Fernando Saint-Jean v. Palisades Interstate Park

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

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No. 21-1162

______

FERNANDO SAINT-JEAN

v.

PALISADES INTERSTATE PARK COMMISSION;

PALISADES INTERSTATE PARKWAY POLICE

DEPARTMENT; MICHAEL HOLLAND, Palisades

Interstate Parkway Police Officer, Badge #403; FABRICIO

M. SALAZAR, Palisades Interstate Parkway Police Officer,

Badge #362; PETER WOJCKIK, Palisades Interstate

Parkway Police Officer, Badge #406; RICHARD DEY,

Palisades Interstate Parkway Police Officer; JOHN/JANE

DOES #1-10, Palisades Interstate Parkway Police Officer

(fictitiously named); ANDREW SAMSON, Palisades

Interstate Parkway Municipal Prosecutor; MICHAEL

COPPOLA, Palisades Interstate Parkway Police Chief

Palisades Interstate Park Commission; Palisades Interstate

Parkway Police Department; Michael Holland; Fabricio M.

Salazar; Peter Wojckik; Richard Dey; Andrew Samson,

Appellants

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On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. No. 2-19-cv-10680)

District Judge: Honorable Kevin McNulty

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Argued: June 29, 2022

Before: JORDAN, PORTER, and PHIPPS, Circuit Judges.

(Filed: September 23, 2022)

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Dara C. Goodman [Argued]

Callinan & Smith

3361 Park Avenue

Suite 104

Wantagh, NY 11793

Counsel for Appellee

Justine M. Longa [Argued]

Bryan E. Lucas

Robert J. McGuire

Office of Attorney General of New Jersey

Division of Law

Hughes Justice Complex

25 Market Street

Trenton, NJ 08625

Counsel for Appellants

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OPINION OF THE COURT

_______________________

PHIPPS, Circuit Judge.

In searching the car of a Massachusetts man who was

driving through New Jersey on a Sunday afternoon, police

officers misidentified heart-shaped Valentine’s Day candies as

illegal drugs. On that basis, the officers arrested and

prosecuted the man. After the heart-shaped objects were lab

tested over two months later, the truth came out: they were just

candies. Even with that knowledge, it still took nearly four

additional months to drop the charges against the driver.

After that, the script flipped. The falsely accused driver

sued the officers, a prosecutor, and three governmental entities

for violations of several constitutional rights and for torts under

New Jersey law. Each of those defendants moved to dismiss

the complaint, and in their brief, the officers raised qualified

immunity defenses.

The District Court partially granted that motion. It rejected

the officers’ request for qualified immunity for the driver’s

Fourth Amendment and related state-law claims. But it

granted the motion to dismiss for one of the constitutional

claims against the officers and all of the claims against the

prosecutor and the governmental entities. Each of the

dismissals was without prejudice, and the order permitted the

driver 30 days to amend his complaint.

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The officers filed a notice of appeal to challenge the District

Court’s denial of qualified immunity under federal and New

Jersey law. But before the officers appealed, the driver had

amended his complaint. Due to that prior amendment, the

District Court’s order was not final when the officers appealed.

And without a final order, see 28 U.S.C. § 1291, or any other

basis for appellate jurisdiction, we will dismiss this appeal.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

(AS ALLEGED IN THE COMPLAINT)

After travelling to New Jersey for a family birthday party

the day before, Fernando Saint-Jean, who was in his early 30s,

began the return trip home to Massachusetts. As he drove with

his uncle along the Palisades Interstate Parkway in New Jersey

in the early afternoon of Sunday, May 6, 2018, a Palisades

Interstate Park Police Officer pulled the vehicle over for

driving too slowly and for having tinted windows. That

officer, Michael Holland, requested identification from both

men, and he asked them what country they were from. Saint-

Jean replied that he was originally from Haiti but had become

a United States citizen. Around that time, another Park Police

Officer, Fabricio Salazar, arrived on the scene, and the officers

ordered Saint-Jean and his uncle out of the car. The officers

began to frisk the two men, and a third Park Police Officer,

Peter Wojckik, also arrived. The officers then requested to

search the vehicle, and Saint-Jean signed a consent-to-search

form.

In searching a storage compartment between the two front

seats, the officers found three small, sealable plastic bags

containing several heart-shaped objects. Those objects had the

appearance of Valentine’s Day candies, but Valentine’s Day

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was two-and-a-half months earlier, and the officers suspected

that the items were actually controlled substances – MDMA or

ecstasy. They asked Saint-Jean what the items were, and he

replied that they were Valentine’s Day candies received from

a coworker, Tammy. Saint-Jean offered to provide Tammy’s

contact information, but the officers declined. Instead, they

arrested Saint-Jean, handcuffed him, and took him to a police

station.

The intake process at the police station included

photographing and fingerprinting Saint-Jean; it did not involve

administering any tests on the small, heart-shaped objects.

Despite not testing the suspected drugs or calling Saint-Jean’s

coworker, two officers, Holland and Richard Dey, initiated

legal proceedings against Saint-Jean. Those included a traffic

summons and a criminal summons for possessing a controlled

substance, see N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:35-10a(1). After receiving

those summonses, Saint-Jean left the police station two to three

hours after the initial stop.

The criminal charges against Saint-Jean were unsuccessful.

Before his initial appearance, the drug charge was downgraded

to a disorderly persons offense, see N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:36-2.

Also, over two months after his initial appearance, the New

Jersey State Police Office of Forensic Sciences analyzed the

small, heart-shaped objects and determined that they were not

controlled substances. Despite learning that information, the

prosecution continued for about four more months, until the

charges were dismissed in November 2018.

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PROCEDURAL HISTORY

To vindicate his rights under federal and state law, Saint-

Jean filed this suit in April 2019. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1367.

He brought several claims against the four officers in their

individual capacities for arresting, detaining, and charging

him. Those included claims for false arrest and malicious

prosecution in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendments, as well as claims alleging violations of

procedural and substantive due process. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

In addition to the claims against the officers, Saint-Jean sued

the prosecutor who litigated the criminal charges against him,

and two governmental entities: the Palisades Interstate

Parkway Police Department and the Palisades Interstate Park

Commission. 1 Saint-Jean also brought tort claims under New

Jersey law against all the defendants for false imprisonment

and abuse of process.

The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of

jurisdiction and for failure to state plausible claims. See Fed.

R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), (6). The officers’ leading argument was

that they should receive qualified immunity for Saint-Jean’s

constitutional and state-law tort claims. The prosecutor

asserted absolute prosecutorial immunity, and the

governmental defendants relied on state sovereign immunity.

The defendants also argued that the due process claims did not

state a claim for relief.

1

Saint-Jean also sued Bergen County, New Jersey, and several

unidentified officers and prosecutors as John Does. But he

voluntary dismissed Bergen County, and as of the motion to

dismiss, he had not identified or served the John Doe

defendants.

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The District Court granted the motion to dismiss in part

through an order on December 28, 2020. In the accompanying

opinion, the District Court explained that state sovereign

immunity applied to the governmental entities and that

absolute immunity applied to the prosecutor, and on those

grounds, it dismissed all counts against them without

prejudice. See Saint-Jean v. Cnty. of Bergen, 509 F. Supp. 3d

87, 99 (D.N.J. 2020) (entities, federal claims); id. at 114

(entities, state claims); id. at 99–100 (prosecutor, federal

claims); id. at 114–15 (prosecutor, state claims). The District

Court also concluded that Saint-Jean’s allegations did not state

a claim for due process violations, and it dismissed those

counts, also without prejudice. See id. at 113.

But some of Saint-Jean’s claims against the officers

survived dismissal. After accepting the allegations in the

complaint as true, the District Court determined that Saint-Jean

demonstrated a violation of a constitutional right – an arrest

and prosecution without probable cause – that applied with

obvious clarity to Saint-Jean’s particular circumstances, such

that the constitutional violation was clearly-established. See

id. at 109–12. On that basis, the District Court denied qualified

immunity to the officers under federal law and the New Jersey

Tort Claims Act. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 59:3-1; Saint-Jean,

509 F. Supp. 3d. at 111–12 (federal claims); id. at 115 (state

claims). And without qualified immunity under either federal

or state law, the District Court permitted Saint-Jean’s

remaining constitutional and tort claims for false arrest and

malicious prosecution to proceed. See Saint-Jean, 509 F.

Supp. 3d. at 114–16.

The District Court’s order permitted Saint-Jean 30 days to

amend his complaint to cure his pleading deficiencies. Saint-

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Jean amended within that time period – 25 days after the order.

The officers also filed a notice of appeal within that time period

– 30 days after the order.

The officers’ notice of appeal did not automatically stay the

proceedings in District Court. And without a stay, the officers

had to respond to Saint-Jean’s amended complaint. They did

so through a motion to dismiss, again on qualified immunity

grounds. After that motion was fully briefed the District Court

stayed all proceedings in the case for the pendency of this

appeal.

DISCUSSION

Saint-Jean contends that his filing of an amended complaint

moots the appeal. Mootness applies when events occurring

after a court has assumed jurisdiction extinguish the

controversy such that the court can no longer award any

effectual relief to the prevailing party. See Chafin v. Chafin,

568 U.S. 165, 172 (2013); Church of Scientology of Cal. v.

United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992). But here, the District

Court’s order permitted Saint-Jean to amend his complaint

within 30 days, and he did so within that time period and before

the officers appealed. Because the original complaint was

superseded before the appeal, the District Court’s order was

not final as to the officers’ entitlement to qualified immunity

based on the pleadings, and this Court never had jurisdiction to

hear this appeal. Cf. Adam v. Barone, 41 F.4th 230, 233 (3d

Cir. 2022) (explaining that, for purposes of original

jurisdiction, the doctrine of standing addresses events

occurring before the filing of a lawsuit, whereas mootness

governs those arising after). Thus, as explained below, this

appeal should be dismissed for that reason, not mootness.

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1. An order denying qualified immunity

under federal and New Jersey law at the

motion-to-dismiss stage is ordinarily

immediately appealable only with respect

to federal qualified immunity.

Ordinarily, an order denying federal qualified immunity

based on allegations in the complaint is immediately

appealable. Because federal qualified immunity provides

“immunity from suit,” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526

(1985) (emphasis omitted), a party may appeal an order

denying federal qualified immunity at the motion-to-dismiss

stage under the collateral order doctrine. See Behrens v.

Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 308 (1996); George v. Rehiel, 738 F.3d

562, 571 (3d Cir. 2013).

The same is not true for an order denying qualified

immunity under New Jersey’s Tort Claims Act. That law

confers immunity from liability, not immunity from suit. See

Brown v. Grabowski, 922 F.2d 1097, 1107–09 (3d Cir. 1990);

see also N.J. Stat. Ann. § 59:3-1. That difference is

dispositive: because New Jersey’s Tort Claims Act does not

provide immunity from suit, an order denying New Jersey

qualified immunity under that statute is not immediately

appealable. See Lozano v. New Jersey, 9 F.4th 239, 244 (3d

Cir. 2021). Consequently, this Court lacks appellate

jurisdiction over the officers’ appeal of the denial of qualified

immunity under New Jersey law.

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2. An order denying federal qualified

immunity based on a complaint is not

immediately appealable if the order allows

for amendment and the complaint is

amended before an appeal is filed.

Although an order denying federal qualified immunity does

not terminate the proceedings, it is ordinarily immediately

appealable under the collateral order doctrine. See Behrens,

516 U.S. at 308; George, 738 F.3d at 571. See generally

Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 106 (2009)

(explaining that, typically, to be final, an order must “terminate

an action” such that “a district court disassociates itself from a

case” (quoting Swint v. Chambers Cnty. Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35,

42 (1995) and Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S.

541, 545 (1949))). That doctrine recognizes a “small class” of

orders that, even without terminating the proceedings, are

nonetheless subject to appeal. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546. To fit

within that class, an order must have three characteristics:

(1) It must conclusively determine the

disputed question;

(2) It must resolve an important issue

completely separate from the merits of the

action; and

(3) It must be effectively unreviewable on

appeal from a final judgment.

Mohawk Indus., 558 U.S. at 106 (quoting Swint, 514 U.S. at

42); Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546.

The District Court’s order here, however, did more than

deny qualified immunity to the officers based on the original

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complaint. It also permitted Saint-Jean 30 days to amend his

complaint. He did so within that time and before the officers

appealed. Due to the timing of his amendment, the order did

not satisfy the first prong of the collateral order doctrine at the

time of the officers’ appeal.

This appeal will not conclusively resolve a disputed

question. Appellate review of the District Court’s order would

resolve the officers’ qualified immunity only with respect to

the allegations in the original complaint. And here, Saint-Jean

amended his complaint before the officers appealed. Because

an amended complaint “supersedes the pleading it modifies,”

the original complaint “no longer perform[ed] any function in

the case” when the officers appealed, and a ruling on qualified

immunity based on such a pleading would not conclusively

resolve a disputed question. 6B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur

R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1476 (3d ed.); see

also Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 220 (3d Cir. 2017);

Snyder v. Pascack Valley Hosp., 303 F.3d 271, 276 (3d Cir.

2002). And even if this Court were to rule on qualified

immunity now, the District Court would still need to compare

the original complaint with the amended complaint and

analyze whether the appellate ruling would apply after Saint-

Jean’s amendments. Due to the need for that subsequent

comparison of the pleadings, immediate appellate review of the

order would not conclusively determine the officers’

entitlement to qualified immunity. See Swint, 514 U.S. at 42

(explaining that the collateral order doctrine “disallow[s]

appeal from any decision which is tentative, informal or

incomplete” (quoting Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546)).

The officers nonetheless want to know whether they are

entitled to qualified immunity based on the allegations in the

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original complaint. They fear that law-of-the-case principles

would obligate the District Court to adhere to its initial order

denying them qualified immunity. For that reason, they submit

that the original order is conclusive. That concern is

unfounded.

As a prudential principle, law of the case holds that a rule

of law announced in a case should later be applied to “the same

issues in subsequent stages in the litigation.” In re Resyn

Corp., 945 F.2d 1279, 1281 (3d Cir. 1991) (quoting Devex

Corp. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 857 F.2d 197, 199 (3d Cir.

1988)). 2 Law of the case may counsel against, but does not

prevent, a district court from reconsidering its prior rulings.

See Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 (1983) (“Law of

the case directs a court’s discretion, [but] it does not limit the

tribunal’s power.”). 3 Because it is discretionary, law of the

2

See also Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 (1983)

(“[L]aw of the case is an amorphous concept. As most

commonly defined, the doctrine posits that when a court

decides upon a rule of law, that decision should continue to

govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the same

case.”); 18B Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Federal

Practice & Procedure § 4478 (3d ed.) (describing law-of-the-

case doctrine as a “reluctan[ce] to reopen a ruling once made”).

3

See also Messenger v. Anderson, 225 U.S. 436, 444 (1912)

(explaining that law-of-the-case doctrine “merely expresses

the practice of courts generally to refuse to reopen what has

been decided, not a limit to their power”); In re City of Phila.

Litig., 158 F.3d 711, 718 (3d Cir. 1998) (“[T]he law of the case

doctrine does not restrict a court’s power but rather governs its

exercise of discretion.”); 18B Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R.

Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 4478 (3d ed.)

(“Although courts are eager to avoid reconsideration of

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case does not compel the same outcome as before for the

officers’ now pending motion to dismiss the amended

complaint. Even more, an appellate court “is not bound by

district court rulings under the law-of-the-case doctrine”

because “[a]n appellate court’s function is to revisit matters

decided in the trial court.” Musacchio v. United States,

577 U.S. 237, 245 (2016); see also 18B Charles Alan Wright

& Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4478.6

(3d ed.) (observing “the basic principle that adherence by a

lower court to its own ruling as the law of the case does not

defeat appellate review when the issue is properly preserved

and presented”). And even if the District Court applied law of

the case to the officers’ request for qualified immunity based

on the amended complaint, that ruling would ordinarily still be

subject to immediate appellate review as a denial of qualified

immunity at the motion-to-dismiss stage. See Behrens,

516 U.S. at 308; George, 738 F.3d at 571.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court lacks appellate

jurisdiction over the officers’ appeal of the order denying

qualified immunity under federal and New Jersey law, and this

case will be dismissed.

questions once decided in the same proceeding, it is clear that

all federal courts retain power to reconsider if they wish.”).

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