Opinion

Earheart, Jr., John v. Central Transport, Inc.

  • 2022 TN WC 69
Court
Tennessee Court of Workers' Compensation Claims
Filed
Sep 15, 2022
Status
Published
On the bench
Kenneth M. Switzer
Cited by
0 cases

The opinion

FILED

Sep 15, 2022

09:36 AM(CT)

TENNESSEE COURT OF

WORKERS' COMPENSATION

CLAIMS

TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION

IN THE COURT OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION CLAIMS

AT NASHVILLE

John Earheart, Jr., ) Docket No. 2019-06-1297

Employee, )

v. )

Central Transport, Inc., ) State File No. 52124-2018

Employer, )

And )

Cherokee Insurance Co., ) Judge Kenneth M. Switzer

Carrier. )

COMPENSATION ORDER

At a compensation hearing on September 6, 2022, the parties narrowed the issues to

just one: John Earheart, Jr.’s entitlement to attorney’s fees and costs for Central Transport,

Inc.’s alleged wrongful failure to timely pay temporary disability benefits.

The parties previously resolved the question of his eligibility for these benefits. In

May 2021, Central Transport agreed to pay them on the record at an in-person hearing, and

the Court ordered that Central Transport pay the amount owed. Central Transport now

argues it should not be responsible for attorney’s fees and costs because the Court did not

make a “finding,” as the statute requires, that the benefits were owed at the expedited

hearing. Mr. Earheart countered that Central Transport’s agreement to pay came only after

extensive time and effort on his lawyer’s part.

The Court agrees with Mr. Earheart and awards all the agreed benefits to which he

is entitled under the Workers’ Compensation Law, as well as reasonable attorney’s fees

and costs totaling $50,505.50.

Claim History

Mr. Earheart worked as a delivery driver for Central Transport. On August 15,

2016, he fell on the deck of a trailer, trapping his right leg underneath him. He tore the

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labrum in his right hip, which Dr. Thomas Byrd, an authorized physician, surgically

repaired in April 2017.

Afterward, Mr. Earheart continued treating the hip with Dr. Byrd. In May 2018, he

first reported heel pain that radiated up to his back. He requested treatment for his back,

which Central Transport denied. Ultimately he filed a hearing request seeking a decision

on the record. Central Transport did not object to the Court deciding the issues by a review

of the record, nor did it submit a brief or evidence to support its defense. The Court ordered

Central Transport to offer panels to treat Mr. Earheart’s hip and back, although Dr. Byrd

later resumed treating the hip. The Court also referred the case to the Compliance Program

for consideration of the imposition of penalties.

Mr. Earheart later filed an additional request for expedited hearing, this time seeking

temporary disability benefits. After prolonged discovery, the day before the May 13, 2021

hearing, Central Transport agreed to pay the requested sum. It later agreed to a twenty-

five percent penalty as well. The parties announced this agreement at the hearing, and the

Court issued an expedited hearing order memorializing it and ordering the agreed relief.

At that time, the Court reserved ruling on Mr. Earheart’s request for attorney’s fees and

costs under section 50-6-226(d)(1)(B). This order, like the first expedited hearing order,

referred the case to the Compliance Program for consideration of the imposition of

penalties.

After completing treatment, the parties agreed to a permanent impairment of four

percent. According to the final dispute certification notice, they disagreed on Mr.

Earheart’s entitlement to increased benefits and whether Central Transport should pay his

attorney’s fees. But at the outset of the compensation hearing, Central Transport

announced it agreed to pay the increased benefits of $20,068.79 that Mr. Earheart had

demanded.

Mr. Earheart offered uncontroverted proof, over Central Transport’s objection,

regarding the events that led to him filing the second request for expedited hearing and

specifically requesting the attorney’s fee and costs.1

He testified that in October 2018, the nurse case manager informed him that he was

scheduled to see Dr. Malcolm Baxter. Mr. Earheart thought Dr. Baxter was treating his

1

Central Transport argued that, since it agreed to pay the increased permanent partial disability benefits,

the parties did not need to offer proof. The Court disagreed and allowed it not on that issue, but rather on

the attorney’s fees and costs dispute relative to temporary disability benefits. Central Transport’s attorney

stated that he would have brought witnesses and introduced other proof had he known this was an issue.

However, in an attachment to the dispute certification notice, he wrote to the mediator, “I believe the

attorney fees and whether or not the EE is eligible for the PPD multipliers would be the only two disputed

issues.”

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back, but instead he had been hired to perform an employer’s examination. Dr. Baxter

placed him at maximum medical improvement after a single visit.

Central Transport argued that its adjuster, Mike Gehringer, did not know that Mr.

Earheart was under Dr. Byrd’s restrictions when it sought Dr. Baxter’s opinion. However,

Mr. Earheart introduced a form listing restrictions from Dr. Byrd. The form notes that it

was faxed to Mr. Gehringer on February 24, 2018.

Mr. Earheart testified that he had been working light duty after his hip surgery

starting in March 2018, performing clerical work at Central Transport and later at

FiftyForward, a senior center. He was working at FiftyForward on December 18 when Mr.

Gehringer called to inform him that he was released at maximum medical improvement

and should immediately contact Central Transport.

Mr. Earheart said he called his supervisors and the local HR supervisor, all of whom

seemed to know nothing about the release or if he was still on light duty. Mr. Earheart then

suggested he take three days of paid time off on December 19-21, “while everything gets

sorted out.” They agreed, the paid time off was approved, and he was paid for that time.

But when Mr. Earheart attempted to clock in on the first work day after the Christmas

holiday on December 26, he was unable to do so and sent home.

Mr. Earheart introduced notes from the adjuster dated January 2, 2019, stating:

EMP Terminated today. Separation approved with effective date of

12/14/2018. Employee was deemed/notified of MMI status with a minimal

% impairment rating and failed or otherwise refused to return to the position

for which he was originally hired despite contacting local terminal staff,

acknowledging same release and commitment to return to work. As such,

same actions or omissions constituted job abandonment[.]

Mr. Earheart received an email on January 2 stating that he was “voluntarily” terminated.

The email closely tracked the adjuster’s note: “deemed/notified of MMI status with a

minimal % impairment rating and failed or otherwise refused to return to the position for

which he was originally hired despite contacting local terminal staff, acknowledging same

release and commitment to return to work.”

Mr. Earheart testified that a separation letter he received later stated that he had not

worked on December 13, 14 and 17, but he did, as shown by the timesheets. The timesheets

also listed “PTO” days on December 19-21. He maintained that he never violated Central

Transport’s attendance policy or had any “points” for other nonattendance.

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After the termination, Mr. Earheart found another job in August 2019 performing

similar work but which does not require him to load and unload his truck. He received no

income during the eight months he continued healing from the injury.

Central Transport offered no proof regarding the propriety of Mr. Earheart’s

discharge—specifically, it did not introduce evidence of a workplace rule regarding

attendance or that Mr. Earheart violated this or any other rule. It also did not attempt to

disprove that Mr. Earheart remained under Dr. Byrd’s work restrictions before and after he

was terminated.

In support of his request for attorney’s fees and costs, Mr. Earheart’s lawyer

introduced an affidavit requesting $300 per hour. He attached a detailed statement listing

the dates and tasks performed. The total amount requested is $35,910.00 in attorney’s fees

and $14,595.50 in costs, or $50,505.50.

Mr. Earheart’s lawyer did not take twenty percent of the temporary disability award

in May 2021. He said he started tracking his time only after the first expedited hearing

order in October 2020.

Counsel acknowledged that Mr. Earheart had also hired him to pursue a separate

claim against Central Transport for a retaliatory discharge. That case, removed to federal

court, was ultimately dismissed on summary judgment, appealed and then settled for a

confidential, “substantial” amount during the pendency of the appeal. Mr. Earheart’s

lawyer took one-third of that recovery. Counsel said that the issue in that lawsuit was

“intimately, intricately intertwined” with the issues in the workers’ compensation case.

In response, Central Transport did not contest the reasonableness of the hourly rate

his counsel requested, nor did it dispute the accuracy of his statement detailing his time

and work performed. However, Central Transport pointed out that many of the tasks Mr.

Earheart’s lawyer listed related to the retaliatory discharge claim and that it was represented

by a different attorney in that claim. Central Transport’s workers’ compensation attorney

attended some but not all of the depositions. Its counsel conceded that the depositions of

the adjuster and Dr. Byrd were necessary to the outcome in this case.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

At a compensation hearing, Mr. Earheart must present sufficient evidence showing

that he is entitled to the requested relief by a preponderance of the evidence. Tenn. Code

Ann. § 50-6-239(c)(6) (2021).

As an initial matter, Central Transport argued that because it agreed to pay the

disputed temporary disability benefits previously (and now the contested increased

benefits), fees under section 50-6-226(d)(1)(B) are inapplicable.

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That subdivision states that a court may order fees and costs when the employer

“wrongfully fails to timely initiate any of the benefits to which the employee is entitled . .

. if the workers’ compensation judge makes a finding that the benefits were owed at an

expedited or compensation hearing.” (Emphasis added). The Appeals Board has

interpreted this provision so that “to be eligible for an award of reasonable attorney’s fees

and expenses under section 226(d)(1), an employee must show . . . that the employer was

erroneous or incorrect in denying the employee’s claim for benefits.” Walls v. United

Technologies Corp., 2021 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 27, at *19 (Aug. 6, 2021).

According to Central Transport, the Court did not “make a finding” but rather

Central Transport voluntarily agreed to pay the disputed benefits, so this subdivision does

not come into play.

The Court disagrees. If it were to accept this excessively strict reading of the statute,

an employer would have no incentive to timely initiate benefits, but could always wait until

its feet are held to the fire and then comply at the last minute, without consequences. This

is inconsistent with a fair, expeditious, and efficient workers’ compensation system.

Moreover, as Mr. Earheart’s attorney argued, Central Transport made this decision

only after he had expended significant time and effort. While the Court did not specifically

make a “finding” in the expedited hearing order for temporary disability benefits, it

implicitly did so by explicitly holding the attorney’s fee issue in abeyance.

Further, the statute permits this type of finding after an expedited “or compensation

hearing,” so nothing precludes this Court from weighing the evidence now and making a

finding at this compensation hearing. Central Transport was aware that attorney’s fees

were disputed, as shown by its attorney’s communication with the mediator about the

issues for trial. But also, the August 19 Order on Motion to Quash memorializes that

attorney’s fees is an issue and that Central Transport’s attorney told the Court he did not

plan to offer proof at the hearing. Central Transport and its counsel made a strategic choice

at that time.

Considering the evidence, Mr. Earheart credibly testified, and supported with

documentary evidence, that he reported to work at all scheduled times while on light-duty

for Central Transport. “A termination due to a violation of workplace rules may relieve an

employer of its obligation to provide temporary partial disability benefits, provided the

termination was related to the workplace violation.” Jones v. Crencor Leasing and Sales,

2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 48, at *8 (Dec. 11, 2015).

No proof here suggests that Mr. Earheart violated a workplace rule, so Central

Transport was never relieved of its obligation to provide temporary disability benefits. The

Court finds that Central Transport was erroneous or incorrect in its decisions: 1) to rely

5

upon an opinion on maximum medical improvement from its own physician rather than

the authorized doctor, and 2) to terminate Mr. Earheart, thereby ending temporary disability

benefits.

This conclusion is bolstered, as Mr. Earheart’s counsel suggested, by Tennessee

Code Annotated section 50-6-234(b). It states in relevant part that “the determination of

attainment of maximum medical improvement . . . shall be made by the physician selected

in accordance with § 50-6-204.” Here, Dr. Byrd was the panel-selected physician and the

proper candidate to pronounce maximum medical improvement, not Dr. Baxter, the

employer’s examination physician.

Therefore, the Court finds at this compensation hearing that Central Transport

wrongfully failed to timely pay the temporary disability benefits to which Mr. Earheart was

entitled. The Court further finds that Mr. Earheart’s attorney’s extensive efforts, including

deposing numerous lay witnesses and Dr. Byrd, led to Central Transport conceding on the

eve of trial that those benefits were owed. Mr. Earheart is entitled to reasonable attorney’s

fees and costs under section 50-6-226(d)(1)(B).

The question now becomes, what amount of fees and costs is “reasonable”? Mr.

Earheart’s counsel argued that he had to take thirteen depositions, costing approximately

$14,000, which he advanced. He characterized the issues in the workers’ compensation

case and the retaliatory discharge lawsuit as “intimately, intricately intertwined.”

For his part, Central Transport’s attorney conceded that the depositions of Dr. Byrd

and Mr. Gehringer were necessary to this case, but he questioned the relevance of the rest

of the depositions, some of which he did not even attend. The depositions are almost all

styled for the retaliatory discharge lawsuit and not this case.

Admittedly, many of the tasks Mr. Earheart’s lawyer performed advanced both

cases. But it would be impossible to apportion them to one case or the other. The Court

agrees with Mr. Earheart’s attorney that a retaliatory discharge allegation (federal case)

and whether Mr. Earheart violated a workplace rule (workers’ compensation case) involve

similar factual issues. While the total amount of fees and costs is sizeable, Central

Transport did not agree to pay the temporary disability benefits until the eve of trial. It had

opportunities to reach that conclusion sooner but did not. In sum, the Court finds that all

the work and expense was necessary to make Central Transport reach its eleventh-hour

decision. The amount is reasonable.

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:

1. Central Transport shall provide medical treatment with Dr. Byrd for Mr.

Earheart’s hip that is causally related to the work injury, reasonable and

6

necessary. Likewise it shall provide medical treatment with Dr. Mathews for his

back that is causally related to the work injury, reasonable and necessary.

2. By the parties’ agreement, Mr. Earheart is entitled to $20,068.79 in permanent

partial disability benefits.

3. Central Transport must pay $50,505.50 in attorney’s fees and costs to Mr.

Earheart’s counsel.

4. Central Transport or the Carrier shall pay the $150 filing fee to the Clerk of the

Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims no later than five business days after

this order becomes final.

5. Central Transport or the Carrier shall complete and file an SD2 form within ten

days after the order becomes final.

6. Unless appealed, this order shall become final thirty days after entry.

ENTERED September 15, 2022.

_____________________________________

JUDGE KENNETH M. SWITZER

Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims

APPENDIX

Technical Record:

1. Petition for Benefit Determination, July 12, 2019

2. Dispute Certification Notice, September 11, 2020

3. Request for Expedited Hearing, September 17, 2020

4. Expedited Hearing Order Granting Medical Benefits (Decision on the Record)

5. Order on Status Hearing, December 9, 2020

6. Petition for Benefit Determination, January 21, 2021

7. Order on Status Hearing, March 8, 2021

8. Dispute Certification Notice, March 12, 2021

9. Hearing Request, March 31, 2021

10. Pretrial Hearing Order

11. Pre-Trial Brief of Employee, April 28, 2021

12. Order

13. Order on Status Hearing, June 7, 2021

14. Order on Status Hearing, August 10, 2021

15. Order on Status Hearing, October 26, 2021

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16. Order on Status Hearing, January 10, 2022

17. Order on Status Hearing, April 12, 2022

18. Order Setting Compensation Hearing

19. Dispute Certification Notice, August 1, 2022, and additional issues

20. Motion to Quash Subpoena

21. Reply in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Quash Subpoena

22. Order on Motion to Quash

23. Pre-Trial Statement of Employee

24. Employer’s Pre-Hearing Statement

Exhibits:

A. Declaration of John Earheart

1. (See Expedited Hearing Order Granting Medical Benefits (Decision on the

Record))

2. Fax/restrictions

3. Dr. Baxter Independent Medical Examination, October 25, 2018

4. Transition2Work Weekly Timesheet, December 14, 2018, December 18, 2018

5. Miscellaneous Pay Request, December 29, 2018

6. Central Transport termination letter to Mr. Earheart, January 2, 2019

7. Deposition transcript excerpt, James “Matt” Combs

8. Deposition transcript excerpt, Steven Mann Skelley

9. Dr. Liddle records, March 20, 2019

B. Deposition Transcript of Dean Kuska

C. Deposition Transcript of Dr. Thomas Byrd, January 12, 2021, January 19, 2021

D. Abridged Deposition Transcripts

1. Michael Gehringer, December 16, 2020

2. Michael Gehringer, January 11, 2021

3. Michael Gehringer, February 4, 2021

4. Steven Mann Skelley

5. James “Matt” Combs

6. Marnie Huss

E. Employee’s Telephone Records

F. 1. Affidavit of D. Andrew Saulters

2. Saulters’s Statement of Services/Time

3. Costs

G. Workers’ Compensation-Employee Medical & Work Status Form-Dr. Byrd,

February 23, 2018

H. Employee Acknowledgement, modified duty at Fifty Forward, July 11, 2018,

I. Text message, nurse case manager, setting appointment with Dr. Baxter

J. Liberty Bell Agency, Inc.-Status Form

K. Eform, January 2, 20219, Terminated Driver/Dock Worker Notice

L. Transition2Work Weekly Timesheets, December 14, 2018, December 18, 2018

M. Pay Stub, January 4, 2019, for pay period December 16-22, 2018

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of this Compensation Order was sent as indicated on September

15, 2022.

Name Certified Via Via Service sent to:

Mail Fax Email

Drew Saulters, X dsaulters@ortalekelley.com

Employee’s attorney jarmstrong@ortalekelley.com

Richard Clark, X rclark@eraclides.com

Employer’s attorney

_____________________________________

Penny Shrum, Clerk of Court

WC.CourtClerk@tn.gov

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Compensation Order Right to Appeal:

If you disagree with this Compensation Order, you may appeal to the Workers’

Compensation Appeals Board. To do so, you must:

1. Complete the enclosed form entitled “Notice of Appeal” and file it with the Clerk of the

Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims within thirty calendar days of the date the

Compensation Order was filed. When filing the Notice of Appeal, you must serve a copy

upon the opposing party (or attorney, if represented).

2. You must pay, via check, money order, or credit card, a $75.00 filing fee within ten calendar

days after filing the Notice of Appeal. Payments can be made in-person at any Bureau office

or by U.S. mail, hand-delivery, or other delivery service. In the alternative, you may file an

Affidavit of Indigency (form available on the Bureau’s website or any Bureau office)

seeking a waiver of the filing fee. You must file the fully-completed Affidavit of Indigency

within ten calendar days of filing the Notice of Appeal. Failure to timely pay the filing

fee or file the Affidavit of Indigency will result in dismissal of your appeal.

3. You are responsible for ensuring a complete record is presented on appeal. The Court Clerk

will prepare the technical record and exhibits for submission to the Appeals Board, and you

will receive notice once it has been submitted. If no court reporter was present at the hearing,

you may request from the Court Clerk the audio recording of the hearing for a $25.00 fee.

A licensed court reporter must prepare a transcript, and you must file it with the Court Clerk

within fifteen calendar days of filing the Notice of Appeal. Alternatively, you may file a

statement of the evidence prepared jointly by both parties within fifteen calendar days of

filing the Notice of Appeal. The statement of the evidence must convey a complete and

accurate account of the testimony presented at the hearing. The Workers’ Compensation

Judge must approve the statement of the evidence before the record is submitted to the

Appeals Board. If the Appeals Board must review testimony or other proof concerning

factual matters, the absence of a transcript or statement of the evidence can be a significant

obstacle to meaningful appellate review.

4. After the Workers’ Compensation Judge approves the record and the Court Clerk transmits

it to the Appeals Board, a docketing notice will be sent to the parties. You have fifteen

calendar days after the date of that notice to file a brief to the Appeals Board. See the Rules

governing the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board on the Bureau’s website

If neither party timely files an appeal with the Appeals Board, the trial court’s Order will

become final by operation of law thirty calendar days after entry. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-

239(c)(7).

For self-represented litigants: Help from an Ombudsman is available at 800-332-2667.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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