Nimer v. Litchfield Township Board of Trustees

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)

File Name: 13a0046p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

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ABDALLA A. NIMER; CATHY J. FOBES;

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MI-KE'S HOME, LLC; MEDINA FOODS, INC.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants, -

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No. 12-3309

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v.

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LITCHFIELD TOWNSHIP BOARD OF TRUSTEES,

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et al.,

Defendants-Appellees. N

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Ohio at Cleveland.

No. 1:11-cv-687—Christopher A. Boyko, District Judge.

Decided and Filed: February 21, 2013

Before: MARTIN, SILER and DONALD, Circuit Judges.

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COUNSEL

ON BRIEF: Theodore J. Lesiak, LESIAK HENSAL & HATHCOCK, LLC, Medina,

Ohio, for Appellants. Timothy T. Reid, Meghan B. Kilbane, MANSOUR, GAVIN,

GERLACK & MANOS CO., LPA, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellees.

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OPINION

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BOYCE F. MARTIN, JR., Circuit Judge. There are two issues in this Younger

abstention case. The first is whether Younger abstention applies to a claim seeking

damages under 42 United States Code section 1983. The second is whether, after

applying Younger and deciding to abstain, a district court may exercise its discretion and

decide to dismiss such a damages claim. We hold that Younger abstention applies to a

42 United States Code section 1983 damages claim, but that a district court lacks the

power to decide whether to dismiss such a damages claim. Instead, where, as here, the

1

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plaintiffs seek only legal relief (in the form of damages), relief that does not involve the

district court’s equitable or discretionary powers, then the district court may not exercise

its discretion to decide whether to dismiss the case; instead, the district court must stay

the damages claim pending the outcome of the state court proceedings. Quackenbush

v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 731 (1996); Carroll v. City of Mount Clemens,

139 F.3d 1072, 1075 (6th Cir. 1998). Therefore, we REMAND this case with

instructions to stay these proceedings.

Abdalla Nimer and his wife, Cathy Fobes, (the Nimers), own land where they

operate a business that produces meat snacks such as beef jerky. They began

constructing buildings on their land because they wanted to expand the business to

include the butchering of cattle and pigs. Their land, however, was zoned for residential

use. The Nimers did not get zoning certificates before constructing and improving the

buildings on their property.

The Litchfield Township Board of Trustees sued the Nimers in the Medina

County Court of Common Pleas seeking injunctive relief. The Medina County Court

enjoined the Nimers from putting the buildings to any other use aside from keeping and

feeding animals until they could get the necessary zoning certificates.

The Nimers then appealed the Medina County Court’s decision to the Ohio Ninth

District Court of Appeals. Several days after appealing the state court decision, the

Nimers sued Litchfield Township in federal district court under 42 United States Code

section 1983, alleging that the Township had violated their rights under the Fourteenth

Amendment and requesting compensatory and punitive damages. The district court

applied the doctrine from Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), to abstain from the

case, which it dismissed without prejudice.

We review de novo a district court’s decision to abstain under the Younger

doctrine. Habich v. Dearborn, 331 F.3d 524, 530 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Traughber v.

Beauchane, 760 F.2d 673, 676 (6th Cir. 1985)). In Traughber, we articulated for the

first time “the standard to be applied by this court in reviewing decisions of abstention

No. 12-3309 Nimer, et al. v. Litchfield Twp. Bd. of Trs., et al. Page 3

by district courts.” Traughber, 760 F.2d at 675. We noted that the Eleventh Circuit

reviewed for abuse of discretion the decisions of district courts to abstain under the

Younger doctrine, but we chose to follow the Ninth and Third Circuits, and several of

our earlier precedents, which applied de novo review to cases of Younger abstention.

Id. We reasoned that de novo review was approriate “[b]ecause theories of state and

federal law, and expressions of federalism and comity, are so interrelated in the decision

to abstain” that “such dispositions are elevated to a level of importance dictating de novo

appellate review.” Id. at 676 n.1.

We have held that a district court may apply the Younger doctrine to abstain from

adjudicating a plaintiff’s federal claim if that claim seeks legal–as opposed to equitable

or declaratory–relief. Carroll, 139 F.3d at 1076. Here, we read the Nimers’ federal

complaint as seeking only legal relief. Their complaint specifically asks for a jury trial

as well as compensatory and punitive damages. It does not specifically request

declaratory or injunctive relief. While their complaint does conclude by requesting “any

further relief this Court deems just and proper[,]” we read this as boilerplate. So, we

conclude that the Nimers’ complaint sounds in damages. This means, as we will explain

later, that the district court was not able to exercise its discretion at all in dismissing the

case; the district court should have stayed the case–instead of deciding to dismiss it

without prejudice–after finding that the Younger doctrine applied.

A district court may abstain under the Younger doctrine if three conditions exist:

there are state proceedings that are (1) currently pending; (2) involve an important state

interest; and (3) will provide the federal plaintiff with an adequate opportunity to raise

his or her constitutional claims. Habich, 331 F.3d at 530 (citing Hayse v. Wethington,

110 F.3d 18, 20 (6th Cir. 1997)).

The first condition for the application of Younger abstention is that the state

proceeding must be pending on the day the plaintiff sues in federal court–the so-called

“day-of-filing” rule. Fed. Express Corp. v. Tenn. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 925 F.2d 962, 969

(6th Cir. 1991).

No. 12-3309 Nimer, et al. v. Litchfield Twp. Bd. of Trs., et al. Page 4

Here, the first condition for Younger abstention is satisfied because the Nimers

appealed their state court case on March 30, 2011, and that appeal was still pending

when they brought their federal lawsuit on April 6, 2011.

The second condition for Younger abstention is that the state has a substantial,

legitimate interest in the kind of state proceeding at issue. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc.

v. Council of the City of New Orleans et al., 491 U.S. 350, 365 (1989).

Here, the proceeding at issue is a civil state court action to enforce a

municipality’s zoning ordinance. In a case involving the Younger doctrine, we held that

a city “does have a substantial interest in enforcing its zoning laws without federal

interference in the state’s judicial processes[.]” Exec. Arts Studio, Inc. v. City of Grand

Rapids, 391 F.3d 783, 791 (6th Cir. 2004). Therefore, the facts of this case satisfy the

second condition for Younger abstention.

The third condition for Younger abstention is that the state proceeding affords an

adequate opportunity for the federal plaintiffs to raise their constitutional claims. Fed.

Express Corp., 925 F.2d at 970 (quoting Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 430 (1979))

(parallel citations omitted). The federal plaintiffs bear the burden of showing that state

procedural law barred presentation of their constitutional claims. Id. (quoting Pennzoil

Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 14 (1987)) (parallel citations omitted).

Here, the Nimers acknowledge that they brought constitutional issues to the

Medina County Court of Common Pleas’ attention. In their brief, the Nimers state that

“it is clear” that they raised “constitutional defenses” in the Medina County Court, but

they claim that the court “ignored” these issues because it did not address them in its

Order granting Litchfield’s injunction. So, the Nimers conclude that they had no

“meaningful opportunity” nor an “adequate opportunity to raise these issues in the state

court[.]” But the Nimers have not carried their burden in showing that state procedural

law barred them from presenting their constitutional claims–which they did present.

Therefore, the facts of this case satisfy the third condition for Younger abstention.

No. 12-3309 Nimer, et al. v. Litchfield Twp. Bd. of Trs., et al. Page 5

If the Nimers had sought equitable or otherwise discretionary relief, we would

proceed to examine for abuse of discretion the district court’s decision to dismiss the

case. Coles v. Granville, 448 F.3d 853, 865 (6th Cir. 2006). But where, as here, the

plaintiffs seek only legal relief, and the district court properly applies the Younger

doctrine to abstain from adjudicating a claim for damages, it must stay the case instead

of exercising its discretion in deciding to dismiss the case. This is because the United

States Supreme Court has held that “[u]nder our precedents, federal courts have the

power to dismiss or remand cases based on abstention principles only where the relief

being sought is equitable or otherwise discretionary.” Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 731

(emphasis added). See also Carroll, 139 F.3d at 1079 (Moore, J., concurring in part)

(“While Quackenbush involved Burford abstention, its reasoning applies with equal

force to Younger abstention.”). Whether the plaintiffs seek a legal versus an equitable

remedy controls how the district court disposes of the case after holding that the Younger

doctrine applies to it. If the plaintiffs seek equitable relief, such as an injunction, then

the district court may exercise its discretion and decide whether to dismiss the case, and

we would then review its decision for abuse of discretion. Coles, 448 F.3d at 865. But

where, as here, the plaintiffs seek purely legal relief, in the form of damages,

Quackenbush prevents the district court from even exercising its discretion and deciding

to dismiss the case.

Because, as discussed above, the Nimers sought legal, instead of equitable or

discretionary, relief, Quackenbush prevented the district court from exercising its

discretion and deciding to dismiss their case. Therefore, the district court erred when it

chose to exercise its discretion and decided to dismiss the Nimers’ claim without

prejudice.

We REMAND this case, instructing the district court to stay these proceedings.