The opinion
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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 12-11198
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 3:10-cv-00976-JBT
DANIEL PIERSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant-Appellee.
___________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
____________________________
(October 31, 2012)
Before TJOFLAT, JORDAN and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Daniel Pierson appeals the district court’s order affirming the Commissioner
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of Social Security’s denial of his applications for a period of disability, disability
insurance benefits, and supplemental security income. Mr. Pierson argues that the
Administrative Law Judge failed to properly assess his credibility, failed to properly
ascertain his Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”), and posed an incomplete and
insufficient hypothetical question to the vocational expert. The district court affirmed
the ALJ’s decision, concluding that the ALJ’s findings were based on the appropriate
legal standards and were supported by substantial evidence. We agree, and affirm.
I
Because we write only for the parties, we assume their familiarity with the
underlying facts, and only summarize those necessary to resolve this case.
Mr. Pierson filed applications for a period of disability, disability insurance
benefits, and supplemental security income. He alleged that he had become disabled
on February 28, 2002, as a result of a back injury that he sustained in a motorcycle
accident in 1993. After the Social Security Administration denied his applications
initially and upon reconsideration, Mr. Pierson requested—and received—a hearing
before an ALJ. On February 25, 2005, the ALJ issued a decision denying Mr.
Pierson’s applications. Subsequently, the Appeals Council denied his request for a
review of the ALJ’s decision. Mr. Pierson then challenged the ALJ’s decision with
the district court, which reversed and remanded the ALJ’s decision. After remand, the
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ALJ held two supplemental hearings, and then issued a decision on April 22, 2008,
denying Mr. Pierson’s applications. The Appeal’s Council once again denied Mr.
Pierson’s request for review, and Mr. Pierson challenged the ALJ’s decision with the
district court. This time, however, the district court affirmed the ALJ’s decision.
II
“In Social Security appeals, we must determine whether the Commissioner’s
decision is supported by substantial evidence and based on proper legal standards.”
Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011) (internal
quotation marks omitted). We review de novo the district court’s decision about
whether the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. See Wilson v.
Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2002). “Substantial evidence is more than
a scintilla, but less than a preponderance. It is such relevant evidence as a reasonable
person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Bloodsworth v. Heckler,
703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983). We must examine the record as a whole, but
we are not permitted to reweigh the evidence, make credibility determinations, or
substitute our judgment for that of the Commissioner. See id.
III
“An individual claiming Social Security disability benefits must prove that she
is disabled.” Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005). The social
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security regulations provide a five-step evaluation process that is used to determine
whether a claimant is disabled. See Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178.1 “These regulations
place a very heavy burden on the claimant to demonstrate both a qualifying disability
and an inability to perform past relevant work.” Moore, 405 F.3d at 1211.
On appeal, Mr. Pierson argues that (1) the ALJ failed to properly assess his
credibility, (2) the ALJ failed to properly ascertain his RFC, and (3) the ALJ failed
to pose a complete and sufficient hypothetical question to the vocational expert. We
address each of these issues in turn.
A
Mr. Pierson contends that the injury he sustained as a result of his motorcycle
accident and the findings of Dr. Robert A. Greenberg and Dr. William E. Benet show
that his pain has both physiological and psychological causes. As a result, Mr.
Pierson continues, the ALJ should have found his testimony about his pain to be fully
credible under our three-part pain standard.
We have provided a “pain standard” for when a claimant attempts to establish
1
The steps are “(1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity;
(2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments; (3) whether the
impairment meets or equals the severity of the specified impairments in the Listing of Impairments;
(4) based on a residual functional capacity (“RFC”) assessment, whether the claimant can perform
any of his or her past relevant work despite the impairment; and (5) whether there are significant
numbers of jobs in the national economy that the claimant can perform given the claimant’s RFC,
age, education, and work experience.” Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178.
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his disability through his own testimony of pain or other subjective symptoms. See
Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005). This standard requires that
a claimant show:
(1) evidence of an underlying medical condition and either (2) objective
medical evidence that confirms the severity of the alleged pain arising
from that condition or (3) that the objectively determined medical
condition is of such a severity that it can be reasonably expected to give
rise to the alleged pain.
Id. Because Mr. Pierson testified as to his subjective complaints of disabling pain, the
ALJ was required to “clearly articulate explicit and adequate reasons for discrediting
[Mr. Pierson’s] allegations of completely disabling symptoms.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted).
The ALJ properly applied the pain standard in acknowledging that Mr. Pierson
had provided evidence of an underlying medical condition, and that Mr. Pierson’s
medical conditions could reasonably be expected to produce the alleged pain. This,
however, does not end the inquiry because “20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 provides that once
such an impairment is established, all evidence about the intensity, persistence, and
functionally limiting effects of pain or other symptoms must be considered . . . in
deciding the issue of disability.” Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1561 (11th Cir.
1995). With regard to Mr. Pierson’s testimony concerning the intensity, persistence,
and limiting effects of his symptoms, the ALJ found Mr. Pierson to not be credible.
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We conclude that the ALJ’s credibility determination was supported by
substantial evidence. The ALJ articulated several reasons for why Mr. Pierson’s
complaints of severe pain were not credible. First, the ALJ stated that Mr. Pierson’s
assertions were “far in excess of the medical evidence of record and other evidence,
and are inconsistent with his reported activities of daily living.” Specifically, the ALJ
noted that Mr. Pierson demonstrated that he was capable of working because he had
been driving a 70-mile paper route for approximately 6 hours a day, and that he
continued to collect cans, recycle small appliances, and rummage through dumpsters
looking for things he could fix and sell. Mr. Pierson also testified to being able to
weed his front yard, do the laundry, cook, wash the dishes, take out the trash, do the
groceries, attend to his personal needs, and drive daily. Second, Mr. Pierson testified
that he was not taking any prescription medications. Finally, the ALJ stated that Mr.
Pierson’s credibility was brought into question by the fact that he had testified to
extensive income and having been laid off from a welding job because of his
limitations, but had reported no earnings.
We find that the ALJ’s stated reasons for not finding Mr. Pierson’s
testimony—about the severity and persistence of his symptoms—credible constitute
substantial evidence. Accordingly, we will not disturb the ALJ’s credibility finding.
See id. at 1562 (“A clearly articulated credibility finding with substantial supporting
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evidence in the record will not be disturbed by a reviewing court.”).
To the extent that Mr. Pierson argues that the ALJ erred in failing to rely on the
opinions of Dr. Greenberg and Dr. Benet, we are not persuaded. “Absent ‘good
cause,’ an ALJ is to give the medical opinions of treating physicians ‘substantial or
considerable weight.’” Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1179. “[G]ood cause” exists when “(1)
treating physician’s opinion was not bolstered by the evidence; (2) evidence
supported a contrary finding; or (3) treating physician’s opinion was conclusory or
inconsistent with the doctor’s own medical records.” Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d
1232, 1241 (11th Cir. 2004). An ALJ may disregard a treating physician’s opinion,
but the ALJ must have good cause and clearly articulate the reasons for disregarding
the opinion. See id.
Here, the ALJ explicitly found Dr. Greenberg’s opinion—that Mr. Pierson’s
pain would markedly affect his ability to perform daily activities and complete a
normal workday without interruptions for pain—to be of little probative weight
because “it is unsupported by rationale or medical findings, and it is inconsistent with
his initial opinion and contains no explanation for the inconsistencies,” and “is also
inconsistent with [Mr. Pierson’s] demonstrated abilities to work as a newspaper
deliverer, small recycler, and can collector.” Because Dr. Greenberg’s opinion was
unsupported by medical evidence, see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(3), 416.927(c)(3),
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and inconsistent with the evidence, the ALJ had “good cause” to disregard Dr.
Greenberg’s opinion. See Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1241.
With regard to Dr. Benet, the ALJ noted that Dr. Benet reported that Mr.
Pierson suffered from “mild limitations with his ability to interact appropriately with
the public, supervisors, and co-workers, and moderate limitations in his ability to
respond appropriately to usual work situations and to changes in a routine work
setting.” The ALJ afforded Dr. Benet’s opinion considerable weight because the ALJ
concluded that Mr. Pierson had “moderate difficulties” in social functioning. Contrary
to Mr. Pierson’s suggestion, however, Dr. Benet’s opinion does not require a finding
that Mr. Pierson’s pain testimony was credible; Dr. Benet’s opinion does not confirm
the severity of Mr. Pierson’s pain, but rather acknowledges that Mr. Pierson’s pain
may have both psychological and physiological causes and that Mr. Pierson has
moderate difficulty with social functions. Accordingly, the ALJ’s credibility
determination was supported by substantial evidence.
B
Mr. Pierson also argues that the ALJ failed to properly ascertain his mental
RFC. In essence, Mr. Pierson contends that the ALJ erred in failing to obtain a Mental
Residual Functional Capacity Assessment (“MRFCA”). “[W]here a claimant has
presented a colorable claim of mental impairment, the social security regulations
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require the ALJ to complete a [Psychiatric Review Technique Form] PRTF, append
it to the decision, or incorporate its mode of analysis into his findings and
conclusions.” Moore, 405 F.3d at 1214. It is undisputed that the ALJ incorporated the
PRTF mode of analysis into his findings and conclusion, and translated the findings
into work-related functions in determining Mr. Pierson’s RFC. Additionally, Mr.
Pierson has presented no authority, and we are aware of none, indicating that an ALJ
must complete a separate MRFCA in addition to performing a PRTF.
Moreover, the ALJ also considered a “Medical Source Statement of Ability to
Do Work-Related Activities (Mental)” (“MSS”) completed by Dr. Benet, which is
similar to a MRFCA. The ALJ relied on Dr. Benet’s report—that Mr. Pierson suffered
from “‘mild’ limitations with his ability to interact appropriately with the public,
supervisors, and co-workers, and ‘moderate’ limitations in his ability to respond
appropriately to usual work situations and to changes in a routine work setting”—in
concluding that Mr. Pierson was restricted to “low stress simple tasks with only
limited contact with the general public.” As a result, we find no error in the ALJ’s
assessment of Mr. Pierson’s mental RFC, and conclude that the ALJ’s assessment was
supported by substantial evidence.
C
Finally, Mr. Pierson contends that the ALJ erred by asking the vocational
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expert an incomplete and insufficient hypothetical. Mr. Pierson contends that the ALJ
failed to pose a hypothetical question that included all of the limitations arising out
of his physiological and psychological pain. Mr. Pierson, however, does not specify
what additional limitations the ALJ should have included.
To the extent that Mr. Pierson argues that the ALJ failed to include his
testimony about the severity and persistence of his symptoms, or the medical opinions
of Dr. Greenberg and Dr. Benet, this argument is essentially a reiteration of his
credibility argument. Because the ALJ did not find Mr. Pierson’s testimony—about
the severity and persistence of his symptoms—credible, and because the ALJ
disregarded the opinion of Dr. Greenberg, he was not required to include those
additional limitations in the hypothetical. See Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1180 (“In order
for a vocational expert’s testimony to constitute substantial evidence, the ALJ must
pose a hypothetical question which comprises all of the claimant’s impairments.”)
(internal quotation marks omitted); Ingram v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d
1253, 1270 (11th Cir. 2007) (“The hypothetical need only include the claimant’s
impairments, not each and every symptom of the claimant. The characteristics that the
[ALJ] omitted are among those that [the claimant] alleged to suffer but were either
not supported by her medical records or were alleviated by medication.”) (internal
citation and quotation marks omitted); Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d
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1155, 1161 (11th Cir. 2004) (“the ALJ was not required to include findings in the
hypothetical that the ALJ had properly rejected as unsupported”).
With regard to the opinion of Dr. Benet, as discussed above, the ALJ relied on
Dr. Benet’s opinion that Mr. Pierson had “mild limitations with his ability to interact
appropriately with the public, supervisors, and co-workers, and moderate limitations
in his ability to respond appropriately to usual work situations and to changes in a
routine work setting.” Having considered Dr. Benet’s opinion, the ALJ concluded that
Mr. Pierson had “moderate difficulties” in social functioning, and that he was
restricted to “low stress simple tasks with only limited contact with the general
public.” Additionally, the ALJ’s hypothetical to the vocational expert included his
conclusion that Mr. Pierson was restricted to a low-stress work assignment with
simple tasks, and limited contact with the public. Accordingly, we find that the ALJ
did not pose an incomplete or improper hypothetical to the vocational expert.
IV
The district court’s order affirming the Commissioner’s denial of Mr. Pierson’s
applications for a period of disability, disability insurance benefits, and supplemental
security income is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
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