Opinion

Javiad Akhtar v. J. Mesa

  • 698 F.3d 1202
  • 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 22701
  • 2012 WL 5383038
Court
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Filed
Nov 5, 2012
Status
Published
Author
Alarcon
On the bench
Alarcón, Graber, Berzon
Cited by
1,464 cases
Authority
More cited than 99.6%

holding that an inmate who fell off his top bunk and broke his wrist stated a claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need where defendants denied the inmate, a disabled man with severe health conditions, a bottom bunk despite notice that the inmate required a bottom bunk

How later courts described this case

  • holding that an inmate who fell off his top bunk and broke his wrist stated a claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need where defendants denied the inmate, a disabled man with severe health conditions, a bottom bunk despite notice that the inmate required a bottom bunk
  • stating that the court should not dismiss a pro se complaint “without leave to 19 amend ‘unless it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be 20 cured by amendment’” (quoting Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1203-04 (9th Cir. 21 1988) (per curiam))
  • stating that a district court should 24 not dismiss a pro se complaint without leave to amend unless “it is absolutely clear that the l deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment” (quoting Schucker v. 2 || Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1203 (9th Cir. 1988))
  • stating that a district court should not dismiss 21 a pro se complaint without leave to amend unless “it is absolutely clear that the 22 deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment” (quoting Schucker v. 1 Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1203 (9th Cir. 1988))

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JAVIAD AKHTAR, No. 11-16629

Plaintiff - Appellant,

D.C. No.

v. 2:09-CV-2733-

FCD-GGH P

J. MESA , S. TURNER; L. WARD ,

individually and in their official

capacities, OPINION

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Frank C. Damrell, Jr., District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

September 14, 2012–San Francisco, California

Filed November 5, 2012

Before: Arthur L. Alarcón, Susan P. Graber,

and Marsha S. Berzon, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Alarcón

2 AKHTAR V . MESA

SUMMARY*

Prisoner Civil Rights

The panel vacated the district court’s dismissal of a

prisoner’s complaint brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging

deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, and

remanded. The panel held that given plaintiff’s pro se status,

limited English skills and disabilities, the district court erred

by refusing to consider arguments that plaintiff raised for the

first time in his objections to a magistrate judge’s findings

and recommendations on defendants’ motion to dismiss. The

panel also held that plaintiff had provided enough detail in his

administrative grievance to exhaust his Eighth Amendment

claim because the grievance gave notice that defendants had

failed to comply with plaintiff’s medical “chrono” requiring

him to be housed in a ground-floor cell. The panel held that

the complaint set forth sufficient facts to show that defendants

were deliberately indifferent when they failed to comply with

the medical chrono and that the district court erred by

dismissing the complaint without explaining the deficiencies

in the complaint and leave to amend and also without

providing plaintiff notice pursuant to Rand v. Rowland,

154 F.3d 952, 960-61 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc).

*

This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

2

AKHTAR V . MESA 3

COUNSEL

Carter C. White and Roya S. Laden (argued), U.C. Davis

School of law, Davis, California, for the Plaintiff-Appellant.

Misha Igra, AGCA - Office of the California Attorney

General, Sacramento, California, for the Defendants-

Appellees.

OPINION

ALARCÓN, Circuit Judge:

In this prisoner civil rights action filed pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1983, Javiad Akhtar appeals from the dismissal

with prejudice of his first amended complaint for deliberate

indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of the

Eighth Amendment. In his complaint, Akhtar alleged that

Correctional Officer J. Mesa and Correctional Sergeant S.

Turner (“Appellees”) violated his federal constitutional rights

by failing to comply with his medical “chrono,”1 which

required him to be housed in a ground floor cell.2 He also

alleged that Appellees failed to provide him with an

interpreter at medical appointments. We must decide whether

1

A “chrono” is collection of informal notes taken by prison officials

documenting medical orders.

2

Akhtar also sued Lieutenant L. W ard and Mule Creek State Prison.

Akhtar’s claims against these defendants are not at issue on appeal.

3

4 AKHTAR V . MESA

the district court erred by (1) refusing to consider arguments

that Akhtar raised for the first time in his objections to a

magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations on

Appellees’ motion to dismiss, (2) concluding that Akhtar

failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, and

(3) dismissing his complaint on the ground that he failed to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted. After

reviewing the record and relevant authority, we vacate the

judgment and remand.

I

Akhtar is a California prisoner incarcerated at Mule Creek

State Prison. He suffers from numerous medical conditions,

including chronic kidney disease, coronary artery disease,

uncontrolled hypertension, hyperlipidemia (high cholesterol),

cerebrovascular accident (stroke), hyperuricemia (gout), and

gastroesophageal reflux disease. Akhtar has “little English

speaking or reading skills, . . . has been deemed illiterate, . .

. [and] has permanent brain damage from a motorcycle

accident.” He is also mobility and hearing impaired.

On December 2, 2008, Akhtar was informed by Officer

Mesa that he was being moved to an emergency bunk (“E-

bunk”) located in an open dormitory in the day room of the

building. He showed Officer Mesa and Sergeant Turner his

medical chrono and told them that he would rather go to

Administrative Segregation (“Ad-Seg”) than move to an E-

4

AKHTAR V . MESA 5

bunk. He was issued a CDC-1153 Rules Violation Report and

placed in Ad-Seg for refusing to move from his cell to an E-

bunk in the dayroom of the prison.

On December 9, 2008, Akhtar received another CDC-115

for refusing to move to an E-bunk in the dayroom. Officer

Mesa and Sergeant Turner were not involved in that incident.

Akhtar was subsequently moved to a triple bunk E-bunk

in the dayroom, at least 75 feet from the closest urinal.

Akhtar fell from his bunk bed and broke his wrist. He also

suffered embarrassment and humiliation because, given that

there were only two toilets and one urinal for the forty beds in

the dayroom, he was often unable to reach the restroom in

time and urinated in his clothes.

Akhtar filed a grievance on January 1, 2009, in which he

appealed the December 9, 2008 CDC-115 Rules Violation

Report. In the grievance, Akhtar stated that prison staff were

deliberately indifferent to his well-being and that he was

denied due process because he did not receive an interpreter

and staff assistant. Akhtar’s administrative grievance was

denied, as was his Second Level Appeal and Director’s Level

Appeal.

Akhtar filed a second grievance on January 5, 2009, in

which he appealed the December 2, 2008 CDC-115 Rules

Violation Report. In that grievance, Akhtar stated that he

3

A CDC-115 Rules Violation Report is a disciplinary report issued by

prison officials when a prisoner misbehaves.

5

6 AKHTAR V . MESA

“was punished for protecting [his] rights.” Akhtar contended

that he was justified in refusing to move to the E-bunk

because his chrono excluded him from “Dayroom and Gym

dormitory bunk living.” Akhtar alleged that the corrections

officials were aware of his medical condition, but were

deliberately indifferent to it in ordering that he be transferred

to an E-bunk. Akhtar also stated that his due process rights

were violated because he was not provided an interpreter or

staff assistant. Akhtar’s grievance was denied, as was his

Second Level Appeal and Director’s Level Appeal.

On October 1, 2009, Akhtar filed a complaint in the

district court against Officer Mesa and Sergeant Turner. In

his initial complaint, Akhtar stated a claim under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 for deliberate indifference to his serious medical

needs, based on Appellees’s failure to comply with his

medical chrono regarding his housing needs. Akhtar attached

the January 1, 2009, and the January 5, 2009 grievances as

exhibits to his complaint, along with copies of the Second

Level Appeals and Director’s Level Decisions. Magistrate

Judge Gregory G. Hollows dismissed Akhtar’s initial

complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), with leave to

amend. Thereafter, Akhtar filed his first amended complaint.

In that complaint, Akhtar re-alleged a deliberate indifference

claim pursuant to the Eighth Amendment based on Appellees’

failure to comply with his medical chrono regarding housing.

He also alleged two new claims for deliberate indifference to

a serious medical need based on the failure to provide an

interpreter at medical appointments, and a requirement that he

pay a $350 filing fee.

6

AKHTAR V . MESA 7

Akhtar attached several documents as exhibits to his first

amended complaint. They included medical records, a

Comprehensive Accommodation Chrono, a Disability

Placement Program Verification form, and a February 11,

2010 Second Level Appeal Response regarding his request for

an interpreter at medical appointments and institutional

hearings. Akhtar did not attach to his first amended

complaint copies of his January 1 and 5, 2009 grievances and

his administrative appeals.

Magistrate Judge Hollows issued a screening order,

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), in which he stated that

Akhtar had filed “a cognizable claim for relief pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) against the

individual appellees. If the allegations of the amended

complaint are proven, plaintiff has a reasonable opportunity

to prevail on the merits of this action.”

Appellees filed a motion to dismiss the first amended

complaint for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies

or to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Magistrate Judge Hollows advised Akhtar that the failure to

file a written opposition or to file a statement of no opposition

may be deemed a waiver of any opposition to the motion

pursuant to Local Rule 230(1). Akhtar did not file an

opposition to the motion. Magistrate Judge Hollows

concluded that Akhtar’s failure to file an opposition “should

be deemed a waiver of opposition to granting the motion.” In

his findings and recommendations, he also determined that

Akhtar had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and

failed to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment.

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8 AKHTAR V . MESA

Akhtar filed an objection to Magistrate Judge Hollows’s

findings and recommendations. He asked that the district

court construe his objection to the findings and

recommendations as an opposition to Appellees’ motion to

dismiss. Akhtar attached copies of the January 1 and January

5, 2009 grievances, and related administrative appeals, to his

objection to the findings and recommendations. The district

court issued an order declining to consider Akhtar’s

objections to the motion to dismiss his first amended

complaint. It adopted Magistrate Judge Hollows’s findings

and his recommendations; dismissed the first amended

complaint with prejudice; and entered judgment in favor of

Appellees.

On May 5, 2011, Akhtar filed a motion to alter or amend

the judgment which the district court denied. Akhtar filed a

timely notice of appeal. The district court had jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have jurisdiction pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1291.4

4

Because the other defendants named in the first amended complaint

were not served with process, the district court’s order dismissing Akhtar’s

first amended complaint as to Officer Mesa and Sergeant Turner “may be

considered final under Section 1291 for the purpose of perfecting an

appeal.” Patchick v. Kensington Publ’g Corp., 743 F.2d 675, 677 (9th

Cir. 1984) (per curiam).

8

AKHTAR V . MESA 9

II

A

Akhtar contends that the district court abused its

discretion in refusing to consider the arguments that he raised

in his objections to Magistrate Judge Hollows’s findings and

recommendations. He also maintains that, even if the district

court had “actually exercised its discretion,” it abused that

discretion by failing to consider his arguments. We review

this issue for abuse of discretion. Brown v. Roe, 279 F.3d

742, 744 (9th Cir. 2002).

In United States v. Howell, 231 F.3d 615, 621 (9th Cir.

2000), we joined the First and Fifth Circuits in holding “that

a district court has discretion, but is not required, to consider

evidence presented for the first time in a party’s objection to

a magistrate judge’s recommendation.” We cautioned,

however, that “in making a decision on whether to consider

newly offered evidence, the district court must actually

exercise its discretion, rather than summarily accepting or

denying the motion.” Id. at 622.

In Brown, applying Howell, we concluded that the district

court had failed to “actually exercise[] its discretion,” as there

was nothing in the record that showed that it had. Brown,

279 F.3d at 745 (citing Howell, 231 F.3d at 622). We stated

that there was “nothing in the record that shows the district

court ‘actually exercise[d] its discretion,’ in refusing to

consider Brown’s newly-raised claim.” Id. (alteration in

original) (quoting Howell, 231 F.3d at 622). We also

9

10 AKHTAR V . MESA

explained that, given that the plaintiff was pro se and had

presented a “relatively novel claim under a relatively new

statute . . . . , even if the district court had ‘exercised its

discretion,’ it would have been an abuse of that discretion to

refuse to consider petitioner Brown’s equitable tolling claim.”

Id.

Two years later, in Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918 (9th Cir.

2004), we again held that a district court abused its discretion

by failing to consider arguments raised for the first time in a

pro se plaintiff’s objections to a magistrate judge’s findings.

Once again, we concluded that the district court did not

“actually exercise its discretion.” Id. at 935 (internal

quotation marks omitted). We also explained that, “given the

circumstances under which this evidence was offered–a pro

se plaintiff, ignorant of the law, offering crucial facts as soon

as he understood what was necessary to prevent summary

judgment against him–it would have been an abuse of

discretion for the district court not to consider the evidence.”

Id.

Akhtar contends that as in Brown and Jones, the record in

this case does not show that the court actually exercised its

discretion in considering his objections to Magistrate Judge

Hollows’s findings and recommendations. We disagree.

Although the district court’s order is brief, it stated correctly

that, pursuant to Howell, “[a] district court has the discretion,

but is not required, to consider evidence presented for the first

time in a party’s objection to a magistrate judge’s

recommendation.” The district court noted that Akhtar did

not explain in his objections why he failed to file a timely

10

AKHTAR V . MESA 11

opposition to Appellees’ motion to dismiss. The court

“elect[ed] to exercise its discretion not to consider an

opposition to a motion to dismiss inappropriately presented

by plaintiff for the first time in objections.” Id.

Akhtar asserts that, even if the district court “actually

exercised its discretion,” it abused it because, like the plaintiff

in Brown, he is proceeding pro se. In Brown and Jones, we

emphasized that the failure to consider a plaintiff’s status as

a pro se litigant is a ground for concluding that the district

court abused its discretion. Jones, 393 F.3d at 935; Brown,

279 F.3d at 745. Given that Akhtar’s objections directed the

court to crucial facts showing he may have exhausted his

administrative remedies and that he is a pro se litigant, who

is illiterate, disabled, and has limited English skills, the

district court abused its discretion by failing to consider these

circumstances.

Moreover, the critical documents, the January grievances

and resulting decisions, had been attached to the original

complaint. Under recent case law, that complaint was not

entirely superseded when the amended complaint was filed,

and so could have been considered by the magistrate judge in

considering exhaustion. See Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., – F.3d

–, 2012 WL 3711591, at *18, *21 (9th Cir. 2012 Aug. 29,

2012) (en banc) (holding that an amended complaint does not

supersede an earlier complaint so as to require a party to

replead claims dismissed with prejudice and without leave to

amend to preserve those claims for appeal).

11

12 AKHTAR V . MESA

Further, if there is any doubt whether the documents

attached to the original complaint were still part of the

operative pleadings, the magistrate judge also could have

considered the documents as part of the record in considering

Appellees’ motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust

administrative remedies. In deciding such a motion–which is

considered an unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion – “the court

may look beyond the pleadings.” Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d

1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003). That the information in question

was not actually new to the case is another reason the district

court abused its discretion in failing to consider it.

B

Akhtar next contends that the district court erred because

it concluded that he failed to exhaust his administrative

remedies. Akhtar contends that he satisfied the administrative

exhaustion requirement of the Prison Litigation Reform Act

(“PLRA”) of 1995 before filing his initial complaint and his

first amended complaint. We review a dismissal for failure to

exhaust de novo and factual findings for clear error. O’Guinn

v. Lovelock Corr. Ctr., 502 F.3d 1056, 1059 (9th Cir. 2007).

1

As an initial matter, Appellees contend that we should

ignore Akhtar’s arguments on appeal because he waived them

by failing to file a timely opposition to the motion to dismiss.

Appellees’ reliance on Bolker v. Commissioner, 760 F.2d

1039 (9th Cir. 1985), to support this contention is misplaced.

Bolker stands for the proposition that, “[a]s a general rule, we

12

AKHTAR V . MESA 13

will not consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal,

although we have the power to do so.” Id. at 1042 (citation

omitted). Bolker does not require us to ignore Akhtar’s

contentions because he failed to file a timely opposition to a

motion to dismiss in the district court.

Indeed, the Bolker rule presumes that the issue was not

raised in the district court. In this case, Akhtar presented his

objections to Magistrate Judge Hollows’s findings and

recommendations in the district court, as well as in the motion

to alter or amend the judgment. In fact, the district court

addressed the issues that Akhtar raises in this appeal in its

order denying his motion to alter or amend the judgment.

Appellees have not cited any portion of Bolker, or any other

case, that suggests we should ignore Akhtar’s contentions

because he failed to assert them in a motion opposing

Magistrate Judge Hollows’s recommendation that his

complaint be dismissed.

2

With respect to exhaustion, “we have held that the failure

to exhaust nonjudicial remedies that are not jurisdictional

should be treated as a matter in abatement, which is subject to

an unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion.” Wyatt v. Terhune,

315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003). Exhaustion under the

PLRA is not jurisdictional. Payne v. Peninsula Sch. Dist.,

653 F.3d 863, 869 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct.

1540 (2012). Thus, a defendant may raise failure to exhaust

under the PLRA in an unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion. See

Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119-20 (“In deciding [such] a motion . .

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14 AKHTAR V . MESA

. , the court may look beyond the pleadings and decide

disputed issues of fact.”).

“The [PLRA] requires that a prisoner exhaust available

administrative remedies before bringing a federal action

concerning prison conditions.” Griffin v. Arpaio, 557 F.3d

1117, 1119 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)

(2008)). “‘[A]n action is ‘brought’ for purposes of

[exhaustion under] § 1997e(a) when the complaint is tendered

to the district clerk,’ and not when it is subsequently filed.”

Vaden v. Summerhill, 449 F.3d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir. 2006)

(quoting Ford v. Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 400 (7th Cir. 2004)).

The failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an

affirmative defense on which the defendant bears the burden

of proof. Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119. Because “there can be no

absence of exhaustion unless some relief remains available, a

defendant must demonstrate that pertinent relief remain[s]

available, whether at unexhausted levels of the grievance

process or through awaiting the results of the relief already

granted as a result of that process.” Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d

926, 936-37 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

We have held that “a prisoner does not comply with [the

exhaustion] requirement by exhausting available remedies

during the course of the litigation.” McKinney v. Carey,

311 F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th Cir. 2002) (per curiam). If,

however, a plaintiff files an amended complaint adding new

claims based on conduct that occurred after the filing of the

initial complaint, the plaintiff need only show that the new

14

AKHTAR V . MESA 15

claims were exhausted before tendering the amended

complaint to the clerk for filing. Rhodes v. Robinson,

621 F.3d 1002, 1007 (9th Cir. 2010).

Akhtar’s first amended complaint asserts two deliberate

indifference claims, both of which required exhaustion under

the PLRA. These claims rest on Appellees’ (1) failure to

comply with Akhtar’s medical chrono regarding housing and

(2) failure to provide an interpreter at medical appointments.

We address, in turn, the question whether each claim was

exhausted.

i

Akhtar asserted his claim for failure to comply with his

medical chrono regarding housing in his initial complaint.

Neither party disputes that this claim arose before Akhtar

filed that complaint. Thus, Akhtar was required to exhaust

this claim before he filed his initial complaint. See

McKinney, 311 F.3d at 1200-01 (requiring pre-suit exhaustion

under the PLRA).

Akhtar contends that the evidence attached to his initial

complaint and objections to Magistrate Judge Hollows’s

findings and recommendations shows that he exhausted his

medical deliberate indifference claim. Akhtar attached the

January 1 and 5, 2009 grievances, along with the related

Second Level Appeals and Director’s Level Decisions, to his

initial complaint and objections.

15

16 AKHTAR V . MESA

The documents attached to Akhtar’s objection to

Magistrate Judge Hollows’s findings and recommendations,

as well as the allegations and attachments to his initial

complaint, show that he exhausted his medical deliberate

indifference claims in May 2009, several months before he

filed his initial complaint. In his January 5, 2009 grievance,

Akhtar appealed the CDC-115 Rules Violation Report that he

received for refusing to move to an E-bunk on December 2,

2008. In that grievance, Akhtar stated that he “was punished

for protecting [his] rights.” According to Akhtar, he was

justified in refusing to move to the E-bunk because his chrono

excluded him from “Dayroom and Gym dormitory bunk

living.” Akhtar suggesed that the corrections officials were

aware of his medical condition, but were deliberately

indifferent to that condition by attempting to transfer him to

an E-bunk. Akhtar also stated that his due process rights were

violated because he did not receive an interpreter or staff

assistant.

Akhtar appealed the denial of this grievance. He received

a Second Level Appeal denying his claim on February 26,

2009. He received a Director’s Level Decision, denying his

claim on May 28, 2009. The Director’s Level Decision

showed that the prison was aware that Akhtar contended that

the move to an E-bunk violated his medical chrono because

it construed his medical chrono as not precluding E-bunk

housing. Specifically, the Director’s Level Decision stated

that “the appellant’s medical chronos limit him to lower

tier/lower bunk housing. The appellant was ordered to move

to a lower bunk bed; therefore, he was not precluded from

obeying the order.”

16

AKHTAR V . MESA 17

Appellees contend that the January 5, 2009 grievance

addressed only Akhtar’s due process claim. We disagree.

“The level of detail necessary in a grievance to comply with

the grievance procedures will vary from system to system and

claim to claim, but it is the prison’s requirements, and not the

PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.”

Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007). For prisons, like

Mule Creek State Prison, that do not instruct prisoners on

what precise facts must be alleged in a grievance, “‘a

grievance suffices if it alerts the prison to the nature of the

wrong for which redress is sought.’” Griffin, 557 F.3d at

1120 (quoting Strong v. David, 297 F.3d 646, 650 (7th Cir.

2002)). Akhtar’s January 5, 2009 grievance provided enough

detail to exhaust his Eighth Amendment claim because it

provided notice that Appellees had failed to comply with

Akhtar’s medical chrono requiring him to be housed in a

ground-floor cell.

Appellees also contend that Magistrate Judge Hollows

“screened out” Akhtar’s claims based on the January 5, 2009

grievance. This contention is misleading. In his screening

order on the initial complaint, Magistrate Judge Hollows

dismissed with leave to amend, any due process challenges to

the hearings on Akhtar’s CDC-115s. Akhtar, however, is not

challenging the dismissal of his due process challenges to his

CDC-115s. Rather, he is challenging the dismissal of his

Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim. Appellees

have not shown that Magistrate Judge Hollows “screened out”

this claim.

17

18 AKHTAR V . MESA

Appellees’ attempt to focus on Akhtar’s August 7, 2009

grievance regarding housing as evidence that he failed timely

to exhaust this claim is not persuasive. Appellees maintain

that Akhtar’s claim fails because he did not receive a

Director’s Level Review on this grievance until November 2,

2009, one month after Akhtar filed his first amended

complaint. While Akhtar’s August 7, 2009 grievance did

address his deliberate indifference claim based on housing, he

did not need to receive a Director’s Level Decision on that

grievance before filing his first amended complaint because,

as discussed above, he had already exhausted that claim.

Thus, Akhtar’s subsequent post-suit exhaustion of the August

7, 2009 grievance is immaterial.

Because Akhtar received a Director’s Level Decision on

his January 5, 2009 grievance before he filed his initial

complaint in which he alleged his deliberate indifference

claim based on housing, he exhausted this claim.5 Thus, the

district court erred by dismissing this claim for failure to

exhaust.

ii

Appellees did not challenge Akhtar’s claim that he was

deprived of an interpreter in their motion to dismiss the first

5

Akhtar also contends that his January 1, 2009 grievance exhausted his

administrative remedies. That grievance, however, did not provide notice

of his contention that Appellees ignored his medical chrono. In addition,

it related to the December 9, 2008 incident, which did not involve Officer

Mesa or Sergeant Turner.

18

AKHTAR V . MESA 19

amended complaint. The record is not clear as to when this

claim arose. Appellees have not pointed to any evidence

establishing that this claim arose before Akhtar filed his

initial complaint or that it was not timely exhausted. Thus,

the district court erred by dismissing this claim for failure to

exhaust.

C

Akhtar further contends that the district court erred by

dismissing his first amended complaint on the alternative

ground of failure to state a claim. He argues that the court

overlooked the allegations in his pleading supporting his

claim and did not explain the basis for its decision. We

review this issue de novo. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338,

341 (9th Cir. 2010).

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). When reviewing a

motion to dismiss, we “consider only allegations contained in

the pleadings, exhibits attached to the complaint, and matters

properly subject to judicial notice.” Swartz v. KPMG LLP,

476 F.3d 756, 763 (9th Cir. 2007) (per curiam).

“[W]e have an obligation where the petitioner is pro se,

particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings

liberally and to afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt.”

Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985) (en

19

20 AKHTAR V . MESA

banc). In fact, “before dismissing a pro se complaint the

district court must provide the litigant with notice of the

deficiencies in his complaint in order to ensure that the

litigant uses the opportunity to amend effectively.” Ferdik v.

Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Noll v.

Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987), superseded

on other grounds by statute as stated in Lopez v. Smith,

203 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2000)) (en banc). A district court

should not dismiss a pro se complaint without leave to amend

unless “it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the

complaint could not be cured by amendment.” Schucker v.

Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1203-04 (9th Cir. 1988) (per

curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted).

In ruling on Appellees’ motion to dismiss for failure to

state a claim, neither the district court nor Magistrate Judge

Hollows explained the deficiencies in Akhtar’s first amended

complaint. Rather, the district court adopted Magistrate

Judge Hollows’s findings and recommendations, which

contained only the following brief parenthetical footnoted

conclusion on this issue: “this court . . . finds this action

should be dismissed on ground 1 (as well as on ground 2 for

failing to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment).”

The district court did not comply with our precedent

regarding the dismissal of pro se prisoner civil rights

complaints for failure to state a claim. The defects are of

particular significance given that the grounds for dismissal

were not readily apparent. To comply with the law of this

circuit, the district court was required to explain the

deficiencies in Akhtar’s first amended complaint. It also

20

AKHTAR V . MESA 21

should have dismissed with leave to amend unless it was

absolutely clear that Akhtar could not cure the deficiencies by

amendment. The district court did neither.

In their motion to dismiss the first amended complaint,

Appellees argued that Akhtar’s deliberate indifference claim

failed because they “did not subject Akhtar to any serious

medical risk, never intended to harm Akhtar, and in fact

Akhtar was not harmed.”6 On appeal, Appellees focus on

Akhtar’s alleged failure to show “a causal relationship

between Appellees and any supposed violation of his

constitutional rights.”

In Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2006), we held

that there is a two-pronged test for evaluating a claim for

deliberate indifference to a serious medical need:

First, the plaintiff must show a serious medical need

by demonstrating that failure to treat a prisoner’s

condition could result in further significant injury or

the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.

Second, the plaintiff must show the defendant’s

response to the need was deliberately indifferent.

This second prong . . . is satisfied by showing (a) a

purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s

6

In their motion to dismiss, Defendants did not challenge, on the

grounds of failure to state a claim, Akhtar’s deliberate indifference claim

based on failure to provide an interpreter or his non-specific claim

regarding the $350 filing fee.

21

22 AKHTAR V . MESA

pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused by

the indifference.

Id. at 1096 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Akhtar’s first amended complaint set forth sufficient facts

to show that he had a serious medical need. Akhtar alleged

that he suffered from numerous medical conditions and was

hearing and mobility impaired. Akhtar also attached a

Comprehensive Accommodation Chrono dated October 9,

2008 and disability verification form dated August 23, 2006,

as exhibits to his first amended complaint. The Chrono stated

that Akhtar required a “bottom bunk” and “ground floor cell.”

The disability verification form stated that Akhtar is “mobility

impaired” and had housing restrictions requiring a “lower

bunk,” “no stairs,” and “no triple bunk.” These allegations

and exhibits are sufficient to show that Akhtar has a serious

medical need.

Contrary to Appellees’ contention, the medical records

attached to the first amended complaint do not contradict

Akhtar’s allegation that he has a serious medical need. The

fact that the records show that a doctor concluded, at a certain

point in time, that Akhtar’s kidney function was stable does

not contradict Akhtar’s allegation that he suffered from

numerous other medical conditions.

Akhtar’s first amended complaint also set forth sufficient

facts to show that Appellees were deliberately indifferent.

Akhtar alleged that he showed his medical chrono requiring

a lower bunk in a ground-floor cell to Officer Mesa and

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AKHTAR V . MESA 23

Sergeant Turner. He also alleged that they ignored the

medical chrono by moving him to an E-bunk in the dayroom.

Akhtar also alleged that he was harmed as a result of

Appellees’ failure to comply with his chrono. He alleged that

he suffered a broken wrist. He also suffered humiliation and

embarrassment on several occasions because he urinated in

his clothes.

Contrary to Appellees’ contentions, the fact that Akhtar’s

medical records attached to the first amended complaint do

not show that he suffered any adverse medical conditions as

a result of the move to the E-bunk does not contradict

Akhtar’s allegations of harm. The absence of any mention of

harm as a result of the move to the E-bunk fails to establish

that Akhtar did not suffer harm. His allegations of deliberate

indifference to his medical condition were sufficient to satisfy

the pleading requirement. To the extent Appellees contest

Akhtar’s ability to prove harm, that is an issue for summary

judgment or trial, not a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.

Because Akhtar’s first amended complaint stated a claim

upon which relief can be granted and neither Magistrate Judge

Hollows nor the district court provided a statement of the

deficiencies before dismissing the first amended complaint

with prejudice, the district court erred in granting the motion

to dismiss.7

7

Nothing in this opinion should be construed as limiting Akhtar’s ability

to seek leave to amend his first amended complaint if he so chooses to do

so upon remand.

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24 AKHTAR V . MESA

D

In a Rule 28(j) letter, Akhtar relies on Woods v. Carey,

684 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2012), to support his contention that he

was not provided with Rand notice at the time Appellees filed

their motion to dismiss. Rand notice requires that a pro se

litigant be provided with fair notice of the requirements for

opposing a motion for summary judgment. Rand v. Rowland,

154 F.3d 952, 960-61 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). In Wyatt,

315 F.3d at 1120 n.14, we extended Rand to motions to

dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

In Woods, we held that the “notice required under [Rand]

and [Wyatt] must be provided to pro se prisoner plaintiffs at

the time the [Appellees’] motions are filed.” Woods, 684 F.3d

at 936. “The failure to provide adequate Rand notice is a

ground for reversal unless it is clear from the record that there

are no facts that would permit the inmate to prevail.” Id. at

941.

Recently, in Stratton v. Buck, ___F.3d___, No. 10-35656,

2012 WL 4094937 (9th Cir. Sept. 19, 2012) decided while

this matter was pending before us, we held that

“when a district court will consider materials beyond

the pleadings in ruling upon a defendant’s motion to

dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies,

the pro se prisoner plaintiff must receive a notice,

similar to the notice described in Rand. The notice

must explain that: the motion to dismiss for failure to

exhaust administrative remedies is similar to a motion

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AKHTAR V . MESA 25

for a summary judgment in that the district court will

consider materials beyond the pleadings; the plaintiff

has a “right to file counter-affidavits or other

responsive evidentiary materials”; and the effect of

losing the motion.

Id. at *3 (footnote omitted). Here, the district court granted

Appellees’ motion to dismiss in part for failure to exhaust his

administrative remedies. Akhtar was not provided with Rand

notice at the time after Appellees filed their motion to

dismiss. In addition, the record shows that Akhtar would

likely prevail on the merits of his claims if a trier of fact is

persuaded by his evidence. Thus, the district court also erred

in failing to provide Akhtar with the notice pursuant to Rand.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we are persuaded that the

district court erred in granting Appellees’ motion to dismiss

the first amended complaint.

VACATED AND REMANDED.

25

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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