an official is entitled to qualified immunity if the “conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)
How later courts described this case
- an official is entitled to qualified immunity if the “conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION OCT 16 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DARNELL DUKES, No. 11-16944
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:10-cv-00864-CRB
v.
MEMORANDUM *
V. LIZAOLA; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Charles R. Breyer, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted October 9, 2012 **
Before: RAWLINSON, MURGUIA, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
California state prisoner Darnell Dukes appeals pro se from the district
court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging excessive force
and deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. We have jurisdiction
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, White v. Roper, 901 F.2d 1501, 1503
(9th Cir. 1990), and we affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Dukes’
handcuffing claim because Dukes failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact
as to whether defendants acted “maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose
of causing harm” by handcuffing Dukes behind his back following an altercation.
Clement v. Gomez, 298 F.3d 898, 903 (9th Cir. 2002).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on the basis of
qualified immunity on Dukes’s pepper spray decontamination claim because it
would not have been clear to reasonable prison officials in defendants’ position
that the decontamination would amount to deliberate indifference. See Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (an official is entitled to qualified immunity if
the “conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights
of which a reasonable person would have known” (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted)); Clement, 298 F.3d at 904 (“‘Deliberate indifference’ is evidenced
only when ‘the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health
or safety. . . .’” (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)).
Defendants’ motion to strike is denied as moot.
AFFIRMED.
2 11-16944