V. Garanin v. Scranton Housing Authority

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Vsevolod Garanin, :

Appellant :

:

v. : No. 233 C.D. 2020

: Submitted: April 14, 2022

Scranton Housing Authority, :

Gary P. Pelucacci, as Executive :

Director of the Scranton Housing :

Authority, in official capacity, :

Karl Lynott, as Deputy Director of :

the Scranton Housing Authority, in :

individual and official capacity, :

and Robert Trudnak, as Inspector :

for the Scranton Housing Authority, :

in official capacity :

BEFORE: HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BY JUDGE DUMAS FILED: September 23, 2022

Vsevolod Garanin pro se appeals from an order of the Court of

Common Pleas of Lackawanna County (trial court), which sustained preliminary

objections filed by the Scranton Housing Authority (Authority) and its Executive

Director Gary P. Pelucacci, Deputy Director Karl Lynott, and Inspector Robert

Trudnak (collectively, Employees), dismissed Garanin’s amended complaint, and

denied Garanin’s motion seeking leave to file a second amended complaint. In this

appeal, Garanin does not challenge the decision of the trial court to sustain the

preliminary objections of the Authority and its Employees. Rather, Garanin asserts

that the trial court erred in denying him leave to file a second amended complaint.

Upon review and discerning no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND1

Garanin owned a rental property in Scranton, Pennsylvania. In March

2016, Trudnak inspected the property and issued a report indicating that it was

suitable as Section 8 housing.2 Relying on the inspection report, Garanin obtained

a property insurance policy from Erie Insurance. Thereafter, in October 2016,

Garanin submitted a property damage claim, asserting that the property’s heating

system had been destroyed by freezing temperatures during the insurance policy

period. The insurer denied the claim, secured evidence that the heating system was

damaged prior to Garanin’s purchase of the policy, and referred the matter to

criminal investigators. Ultimately, the Commonwealth filed criminal charges

against Garanin, who pleaded guilty to an attempted theft charge.3

In April 2019, Garanin commenced this litigation. In his amended

complaint, Garanin alleged negligence by the Authority and its Employees, as well

as civil conspiracy between the Authority, its Employees, and the Lackawanna

County District Attorney’s Office. Essentially, Garanin claimed that Trudnak had

failed to exercise reasonable care or competence in issuing the inspection report, that

Garanin had relied on this report to his detriment, and that the Authority was liable

1

Except as noted otherwise, we derive this brief background from Garanin’s Amended

Complaint, 5/15/19, including exhibits attached thereto.

2

Housing is subsidized by the federal government under Section 8 of the United States

Housing Act (Section 8), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §1437f.

3

The Commonwealth filed criminal charges alleging (1) theft by deception, (2) theft by

deception – failure to correct a false impression, and (3) insurance fraud. See, respectively, 18 Pa.

C.S. §§ 3922(a)(1) & (3), 4117(a)(2). Garanin pleaded guilty to attempted theft by deception –

failure to correct a false impression; the Commonwealth nolle prossed the other criminal charges;

and Garanin was sentenced to four years of restrictive intermediate punishment.

2

for Garanin’s pecuniary loss. Thereafter, according to Garanin, the Authority and

its Employees had conspired with local prosecutors in retaliation against him for

seeking clarification of the Employees’ actions.

By way of preliminary objections, the Authority and its Employees

demurred, asserting sovereign immunity.4,5 Prelim. Objs., 5/15/19. In response,

Garanin filed a motion for leave to amend his complaint further. Mot. for Leave to

Amend Compl., 8/30/19. His proposed second amended complaint added a claim

for negligent conversion. Authority’s Br. in Opp’n, 11/26/19, Ex. A (“Second Am.

Compl.”) ¶¶ 31-32.6 According to Garanin, the Authority and its Employees had

negligently interfered with his right to chattel, i.e., the inspection report. Id. ¶¶ 16,

31.

Following oral argument, the trial court sustained the preliminary

objections, dismissed the amended complaint, and denied Garanin’s motion for leave

to amend. Trial Ct. Mem. & Order, 1/27/20. According to the trial court, Garanin

could not establish an exception to the Agency’s sovereign immunity. In particular,

the court reasoned, claims involving negligent inspection or examination resulting

in erroneous reports or records have been found not to fall within the personal

property exception under 42 Pa.C.S. § 8522(b)(3). Id. at 14-17 (citing, inter alia,

Bufford v. Department of Transportation, 670 A.2d 751 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996)).

4

“Sovereign immunity is an affirmative defense which ordinarily should be raised as new

matter[] but may be raised in preliminary objections when to delay a ruling thereon would serve

no purpose.” Stackhouse v. Pa. State Police, 892 A.2d 54, 60 n.7 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006); see also

Kull v. Guisse, 81 A.3d 148, 160 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013) (sovereign immunity may be raised in

preliminary objections where it is apparent on the face of the pleading that the cause of action does

not fall within the statutory exceptions to sovereign immunity).

5

The Authority is deemed to be a Commonwealth agency for purposes of tort immunity.

Weckel v. Carbondale Hous. Auth., 20 A.3d 1245, 1248 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011).

6

Garanin did not attach the proposed second amended complaint to his motion but

provided it to the Authority and its Employees. See Authority’s Br. in Opp’n at 2.

3

Further, the trial court observed, the General Assembly has not waived sovereign

immunity for intentional acts committed by a Commonwealth employee acting

within the scope of his or her employment. Id. at 12 (citing Paluch v. Department

of Corrections, 175 A.3d 433, 438 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017)). Thus, Garanin’s conspiracy

claim was also barred by sovereign immunity. Id. at 17.

Regarding Garanin’s motion for leave to amend the complaint, the trial

court acknowledged that the right to amend should be liberally granted but

concluded that Garanin’s negligent conversion claim “suffer[ed] from the same

infirmities as his other negligence allegations” because it did not fall within any of

the enumerated exceptions to sovereign immunity under 42 Pa.C.S. § 8522. Id. at

18. Thus, the trial court denied Garanin’s motion. Id.

Garanin timely appealed.

II. ISSUE7

Garanin asserts that the trial court erred in denying him leave to file a

second amended complaint. See generally Garanin’s Br. at 28-33. According to

Garanin, a claim for negligent conversion is not precluded by the doctrine of

sovereign immunity. See id. at 31-32 (citing Shore v. Pennsylvania Department of

Corrections, 168 A.3d 374 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017)). Thus, Garanin concludes, this

7

Garanin raises three questions for this Court’s review, which we have combined into one

for clarity: “[Question 1]: Did Appellant properly seek leave to file a Second Amended Complaint?

. . . [Question 2]: Is the standard for leave to file an amended complaint both ‘liberal’ and ‘[freely]

given’? . . . [Question 3]: Can Appellant overcome the “fatal defect” by way of a post-deprivation

tort (negligent conversion) which the doctrine of sovereign immunity does not preclude?”

Garanin’s Br. at 26 (suggested answers omitted).

4

Court should reverse the decision of the trial court and remand with instructions that

it permit Garanin to amend his complaint. Id. at 33.8

III. ANALYSIS

It is well established that leave to amend is within the sound discretion

of the trial court and will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion. Sobat

v. Borough of Midland, 141 A.3d 618, 627 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (citations omitted).

“An abuse of discretion may not be found merely because the appellate court might

have reached a different conclusion, but requires a showing of manifest

unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support as

to be clearly erroneous.” Wagner v. Pa. Capitol Police Dep’t, 132 A.3d 1051, 1057

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2016).

While amendments should be liberally permitted “in order to allow full

development of a party’s theories and averments,” it is not absolute. Weaver v.

Franklin Cnty., 918 A.2d 194, 203 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007). Amendment is “properly

denied where the complaint’s defects are so substantial that amendment would be

futile. Moreover, the trial court does not abuse its discretion in failing to grant leave

to amend where further amendment could not circumvent a defendant’s immunity.”

Sobat, 141 A.3d at 627 (discerning no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in failing

to give plaintiff an opportunity to amend her complaint where plaintiff’s numerous

assertions would not establish the utility service facilities exception to governmental

immunity).

8

In response, the Authority and its Employees concede that a claim for negligent

conversion may lie under 42 Pa.C.S. § 8522(b)(3), the personal property exception to sovereign

immunity. See Authority’s Br. at 13-14. Nevertheless, they reject Garanin’s prayer for relief.

According to the Authority and its Employees, any claim against them for negligent conversion

would be “legally insufficient, and, therefore, amendment would have been futile.” Id. at 9.

5

Here, Garanin contends that amending his complaint to include a claim

for negligent conversion would overcome the Authority’s sovereign immunity. We

disagree.

A housing authority is deemed a Commonwealth agency, not a local

agency. Weckel, 20 A.3d at 1248 (citing Crosby v. Kotch, 580 A.2d 1191 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 1990)). Thus, housing authorities and their employees are generally

immune from suit pursuant to the Sovereign Immunities Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 8521-

8527. Id.; Hoover v. Stein, 153 A.3d 1145, 1155 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016). A suit may

proceed only if the plaintiff establishes (1) a cause of action that is recognized at

common law or by statute and (2) that the cause of action falls under one of the

enumerated, statutory exceptions to sovereign immunity. Dean v. Dep’t of Transp.,

751 A.2d 1130, 1132 (Pa. 2000); Hoover, 153 A.3d at 1155.9

Under the common law of Pennsylvania, the tort of conversion is

recognized as “the deprivation of another’s right of property in, or use or possession

of, a chattel, or other interference therewith, without the owner’s consent and

without lawful justification.” HRANEC Sheet Metal, Inc. v. Metalico Pittsburgh,

9

In pertinent part, Section 8522(b) provides:

(b) Acts which may impose liability.--The following acts by a Commonwealth party may

result in the imposition of liability on the Commonwealth and the defense of sovereign immunity

shall not be raised to claims for damages caused by:

(1) Vehicle liability. . . .

(2) Medical-professional liability. . . .

(3) Care, custody or control of personal property. . . .

(4) Commonwealth real estate, highways and sidewalks. . . .

(5) Potholes and other dangerous conditions. . . .

(6) Care, custody or control of animals. . . .

(7) Liquor store sales. . . .

(8) National Guard activities. . . .

(9) Toxoids and vaccines. . . .

42 Pa.C.S. § 8522(b) (emphasis omitted). These exceptions are strictly construed “[b]ecause of the

clear intent to insulate [the] government from exposure to tort liability.” Dean, 751 A.2d at 1132.

6

Inc., 107 A.3d 114, 119 (Pa. Super. 2014).10 The tort of conversion does not require

proof of a specific intent to commit a wrong. Id.

A claim for negligent conversion may lie under 42 Pa.C.S. §

8522(b)(3), the personal property exception to sovereign immunity. Shore, 168 A.3d

at 385 n.6; see also Borrero-Bejerano v. Dep’t of Corr. (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 453 C.D.

2018, filed Feb. 8, 2019), 2019 WL 489835 at *5.11 Pursuant to this exception, the

Commonwealth may accept liability for damages caused by “[t]he care, custody or

control of personal property in the possession or control of Commonwealth parties,

including Commonwealth-owned personal property and property of persons held by

a Commonwealth agency.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 8522(b)(3).

Thus, for example, this Court has recognized a potential claim by a state

inmate for monetary damages resulting from the negligent destruction or

confiscation of personal property by prison officials. Shore, 168 A.3d at 385 n.6

(observing that good faith negligence in the destruction or confiscation of an

inmate’s photographs by state officials may invoke the personal property exception);

Borrero-Bejerano, 2019 WL 489835 at *5, *7 (concluding that a plaintiff could

proceed with his claim that prison officials negligently contributed to the loss of his

watch).

However, in order to invoke this exception, “the personal property

possessed or controlled by the Commonwealth party must directly cause, and not

merely facilitate, the plaintiff's injuries.” Mazur v. Cuthbert, 186 A.3d 490, 498 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 2018) (citing Pa. State Police v. Klimek, 839 A.2d 1173, 1175 (Pa. Cmwlth.

10

We may cite published decisions of the Pennsylvania Superior Court for their persuasive

value. Dep’t of Env’t Prot. v. B&R Res., LLC, 270 A.3d 580, 595 n.21 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021).

11

We cite Borrero-Bejerano for its persuasive value pursuant to Rule 126(b)(1) of the

Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, Pa.R.A.P 126(b)(1), and Section 414(a) of this Court’s

Internal Operating Procedures, 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a).

7

2003)). It is well settled that “alleged[ly] negligent, erroneous[,] and inaccurate

examinations by a Commonwealth agency, [as well as] allegedly erroneous reports,

are outside the exceptions to sovereign immunity.” Bufford, 670 A.2d at 754.

In Bufford, for example, the plaintiff was detained by police after

discovering that the plaintiff was driving with a suspended license. Id. at 751.

However, the plaintiff’s driving privileges had been suspended incorrectly. Id. The

plaintiff commenced litigation, alleging that the Pennsylvania Department of

Transportation had suspended his license negligently and that this negligence had

subjected him to arrest, detention, and false imprisonment. Id. at 752. The trial court

overruled the Department’s assertion of sovereign immunity, but on appeal, this

Court reversed. Criticizing the Department’s “inept behavior,” we nonetheless

declined to interpret the personal property exception broadly as “a mechanism for

the recovery of damages inflicted by administrative decision making and the

negligent recordation of any information first stored and then disgorged by any

Commonwealth agency.” Id. at 755; see also Dean, 751 A.2d at 1132 (instructing

that exceptions are strictly construed).

Similarly, here, the Authority and its Employees may have negligently

inspected Garanin’s property. The inspection revealed no problems with the heating

system and resulted in a report indicating that the property was suitable as Section 8

housing. However, even if we assume that this erroneous report facilitated Garanin’s

injuries, such negligence falls outside the personal property exception to sovereign

immunity. See Bufford, 670 A.2d at 755. Thus, as noted by the trial court, Garanin’s

proposed claim of negligent conversion suffers from the same defect as his other

negligence claims, i.e., Garanin cannot establish an enumerated, statutory exception

8

to the sovereign immunity that insulates the Authority and its Employees from

liability. See Dean, 751 A.2d at 1132; Hoover, 153 A.3d at 1155.

Garanin’s right to amend his pleadings is not absolute, and as his

proposed amendment would be futile, we discern no abuse of the trial court’s

discretion in denying Garanin’s motion for leave to amend his complaint. Sobat,

141 A.3d at 627; Weaver, 918 A.2d at 203. Thus, we affirm.

LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

9

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Vsevolod Garanin, :

Appellant :

:

v. : No. 233 C.D. 2020

:

Scranton Housing Authority, :

Gary P. Pelucacci, as Executive :

Director of the Scranton Housing :

Authority, in official capacity, :

Karl Lynott, as Deputy Director of :

the Scranton Housing Authority, in :

individual and official capacity, :

and Robert Trudnak, as Inspector :

for the Scranton Housing Authority, :

in official capacity :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 23rd day of September, 2022, the order entered by

the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County in the above-captioned matter

on January 27, 2020, is AFFIRMED.

LORI A. DUMAS, Judge