James Wells v. Jeff Coker

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 11-3428

JAMES W ELLS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

JEFF C OKER, in his Individual Capacity, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of Illinois.

No. 3:08-cv-03302—Sue E. Myerscough, Judge.

A RGUED JULY 11, 2012—D ECIDED F EBRUARY 12, 2013

Before P OSNER, M ANION, and T I NDER, Circuit Judges.

T INDER, Circuit Judge. At around midnight on January 1,

2008, James Wells decided to celebrate New Year’s Eve

by shooting his gun into the air from his back porch.

His celebration ended when Officer Jeffrey Coker of the

Springfield, Illinois, Police Department shot him three

times. What transpired in the moments between those

two events is at the heart of this case.

2 No. 11-3428

Wells pleaded guilty to reckless conduct for his actions

on that night. The charge to which he entered a guilty

plea stated that he “discharged a firearm multiple

times . . . and then pointed the firearm at [Coker].” Prior

to entering this guilty plea, Wells sued Coker and his

employer, the City of Springfield, alleging that Coker

used excessive force in shooting Wells. Coker contends

that his force was reasonable under the Fourth Amend-

ment and state law because Wells pointed his gun at

him. The district court granted summary judgment

to the defendants after determining that Wells was judi-

cially estopped from denying that he had pointed

the gun at Coker because Wells pleaded guilty to a

charge that included the statement that he had pointed

the gun at Coker. Because neither judicial estoppel nor

other doctrines of preclusion apply to the particular

facts of Wells’s plea agreement, we reverse the district

court’s order.

I. Background

The factual background for this appeal is deceptively

simple. The parties agree that Wells shot his gun into

the air several times to celebrate the New Year of 2008.

They also agree that, after arriving at the scene to investi-

gate the gunfire, Coker shot Wells three times, seriously

injuring Wells. The only material fact in dispute is

whether Wells pointed his gun at Coker before Coker

fired at Wells. Coker claims that Wells turned toward

him and pointed a gun in his direction, whereas Wells

denies doing so.

No. 11-3428 3

On January 30, 2008, the Sangamon County State’s

Attorney’s Office filed an information charging Wells

with reckless discharge of a firearm, a felony, and

stated that he “endangered the bodily safety of an indi-

vidual in that, while acting in a reckless manner, he

discharged a firearm multiple times.” On August 11,

2009, the State’s Attorney filed a second count against

Wells, charging him with reckless conduct, a misde-

meanor. This second count alleged that Wells “en-

dangered the bodily safety of individuals in that, while

acting in a reckless manner, he discharged a firearm

multiple times . . . and then pointed the firearm at

Officer Jeff Coker” (emphasis added). See 720 ILCS 5/12-

5(a)(1) (“A person commits reckless conduct when he

or she . . . recklessly performs an act or acts that

cause bodily harm to or endanger the safety of another

person”). Either of these two factual bases—discharging

a gun in a residential neighborhood or pointing a gun

at Coker—would have been sufficient, standing alone,

to support a guilty plea for reckless conduct. Through

an agreement with the State to dismiss the felony

count, Wells pleaded guilty to this second count on

that same day, following a plea hearing during which

the court recited the terms of this second count to

Wells, who replied by agreeing that he understood the

charge and all possible penalties. Wells’s lawyer was

present during this plea hearing. The transcript of the

guilty plea hearing (which Wells introduced in opposi-

tion to the State’s summary judgment motion) shows

that the discussion of the facts supporting the charge

was brief and that Wells’s guilty plea was not specific

4 No. 11-3428

with respect to whether he was admitting to shooting

the firearm, pointing it at Coker, or both:

The Court: All right, in Count II, Mr. Wells,

you’re charged with the offense of

Reckless Conduct. It’s alleged that

on or about the 1st day of January,

2008, within Sangamon County,

that you endangered the bodily

safety of individuals in that, while

acting in a reckless manner, you dis-

charged a firearm in the air multiple

times in a residential neighborhood

while celebrating New Year’s Eve

and then pointed the firearm at Offi-

cer Jeff Coker of the Springfield Po-

lice Department.

As charged, it’s a Class A misde-

meanor punishable up to a year in

jail, $2,500 fine, and you could be

sentenced to probation, conditional

discharge or periodic imprisonment.

Do you understand the charge in

Count II and all of the possible pen-

alties for a Class A misdemeanor?

Wells: Yes.

...

The Court: How do you plead to the charge of

Reckless Conduct, a Class A misde-

meanor, in Count II?

No. 11-3428 5

Wells: Guilty.

During the period between the filing of the first and

second criminal charge, Wells brought a civil rights

action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Coker, alleging

that Coker’s decision to shoot Wells violated Wells’s

constitutional rights. Wells also sued the City of Spring-

field under a Monell custom or policy theory, Monell v.

New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978),

and included some state tort law claims as well.1 The

defendants moved for summary judgment on May 20,

2011, arguing that, since the charge to which Wells

pleaded guilty stated that Wells pointed a loaded gun

at Coker, Coker’s use of deadly force in response was

justified. In response, Wells denied aiming his gun at

Coker. But he admitted that after he shot several

rounds in the air, his gun still contained a few rounds

of ammunition.

In litigating the motion for summary judgment, the

parties also disputed the legal significance of Wells’s

guilty plea for reckless conduct. The defendants argued

that Wells admitted to pointing his gun at Coker when

he pleaded guilty in 2009 to recklessly endangering the

safety of another person that New Year’s Eve. They

observed that the information to which he pleaded

guilty alleged that Wells had “discharged a firearm in

1

These claims, however, require no separate discussion—either

by the district court in considering the defendants’ motion or

on appeal—because the judgment was based entirely on

whether Wells could contest that he pointed a gun at Coker.

6 No. 11-3428

the air multiple times in a residential neighborhood

while celebrating New Year’s Eve and then pointed the

firearm at Officer Jeff Coker.” Wells responded that he

pleaded guilty to only the offense of reckless conduct,

not to the facts in the information.

The district court granted summary judgment for

the defendants on all counts. The district court con-

cluded that Wells had admitted that he had pointed his

gun at Coker when he pleaded guilty to the charge

of reckless conduct, and that Wells was therefore

judicially estopped from denying that he had pointed

his gun at Coker. Thus, the district court reasoned, it

was undisputed that Wells had pointed his gun at

Coker and Coker’s use of force was objectively reason-

able. The district court conceded that if Wells had not

been bound by the admission, the question of whether

Wells had pointed his gun at Coker would have been

disputed, and summary judgment therefore would

have been inappropriate.

On appeal, Wells argues that the district court erred

by applying judicial estoppel. He reasons that, in

pleading guilty to reckless conduct, he did not admit

that he had pointed a gun at Coker. That allegation,

he contends, was superfluous to the charge that by dis-

charging his gun overhead he committed reckless con-

duct. As a result, he concludes, he may and does dispute

whether he pointed a loaded gun at Coker, so summary

judgment was inappropriate.

No. 11-3428 7

II. Discussion

A. Legal Standard

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo.

Repa v. Roadway Express, Inc., 477 F.3d 938, 940 (7th Cir.

2007). Summary judgment is appropriate where “the

pleadings and submissions in the record indicate the

absence of any genuine issues of material fact, such that

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law.” Mercatus Grp., LLC v. Lake Forest Hosp., 641 F.3d

834, 839 (7th Cir. 2011). A genuine issue of material

fact exists when “the evidence is such that a reasonable

jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we construe

the facts in the non-movant’s favor. Kuhn v. Goodlow,

678 F.3d 552, 555 (7th Cir. 2012).

B. Judicial Estoppel

In determining whether Wells is judicially estopped

from denying pointing the gun at Coker, we apply

federal law concerning judicial estoppel. The Full Faith

and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution and 28 U.S.C.

§ 1738 require a federal court to give a state judgment

the same effect it would have in state court, which

typically requires the federal court to apply state law

concerning preclusion doctrines. See, e.g., Chi. Title Land

Trust Co. v. Potash Corp. of Saskatchewan Sales Ltd., 664

F.3d 1075, 1079 (7th Cir. 2011). Judicial estoppel, however,

“is not part of the law of judgments in Illinois so much

8 No. 11-3428

as it is a rule of evidence or pleading.” Astor Chauffeured

Limousine Co. v. Runnfeldt Inv. Corp., 910 F.2d 1540, 1550

(7th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). Thus, federal law

applies. Id.

The doctrine of judicial estoppel prevents a party

from prevailing on an argument in an earlier matter

and then relying on a contradictory argument to prevail

in a subsequent matter. See New Hampshire v. Maine,

532 U.S. 742, 749 (2001). In determining whether a party

is judicially estopped from raising an argument, we

examine three factors: (i) whether the party’s positions

in the two litigations are clearly inconsistent; (ii) whether

the party successfully persuaded a court to accept

its earlier position; and (iii) whether the party would

derive an unfair advantage if not judicially estopped. Id.

at 750-51; see also United States v. Christian, 342 F.3d 744,

747 (7th Cir. 2003). In addition, to qualify as a judicial

admission, a statement also must be “deliberate, clear,

and unambiguous.” Robinson v. McNeil Consumer Health-

care, 615 F.3d 861, 872 (7th Cir. 2010).

We need not reach this test, however, since Wells did

not “prevail” in his criminal case. After pleading guilty

to reckless conduct, Wells was sentenced to two years

of probation and two days in jail. At best, perhaps one

could say that Wells “prevailed” in the sense that he

avoided a trial for reckless discharge of a firearm, a

felony for which Wells, if convicted, likely would have

received a more onerous sentence. But this argument

is specious. After all, Wells could have been acquitted

had he gone to trial on the felony charge. Moreover,

No. 11-3428 9

the State also benefitted from its compromise with

Wells, trading the uncertainty of a jury trial for a known

outcome while conserving prosecutorial resources.

Given the compromise nature of this plea agreement, re-

ferring to Wells as the prevailing party is a bridge too far.

Although we have applied judicial estoppel to

arguments made in prior proceedings where there was

no definitive winner or loser, we do not do so in this

particular case, where the disposition involved a

criminal conviction. In Kale v. Obuchowski, we held that

the appellant was judicially estopped from claiming that

he owned certain assets during a business dispute,

when he had denied owning them during an earlier

divorce proceeding. 985 F.2d 360, 361-62 (7th Cir. 1993).

That divorce proceeding was resolved with a court-ap-

proved divorce settlement. Id. at 361. As with Wells’s

plea agreement, neither party to that divorce settle-

ment won all that it had desired. But the similarities

end there. Even though Mr. Kale did not strictly “pre-

vail” in his divorce, he received a highly favorable

settlement. This court characterized him as having

“triumph[ed] by inducing [his] opponent[] to surrender.”

Id. at 362. In the instant case, one can hardly say that

Wells “triumph[ed].” Given this important difference

between Kale and Wells’s appeal, we decline to extend

our decision in Kale to the circumstances here.2

2

While some of our sister circuits have applied judicial

estoppel to guilty pleas in specific instances following highly

(continued...)

10 No. 11-3428

C. Issue Preclusion

Neither does the doctrine of issue preclusion prevent

Wells from contesting whether he pointed a gun at Coker.

We apply Illinois law concerning issue preclusion

to determine whether Wells’s state court conviction

collaterally estops him from pursuing a § 1983 claim. See

Brown v. City of Chicago, 599 F.3d 772, 774 (7th Cir. 2010).

In Illinois, a litigant is estopped from raising an issue in

a collateral proceeding when the following four factors

are met: “(1) the party against whom the estoppel is

asserted was a party to the prior adjudication, (2) the

issues which form the basis of the estoppel were

actually litigated and decided on the merits in the

prior suit, (3) the resolution of the particular issue was

necessary to the court’s judgments, and (4) those issues

are identical to issues raised in the subsequent suit.”

Wozniak v. DuPage County, 845 F.2d 677, 682-83 (7th Cir.

1988) (quotation marks and citation omitted); accord

Talarico v. Dunlap, 667 N.E.2d 570, 572 (Ill. App. Ct.

1996), aff’d, 685 N.E.2d 325 (Ill. 1997).

In Wells’s case, the third factor plainly is not met.

According to the second count filed in Wells’s criminal

case, Wells both discharged his gun in the air and pointed

2

(...continued)

fact-dependent analyses, see, e.g., Bradford v. Wiggins, 516

F.3d 1189, 1195 (10th Cir. 2008); Thore v. Howe, 466 F.3d 173, 185

(1st Cir. 2006); Lowery v. Stovall, 92 F.3d 219, 224 (4th Cir.

1996), we do not believe that the facts concerning Wells’s

plea agreement and plea colloquy warrant the same treatment.

No. 11-3428 11

the gun at Coker. Either of these actions, taken in

isolation, would have supported Wells’s guilty plea

for reckless conduct. Therefore, the resolution of the

issue of whether Wells pointed his gun at Coker was not

necessary to the judgment in the earlier criminal case.

At first glance, it may seem peculiar that, where each

of two alternative factual bases would be sufficient to

support a guilty plea but neither is necessary, this inde-

terminacy means that neither of the two bases can bind

a party in subsequent litigation, even where the party

agrees that at least one of these two bases was neces-

sary. Illinois courts, however, read the “necessary for

the judgment” factor literally. For instance, in Kessinger

v. Grefco, Inc., the Illinois Supreme Court stated:

To operate as an estoppel by verdict it is absolutely

necessary that there shall have been a finding of a

specific fact in the former judgment or record that

is material and controlling in that case and also

material and controlling in the pending case. It must

also conclusively appear that the matter of fact was

so in issue that it was necessarily determined . . . .

If there is any uncertainty on the point that more than

one distinct issue of fact is presented to the court the

estoppel will not be applied, for the reason that the

court may have decided upon one of the other

issues of fact.

672 N.E.2d 1149, 1156 (Ill. 1996) (emphases added) (quota-

tion marks and citations omitted). Given this strict stan-

dard, Illinois courts will not apply collateral estoppel

where there are multiple independent bases that could

12 No. 11-3428

be sufficient to support the outcome in an earlier case,

with it being “impossible to determine on which issue

the plaintiff prevailed.” Herzog v. Lexington Township, 657

N.E.2d 926, 931 (Ill. 1995). The strong language in

Kessinger leaves no gray area concerning when issue

preclusion applies. When there is “any uncertainty”

regarding whether a specific factual finding was “abso-

lutely necessary,” issue preclusion does not apply.

Since the issue of whether Wells pointed a gun at

Coker was not controlling or necessary to the disposi-

tion of Wells’s criminal case, the doctrine of issue preclu-

sion does not apply.

D. Illinois Courts’ General Practice

In determining how to treat facts that underlie a guilty

plea in a subsequent proceeding, we also examine the

general practice of Illinois courts. If Illinois courts would

give preclusive effect to Wells’s earlier plea agreement,

then we are required to do the same. See Haring v.

Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 308 (1983). In certain circumstances,

Illinois courts will give prior guilty pleas preclusive

effect in later litigation, without expressly invoking

judicial estoppel, issue preclusion, or some other doc-

trine of preclusion. See, e.g., In re Callas, 411 N.E.2d 273,

277 (Ill. 1980) (an attorney’s guilty plea for an offense

involving moral turpitude is conclusive evidence of

guilt in a later professional disciplinary proceeding).

Therefore, we examine whether Illinois courts’ gen-

eral practice in similar cases—apart from those cases

applying traditional doctrines of preclusion, which

No. 11-3428 13

we have already discussed—can offer guidance to

this court.

Before discussing Illinois courts’ general practice,

we note that we are interested in these courts’ treatment

of a guilty plea in a prior case, not of a conviction

following a trial in a prior case. See Smith v. Sheahan, 959

F. Supp. 841, 843 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (noting that Illinois

courts are inconsistent with respect to whether there is

a distinction between the conclusive effect of a guilty

plea and the conclusive effect of a conviction following

a trial). We also note that we are not concerned merely

with whether Illinois allows for the introduction of a

guilty plea in an earlier case as evidence in subsequent

litigation. The answer to that question, in almost all

circumstances, is yes. See id. at 842-47 (providing an

overview of Illinois practice in this area). Instead, the

focus of our inquiry is whether a prior guilty plea

provides conclusive evidence of the underlying facts in

the plea, which would make summary judgment appro-

priate in this case, rather than prima facie evidence,

which may be refuted.

In past surveys of Illinois caselaw, we have come to

conflicting conclusions regarding the treatment of facts

that underlie a guilty plea in a criminal case, where

those facts are relevant to a subsequent civil proceeding.

In Brown v. Green, we cited the Illinois case Smith v. An-

drews for the proposition that “Illinois courts have tradi-

tionally treated the guilty plea as an admission by

the defendant of the facts alleged in the complaint that

may be used against the defendant in a subsequent pro-

14 No. 11-3428

ceeding.” 738 F.2d 202, 206 (7th Cir. 1984) (citing Smith

v. Andrews, 203 N.E.2d 160, 163-64 (Ill. App. Ct. 1964);

see also Rodriguez v. Schweiger, 796 F.2d 930, 933 (7th Cir.

1986) (citing Brown and Andrews for the same proposi-

tion 3 ). Andrews, however, explained simply that a guilty

plea to a robbery charge “is an admission which may

be received against [the defendant] in a subsequent

proceeding,” and it “would be sufficient, especially

when uncontradicted, to support the finding that the

defendant had in fact committed a robbery.” 203 N.E.2d

at 163-64. Wells’s situation is starkly different. Whereas

the fact to be established in Andrews was simply that

the party had committed a crime to which he later

pleaded guilty, the matter at issue here is not whether

Wells engaged in reckless conduct. Rather, a predicate

fact—whether Wells pointed his gun at Coker—is at

issue in this case.

A separate strand of Illinois caselaw indicates that a

guilty plea in an earlier criminal case is admissible as

prima facie evidence in a later civil case. See O’Dell v.

Dowd, 429 N.E.2d 548, 551 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981). As such,

this caselaw considers evidence related to an earlier

guilty plea to be rebuttable; it may be “explained and

contradicted.” Id.; see also Country Mut. Ins. Co. v. Duncan,

3

Rodriguez also cites Thornton v. Paul for a similar proposition,

when in fact Thornton expressly declined to consider the effect

of a guilty plea in a later proceeding. 384 N.E.2d 335, 342

(Ill. 1978), overruled by Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Savickas,

739 N.E.2d 445 (Ill. 2000).

No. 11-3428 15

794 F.2d 1211, 1215 (7th Cir. 1986) (“A guilty plea, like

any other admission, is not necessarily conclusive as to

the facts underlying the plea but is subject to explana-

tion by the declarant.”); Sheahan, 959 F. Supp. at 846

(“Illinois law is clear that a guilty plea itself is an admis-

sion that may be considered with other evidence.”);

Barnes v. Croston, 247 N.E.2d 1, 3 (Ill. App. Ct. 1969) (“[A]

guilty plea is admissible in a subsequent civil action

against defendant . . . subject to explanation and con-

tradictions and may be received, weighed, and con-

sidered by the jury in connection with all of the other

evidence in the case.”). In Country Mutual, we stated

that, while “there is no Illinois Supreme Court ruling

explicitly on the admissibility of guilty pleas, a sub-

stantial number of Illinois appellate courts and federal

courts sitting in diversity have held that a guilty plea

is introduced into evidence as an admission against

interest.” 794 F.2d at 1214-15. Like other admissions,

a guilty plea in a previous case “is not necessarily con-

clusive as to the facts underlying the plea but is subject

to explanation by the declarant” in a later civil action.

Id. at 1215.

Given this conflicting caselaw, it is apparent that

Illinois law does not have a consistent, general prac-

tice—aside from the traditional doctrines of preclu-

sion—that is applicable to these circumstances. As we

have explained, neither do the doctrines of judicial

estoppel or issue preclusion apply. Accordingly, we

conclude that the district court erred in granting the

defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Wells

16 No. 11-3428

should be given the opportunity to contest or other-

wise explain the facts that underlie his guilty plea.

III. Conclusion

Since the question of whether Wells pointed a gun

at Coker constitutes a genuine issue of material fact,

we R EVERSE the judgment, and R EMAND the case for

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

2-12-13