Lefemine v. Wideman

Cite as: 568 U. S. ____ (2012) 1

Per Curiam

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

STEVEN LEFEMINE, DBA COLUMBIA CHRISTIANS

FOR LIFE v. DAN WIDEMAN ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12–168. Decided November 5, 2012

PER CURIAM.

This case concerns the award of attorney’s fees in a suit

alleging unconstitutional conduct by government officials.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

held that a plaintiff who secured a permanent injunction

but no monetary damages was not a “prevailing party”

under 42 U. S. C. §1988, and so could not receive fees.

That was error. Because the injunction ordered the de-

fendant officials to change their behavior in a way that

directly benefited the plaintiff, we vacate the Fourth Cir-

cuit’s decision and remand for further proceedings.

* * *

Petitioner Steven Lefemine and members of Columbia

Christians for Life (CCL) engage in demonstrations in

which they carry pictures of aborted fetuses to protest the

availability of abortions. On November 3, 2005, Lefemine

and about 20 other CCL members conducted such a

demonstration at a busy intersection in Greenwood Coun-

ty, South Carolina. Citing complaints about the graphic

signs, a Greenwood County police officer informed Lefem-

ine that if the signs were not discarded, he would be tick-

eted for breach of the peace. Lefemine objected, asserting

that the officer was violating his First Amendment rights,

but the threat eventually caused him to disband the pro-

test. See Lefemine v. Davis, 732 F. Supp. 2d 614, 617–619

(SC 2010).

A year later, an attorney for Lefemine sent a letter to

2 LEFEMINE v. WIDEMAN

Per Curiam

Dan Wideman, the sheriff of Greenwood County, inform-

ing him that the group intended to return to the same site

with the disputed signs. The letter cautioned that further

interference would cause Lefemine “ ‘to pursue all avail-

able legal remedies.’ ” Id., at 619. Chief Deputy Mike

Frederick responded that the police had not previously

violated Lefemine’s rights, and warned that “ ‘should we

observe any protester or demonstrator committing the

same act, we will again conduct ourselves in exactly the

same manner: order the person(s) to stop or face criminal

sanctions.’ ” Ibid. Out of fear of those sanctions, the group

chose not to protest in the county for the next two years.

See ibid.

On October 31, 2008, Lefemine filed a complaint under

42 U. S. C. §1983 against several Greenwood County

police officers alleging violations of his First Amendment

rights. Lefemine sought nominal damages, a declaratory

judgment, a permanent injunction, and attorney’s fees.

See 732 F. Supp. 2d, at 620. Ruling on the parties’ dueling

motions for summary judgment, the District Court deter-

mined that the defendants had infringed Lefemine’s

rights. See id., at 620–625. The court therefore perma-

nently enjoined the defendants “from engaging in content-

based restrictions on [Lefemine’s] display of graphic signs”

under similar circumstances. Id., at 627. The court,

however, refused Lefemine’s request for nominal damages,

finding that the defendants were entitled to qualified

immunity because the illegality of their conduct was not

clearly established at the time. See ibid. The court as

well denied Lefemine’s request for attorney’s fees under

§1988, stating that “[u]nder the totality of the facts in this

case the award of attorney’s fees is not warranted.” Ibid.

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of attorney’s fees

on the ground that the District Court’s judgment did

not make Lefemine a “prevailing party” under §1988. 672

Cite as: 568 U. S. ____ (2012) 3

Per Curiam

F. 3d 292, 302–303 (2012).* The court reasoned that the

relief awarded did not “ ‘alte[r] the relative positions of

the parties’ ”: The injunction prohibited only “unlawful, but

not legitimate, conduct by the defendant[s],” and merely

“ordered [d]efendants to comply with the law and safe-

guard [Lefemine’s] constitutional rights in the future. No

other damages were awarded.” Ibid. Lefemine sought a

writ of certiorari to review the Fourth Circuit’s determina-

tion that he was not a prevailing party under §1988.

The Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 90

Stat. 2641, 42 U. S. C. §1988, allows “the prevailing party”

in certain civil rights actions, including suits brought

under §1983, to recover “a reasonable attorney’s fee.” A

plaintiff “prevails,” we have held, “when actual relief on

the merits of his claim materially alters the legal relation-

ship between the parties by modifying the defendant’s

behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff.”

Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U. S. 103, 111–112 (1992). And we

have repeatedly held that an injunction or declaratory

judgment, like a damages award, will usually satisfy that

test. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U. S. 1, 4 (1988) (per

curiam).

Under these established standards, Lefemine was a

prevailing party. Lefemine desired to conduct demonstra-

tions in Greenwood County with signs that the defendant

police officers had told him he could not carry. He brought

this suit in part to secure an injunction to protect himself

from the defendants’ standing threat of sanctions. And he

succeeded in removing that threat. The District Court

held that the defendants had violated Lefemine’s rights

and enjoined them from engaging in similar conduct in the

——————

* The defendants did not appeal the District Court’s judgment that

they had violated Lefemine’s First Amendment rights, so the Court of

Appeals took as a given that a violation had occurred. See 672 F. 3d, at

299, n. 5.

4 LEFEMINE v. WIDEMAN

Per Curiam

future. Contrary to the Fourth Circuit’s view, that ruling

worked the requisite material alteration in the parties’

relationship. Before the ruling, the police intended to stop

Lefemine from protesting with his signs; after the ruling,

the police could not prevent him from demonstrating

in that manner. So when the District Court “ordered

[d]efendants to comply with the law,” 672 F. 3d, at 303,

the relief given—as in the usual case involving such an

injunction—supported the award of attorney’s fees.

Because Lefemine is a “prevailing party,” he “should

ordinarily recover an attorney’s fee unless special circum-

stances would render such an award unjust.” Hensley v.

Eckerhart, 461 U. S. 424, 429 (1983) (internal quotation

marks omitted). Neither of the courts below addressed

whether any special circumstances exist in this case, and

we do not do so; whether there may be other grounds on

which the police officers could contest liability for fees

is not a question before us. Accordingly, the petition for

certiorari is granted, the judgment of the Fourth Circuit is

vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.