allege that plaintiff’s rights as

a voter were adversely affected, the only allegation as to

the nature of that adverse effect was the fact that he might

suffer financial harm should the district be unable to meet

its obligations. And, consistently with that allegation, the

only argument that plaintiff made to the trial court was

that he has standing because of that potential fiscal impact

on him as a taxpayer.

Even assuming for the sake of argument that

plaintiff adequately preserved his contention that he has

voter standing based on the loss of his right to vote on the

resolution approving the certificates of participation, the

contention ultimately fails. At the outset, we note that this

Cite as 353 Or 189 (2013) 199

court has recognized that the denial of the right to vote can

satisfy the personal injury requirement that the Uniform

Declaratory Judgments Act makes a prerequisite to

standing. In Webb v. Clatsop Co. School Dist. 3, 188 Or 324,

215 P2d 368 (1950), a voter brought a declaratory judgment

action, seeking to set aside the results of an election in which

he had been denied the right to vote. The particular election

involved two school districts that had voted to consolidate.

The consolidation proposal had been approved by a margin

of a single vote. In challenging the validity of the election,

the plaintiff noted that, had he been permitted to vote,

the outcome of the election would have been different. The

defendant school districts sought dismissal of the action on

the ground that the plaintiff lacked standing. This court

disagreed, holding that the complaint clearly set out the

denial of his right to vote, followed by “an appropriate prayer

in that regard.” Id. at 331. It bears some emphasis that the

court’s decision was based not only on the allegation of a

denial of the right to vote, but also on the existence of an

“appropriate prayer,” that is, one that, if granted, would

have remedied the injury of which the plaintiff complained.

The court also noted that the plaintiff had alleged that,

had he been permitted to vote, the outcome of the election

would have been different. But it is not entirely clear from

the court’s opinion how much difference that made in its

analysis.

In this case, plaintiff did allege in his complaint

that he was a voter who had been denied the right to vote.

But, unlike the plaintiff in Webb, plaintiff in this case seeks

no relief that could remedy the denial of his right to vote.

His complaint does not ask for an order compelling the

district to hold an election. It simply asks for a declaration

that the district should have held one. Such a declaration

would have no practical effect on plaintiff’s voting rights and

would amount to a purely advisory opinion. We therefore

conclude that his allegation that he is a voter who has been

denied the right to vote is inadequate to satisfy the standing

requirements of ORS 28.020.

In reaching that conclusion, we emphasize that

we are not holding that plaintiff lacks standing because he

200 Morgan v. Sisters School District #6

merely asks for a declaration that his rights had been violated.

To the contrary, in appropriate cases, such a declaration is

adequate to satisfy the practical effect requirement that this

court’s cases have described. In cases involving disputed

provisions of a contract or insurance policy, for example,

a declaration of the parties’ rights under that contract or

policy can have a concrete effect on the parties to it. See,

e.g., Carey v. Lincoln Loan Co., 342 Or 530, 532-33, 157

P3d 775 (2007) (action for declaration as to enforceability

of provisions in loan agreement); North Pacific Ins. Co. v.

Hamilton, 332 Or 20, 22-23, 22 P3d 739 (2001) (action for

declaration as to insurer’s liability under a policy of liability

insurance). Or, for another example, in cases involving a

recurring action, a declaration of the lawfulness of that

action can have a practical effect in establishing the basis

for further relief, such as an injunction, see, e.g., State ex

rel Oregonian Publishing Co. v. Sams, 298 Or 329, 333, 692

P2d 116 (1984) (suggesting that “the appropriate remedy for

challenging a recurring practice that is believed to be illegal

is by declaratory judgment”), or monetary damages, see, e.g.,

Ken Leahy Construction, Inc. v. Cascade General, Inc., 329

Or 566, 573-74, 994 P2d 112 (1999); Lowe v. Harmon, 167 Or

128, 136, 115 P2d 297 (1941) (relief under the Declaratory

Judgments Act “may include an assessment of damages”).

In this case, however, plaintiff has offered no explanation as

to how the issuance of the judicial declaration that he seeks

would have any practical effect on his voting rights, and we

are aware of none.

We turn then to plaintiff’s contention that he

nevertheless has adequately alleged taxpayer standing

based on the potential financial impact of the issuance of the

certificates of participation. As we have described, plaintiff

alleged that the issuance of the certificates of participation

“may jeopardize the district[’]s ability to provide for the daily

operation of the district.” His complaint, however, does not

explain why the issuance of those obligations might have

that effect. Moreover, he does not allege that the district’s

potential inability to provide for its daily operations affects

him in any way. He also alleged that the issuance of the

obligations “increases the likelihood” that the district will

have to seek additional funds from taxpayers like himself.

Cite as 353 Or 189 (2013) 201

The problem is that such a “likelihood” is “increased” only

in the event that the district finds itself unable to pay its

obligations, and even then, only if the voters were to approve

a district request for additional funding, and further, only

if plaintiff remains a resident of the district when those

other events occur. Thus, plaintiff’s allegations that the

issuance of the certifications of participation will affect him

are predicated on a series of hypothetical contingencies, not

on present facts. As such, they are inadequate to satisfy the

requirements of standing under the Uniform Declaratory

Judgments Act.

That leaves plaintiff’s proposed “hybrid” standing

argument: That is, even if he lacks standing as a voter and

a taxpayer, he should be held to possess standing as a voter

who has not only been denied the right to vote, but who also

has suffered (or will suffer) financial loss as a taxpayer. Even

assuming for the sake of argument that it is permissible for

plaintiff to advance such an argument at this late stage, the

argument is unavailing. The fact remains that a declaratory

judgment in this case will not remedy any injury to plaintiff’s

voting rights. And adding to the inquiry his allegations of

purely contingent, hypothetical fiscal harm does not alter

that fact.

Plaintiff also seeks injunctive relief, specifically,

an order that the district not continue to pay on the

certificates of participation. As this court observed in Eckles

v. State of Oregon, 306 Or 380, 386, 760 P2d 846 (1988),

no statute governs the issue of standing to seek injunctive

relief. Nevertheless, the court explained, it has long

applied essentially the same standing requirements that

ordinarily apply in declaratory judgment actions. Id. In

fact, in a number of the cases that we have described above

concerning the three requirements of standing under the

Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, the plaintiffs sought

both declaratory and injunctive relief, and the court did

not distinguish between the forms of relief in assessing the

issue of standing. See, e.g., Hazell, 352 Or at 467-68; League

of Oregon Cities, 334 Or at 657-62; Barcik, 321 Or at 179. In

light of the fact that the same standing standards apply to

plaintiff’s request for declaratory and injunctive relief, we

202 Morgan v. Sisters School District #6

conclude that, for the reasons that we have described with

respect to his request for declaratory relief, his claim for

injunctive relief also fails for lack of standing.

The decision of the Court of Appeals and the

judgment of the circuit court are affirmed.