Opinion

Shakeproof Assembly Components Division of Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. United States

  • 59 F. Supp. 2d 1354
  • 23 Ct. Int'l Trade 479
  • 23 C.I.T. 479
  • 21 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1626
  • 1999 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 64
Court
United States Court of International Trade
Filed
Jul 29, 1999
Status
Published
Author
Barzilay
On the bench
Barzilay
Cited by
32 cases
Authority
More cited than 86.5%

recognizing that Commerce is entitled to deference in interpreting the undefined term “best available information”

How later courts described this case

  • recognizing that Commerce is entitled to deference in interpreting the undefined term “best available information”
  • Commerce’s “administrative practice with respect to aberrational data is ‘to disregard small-quantity import data when the per-unit value is substantially different from the per-unit values of the larger quantity imports of that product from other countries.’ ”
  • “The statute requires Commerce to use the best available information, but does not define that term.... If Congress had desired to restrict the material on which Commerce could rely, it would have defined the best available information.”
  • “administrative practice with respect to aberrational data is to disregard small-quantity import data when the per-unit value is substantially different from the per-unit values of the larger quantity imports of that product from other countries”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

Slip Op. 99-70

UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE

__________________________________________

SHAKEPROOF ASSEMBLY COMPONENTS :

DIVISION OF ILLINOIS TOOL WORKS, INC.,

:

Plaintiff, Court No. 97-12-02066

: Before: Barzilay, Judge

v.

:

UNITED STATES,

:

Defendant.

:

__________________________________________

[Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment Upon an Agency Record granted in part, denied in part.]

Decided: July 29, 1999.

Creskoff & Doram, L.L.P. (Stephen M. Creskoff, Robert T. Hume, Lisa E. Smilan) for Plaintiff.

David W. Ogden, Acting Assistant Attorney General, David M. Cohen, Director, Commercial

Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice (Lucius B. Lau), Robert E.

Nielsen, Senior Attorney, Office of the Chief Counsel for Import Administration, United States

Department of Commerce, of counsel, for Defendant.

OPINION

BARZILAY, JUDGE:

This case is before the Court on Plaintiff’s USCIT R. 56.2 Motion for Judgment Upon an

Agency Record. Plaintiff challenges certain aspects of the Department of Commerce, International

Trade Administration’s (“Commerce” or “ITA”) final determination in Certain Helical Spring Lock

Washers from the People’s Republic of China; Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative

Review, 62 Fed. Reg. 61794-801 (Nov. 19, 1997) (“Final Determination”). Defendant partially

opposes Plaintiff’s motion, but agrees that a remand is required to enable Commerce to recalculate

Page 2 97-12-02066

the value for steel scrap by eliminating duplicate total quantity and value figures for the period April

1995 - August 1995. For the reasons that follow the Court remands the case to the agency to explain

how the use of import price data for steel wire rod to value all steel wire rod, including domestically

sourced rod, promotes accuracy in this case, to recalculate the steel scrap factor by eliminating

duplicative data and certain import data which were aberrational and to explain why good cause did

not exist to verify the steel wire rod import price information submitted by the respondent. The

Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) (1994) and 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2)(B)(iii) (1994).

I. INTRODUCTION

The present controversy arises out of the third administrative review conducted by Commerce

stemming from an October, 19, 1993, antidumping duty order1 respecting helical spring lock washers

(“washers”) from the People’s Republic of China. Commerce assigned Hangzhou Spring Washer

Plant, subsequently known as Zhejian Wanxin Group, Co. (“ZWG”), a respondent in the original

investigation, an individual dumping margin. On November 15, 1996, Commerce initiated the third

annual review covering the period October 1, 1995 - September 30, 1996. See 61 Fed. Reg. 58513.

Commerce published its preliminary determination on July 11, 19972 and its Final Determination

on November 19, 1997.3

No one challenged Commerce’s designation of China as a nonmarket economy and so

Commerce used a factors of production analysis, pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c) (1994) to

1

58 Fed. Reg. 53914.

2

62 Fed. Reg. 37192.

3

62 Fed. Reg. 61794-801.

Page 3 97-12-02066

determine the normal value for the washers produced by ZWG.4 Commerce, without objection,

chose India as the appropriate surrogate country pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(4). Plaintiff

challenges Commerce’s use of the price paid for steel wire rod imported from the United Kingdom

by ZWG, accounting for 34.7 percent of ZWG’s total purchases of steel wire rod during the period

of review (“POR”), to value all steel wire rod. Additionally, Plaintiff argues that Commerce failed

to verify the price information ZWG submitted and miscalculated the final dumping margin by using

duplicative and aberrational data.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In reviewing a challenge to Commerce’s determination in an antidumping administrative

review, the Court is to hold unlawful a determination, finding or conclusion by Commerce that is

unsupported by substantial evidence or otherwise not in accordance with law. See 19 U.S.C. §

1516a(b)(1)(B)(i) (1994). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind

might accept to support a conclusion.” Consolidated Edison v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938);

accord Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. United States, 750 F.2d 927, 933 (Fed. Cir. 1984).

To determine whether Commerce has acted in accordance with law the court must undertake

the two step analysis prescribed by Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467

U.S. 837 (1984). First the court must determine whether the statute speaks to the precise question

4

Normal value in market economy cases is generally the price at which the foreign

product is first sold in the exporting country. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(1)(B)(i) (1994).

However, in nonmarket economies the statute directs Commerce to value the merchandise on the

basis of the factors of production. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c) (1994). The export price (or

constructed export price) is generally the price of the merchandise at importation after certain

statutory adjustments are made. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1677a(a)-(b) (1994). The amount by which

the normal value exceeds the export price or constructed export price is the dumping margin.

See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(35)(A) (1994).

Page 4 97-12-02066

at issue. See id. at 842. If the statute is clear or the legislative history unambiguously expresses

Congress’ intent then the matter is at an end, for the agency cannot contravene the will of Congress.

See id. at 842-843. Second, if the court determines the statute is silent or ambiguous, the question

to be asked is whether the agency’s construction of the statute is permissible. See id. at 843.

Essentially, this is an inquiry into the reasonableness of Commerce’s interpretation. See Fujitsu

General Ltd. v. United States, 88 F.3d 1034, 1038 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Provided Commerce has acted

reasonably, the court may not substitute its judgment for the agency’s. See IPSCO, Inc. v. United

States, 965 F.2d 1056, 1061 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Substantial deference is accorded to Commerce’s

statutory interpretations since the ITA is the “‘master’ of the antidumping laws.” Torrington Co. v.

United States, 68 F.3d 1347, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1995).

III. DISCUSSION

A. The Statute Does not Speak to Whether Commerce May Use Import Prices to Value

Domestically Purchased Materials.

Plaintiff argues that the use of import prices to value non-imported material is contrary to law

because Congress has addressed the issue in 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c) by providing for surrogate country

values to be used to the extent possible and thus falls under the first step in the Chevron analysis.

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. Plaintiff claims that the statute requires Commerce to determine normal

value “on the basis of the value of the factors of production . . . [and] the valuation of the factors of

production shall be based on the best available information regarding the values of such factors in

a market economy country or countries considered to be appropriate by the [Department].”

19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(1). Furthermore, the statute provides that Commerce “shall utilize, to the

extent possible, the prices or costs of factors of production in one or more market economy countries

Page 5 97-12-02066

. . . .” 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(4).

Nowhere does the statute speak directly to any methodology Commerce must employ to value

the factors of production, indeed the very structure of the statute suggests Congress intended to vest

discretion in Commerce by providing only a framework within which to work. The statute requires

Commerce to use the best available information, but does not define that term. 5 See e.g., Olympia

Indus. v. United States, 7 F. Supp.2d 997, 1000 (1998) (“The relevant statute does not clearly

delineate how Commerce should determine what constitutes the [best available information].”

(citation omitted)). If Congress had desired to restrict the material on which Commerce could rely,

it would have defined best available information.

Another signal that Congress did not speak and therefore left Commerce discretion in

developing the details of its methodology is the phrase “to the extent possible” in defining how

Commerce is to value the prices or costs of factors of production. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(4).

Having decided that the statute grants discretion to Commerce to decide what qualifies as the best

available information, the Court proceeds to examine whether Commerce acted reasonably pursuant

to the second step in the Chevron analysis. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.

B. Since the Purpose of the Antidumping Law Is Accurate Calculations of Dumping Margins,

Commerce’s Use of Import Prices to Value Domestically Purchased Material Must Promote

Accuracy to Be Reasonable.

In the Final Determination, Commerce used the import price paid for steel wire rod, which

accounted for 34.7% of all steel wire rod used during the POR, to value the remaining 65.3% of the

5

The terms best available information and best information available have, on occasion

caused some confusion. See e.g., Coalition for the Preservation of Am. Brake Drum and Rotor

Aftermarket Mfrs. v. United States, 44 F. Supp.2d 229, 255 n.46 (CIT 1999).

Page 6 97-12-02066

rod purchased domestically. Commerce defended its decision on three grounds. First, Commerce

stated that it acted in accordance with an established administrative practice and judicial precedent.

See 62 Fed. Reg. 61794, 61796. Second, Commerce found the amount of the imported steel wire

rod to be significant. Id. Third, Commerce found the imported steel to be physically identical to the

domestically purchased steel. Id.

Despite Commerce’s representations, its actions with regard to import price data in this case

do not follow clearly established administrative practice nor do they enjoy affirming judicial

precedent. At the hearing held on this matter, Defendant’s counsel conceded that this was an issue

of first impression.6 See Transcript, at 46. Additionally, the judicial decision cited by Commerce

in the Final Determination was limited to a situation where Commerce used the cost that

manufacturers paid on the international market for the supplies they used. See Lasko Metal Prods.,

Inc. v. United States, 43 F.3d 1442, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Thus, the issue presented is one of first

impression and although the standard of review does not change, the reasonableness of Commerce’s

new practice lacks judicial support.

Although Commerce claims that the amount of imported steel wire rod used in this case is

significant, the Court cannot agree as there is no basis on which to evaluate what Commerce means

when it uses the term. In the Final Determination, the only justification of Commerce’s finding that

the amount of imported steel wire rod was significant was that the imported steel accounted for

approximately one-third of all steel wire rod used during the POR. See 62 Fed. Reg. 61795, 61796.

6

Commerce’s position in the Final Determination and in its brief was that its use of

imported purchases to value domestically purchased material was a consistent administrative

practice. However, Commerce has never used the import prices of approximately one-third of

the input to value the entire input, as it did in this review.

Page 7 97-12-02066

The Court finds Commerce’s explanation of the significance of the import volume to be deficient

in several respects. As Commerce itself noted, “the purpose of the antidumping statute is to

‘determine margins as accurately as possible.’” Id. (quoting Rhone Poulenc, Inc. v. United States,

899 F.2d 1185, 1191 (Fed. Cir. 1990); see also Lasko Metal Prods. Inc. v. United States, 43 F.3d

1142, 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Union Camp Corp. v. United States, CIT Slip Op. No. 99-40 (1999);

Olympia Indus. v. United States, 7 F.Supp.2d 997, 1000-1001 (1998); Nation Ford Chem. Co. v.

United States, 985 F. Supp. 133, 135 (CIT 1997); Writing Instrument Mfr. Ass’n v. United States,

984 F. Supp. 629, 637 (CIT 1997). While Congress has left it within Commerce’s discretion to

develop methodologies to enforce the antidumping statute, any given methodology must always seek

to effectuate the statutory purpose -- calculating accurate dumping margins. Whether Commerce’s

use of imported prices to value an entire factor of production is reasonable is inextricably linked to

whether the methodology promotes accuracy. See e.g., Lasko Metal Prods., Inc. v. United States,

810 F.Supp 314, 317, 16 CIT 1079, 1081, aff’d, 43 F.3d 1442, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (noting that

Commerce’s combination of surrogate values and market-based values would be unreasonable if the

results were less accurate). Accuracy may result if a significant amount of the input is imported and

if, in that case, Commerce chooses to use the import price to value all of the input. But contrary to

Commerce’s claim, here, the use of import prices to value domestically purchased material will not

promote accuracy, fairness or predictability unless Commerce explains its finding of significance.

As the matter stands, Commerce defines “significant” as “a meaningful amount, i.e., not

insignificant. . . .” 62 Fed. Reg. 61795, 61796. The Court finds this to be no definition at all.

Whether the use of import prices to value domestically purchased material promotes

accuracy, and thus is reasonable under the statute, may indeed vary from case to case. Of course,

Page 8 97-12-02066

as the amount of imported material actually used in the production of the article approaches 100%,

the reasonableness and accuracy of Commerce’s determination are enhanced. However, even in

those instances, Commerce must not ignore the possibility that use of import prices to value

domestically purchased material is somehow distorting, and thus inaccurate. As Plaintiff argues,

there was publicly available information indicating that the value or cost of steel obtained from

domestic mills in China during the POR was substantially higher than import prices. On remand,

Commerce must demonstrate that the use of import prices to value domestically purchased materials

promotes accuracy.7 Therefore, the Court reserves judgment on the reasonableness of Commerce’s

action until it has the opportunity to explain, with reference to the record, how its use of import

prices in this case has led to the calculation of a more accurate dumping margin than any of the

alternatives available to it.

In addition to its claim that Commerce’s methodology promoted accuracy, fairness and

predictability, Commerce argues that it would have been illogical to use different prices for

physically identical material. Commerce responded to the Plaintiff’s objection to the use of prices

paid for imported material to value domestically purchased material, in part, by stating that “[t]here

is no evidence that the imported steel . . . should be considered a different factor of production from

the domestically-sourced steel.” See 62 Fed. Reg. 61794, 61796. Yet Commerce has used import

prices and surrogate data in the past to value the same factor of production and that practice has been

7

The Court also notes that Commerce’s definition of significant does not promote

predictability. The rationale to use prices paid on the open market to value an entire factor of

production will vary from case to case. Accordingly, it is impossible under Commerce’s present

approach to significance determinations to foster predictability. The absence of predictability is

not fatal to Commerce’s methodology, but it enhances the need for Commerce to explain fully,

on the record, its grounds for decision.

Page 9 97-12-02066

upheld. See Lasko Metal Prods. United States, 43 F.3d 1442 (Fed. Cir. 1994); see also Melamine

Institutional Dinnerware Products from the People’s Republic of China, 62 Fed. Reg. 1708, 1711

(Jan. 13, 1997). Thus, the Court finds Commerce’s argument on this point wholly without merit.

C. Commerce Failed to Examine Whether Good Cause Existed to Verify the Prices Submitted

By ZWG.

Plaintiff argues that in addition to the error committed by Commerce in using the import

prices to value all of the steel wire rod used in the production of the washers, Commerce had good

cause to verify the validity of the price information submitted by ZWG. Defendant’s initial response

was that Plaintiff did not request verification, but at oral argument it became clear that since a

verification had been conducted in a prior review, the applicable regulation, 19 C.F.R. § 353.

36(a)(v)(B) (1996), did not provide Plaintiff the right to request verification.8 See Transcript, at 39-

40. Implicit in Commerce’s position, particularly evident from oral argument, is that Plaintiff failed

to exhaust its administrative remedies because it never requested verification of the import prices

ZWG submitted.

It is a cardinal principle of administrative law that a court may not consider arguments that

were not made before the agency. See United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Line, 344 U.S. 33, 36-37

(1952) (“We have recognized . . . that orderly procedure and good administration require that

objections to the proceedings of an administrative agency be made while it has opportunity for

correction in order to raise issues reviewable by the courts.”). However, the equally well recognized

exception to the exhaustion of administrative remedies rule is that exhaustion is not required where

8

As a result, the only way verification can occur is if the Secretary acts on his own

initiative. Compare 19 C.F.R. § 353.36 (v) with 19 C.F.R. § 353.36(iv).

Page 10 97-12-02066

the efforts of the individual would be futile. See Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 557 (1941);

see also United Black Fund, Inc. v. Hampton, 352 F. Supp. 898, 902 (D.D.C.1972) (“[I]t is well

settled that an action should not be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies when

an attempt to gain the desired relief from the agency in question would obviously be a futile act .”);

accord Rhone Poulenc, Inc. v. United States, 7 CIT 133, 583 F. Supp. 607 (1984). Moreover, 28

U.S.C. § 2637(d) grants the court discretion in deciding when requiring exhaustion is appropriate.

See United States v. Priority Prods., Inc., 793 F.2d 296, 300 (Fed. Cir. 1986).

Here, it is clear that even if Plaintiff had requested verification, the regulation gives an

interested party the right to request it only if “[t]he Secretary conducted no verification . . . during

either of the two immediately preceding administrative reviews.” 19 C.F.R. § 353.36(a)(v)(B).

Since a verification occurred during the first administrative review, Plaintiff did not have the right

to request verification under the ITA’s regulations. Therefore, on remand, Commerce should

reconsider its use of unverified import price information and explain why good cause does not exist

to verify the prices ZWG submitted, especially since Commerce seeks to use the information to value

all of the steel wire rod used in the production of the washers.

D. Commerce’s Decision to Use the March 1996 Indian Import Statistics to Value Steel Scrap Is

not Supported By Substantial Evidence.

Plaintiff submits that Commerce’s use of certain March, 1996, Indian import data for steel

scrap was aberrational and should have been excluded because Indian imports from Germany, Korea

and the United Kingdom distorted the March unit value for steel scrap. Indeed, Plaintiff points to

a subsequent determination by Commerce in an unrelated investigation where the identical data was

found to be aberrational. While the Defendant is correct that the subsequent review is beyond the

Page 11 97-12-02066

record of this case, its importance is in Commerce’s acknowledgment that its administrative practice

with respect to aberrational data is “to disregard small-quantity import data when the per-unit value

is substantially different from the per-unit values of the larger quantity imports of that product from

other countries.” See 63 Fed. Reg. 16758, 16761 (citing Heavy Forged Hand Tools, Finished or

Unfinished, With or Without Handles, from the People's Republic of China, Final Results of

Administrative Reviews, 62 Fed. Reg. 11813 (March 13, 1997); Tapered Roller Bearings and Parts

Thereof, Finished or Unfinished, from Romania, Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative

Review, 62 Fed. Reg. 37194 (July 11, 1997). Thus, the practice referred to by Commerce existed

prior to the effective date of the Final Determination. Commerce failed to follow its administrative

practice because the record demonstrates that the import prices for steel scrap derived for India were

compared to prices in other countries. See A.R. 50. It was through this comparison that Commerce

found the Indian import prices for steel scrap not to be aberrational, although the record discloses

the Indian price to be the highest of all the countries examined, except for Indonesia, which appears

to be clearly aberrational. See A.R. 50, at 8. Here, Commerce failed to follow its administrative

practice of excluding “small-quantity import data when the per-unit value is substantially different

from the per-unit values of the larger quantity imports of that product from other countries.” The

Court finds Commerce’s decision to retain the March 1996 import data is not based on substantial

evidence. On remand, Commerce must recalculate the Indian steel scrap figure by making the

appropriate adjustments in accordance with its administrative practice to discard any aberrational

figures.

Page 12 97-12-02066

E. Plaintiff Has not Met Its Burden On Its Claim that Commerce Failed to Disregard Data

Regarding Paper Cartons.

In a footnote on the final page of its moving brief, Plaintiff raises an argument that

Commerce failed to disregard aberrational data regarding paper cartons imported into India. As the

Defendant correctly noted in its response, the burden of proving Commerce’s determination incorrect

lies with the party challenging the determination. See 28 U.S.C. § 2639(a)(1). The Plaintiff did not

address the Indian paper carton issue at all in its reply. The Court finds the Plaintiff has failed to

meet its burden on this issue and upholds the decision of Commerce to use certain Indian data

regarding paper cartons.

F. Commerce Must Delete the Duplicate Data for April 1995 - August 1995 When Recalculating

the Steel Scrap Value Factor.

It is uncontested that Commerce erred in its calculation of the surrogate value for steel scrap

by using the incorrect total quantity and value figures for April 1995 - August 1995. Commerce has

agreed to delete the duplicate figures and recalculate the steel scrap factor along with the additional

recalculation discussed above.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Plaintiff’s Motion in part, denies it in part and

remands. An order so stating will be entered accordingly.

Dated: ___________________ ___________________________

New York, NY Judith M. Barzilay

Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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