In re Kelan W.

2022 IL 128031

IN THE

SUPREME COURT

OF

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

(Docket No. 128031)

In re KELAN W., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellee,

v. Kelan W., Appellant).

Opinion filed October 6, 2022.

JUSTICE THEIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Justices Neville, Michael J. Burke, Overstreet, and Carter concurred in the

judgment and opinion.

Chief Justice Anne M. Burke specially concurred, with opinion.

Justice Holder White took no part in the decision.

OPINION

¶1 At issue in this appeal is whether, under section 5-120 of the Juvenile Court Act

of 1987 (Act) (705 ILCS 405/5-120 (West 2020)), a minor may be adjudicated

delinquent for unlawful conduct committed outside of Illinois. The circuit court of

St. Clair County found that section 5-120 does not provide such authority and

dismissed the count of the delinquency petition against respondent Kelan W., a

minor, that involved his alleged criminal conduct in Missouri. The appellate court

reversed the circuit court’s order and allowed all four counts of the delinquency

petition against respondent to proceed. 2021 IL App (5th) 210029, ¶ 24. For the

reasons that follow, we affirm the appellate court’s judgment.

¶2 BACKGROUND

¶3 On August 27, 2020, respondent, while in Missouri with an adult accomplice,

allegedly took Joshua Luterman’s 2019 Volkswagen Jetta by force or the threat of

force. The two then drove the car across the river into Illinois, where they were both

apprehended. Respondent was 16 years old at the time of the offense. He resides in

Illinois with his mother.

¶4 On September 28, 2020, the State filed an amended four-count petition to

adjudicate respondent a delinquent minor. Count I alleged that, on August 27, 2020,

while in Missouri, respondent took a motor vehicle by force or threat of force, while

armed with a firearm, in violation of section 18-4(a) of the Criminal Code of 2012

(Code) (720 ILCS 5/18-4(a) (West 2020)) (aggravated vehicular hijacking) and

section 570.023 of Missouri’s Revised Criminal Code (Mo. Rev. Stat. § 570.023

(Supp. 2017)) (robbery, first degree). Counts II to IV alleged that, on the same date,

while in Illinois, respondent committed unlawful possession of a stolen motor

vehicle (625 ILCS 5/4-103(a)(1) (West 2020)), aggravated unlawful use of a

weapon by a person under 21 (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1), (3)(I) (West 2020)), and

theft (id. § 16-1(a)(4)).

¶5 Respondent filed a motion to dismiss count I on the ground that the circuit court

did not have the authority to consider a prosecution for acts committed by a juvenile

entirely outside of Illinois. In response, the State asserted that juvenile court

procedure is defined by statute and that delinquency proceedings based on out-of-

state conduct are explicitly permitted under section 5-120 of the Act (705 ILCS

405/5-120 (West 2020)).

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¶6 On January 6, 2021, the circuit court entered an order holding that it did not

have the authority, or the required jurisdiction, to rule on violations of Missouri

law. Consequently, the circuit court dismissed count I and allowed the remaining

three counts to proceed.

¶7 The appellate court reversed and remanded for further proceedings on all four

counts. 2021 IL App (5th) 210029, ¶ 24. The appellate court found that the plain

language of section 5-120 of the Act is clear and unambiguous and that it authorizes

delinquency proceedings against a minor in Illinois who violates another state’s

law. Id. ¶ 22. The appellate court therefore found that the circuit court erred as a

matter of law in dismissing the charge contained in count I. Id.

¶8 This court granted respondent’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315

(eff. Oct. 1, 2020).

¶9 ANALYSIS

¶ 10 The sole issue before us is whether, under section 5-120 of the Act, the State

may bring a juvenile delinquency petition against respondent for alleged unlawful

conduct committed outside of Illinois.

¶ 11 The parties agree that this question is a narrow one, concerning the proper

construction of the Act, subject to de novo review. People v. Giraud, 2012 IL

113116, ¶ 6. The principles guiding our analysis are well established. Our primary

objective is to ascertain and give effect to legislative intent, the surest and most

reliable indicator of which is the statutory language itself, given its plain and

ordinary meaning. Id. In determining the plain meaning of statutory terms, we

consider the statute in its entirety, keeping in mind the subject it addresses and the

apparent intent of the legislature in enacting it. Id. Where the language of the statute

is clear and unambiguous, we must apply it as written, without resort to extrinsic

aids to statutory construction. Id.

¶ 12 This appeal turns on the proper construction of section 5-120 of the Act, which

states:

“Exclusive jurisdiction. Proceedings may be instituted under the provisions of

this Article concerning any minor who prior to his or her 18th birthday has

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violated or attempted to violate, regardless of where the act occurred, any

federal, State, county or municipal law or ordinance. Except as provided in

Sections 5-125, 5-130, 5-805, and 5-810 of this Article, no minor who was

under 18 years of age at the time of the alleged offense may be prosecuted under

the criminal laws of this State.” (Emphasis added.) 705 ILCS 405/5-120 (West

2020).

As this court has previously explained, “section 5-120’s title is misleading, as [this]

section is not in fact a grant of authority to the circuit court. Rather, section 5-120

is a grant of authority to the State, specifically defining the class of persons against

whom the State may lawfully initiate delinquency proceedings.” (Emphases in

original.) In re Luis R., 239 Ill. 2d 295, 304 (2010).

¶ 13 We find the language of section 5-120 unambiguously authorizes delinquency

proceedings in Illinois when a minor engages in unlawful conduct in this or any

other state. Our legislature chose to use the word “any” in this provision before

“federal, State, county or municipal law or ordinance.” The word “any” is defined

“to indicate one that is selected without restriction or limitation of choice.”

Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 97 (1993). The legislature’s use of

the word “any” in this regard demonstrates its intent to authorize the State to initiate

delinquency proceedings for unlawful conduct by a minor, including for a violation

of another state’s laws. Additionally, the legislature expressly excluded any

geographic restriction on the conduct of a minor that may result in a delinquency

proceeding by including language authorizing such a proceeding for conduct

“regardless of where the act occurred.” 705 ILCS 405/5-120 (West 2020). This

further demonstrates the legislature’s intent to extend the reach of delinquency

proceedings for violations that occur in Illinois as well as in other states. See

generally In re H.G., 322 Ill. App. 3d 727, 735-36 (2001) (holding that, by inserting

language “regardless of where the act occurred,” the legislature has specifically

excluded in section 5-120 a requirement to prove in a juvenile proceeding the

location of the offense). Consistent with section 5-120, we note the Act utilizes

identical language in defining a delinquent minor as “any minor who prior to his or

her 18th birthday has violated or attempted to violate, regardless of where the act

occurred, any federal, State, county or municipal law or ordinance.” (Emphasis

added.) 705 ILCS 405/5-105(3) (West 2020).

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¶ 14 Furthermore, section 5-120 specifically authorizes prosecution in juvenile court

in Illinois for a violation of any federal law, “regardless of where the act occurred.”

That a minor may be adjudicated delinquent for violating any federal law, whether

in Illinois or elsewhere, further supports our conclusion that “any *** State ***

law” was similarly intended by the legislature not to be limited to violations that

occur in Illinois.

¶ 15 Respondent attempts to circumvent the plain language of section 5-120 by

arguing that it does not allow prosecution for his alleged conduct in Missouri

because the legislature chose to capitalize “State” to refer to the “State of Illinois.”

As the appellate court recognized, respondent points to no grammar, style, or

principle of bill drafting to show that capitalization of the word “State” always

indicates the State of Illinois. We similarly find no evidence that capitalization of

the word “State” with no qualifying language such as “this” or “State of Illinois,”

means only “State of Illinois.” Respondent’s suggested construction would also

require this court to improperly construe the word “State” in section 5-120 in

isolation, rather than in light of the other words and phrases in the provision. It is

well settled that when the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous it must be

applied as written, and we cannot depart from the plain language by reading into it

exceptions or limitations not expressed by our legislature. In re Jarquan B., 2017

IL 121483, ¶ 22.

¶ 16 Similarly, respondent’s reliance upon section 5-101(3) of the Act’s purpose and

policy provision, in conjunction with the adult criminal jurisdiction provision

contained in section 1-5(a) of the Code (720 ILCS 5/1-5(a)(1) (West 2020)) is

misplaced. He relies upon these provisions to support his argument that a juvenile

may not be found delinquent for a crime committed outside of Illinois because an

adult could not be similarly prosecuted in Illinois. Section 5-101(3) of the Act

provides, in pertinent part, that “minors shall have all the procedural rights of adults

in criminal proceedings, unless specifically precluded by laws that enhance the

protection of such minors.” 705 ILCS 405/5-101(3) (West 2020). For purposes of

adult prosecution, section 1-5(a)(1) of the Code provides that a person is subject to

prosecution for an offense in Illinois if the offense is “committed either wholly or

partly within the State.” 720 ILCS 5/1-5(a)(1) (West 2020). Simply put, section 1-

5 of the Code does not inform our decision on the proper construction of section 5-

120 of the Act. Rather, it provides the reach of this state’s criminal jurisdiction for

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adults; it does not bestow any procedural rights on adult criminal defendants that

would be applicable to juveniles in a delinquency proceeding.

¶ 17 Respondent also asserts that, if this delinquency proceeding may proceed for

conduct that occurred in Missouri, it may be difficult for counsel to interview

witnesses in another state and to issue subpoenas and request witnesses from

another state to testify and it may require counsel to familiarize himself with the

laws of another state. As the appellate court recognized, these arguments are simply

based on practical and policy objections to juvenile delinquency proceedings based

on out-of-state conduct. The only issue we are addressing in this appeal is whether

the State has the authority to initiate delinquency proceedings for an offense that

was not committed in Illinois. That question requires us only to interpret the plain

language of section 5-120, without consideration of any potential inconveniences

to the court, witnesses, or counsel.

¶ 18 Finally, we note that the purpose of the Act is to promote a juvenile justice

system capable of dealing with the problem of juvenile delinquency, a system that

will protect the community, impose accountability for violations of the law, and

equip juvenile offenders with competencies to live responsibly and productively.

705 ILCS 405/5-101 (West 2020). A delinquency adjudication is not the legal

equivalent of a felony conviction. In re Lakisha M., 227 Ill. 2d 259, 269-70 (2008).

This court has long found that, “[e]ven as the legislature recognized that the

juvenile court system should protect the public, it tempered that goal with the goal

of developing delinquent minors into productive adults, and gave the trial court

options designed to reach both goals.” In re Rodney H., 223 Ill. 2d 510, 520 (2006).

¶ 19 The Act also instructs that “juvenile justice polices” should, inter alia,

“[i]nclude the minor’s family in the case management plan,” “[a]llow minors to

reside within their homes whenever possible and appropriate and provide support

necessary to make this possible,” and “[p]rovide programs and services that are

community-based and that are in close proximity to the minor’s home.” 705 ILCS

405/5-101(2) (West 2020). Additionally, the Act allows the court to “transfer the

case to the county of the minor’s residence” if the “proceedings are commenced in

any [other] county.” Id. § 5-135(2). We agree with the State that the Act’s

rehabilitative purposes, along with its policies emphasizing family and community

involvement to advance those goals, support our finding that the legislature

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intended to permit delinquency proceedings for unlawful conduct committed by an

Illinois minor in another state. Illinois is likely to be in a better position than another

state to ensure that family and community are involved in our juveniles’

rehabilitative process, and it may help reduce disruption to the minor’s life to

receive necessary services in his or her home state.

¶ 20 Because we hold that the plain language of the Act allows for a delinquency

proceeding for out-of-state conduct, the circuit court erred in dismissing count I of

the petition against respondent.

¶ 21 CONCLUSION

¶ 22 Accordingly, we affirm the appellate court’s judgment and remand to the circuit

court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

¶ 23 Appellate court judgment affirmed.

¶ 24 Circuit court judgment reversed.

¶ 25 Cause remanded.

¶ 26 CHIEF JUSTICE ANNE M. BURKE, specially concurring:

¶ 27 Although I agree with the result reached by the majority in affirming the

judgment of the appellate court, I disagree with portions of the majority’s

reasoning. I therefore specially concur.

¶ 28 At issue in this case is the proper interpretation of section 5-120 of the Juvenile

Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/5-120 (West 2020)). This provision states:

“Exclusive jurisdiction. Proceedings may be instituted under the provisions of

this Article concerning any minor who prior to his or her 18th birthday has

violated or attempted to violate, regardless of where the act occurred, any

federal, State, county or municipal law or ordinance. Except as provided in

Sections 5-125, 5-130, 5-805, and 5-810 of this Article, no minor who was

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under 18 years of age at the time of the alleged offense may be prosecuted under

the criminal laws of this State.” (Emphasis added.) Id.

¶ 29 The appellate court interpreted the language emphasized above to mean that

proceedings may be instituted in juvenile court in Illinois for a violation, or

attempted violation, of any Illinois criminal law or any criminal law of the other 49

states. To hold that section 5-120 refers only to Illinois criminal law, the appellate

court explained, “would be contrary to the statute’s plain language and would

require this court to disregard the statute’s reference to any violations of the law,

wherever they may occur, including those laws of other states, counties,

municipalities, or federal law.” (Emphasis in original.) 2021 IL App (5th) 210029,

¶ 13.

¶ 30 The appellate court thus concluded that section 5-120 incorporates by reference

the criminal laws of both Illinois and all 49 other states. See, e.g., People v. Lewis,

5 Ill. 2d 117, 122 (1955) (when a statute incorporates the law of another jurisdiction

it is “ ‘ “the same as though the statute or the provisions adopted had been

incorporated bodily into the adopting statute” ’ ” (quoting Evans v. Illinois Surety

Co., 298 Ill. 101, 106 (1921), quoting People ex rel. Cant v. Crossley, 261 Ill. 78,

85 (1913))); In re Jose C., 198 P.3d 1087, 1095 (Cal. 2009) (explaining that the

incorporation of federal criminal law into the state delinquency act created an

independent state action). In this way, the criminal laws of the other states may

serve as the basis for a juvenile adjudication in an Illinois circuit court, just as the

criminal laws of Illinois do.

¶ 31 Affirming the appellate court, the majority similarly concludes that section 5-

120 incorporates by reference, and without qualification, the penal codes of the

other 49 states. The majority holds that “the legislature’s use of the word ‘any’ in

this regard demonstrates its intent to authorize the State to initiate delinquency

proceedings for unlawful conduct by a minor, including for a violation of another

state’s laws.” Supra ¶ 13. I disagree.

¶ 32 The majority’s reading of section 5-120 is unpersuasive because it fails to

account for the fact that the criminal laws of Illinois will often conflict with the

laws of our sister states, particularly in controversial areas such as gun possession,

abortion, marijuana use, or gambling. To illustrate the point, consider a scenario

involving abortion. Assume that a 17-year-old Illinois resident travels to another

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state that has restrictive abortion laws. While there, the juvenile helps another

person receive an abortion and, in doing so, violates that state’s laws. Assume

further that the Illinois legislature has affirmatively declared that assisting a person

with receiving an abortion is not criminal conduct under Illinois law. Under the

majority’s reasoning, section 5-120 would nevertheless authorize delinquency

proceedings against the juvenile. In other words, the majority has concluded that,

in section 5-120, our legislature has authorized delinquency proceedings even for

conduct that the legislature has declared elsewhere to be entirely legal.

¶ 33 Moreover, the conduct need not occur in another state. As the majority stresses,

section 5-120 excludes “any geographic restriction on the conduct of a minor that

may result in a delinquency proceeding by including language authorizing such a

proceeding for conduct ‘regardless of where the act occurred.’ ” Supra ¶ 13

(quoting 705 ILCS 405/5-120 (West 2020)). Thus, under the majority’s

interpretation of section 5-120, a juvenile may be subject to delinquency

proceedings for engaging in conduct that has been declared unlawful by another

state, even if our own legislature has declared that the conduct is not criminal and

even if that conduct occurs entirely within Illinois. This cannot be correct. The

legislature cannot have intended to relinquish the sovereignty of Illinois in this way.

¶ 34 The majority maintains, however, that it is simply adhering to the plain

language of the statute. The majority rejects respondent’s argument that, because

the word “State” is capitalized in section 5-120, the legislature intended the word

to mean “Illinois” and the statute therefore references only violations of Illinois

law. According to the majority, there is no principle of grammar, style, or bill

drafting that supports this argument. Supra ¶ 15. Here, too, I disagree.

¶ 35 This court’s own style manual adopts the usage principle urged by respondent,

instructing that the word “State” should be capitalized when used in lieu of the word

“Illinois.” Style Manual for the Supreme and Appellate Courts of Illinois 37 (5th

ed. 2017) (“Capitalization”). Indeed, the majority itself uses the very principle

which it says does not exist. Announcing its holding, the majority states that the

legislature’s use of the word “any” in section 2-150 “demonstrates its intent to

authorize the State [(here capitalized to mean ‘Illinois’)] to initiate delinquency

proceedings for unlawful conduct by a minor, including for a violation of another

state’s [(here in lower case)] laws.” Supra ¶ 13.

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¶ 36 The word “State” in section 2-150 is clearly being used in lieu of the word

“Illinois.” Thus, the rule set forth in section 2-150 is that delinquency proceedings

may be initiated in Illinois for a violation or attempted violation of any Illinois law

but not the laws of all other 49 states. 1 The majority’s contrary reading of the

statute is at odds with the ordinary usage of the capitalized word “State” and leads

to results that simply cannot have been contemplated by the legislature.

¶ 37 This is not, however, the end of the analysis. Section 2-150 states that

delinquency proceedings may be initiated for a violation of Illinois law, “regardless

of where the act occurred.” So, by its plain terms, section 2-150 authorizes the State

to pursue delinquency proceedings for a violation of Illinois law, even if the

underlying conduct occurs in another state. This is what happened here. In count I

of its delinquency petition, the State alleged that respondent committed aggravated

vehicular hijacking, in violation of Illinois law (720 ILCS 5/18-4(a)(5) (West

2020)), while in the state of Missouri. 2

¶ 38 Respondent maintains, however, that Illinois lacks the power, or legislative

jurisdiction, to authorize delinquency proceedings for conduct that occurs entirely

within another state. In support, respondent points to section 1-5(a)(1) of the

Criminal Code of 2012 (id. § 1-5(a)(1)). This provision states that a person

generally will not be “subject to [criminal] prosecution in this State for an offense”

that was not “committed either wholly or partly within the State.” Id. However, as

the majority correctly notes, section 1-5(a)(1) defines the reach of this State’s

criminal laws, not its delinquency proceedings. The Juvenile Court Act contains no

geographic restriction for delinquency proceedings but, instead, expressly permits

a juvenile to be adjudicated delinquent for violating Illinois law “regardless of

where the act occurred.” 705 ILCS 405/5-120 (West 2020).

1

The problem of conflicting laws does not arise with respect to federal laws. If a federal law

conflicts with an Illinois law, the federal law must be given effect under the supremacy clause of

the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., art. VI).

2

In its petition, the State also referenced the relevant Missouri statute that would address

respondent’s conduct. However, as the State explained in the circuit court, this cross-referencing

was done only to “assure that this minor is accused of a violation of law that would be a crime where

it physically occurred.”

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¶ 39 Respondent also contends that conducting delinquency proceedings in Illinois

for conduct that took place in Missouri raises “due process concerns,” arguing in

essence that it is unfair and illogical to apply section 2-150 here. I disagree.

¶ 40 The Juvenile Court Act is a codification and exercise of the powers of the State

as parens patriae (People ex rel. Houghland v. Leonard, 415 Ill. 135, 138 (1953)),

to which respondent, as a juvenile resident of Illinois, is subject. It is well settled

that the State, acting as parens patriae, is “entitled to adjust its legal system to

account for children’s vulnerability” and may exercise broad authority over their

activities to afford them protection. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634-35 (1979).

Given this legal framework, it would be wholly inconsistent to say that the State

has an obligation to protect and rehabilitate respondent but that it may not initiate

delinquency proceedings in Illinois. And this is particularly true here, where

Missouri has no power as parens patriae and has not requested respondent’s return

under the Interstate Compact on Juveniles Act (45 ILCS 10/0.01 et seq. (West

2020)) and where there has been no assertion that the sovereignty of Missouri

would be negatively affected in any way by delinquency proceedings held in

Illinois. See e.g., In re D.B.S., 349 A.2d 105, 107-08 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.

1975) (New Jersey had “an obligation to protect and rehabilitate” a juvenile who

lived on, and committed a crime on, a federal military base so long as there was no

interference with jurisdiction asserted by the federal government).

¶ 41 Further, as the State points out, in many respects respondent benefits from

having the delinquency proceedings initiated in Illinois rather than Missouri. While

both the Illinois and Missouri juvenile justice systems emphasize rehabilitation

through family and community-based interventions, as the place of his residence,

Illinois is better positioned than Missouri to ensure that the respondent’s family and

community are involved in the rehabilitative process and that there is no more

disruption in respondent’s life than is necessary to foster rehabilitation and protect

the public.

¶ 42 Finally, respondent contends that practical difficulties in conducting a defense,

such as interviewing witnesses or obtaining evidence, may arise when delinquency

proceedings are held in Illinois for conduct that occurred in another state. However,

to the extent that respondent is asserting that practical concerns have risen to the

level of a due process violation in this case, the allegations are premature, as there

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is no evidence of record that any practical difficulties do, in fact, exist. See, e.g.,

Vasquez Gonzalez v. Union Health Service, Inc., 2018 IL 123025, ¶ 24 (findings of

fact are required to determine whether a statute is unconstitutional as applied).

Should serious impediments to conducting a defense actually arise on remand,

respondent is free to raise those concerns in the circuit court, as would any juvenile

subject to delinquency proceedings for conduct that occurred in another state.

¶ 43 For these reasons, I specially concur.

¶ 44 JUSTICE HOLDER WHITE took no part in the consideration or decision of

this case.

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