The opinion
Slip Op. 99-28
UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
___________________________________
:
FLORIDA SUGAR MARKETING AND :
TERMINAL ASSOCIATION, INC., :
: Court No. 98-05-01303
Plaintiff, :
:
v. :
:
UNITED STATES, :
:
Defendant. :
___________________________________:
[Judgment for defendant.]
Dated: March 23, 1999
Stewart and Stewart (Terence P. Stewart, Wesley K. Caine and
Patrick J. McDonough) for plaintiff.
David W. Ogden, Acting Assistant Attorney General, David M.
Cohen, Director, Jeanne E. Davidson, Assistant Director,
Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States
Department of Justice (Lara Levinson, Todd M. Hughes), Richard
McManus, Office of the Chief Counsel for Import Administration,
United States Customs Service, of counsel, for defendant.
OPINION
RESTANI, Judge: This matter is before the court on cross-
motions for summary judgment. In this action plaintiff seeks to
have declared unconstitutional the Harbor Maintenance Tax (HMT)
established by 26 U.S.C. §§ 4461, 4462 (1994), as applied to
interstate shipments.
COURT NO. 98-05-01303 PAGE 2
Between January 27, 1995 and February 20, 1998, plaintiff
Florida Sugar Marketing and Terminal Association, Inc., paid this
ad valorem tax on shipments of sugar from ports of one state to
ports of other states. Because the tax is imposed upon shipment,
the parties apparently agree that the HMT at issue was assessed
upon export from a state, as opposed to import into another
state.
Plaintiff asserts that the HMT violates the Export Clause,
Art. I, § 9, cl. 5 of the Constitution, which provides “No Tax or
Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State,” relying
on United States v. U.S. Shoe Corp., 523 U.S. 360 (1998) (holding
HMT invalid as applied to exports to foreign countries). The
parties to the action disagree as to whether it is a binding
holding of Dooley v. United States, 183 U.S. 151, 154 (1901)
(Congress permitted to impose tax on exports from New York
imported into Puerto Rico) that “exports” for purpose of the
Export Clause means exports to foreign countries. The Dooley
court cited Woodruff v. Parham, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 123 (1868)
(holding Import-Export Clause of Constitution1 did not bar
1
The Import-Export Clause, Article I, § 10, cl. 2 reads in
part:
No state shall, without the Consent of the
Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on
(continued...)
COURT NO. 98-05-01303 PAGE 3
Alabama sales tax on merchandise from another state), for that
proposition. The Dooley court, however, clearly held that the
tax at issue was a valid tax on imports into Puerto Rico.
Dooley, 183 U.S. at 155. Thus, the status of the statement in
Dooley with respect to exports is not certain.
Despite the fact that Dooley has been cited by the Supreme
Court specifically for this point, see Prudential Ins. Co. v.
Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 434 n. 44 (1946), plaintiff argues that
Dooley’s statement on the meaning of “exports” is dicta. It
cites Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt ("Hooven I"), 324 U.S. 652
(1945) (holding articles brought from the Philippine Islands into
the United States were imports immune from state taxation under
the Import-Export Clause, because the Philippines were not part
of the United States in constitutional sense), overruled on other
grounds, Limbach v. Hooven & Allison Co. ("Hooven II"), 466 U.S.
353 (1984). Hooven I stated in what also seems to be dicta, that
Dooley’s export definition was dicta. Hooven I, 324 U.S. at 670
n.5. The court, however, need not resolve the exact status of
the operative words in Dooley.
1
(...continued)
Imports or Exports, except what may be
absolutely necessary for executing its
inspection Laws.
COURT NO. 98-05-01303 PAGE 4
The parties agree that the Dooley court’s choice to make no
distinction between the meaning of export in the Export Clause
and in the Import-Export Clause as set forth in Woodruff v.
Parham, has been long adhered to. See, e.g., Kosydar v. National
Cash Register Co., 417 U.S. 62, 67 n. 5 (1974); Richfield Oil
Corp. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 329 U.S. 69, 83 (1946).
Plaintiff does not contend that the court can ignore the
longstanding view that “exports” means the same in both clauses.
Plaintiffs’ main argument is that Woodruff (and Dooley to
the extent it followed Woodruff) was wrongly decided, citing the
Thomas/Scalia dissent in Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of
Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 609-610 (1997). The dissent contends
that the negative Commerce Clause rationale used by the majority
to strike down a property tax with an exemption for charitable
institutions benefitting residents is untenable. Id. at 610.
The negative Commerce Clause is said to be unnecessary to check
discriminatory state taxes on the commerce of other states
because the Import-Export Clause serves that purpose, ”Woodruff,
notwithstanding.” Id.
Whatever the merits of the point of view expressed in the
Camps dissent, this court must follow decisions of the Supreme
Court which have not been overruled. As accurately stated by
COURT NO. 98-05-01303 PAGE 5
plaintiff, “the [Supreme] Court has repeatedly followed Woodruff
in a line of cases over the years.” Pl. Br. at 3. The court
must do the same now.
Accordingly, the court finds the Export Clause does not
prevent the imposition by Congress of taxes on interstate
shipments and judgment is found for defendant dismissing this
action for failure to state a claim.
_______________________
Jane A. Restani
JUDGE
Dated: New York, New York
This day of March, 1999.