Central Pines Land Co. v. United States

United States Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

__________________________

CENTRAL PINES LAND COMPANY, L.L.C., D, S, &

T, INC., DROST & BRAME, INC., LINDA LEW

LAWTON DROST, EVELYN GAY LAWTON DUHON,

JACK E. LAWTON, JR., TOWER MINERALS

COMPANY, L.L.C., JACK E. LAWTON, SR.,

AND WILLIAM B. LAWTON COMPANY, L.L.C.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee.

__________________________

2012-5002

__________________________

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal

Claims in case no. 98-CV-314, Judge Nancy B. Firestone.

__________________________

Decided: October 15, 2012

__________________________

ANDREW JACKSON GRAY, III, The Gray Law Firm,

PLC, of Lake Charles, Louisiana, argued for plaintiffs-

appellants.

KATHERINE J. BARTON, Attorney, Environment and

Natural Resources Division, United States Department of

CENTRAL PINES LAND COMPANY v. US 2

Justice, of Washington, DC, argued for defendant-

appellee. With her on the brief were IGNACIA S. MORENO,

Assistant Attorney General, and AARON P. AVILA, Attor-

ney.

__________________________

Before NEWMAN, LOURIE, and PROST, Circuit Judges.

PROST, Circuit Judge.

Central Pines Land Company, L.L.C., D, S, & T, INC.,

Drost & Brame, INC., Linda Lew Lawton Drost, Evalyn

Gay Lawton Duhon, Jack E. Lawton, JR., Tower Minerals

Company, L.L.C., Jack E. Lawton, SR., and William B.

Lawton Company, L.L.C. (collectively, “Central Pines” or

“plaintiffs”) appeal the decision of the United States Court

of Federal Claims (“Claims Court”) to dismiss their tak-

ings claims for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1500. Central Pines Land Co. v. United States, 99 Fed.

Cl. 394 (2011). Because § 1500 barred the Claims Court

from having jurisdiction over this action, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

The progression of Central Pines’s two suits informs

the § 1500 issue before us. On August 22, 1996, Central

Pines and others, some of whom are not party to the

current action, filed suit against the United States, et al.,

in the U.S. District Court for the District of Louisiana.

Central Pines alleged it was the owner of all oil, gas, and

other minerals underlying property in Vernon Parish,

Louisiana, which it subdivided into Group A, Group B,

and Group C mineral servitudes. It claimed that between

1943 and 1978, the United States imposed a drilling and

operations moratorium on the three groups and that the

surface has continually been used for bombing and artil-

lery practice. It further alleged that starting in 1992, the

3 CENTRAL PINES LAND COMPANY v. US

United States, claiming ownership over the mineral

rights, has granted a series of oil and gas leases covering

the property in interest. Based on these factual allega-

tions, Central Pines filed for declaratory judgment quiet-

ing title to the property. In the alternative, it alleged an

unconstitutional taking without just compensation in

violation of the Fifth Amendment.

In a pair of decisions issued on April 7, 1999 and July

28, 2008, the district court granted summary judgment to

the United States with regards to Group A and Group B

mineral servitudes because the Louisiana prescription

period was not suspended by the government’s moratori-

ums. With regards to Group C, the district court granted

summary judgment to Central Pines, finding that the

Group C servitude was imprescriptible. On November 28,

2001, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court. Cen-

tral Pines Land Co. v. United States, 274 F.3d 881 (5th

Cir. 2001). On October 7, 2002, Central Pines’s petition

for writ of certiorari was denied. Central Pines Land Co.

v. United States, 537 U.S. 822 (2002).

On April 3, 1998, while summary judgment motions

were pending in district court, Central Pines filed a

complaint in the Claims Court, alleging a taking without

just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment.

As in its district court complaint, Central Pines alleged it

was the owner of all oil, gas, and other minerals underly-

ing property in Vernon Parish, Louisiana, which it subdi-

vided into Group A, Group B, and Group C mineral

servitudes. It claimed that between 1943 and 1978, the

United States imposed a drilling and operations morato-

rium on the three groups and that the surface has con-

tinually been used for bombing and artillery practice. It

further alleged that starting in 1992, the United States,

claiming ownership over the mineral rights, has granted a

CENTRAL PINES LAND COMPANY v. US 4

series of oil and gas leases covering the property in inter-

est. Central Pines acknowledged that it had filed suit

against the United States, et al., in district court for quiet

title and, alternatively, for an unconstitutional taking in

violation of the Fifth Amendment. Central Pines ex-

plained that its Claims Court suit was brought in the

alternative of its district court action, and requested that

its Claims Court suit be stayed pending resolution in the

district court.

The Claims Court granted the stay, which remained

in place until November 12, 2002. Upon lifting the stay,

the Claims Court ordered plaintiffs to amend their com-

plaint, and on January 6, 2003, plaintiffs filed a First

Amended and Restated Complaint. They alleged a tem-

porary taking of the Group C mineral servitude and

permanent taking of Group A and Group B mineral

servitudes. The complaint reiterated the same factual

allegations to title and the same government conduct

made in the original complaint, and added allegations

based on the resolution of the district court action. Liti-

gation with regard to these three mineral servitudes

proceeded. In 2004, the Claims Court dismissed the

Group A and Group B claims and limited the Group C

claim to post-1992 action. Central Pines Land Co. v.

United States, 61 Fed. Cl. 527, 530 (2004). After denial of

summary judgment in 2008, Central Pines Land Co. v.

United States, No. 98-314 (Fed. Cl. Sept. 30, 2008), the

case proceeded to trial. At trial, the Claims Court found

that the government’s issuance of protective leases com-

mencing after May 1, 1997, constituted a temporary

taking for which Central Pines was entitled to compensa-

tion. Central Pines Land Co. v. United States, 95 Fed. Cl.

633, 651-53 (2010).

5 CENTRAL PINES LAND COMPANY v. US

On May 26, 2011, while the parties were briefing the

question of attorneys fees and costs and prior to the entry

of final judgment, the United States filed a motion to

dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1500, in light of the Supreme Court’s recent

decision in United States v. Tohono O’Odham Nation, 131

S. Ct. 1723 (2011). On September 7, 2011, the Claims

Court granted the United States’ motion to dismiss.

Central Pines Land Co. v. United States, 99 Fed. Cl. 394

(2011). The Claims Court compared the district court

complaint and the original Claims Court complaint line-

by-line, finding that the operative facts alleged in the two

complaints were nearly identical. Id. at 400-02. Because

these two complaints shared the same operative facts and

thus were “for or in respect to” the same claim, § 1500

precluded the Claims Court from exercising jurisdiction

over the plaintiffs’ original Claims Court complaint,

which was filed while the district court action was pend-

ing. Id. The Claims Court also rejected plaintiffs’ argu-

ment that their First Amended and Restated Complaint

was a supplemental complaint that vested the Claims

Court with jurisdiction previously lacking over the origi-

nal complaint. Id. at 402-03.

Central Pines appeals the dismissal of its Claims

Court action. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1295(a)(3).

DECISION

We review the Claims Court’s decision to dismiss a

case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction de novo.

Trusted Integration, Inc. v. United States, 659 F.3d 1159,

1163 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Section 1500 limits the Claims

Court’s jurisdiction when a related action is pending in

another court. Specifically, the statute provides:

CENTRAL PINES LAND COMPANY v. US 6

The United States Court of Federal Claims shall

not have jurisdiction of any claim for or in respect

to which the plaintiff or his assignee has pending

in any other court any suit or process against the

United States or any person who, at the time

when the cause of action alleged in such suit or

process arose, was, in respect thereto, acting or

professing to act, directly or indirectly under the

authority of the United States.

28 U.S.C. § 1500. Because subject matter jurisdiction

depends on the state of things at the time of the Claims

Court action that was brought, we look to the facts as

they exist when a plaintiff filed his Claims Court com-

plaint to determine if § 1500 applies. Keene Corp. v.

United States, 508 U.S. 200, 207-08 (1993). If a plaintiff,

upon filing, has a suit pending in any other court “for or

in respect to” the same claim, § 1500 bars jurisdiction

over the Claims Court suit. Id. at 209. “Two suits are for

or in respect to the same claim, precluding jurisdiction in

the [Claims Court], if they are based on substantially the

same operative facts, regardless of the relief sought in

each suit,” Tohono O’Odham, 131 S. Ct. at 1731, or the

legal theories asserted, Keene, 508 U.S. at 210.

On appeal, plaintiffs do not dispute that the district

court action was pending when they filed their Claims

Court action in 1998. Rather, plaintiffs argue that § 1500

does not bar their Claims Court action because the

Claims Court action and district court action were decided

on different facts—specifically, different time periods.1 In

1 As a corollary to this argument, plaintiffs dispute

whether Rule 12(b)(1) of the Rules of the U.S. Court of

Federal Claims (“RCFC”) was the proper mechanism for

the government to move for dismissal at the late stage of

litigation. It was. An objection to a court’s subject matter

7 CENTRAL PINES LAND COMPANY v. US

essence, plaintiffs are advocating a comparison of the

state of the two suits at the time the motion to dismiss

was filed by the government or considered by the Claims

Court. The problem for plaintiffs, though, is that this

argument has been soundly rejected time and again.

Keene, 508 U.S. at 208; Dico, Inc. v. United States, 48 F.3d

1199, 1203-04 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (explaining that “the

§ 1500 bar rises, if at all, at the time the complaint is filed

in the Court of Federal Claims, . . . and is based on well-

plead allegations”); UNR Indus., Inc. v. United States, 962

F.2d 1013, 1022 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (en banc) aff’d sub nom.

Keene, 508 U.S. 200 (“There is nothing in section 1500 to

suggest a free floating jurisdictional bar that attaches

only when the government files a motion to dismiss, or

worse, when the court gets around to acting on it.”).

Thus, to the extent that plaintiffs rely on the ultimate

determinations of the district court and Claims Court,

which were based on different time periods of alleged

government action, their reliance is misplaced because

the § 1500 jurisdictional bar attaches, if at all, at filing.

To determine whether the § 1500 bar attached when

plaintiffs filed their Claims Court action, we compare the

operative facts asserted at the time the two complaints

were filed. See Tohono O’Odham, 131 S. Ct. at 1731;

Trusted Integration, 659 F.3d at 1169. A review of the

complaint filed by plaintiffs at the district court and at

the Claims Court reveals that the factual allegations are

very similar, save the captions, sections related to relief,

and acknowledgement of the district court action in the

jurisdiction can be raised by any party or the court at any

stage of litigation, including after trial and the entry of

judgment. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 506-07

(2006).

CENTRAL PINES LAND COMPANY v. US 8

Claims Court complaint. Both complaints describe, using

identical language, the same three groups of mineral

servitudes, the same history of conveyances of the land

from the 1920s through the 1980s, the same military and

Forest Service use of the land, the same drilling and

operations moratorium, and the same claim by the United

States of ownership over the mineral leases. Both com-

plaints allege that the government had recognized plain-

tiffs as mineral owners but had been continuously using

the land overlaying the mineral interests for heavy mili-

tary use since 1943, and that the government had granted

leases to the mineral servitudes as early as 1992. These

are not mere background facts; they are critical to plain-

tiffs’ claims in both actions. In fact, both complaints

allege these facts within the context, inter alia, of a

takings claim.2 The district court complaint also alleges a

quiet title action in which plaintiffs’ claim of rightful

ownership to the mineral servitudes is based on these

same exact facts. Because plaintiffs filed two nearly

identical complaints that, at best, repackaged the same

conduct into two different theories, and at worst, alleged

the same takings claim, we find that there is a substan-

tial overlap of operative facts that implicates the § 1500

bar. See, e.g., Tohono O’Odham, 131 S. Ct. at 1731 (find-

ing two suits had substantial overlap of operative facts

where tribe could have filed two nearly identical com-

plaints without changing the claim in either suit in any

significant way); Trusted Integration, 659 F.3d 1166-67.

2 In the district court complaint, Central Pines al-

leges a takings claim as an alternative to the quiet title

action. Although Central Pines subsequently filed the

same takings claim in the Claims Court, it never moved

to dismiss the takings claim before the district court, and

thus a takings claim was pending when Central Pines

filed its complaint at the Claims Court.

9 CENTRAL PINES LAND COMPANY v. US

Anticipating that § 1500 divests the Claims Court of

jurisdiction over their original complaint, plaintiffs argue

that their First Amended And Restated Complaint is a de

facto supplemental complaint that vested the Claims

Court with jurisdiction in 2003, after the district court

litigation had become final. That pleading reiterates

almost all of the facts and allegations made in the original

complaint, but adds paragraphs relating to the conclusion

of the district court action and divides the original takings

claim into two counts—one count alleging a permanent

taking of Group A and B mineral servitudes and one

count alleging a temporary taking of the Group C mineral

servitude. We agree with plaintiffs that their 2003 plead-

ing constitutes a supplemental complaint (rather than an

amended complaint) because it sets out a “transaction,

occurrence, or event that happened after the date of the

pleading to be supplemented.” RCFC 15(d).

But, we disagree with plaintiffs that their supplemen-

tal complaint can cure the § 1500 jurisdictional bar pre-

cluding their original complaint.3 Generally, “‘jurisdiction

of the court depends upon the state of things at the time

of the action brought.’” Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global

Grp., 541 U.S. 567, 570 (2004) (quoting Mollan v. Tor-

rance, 9 Wheat. 537, 539 (1824)). While we have held

that certain circumstances may exist in which a supple-

3 To the extent plaintiffs rely on the discussion in

Rockwell International Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S.

457, 474 (2007), to aid their argument, that case is distin-

guishable. In that case, jurisdiction existed when the case

was filed and the question was whether the amended

complaint subsequently divested the court of jurisdiction;

here, plaintiffs argue the inverse. Id. Similarly, several

other cases relied on by plaintiffs relate to amended

rather than supplemental complaints, and thus are not on

point.

CENTRAL PINES LAND COMPANY v. US 10

mental complaint can cure a defect in subject matter

jurisdiction, these circumstances “depend[] on a careful

reading of the substantive provision at issue.” Black v.

Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 93 F.3d 781, 790 (1996).

In instances where statutes impose a prerequisite to filing

which a plaintiff has failed to meet upon filing, a supple-

mental complaint may cure such a defect. See Mathews v.

Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 75 (1976) (allowing supplemental

complaint to cure failure of a plaintiff to meet statute’s

administrative exhaustion requirements); Black, 93 F.3d

at 790 (allowing a supplemental complaint to cure a

petition that was defective because it was filed before the

$1,000 threshold of reimbursable expenses required by

the Vaccine Act was reached).4 By contrast, if a statute

contains an express prohibition against filing suit, then a

supplemental complaint cannot cure the lack of jurisdic-

tion existing at the onset. Black, 93 F.3d at 790 (citing

McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 110-11 (1993), and

4 Recent cases bring into question whether the

statutory limitations implicated in these cases are truly

jurisdictional or are “nonjurisdictional ‘claim-processing

rules.’” See Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 648 (2012)

(noting that in the past, the Court was less than meticu-

lous in rendering statutory language jurisdictional);

Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197,

(2011) (holding that the 120-day filing deadline at issue

was “[a]mong the types of rules that should not be de-

scribed as jurisdictional” but rather “claim processing

rules”); Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237,

1248 (2010) (holding copyright statute’s registration

requirement a nonjurisdictional condition although previ-

ously held to be jurisdictional); Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 510-

11 (holding that employee-numerosity requirement of

Title VII was not jurisdictional). Regardless, these same

cases only confirm that § 1500 is indeed a jurisdictional

statute. See, e.g., Henderson, 131 S. Ct. at 1204 (noting

that when Congress intends a statute to be jurisdictional

it casts the provision in explicit jurisdictional terms).

11 CENTRAL PINES LAND COMPANY v. US

Halstrom v. Tillamook Cnty., 493 U.S. 20, 25-26 (1989)).

It would defeat the purpose of the prohibition to permit a

plaintiff to file his complaint during the prohibited period

and then, after the prohibited period expired, rely on a

supplemental complaint to cure the jurisdictional defect.

Id.

Section 1500 falls squarely within the latter category;

it serves as an “express prohibition against filing claims

for which another suit [is] pending.” Keene, 508 U.S. at

208-09; see Black, 93 F.3d at 791. The statute explicitly

states that the Claims Court “shall not have jurisdiction”

over “any claim” that a party has pending in another

court. 28 U.S.C. § 1500. This language creates a manda-

tory prohibited period—the duration of the district court

action for the same claim—during which the Claims

Court cannot have jurisdiction over any action initiated

by plaintiff for the claim. Keene, 508 U.S. at 509; UNR

Indus., 962 F.2d at 1021 (“By the plain language of sec-

tion 1500, if the same claim is pending in another court

while the plaintiff files his complaint in the Claims Court,

there is no jurisdiction, period, even if the conflicting

claim is no longer pending . . .” (emphasis added)); cf.

Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551

U.S. 644, 661-62 (2007) (collecting cases that note Con-

gress’s use of “shall” indicates a mandatory requirement

void of judicial discretion). The predecessor statute

confirms that § 1500 bars jurisdiction over a Claims Court

action initiated during the prohibited period. That stat-

ute (which has changed in phraseology only)5 states that

“no person shall file . . . any claim . . . for or in respect to

which he . . . has pending any suit or process in any other

court.” Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 154, 36 Stat. 1138

5 See H.R. Rep. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., A140

(1947).

CENTRAL PINES LAND COMPANY v. US 12

(emphasis added); see Keene, 508 U.S. at 209 (holding

amending of “shall file or prosecute” to “shall not have

jurisdiction” was not substantive). Together, the plain

language of the statute and legislative history leave “no

doubt that at least a time-of-filing rule applie[s]” such

that jurisdiction under § 1500 is dependent on the state of

things when the action is brought, and cannot be rescued

by subsequent action of either party or by resolution of

the co-pending litigation. See Keene, 508 U.S at 207-09;

UNR Indus., 962 F.2d at 1021-22 (holding it readily

apparent that “any suit filed in the Court of Claims when

the same claim was pending in another court . . . had to

be dismissed, . . . regardless of intervening actions in the

conflicting case” (emphases added)); British Am. Tobacco

Co. v. United States, 98 Ct. Cl. 438, 441 (1939) (rejecting,

under § 1500’s predecessor, the contention that once the

co-pending district court litigation was final, a party could

prosecute its claim filed prior to the final resolution).

Thus, the Claims Court cannot retroactively acquire

jurisdiction, via the filing of a supplemental complaint or

otherwise, after a co-pending district court action is final;

“The [Claims Court] suit must be dismissed and refiled to

avoid § 1500.” Trusted Integration, 659 F.3d at 1166 n.2

(citing Tohono, 121 S. Ct. at 1731).

Because plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Claims

Court “for or in respect to” the same claim as their pend-

ing district court action, their Claims Court action lacked

jurisdiction under § 1500. Their supplemental complaint

did not create jurisdiction where none existed at the time

the suit was filed.6 We affirm the Claims Court’s dis-

missal for lack of jurisdiction.

6 To the extent that § 1500 may impose hardship

upon plaintiffs, the Supreme Court has made clear that

the statutory language of § 1500 leaves no room to ac-

13 CENTRAL PINES LAND COMPANY v. US

AFFIRMED

count for such hardship. Tohono O’Odham, 131 S. Ct. at

1731 (“Even were some hardship to be shown, considera-

tions of policy divorced from the statute’s text and pur-

pose could not override its meaning.”); Keene, 508 U.S. at

217-218; Corona Coal Co. v. United States, 263 U.S. 537,

540 (1924) (“[T]he words of the statute are plain . . . no

room is left for construction, and we are not at liberty to

add an exception in order to remove apparent hardship in

particular cases.”).