City of New Orleans v. BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

July 31, 2012

No. 11-30607 Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

CITY OF NEW ORLEANS

Plaintiff – Appellee Cross-Appellant

COUNCIL FOR THE CITY OF NEW ORLEANS

Intervenor Plaintiff – Appellee Cross-Appellant

v.

BELLSOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INCORPORATED,

doing business as AT&T Louisiana,

Defendant – Intervenor Defendant – Appellant

Cross-Appellee

Consolidated with

No. 11-31058

CITY OF NEW ORLEANS

Plaintiff

v.

BELLSOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INCORPORATED

Defendant

BELLSOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS, L.L.C., doing business as AT&T

Louisiana,

No. 11-30607

consolidated with

No. 11-31058

Plaintiff – Appellant

v.

CITY OF NEW ORLEANS; NEW ORLEANS CITY COUNCIL; JACQUELYN

BRECHTEL CLARKSON, solely in her official capacity as member of the

Council of the City of New Orleans; ARNIE FIELKOW, solely in his official

capacity as member of the Council of the City of New Orleans; SUSAN G.

GUIDRY, solely in her official capacity as member of the Council of the City of

New Orleans; STACY HEAD, solely in her official capacity as member of the

Council of the City of New Orleans; KRISTIN GISLESON PALMER, solely in

her official capacity as member of the Council of the City of New Orleans;

CYNTHIA HEDGE-MORRELL, solely in her official capacity as member of the

Council of the City of New Orleans; JON D. JOHNSON, solely in his official

capacity as member of the Council of the City of New Orleans; MITCHELL

JOSEPH LANDRIEU, also known as Mitch Landrieu, solely in his official

capacity as Mayor of the City of New Orleans,

Defendants – Appellees

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

Before SMITH, GARZA, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

GARZA, Circuit Judge:

The City of New Orleans (“the City”) filed suit against BellSouth

Telecommunications, L.L.C. (“BellSouth,” or “the company”), claiming that the

company owed it additional compensation for the use of its public rights-of-way.

After a bench trial, the district court issued findings of fact and conclusions of

law that rejected the City’s claims for additional compensation pursuant to the

various contracts between the parties. However, the court awarded the City

unjust enrichment damages in the amount of $1,549,240.93 to compensate the

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City for benefits the company had received from its use of the City’s rights-of-

way from the end of 2006 to the time of judgment. Both parties appealed.

After the court entered an order indicating its method for calculating the

amount of unjust enrichment damages, the City enacted an ordinance intended

to force BellSouth to continue compensating the City in future years for the

unjust enrichment identified by the district court. BellSouth moved for a

preliminary injunction to enjoin the City from enforcing the ordinance pending

its appeal from the district court’s judgment. The district court denied the

injunction. BellSouth appealed, and we consolidated the various appeals.

For the following reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s findings of fact

and conclusions of law, in part, to the extent the court rejected the City’s claims

for damages. We REVERSE and VACATE the district court’s judgment

awarding unjust enrichment damages to the City. Given the latter holding, we

need not decide BellSouth’s appeal concerning its request for a preliminary

injunction. We REMAND to the district court with instructions to permanently

enjoin enforcement of the 2011 Ordinance.

I

The parties’ contractual relationship began in 1879 when the City Council

enacted Ordinance No. 4906 (“1879 Ordinance”). Section 1 of the 1879

Ordinance authorized BellSouth1

to construct and maintain a line or lines of telegraphs through the

streets of this city, the line or lines to be constructed along such

streets, at such points and in such manner as to the kind and

position of the telegraph poles, the height of the wires above the

streets, and in all other particulars, as the Administrator of the

Department of Improvements of this city may direct; provided,

however, that the said company shall connect their wires with the

Mayor’s office, chief of police office and fire alarm telegraph office,

1

We use “BellSouth” to also refer to all of its predecessors in interest.

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and place and keep telephones therein, free of charge to the city, so

that the said telephones may be used in connection with all wires

under the control of said company.

New Orleans, La., Ordinance 4906 (Feb. 18, 1879).

Section 2 of the 1879 Ordinance provided “[t]hat all the acts and doings of

said company under this ordinance shall be subject to any ordinance or

ordinances that may hereafter be passed by the City Council concerning the

same.” Id. BellSouth provided the free phones to the City and used the City’s

rights-of-way to construct and maintain telecommunications lines pursuant to

the 1879 Ordinance.

In 1880, the Louisiana legislature enacted Act. 124, which granted

corporations formed “for the purpose of transmitting intelligence by magnetic

telegraph or telephone or other system of transmitting intelligence, the

equivalent thereof which may be hereafter invented or discovered” the right to

“construct [and] maintain such telegraph, telephone or other lines necessary to

transmit intelligence along all State, parish or public roads or public works.”

1880 La. Acts 168 (codified as amended at LA. REV. STAT. § 45:781(A)). The Act

also permitted companies to construct and maintain lines “along the streets of

any city, with the consent of the council or trustees thereof.” Id.

Apparently discontent with its consideration under the 1879 Ordinance,

the City passed a new ordinance in December 1883, which purported to “regulate

and control the erection and maintenance of poles for supporting wires of the

telephones within [the City]”; the Ordinance provided, inter alia, that

No poles shall be allowed to be erected, or any existing poles be

allowed to remain, in [a certain] portion of the city . . . , except on the

payment of $5 per annum per pole for every such pole erected or at

present in use within that section of the city[;] said payments to be

in consideration of the privilege and advantage of entering upon,

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using, and permanently occupying the streets, ways and places of the

city for private property, and to be paid annually in advance . . . .

City of New Orleans v. Great S. Tel. & Tel. Co., 3 So. 533, 534 (La. 1888) (citation

omitted).

The City filed suit to enjoin BellSouth from using or maintaining the 600

poles it had erected in a designated portion of town until the company paid the

amount due under the 1883 Ordinance. On appeal, the Louisiana Supreme

Court invalidated the 1883 Ordinance, holding that the City could not exact

additional consideration from BellSouth for the company’s “continued enjoyment

of privileges already granted.” Id. at 535. The court concluded that because

BellSouth had complied with the conditions of the 1879 Ordinance, the City’s

“grant of authority” to BellSouth had become an “irrevocable contract, and the

city is powerless to set it aside or to interpolate new or more onerous

considerations therein.” Id. (citing Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward,

17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819)).

In 1906, the City inquired “whether [BellSouth] would be willing to pay

[the City] a considerable sum per annum for the use of the streets.” BellSouth

responded to the inquiry by letter. The company first stated that it was “in the

enjoyment of a grant, made in 1879, which gave it for legal consideration the

right to conduct its business and make use of the streets, and cannot therefore

make any payment or contribution to the City as a consideration for a grant

already acquired.” However, “recognizing the fact that the grant has by reason

of the great development of the telephone business proved to be of great benefit

to the Company,” BellSouth expressed its “willing[ness] to pay to the [City],

quarterly, . . . three (3) per cent of its gross receipts from rentals paid by

telephone subscribers for rental of telephones in [the City], so long as [BellSouth]

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is alone operating in the city.” The company further qualified its offer as follows:

“Should any other person or company acquire the right to conduct a telephone

exchange or business in the City, the Company would not feel justified in

continuing its payments, and would cease to make them.”

In response, the City Council adopted a motion to accept BellSouth’s

tender of 3% of its gross receipts for local telephone rentals, but “with the

reservation that said tender . . . and the acceptance of said [tender] . . . shall in

nowise constitute a contract between [BellSouth] and the [City] or bind the

[City] to hereafter grant no other privileges for the use of streets in connection

with the telephone business.” BellSouth began making payments under the

1906 Agreement.

In 1916, BellSouth sent a letter to the City’s Commissioner of Public

Property, purporting to confirm a previous conversation involving BellSouth and

certain City officials. In the letter, BellSouth agreed to provide the City with

telephone service at regulated rates, less a 33.33% discount; the parties also

agreed that the discount “would apply to all classes of service which are or may

be furnished to the City or any of its Departments.” The letter further stated

that BellSouth would provide the City with 25 additional telephones, free of

charge, “[i]n addition to the three free telephones which the Company furnishes

to the City under its franchise obligation.” BellSouth does not appear to have

received any explicit consideration for its “additional” concessions in the 1916

Letter Agreement.

In 1984, the divestiture of AT&T broke the company into several smaller

companies, including BellSouth. Under the divestiture, BellSouth could no

longer own or provide telephone equipment to its customers. Accordingly,

BellSouth could no longer provide free telephones to the City as required by the

1879 Ordinance and the 1916 Letter Agreement. To solve this problem, the

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parties entered into the 1984 Concession Agreement. Under the Agreement,

BellSouth agreed to make a lump sum payment of $417,285.18 to “cover the

City’s budgetary deficit for one year on the equipment portion of the concession,”

in exchange for the City’s agreement “to a cap on the lines and service portion

of the concession at the present dollar value, i.e., $31,407.21 monthly.” The

parties further agreed that the 1984 Concession Agreement would only amend

the 1916 Letter Agreement, and it would not waive any of the City’s other rights,

including its rights under the 1906 Agreement—that is, BellSouth’s obligation

to pay the City 3% of its gross receipts from local recurring revenue. BellSouth

has fulfilled its obligations under the 1984 Agreement, which involve making

payments totaling $376,886.52 annually.

In 1996, the City Council enacted the Ordinance of General Applicability

(“OGA”), to provide for uniform procedures, terms, conditions and compensation

for telecommunications franchises that use the City’s rights-of-way. New

Orleans, La., Ordinance 17,560 (Feb. 1, 1996). The OGA applies to all

franchisees occupying the City’s rights-of-way for the purposes of regulating the

installation, maintenance, repair and/or operation of wired telecommunications

systems. However, the OGA distinguishes between new and existing franchisees

to the extent it regulates the compensation owed to the City for the use of its

rights-of-way. For compensation purposes, the OGA applies to pre-existing

franchises only if those franchises “acknowledge susceptibility to an [OGA].” Id.

The OGA provides that pre-existing franchises that do not acknowledge

susceptibility to an OGA “shall remain subject to all existing provisions of such

pre-existing franchise, as well as being subject to [certain non-compensation

parts of the OGA].” Id. The compensation provisions of the OGA do apply,

however, to all pre-existing franchises when they are renewed.

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In early 2000, the City informed BellSouth of its belief that the company

owed it an additional $7,250,983 under the 1906 agreement for the years

1997–1998.2 When BellSouth refused to pay, the City filed suit in Louisiana

state court (1) to recover the outstanding compensation due under the 1906

Agreement and (2) to obtain a declaration that all future payments under the

1906 Agreement must be based upon 3% of the company’s total gross receipts

from the City, as opposed to 3% of its gross receipts from local recurring

telephone services. BellSouth removed the suit to federal court and filed a

counterclaim seeking (1) a declaration that the 1906 Agreement had terminated

since BellSouth was no longer the exclusive provider of telecommunications

services in the City and (2) a return of all payments made under the 1906

Agreement after BellSouth was no longer the exclusive provider of

telecommunications services in the City.3

In 2001, the parties settled their lawsuit and entered into the 2001

Settlement Agreement, which was ratified by the City Council. The 2001

Settlement Agreement was “intended to fully and completely compromise, settle

and finally terminate all of the disputes, claims and causes of action by and

between BellSouth and the City with respect to the agreements and ordinances

described herein and in the Pending City Suit.” The Settlement Agreement

contained the following material terms: (1) the City expressly recognized the

grant of rights conferred to BellSouth by the 1879 Ordinance, as interpreted and

2

In 1994, the City had made a similar claim, and it had demanded additional

compensation from the company under the 1906 Agreement. BellSouth eventually agreed to

pay the City $2.5 million as a credit against any future liability under the 1906 Agreement;

BellSouth did not admit liability.

3

The Federal Telecommunications Act of 1996 definitively introduced competition into

the City’s market for telephone services. Nevertheless, BellSouth continued to make payments

to the City under the 1906 Letter Agreement after other telecommunications providers had

begun providing services in the City.

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confirmed by the Great Southern court; the City also expressly recognized that

it was not entitled to seek additional compensation or consideration from

BellSouth for the rights conferred by the 1879 Ordinance; (2) the parties

expressly recognized that the 1906 Agreement had terminated because other

companies had acquired the right to conduct telephone business in the City; (3)

BellSouth agreed to pay the City a fixed, annual amount of $5.5 million for six

years, terminating in January 2006; and (4) the parties mutually released each

other from all claims, whether known or unknown, that in any way concerned

the 1879 Ordinance, the 1906 Agreement, or the 1984 Concession Agreement.

As “further consideration for the settlement embodied in th[e] agreement”:

(1) the Mayor agreed to publicly support state Simplified Tax Legislation; and

(2) if Louisiana did not pass Simplified Tax Legislation prior to January 2007,

the parties agreed that the City could elect, by ordinance “during the calendar

year 2007,” to enter into a Local Municipality Agreement (“LMA”), which would

require BellSouth to pay the City 5% of its gross revenues from certain

BellSouth Accounts. The Settlement Agreement provided that the LMA would

have a maximum primary term of five years, and that it could be extended for

one additional five year term if certain conditions were satisfied.

The Settlement Agreement further provided that the City would have no

right to elect to enter the LMA if it failed to meet its obligations under the

Agreement, which included the requirement that it enact an ordinance entering

into the LMA during the calendar year 2007. Lastly, the parties agreed that the

Settlement Agreement “shall form the entire and only agreement between the

Parties and that no promises, inducement or other agreement expressed herein

has been made.”

BellSouth made the required $5.5 million annual payments through 2006.

However, Louisiana did not pass the Simplified Tax Legislation, and the City

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Council did not pass an ordinance entering into the LMA during the calendar

year 2007. Accordingly, starting in 2007, BellSouth was only paying the City

$376,886.52 annually to use the City’s rights-of-way under the 1984 Concession

Agreement. When BellSouth refused the City’s demand for additional

compensation, the City filed the present lawsuit in January 2009.

In its complaint, the City asserted several claims for damages alleging that

BellSouth owed it additional compensation for use of its rights-of-way. The City

also sought various forms of declaratory relief that would allow it to subject

BellSouth’s franchise to the compensation provisions of the OGA. BellSouth

answered and denied the City’s claims. It also asserted a counterclaim against

the City, seeking damages from certain payments it had made to the City

pursuant to the 2001 Settlement Agreement and the 1906 Agreement.

The district court held a bench trial, and, in November 2010, it issued its

findings of fact and conclusions of law. In its findings and conclusions, the

district court agreed with BellSouth that the company did not owe the City

additional compensation pursuant to any of the existing agreements between the

parties.

First, the district court concluded that the 1879 Ordinance was valid and

that Great Southern precluded the City from imposing new or more onerous

consideration for the franchise rights granted therein. The court also rejected the

City’s argument that the 1879 Ordinance only granted the company a franchise

to use the City rights-of-way aboveground. The court similarly rejected the

City’s argument that the 1906 Agreement actually granted BellSouth a franchise

right to use the City’s belowground rights-of way.

Second, the district court concluded that the 1984 Concession Agreement

was valid and that it monetized BellSouth’s obligations under the 1879

Ordinance and the 1916 Letter Agreement.

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Third, the district court concluded that the OGA did not regulate the

compensation owed by BellSouth to the City for its franchise rights under the

1879 Ordinance. The court found that BellSouth’s 1879 franchise rights

preexisted the OGA, did not acknowledge susceptibility to the OGA, and had not

been renewed since the passage of the OGA. Similarly, because the district court

concluded that the 1906 Agreement did not grant any franchise right to

BellSouth, it determined that the OGA did not apply to whatever benefit the

company received from the 1906 Agreement.

However, the district court disagreed with BellSouth’s interpretation of

the parties’ contracts in two important respects. First, the court determined that

BellSouth entered into the 1906 Agreement in exchange “for some benefit other

than exclusivity.” It based that conclusion on (1) the City’s refusal to provide

BellSouth with exclusivity in 1906, (2) BellSouth’s decision to continue making

the payments even after competition entered the telecommunications market,

and (3) the fact that BellSouth did not raise an exclusivity claim regarding the

1906 payments until it brought a counter-claim in the 2000 litigation. The

district court further concluded that the 1906 Agreement granted BellSouth a

benefit in addition to and separate from its 1879 franchise rights. However, the

court acknowledged that it could not identify the exact benefit that BellSouth did

receive from the 1906 Agreement.

Second, the district court rejected BellSouth’s contention that the “further

consideration” provisions of the 2001 Settlement Agreement—Simplified Tax

Legislation and the LMA—were exclusive. Specifically, the court concluded that

the inclusion of the two “further consideration” provisions in the 2001

Settlement Agreement “indicated that the parties contemplated compensation

would be paid by BellSouth to the City post-2006 in addition to BellSouth’s

payments to the City pursuant to the 1984 Concession Agreement.” The court

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related this conclusion to its prior determination that the 1906 Agreement

conferred an unknown benefit to BellSouth: that is, the court concluded that the

parties intended the “further consideration” as compensation for the unknown

benefit BellSouth would continue to receive from the 1906 Agreement. It

concluded that the failure to enact either of the enumerated “further

consideration” conditions did not “foreclose the City from receiving compensation

from BellSouth post-2006 for the benefits BellSouth has enjoyed and continues

to enjoy which were granted originally in the 1906 Agreement.” However, the

court determined that no valid agreement governed the amount of compensation

BellSouth owed to the City post-2006 for the benefits it was continuing to receive

from the 1906 Agreement.

Because the court determined that “no agreed upon method of payment

has been in place from 2006,” it concluded that“the doctrine of unjust enrichment

must be used to define the extent of BellSouth’s obligation to pay the City for the

benefits it has been receiving post-2006 which originally derived from the 1906

Agreement and later were recognized in the 2001 Settlement Agreement.” In

particular, the court concluded that the equities of the situation merited an

award of unjust enrichment damages under Louisiana law; the court concluded

that BellSouth had no justification for failing to “compensate the City post-2006

since the parties contemplated that payments would continue after 2006 and

BellSouth has continued to enjoy the same benefits post-2006 as when it was

previously making payments to the City pursuant to the 1906 Agreement and

the 2001 Settlement Agreement.”

The district court eventually decided to use the amount BellSouth would

have paid if the City had decided to enact the LMA, minus a credit to BellSouth

for discounts it gives to the City on services, as a basis for calculating the unjust

enrichment damages. Following this formula, the district court entered

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judgment in favor of the City in the amount of $1,549,240.93 to compensate the

City for the company’s use of its rights-of-way from the end of 2006 to the time

of judgment. Both parties timely filed notices of appeal.

The district court’s pre-judgment orders indicated that BellSouth should

make “similar payments for subsequent years, unless the rights and obligations

of the parties change so as to no longer require such payments.” A month after

the court’s judgment was entered, the City passed the 2011 Ordinance in order

to set the compensation BellSouth would have to pay the City in future years for

the benefits it would receive “in excess of such benefits received by said company

pursuant to [the 1879 Ordinance].” New Orleans, La., Ordinance 24,547 (July

7, 2011). As the district court described the 2011 Ordinance, it is “an effort to

legislate future unjust enrichment payments” by requiring “BellSouth to pay

five-percent of its gross revenues ‘derived from its business in [the City].’”

BellSouth filed a motion seeking a preliminary injunction to enjoin the

enforcement of the 2011 Ordinance, contending inter alia, that it violates Great

Southern and the district court’s earlier rulings. The district court denied

BellSouth’s request for a preliminary injunction, primarily concluding that the

2011 Ordinance properly “carve[d] out Great Southern” by expressly stating that

the City was seeking compensation for benefits “in excess” of those granted by

the 1879 Ordinance. Thus, the district court concluded that enjoining the 2011

Ordinance would effectively overturn its 2009 judgment awarding unjust

enrichment damages. BellSouth appealed, and we consolidated the parties’

various appeals.

II

On appeal, the City makes two primary claims. First, it contends that the

district court erred when it construed the scope of the rights granted to

BellSouth by the 1879 Ordinance. Second, it claims that even if the district

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court properly interpreted the scope of the company’s 1879 franchise rights, the

court erred by concluding that the OGA does not govern the compensation owed

to the City under that franchise.4

In its appeal, BellSouth primarily asserts that the district court erred by

awarding the City unjust enrichment damages. The company also appeals the

district court’s order denying its request for a preliminary injunction.

On appeal from a bench trial, we review the district court’s findings of fact

for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo. Preston Exploration Co., L.P.

v. GSF, L.L.C., 669 F.3d 518, 522 (5th Cir. 2012). Because the district court

exercised diversity jurisdiction over this dispute, we apply the substantive law

of Louisiana. Id.

Our resolution of the parties’ claims turns on the interpretation of

ordinances passed by the City and the various contracts between the parties.

Under Louisiana law, “[t]he statutory and jurisprudential rules for the

construction and interpretation of state statutes are applicable to the

construction and interpretation of municipal and parochial ordinances.” Bunch

v. Town of St. Francisville, 446 So. 2d 1357, 1360 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1984) (citing

Lieber v. Rust, 388 So. 2d 836 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1980), affirmed, 398 So. 2d 519

(La. 1981); Louisiana Television Broadcasting Corp. v. Total C.A.T.V., 341 So.

2d 1183 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976), writ refused, 343 So. 2d 1076 (La. 1977)).

Accordingly, determining the meaning of the City’s ordinances poses questions

of law. Thibodeaux v. Donnell, 9 So. 3d 120, 122 (La. 2009) (“Because this

matter involves the interpretation of a statute, it is a question of law . . . .”)

(citation omitted).

4

The City alternatively argues that the district court erred in setting the amount of the

unjust enrichment award. Because we conclude that the district court erred by awarding

unjust enrichment damages, we need not address this claim.

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Similarly, because we determine that the various contracts between the

parties can be construed within their four corners, the “interpretation of the

contract[s] presents [] question[s] of law.” Greenwood 950, L.L.C. v. Chesapeake

Louisiana, L.P., 683 F.3d 666, 668 (5th Cir. 2012) (applying Louisiana law); see

LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2046 (“When the words of a contract are clear and

explicit and lead to no absurd consequences, no further interpretation may be

made in search of the parties’ intent.”); Sims v. Mulhearn Funeral Home, Inc.,

956 So. 2d 583, 590 (La. 2007) (“The determination of whether a contract is clear

or ambiguous is a question of law.”). Thus, we will review the district court’s

conclusions de novo.

A

We first consider the City’s claim that the district court erred by

concluding that BellSouth does not owe it compensation under any existing

agreement or ordinance, apart from BellSouth’s obligations under the 1984

Concession Agreement.

The City first contends that the district court misinterpreted the language

of the 1879 Ordinance and improperly expanded the Louisiana Supreme Court’s

holding in Great Southern when it concluded that the 1879 Ordinance granted

certain rights to the company. Specifically, the City claims that the Great

Southern court only held that the 1879 Ordinance prevented the City from

unilaterally demanding additional consideration from BellSouth for the

company’s existing uses of the City’s rights-of-way. It contends that neither the

language of the 1879 Ordinance nor the court’s holding in Great Southern limits

its ability to demand additional consideration from BellSouth for the company’s

future uses of its rights-of-way. The City also asserts that the 1879 Ordinance

did not grant the company the right to use its belowground rights-of-way. We

reject both of the City’s interpretations of the 1879 Ordinance.

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First, we conclude that the 1879 Ordinance prevents the City from

unilaterally increasing the consideration owed to it by BellSouth for both present

and future uses of its rights-of-way. In Great Southern, the Louisiana Supreme

Court invalidated an 1883 Ordinance, in which the City had attempted to

require BellSouth to pay “$5 per annum per pole for every” pole “erected or at

present in use” in a part of the City. 3 So. at 534. The 1883 Ordinance plainly

attempted to impose additional consideration on BellSouth for both its existing

and future uses of the City’s rights-of-way. See id. (“No poles shall be allowed

to be erected, . . . except on the payment of $5 per annum per pole for every such

pole erected . . . .”) (citation omitted). Accordingly, because the Great Southern

court struck down the 1883 Ordinance in its entirety, we agree with the district

court that the holding in Great Southern prevents the City from unilaterally

increasing the consideration required by the 1879 Ordinance for both present

and future uses of the City’s rights-of-way.

We also conclude that the 1879 Ordinance granted BellSouth a franchise

right to use the City’s rights-of-way both above and below the surface. The City

contends that the 1879 Ordinance only concerned its aboveground rights-of-way,

and that it was the 1906 Agreement that gave BellSouth a franchise to use the

City’s sub-surface rights-of-way. However, the City’s argument is not supported

by the text of either the 1879 Ordinance or the 1906 Agreement.

The 1879 Ordinance “authoriz[es] the construction and maintenance of a

telephonic telegraph line through the streets of the [C]ity.” Although the 1879

Ordinance does indicate that the parties contemplated the placement of

BellSouth’s lines aboveground, nothing in the 1879 Ordinance precludes the City

from ordering the company to place its lines underground. For instance, section

2 of the 1879 Ordinance requires BellSouth to install and maintain its lines “in

all other particulars, as the [City] may direct.” The Great Southern court

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interpreted section 2 to recognize the right of the company to act in accord with

the 1879 Ordinance, “only subjecting such ‘acts and doings’ to municipal

regulations not conflicting with the ordinance itself.” 3 So. at 535–36. Because

a municipal regulation requiring BellSouth to place its lines underground would

not conflict with the 1879 Ordinance itself, we reject the City’s argument that

the 1879 Ordinance did not grant the company a franchise to use the City’s

belowground rights-of-way.

The subsequent conduct of the parties confirms our reading of the 1879

Ordinance. In 1897, the City passed an ordinance requiring all companies

operating with electrical wires or conductors to install facilities below ground in

certain portions of the City. New Orleans, La., Ordinance 13,838 (Dec. 15, 1897).

The next year, the City passed an ordinance purporting to temporarily regulate

“the erection of poles and the stringing of wires overhead,” pursuant to existing

ordinances, “pending the laying of wires and electrical conductors underground”;

moreover, this ordinance expressly applied to “telegraph, telephone, and

signalling wires.” New Orleans, La., Ordinance 13,970 (Feb. 2, 1898). This post-

formation conduct affirms our conclusion that the 1879 Ordinance granted

BellSouth a franchise to use the City’s belowground rights-of-way.

Similarly, we conclude that the 1879 Ordinance included the right to use

the City’s belowground rights-of-way because we reject the City’s argument that

it was the 1906 Agreement that granted the company a franchise to place its

lines underground. As we will subsequently discuss, BellSouth entered into the

1906 Agreement in exchange for the exclusive right to operate a telephone

business in the City. Indeed, the City is precluded from arguing otherwise

because it expressly acknowledged in the 2001 Settlement Agreement that the

1906 Agreement had terminated when the company was no longer the only

telephone company operating in the City. See 2001 Settlement Agreement

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(“BellSouth and the City expressly recognize that because other persons or

companies have acquired the right to conduct a telephone exchange or business

in the City, the 1906 Agreement has terminated.”). Under Louisiana law, “[a]

compromise settles only those differences that the parties clearly intend to

settle, including the necessary consequences of what they express.” LA. CIV.

CODE ANN. art. 3076. Here, the parties’ “compromise,” which was embodied in

the 2001 Settlement Agreement, “clearly comprehended” any “dispute” over the

purpose of the 1906 Agreement; accordingly, the City is precluded from arguing

that the 1906 Agreement conferred any benefit on BellSouth other than

exclusivity. See Brown v. Drillers, Inc., 630 So. 2d 741, 748–50 (La. 1994)

(describing the inapplicable circumstances in which Louisiana courts do not

enforce the clear and explicit words of a settlement agreement). Lastly, neither

BellSouth’s 1906 tender nor the City’s motion accepting that tender mentions

belowground franchise rights.

Accordingly, we conclude that the 1879 Ordinance granted BellSouth a

franchise to place its lines both above and below the ground.

The City also argues that the district court erred by concluding that the

OGA does not govern the compensation owed by BellSouth for its use of the

City’s rights-of-way. It contends that the OGA regulates the compensation

BellSouth must pay to the City for the company’s (1) franchise rights under the

1879 Ordinance and (2) “its franchise rights for those rights and benefits it

utilizes beyond those granted under the 1879 Ordinance.” We disagree.

First, we need not decide whether the City intended for the OGA to

regulate the compensation owed by BellSouth under the 1879 Ordinance because

the City lacks the authority to unilaterally increase the consideration due for

BellSouth’s rights under the Ordinance. The OGA applies to pre-existing

franchises “for the purposes of determining compensation payable to the City .

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. . , which acknowledge susceptibility to an Ordinance of General Application or

Ordinance of General Applicability.” Section 2 of the 1879 Ordinance does

provide that “all the acts and doings of said company under this ordinance shall

be subject to any ordinance or ordinances that may hereafter be passed by the

city council concerning same.” However, in Great Southern, the Louisiana

Supreme Court interpreted section 2 of the 1879 Ordinance (1) to “assume[] that

the ordinance itself is to continue in full force and effect, and certainly reserves

no power to repeal, destroy, or alter it in any of its essential features and

considerations” and (2) to “recognize[] the right of the company to act and to do

under and according to the ordinance, only subjecting such ‘acts and doings’ to

municipal regulations not conflicting with the ordinance itself.” 3 So. at 535–36.

Accordingly, even if the City intended for the compensation provisions of the

OGA to apply to the 1879 Ordinance, the OGA would then violate the terms of

1879 Ordinance as interpreted in Great Southern. That is, the OGA would

conflict with the 1879 Ordinance by attempting to unilaterally increase the

consideration owed by BellSouth for its franchise rights. See id. at 535 (“[T]he

city is powerless to set [the grant of authority to BellSouth in the 1879

Ordinance] aside or to interpolate new or more onerous consideration therein.”).

Second, we reject the City’s argument that the OGA regulates the

compensation owed by BellSouth for the franchise rights “it utilizes beyond those

granted under the 1879 Ordinance.” In short, the City has failed to establish

that BellSouth enjoys any franchise rights beyond those granted to it by the

1879 Ordinance. As we previously concluded, the 1879 Ordinance gave

BellSouth the right to use the City’s rights-of way both above and belowground,

and, as we will discuss more fully below, the 1906 Agreement did not give the

company any additional franchise rights. Thus, the City has not established

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that BellSouth possesses any franchise rights other than those granted by the

1879 Ordinance.

Accordingly, we agree with the district court that the City is not entitled

to any additional compensation under any ordinance or the existing contracts

between the parties.

B

We next consider BellSouth’s claim that the district court erred by

awarding the City unjust enrichment damages. BellSouth contends that the

court’s unjust enrichment award rests on two erroneous premises. First, it

asserts that the district court erroneously concluded that BellSouth began

making payments under the 1906 Agreement in exchange for some

“indeterminate benefit” in addition to and separate from the franchise rights

that it received from the 1879 Ordinance. Second, BellSouth claims the district

court erred by concluding that the “further consideration” provisions of the 2001

Settlement Agreement were not the exclusive methods for BellSouth to

compensate the City post-2006 for the “indeterminate benefits” it originally

received in the 1906 Agreement.

Under Louisiana law, unjust enrichment has five elements:

(1) there must be an enrichment, (2) there must be an

impoverishment, (3) there must be a connection between the

enrichment and resulting impoverishment, (4) there must be an

absence of “justification” or “cause” for the enrichment and

impoverishment, and finally (5) the action will only be allowed when

there is no other remedy at law, i.e., the action is subsidiary or

corrective in nature.

Richard v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 559 F.3d 341, 346 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting

Minyard v. Curtis Prods., Inc., 205 So. 2d 422, 432 (La. 1968)). As we have

previously noted when discussing unjust enrichment under Louisiana law:

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Not every unjust enrichment warrants usage of equity. Courts may

resort to equity only in cases of unjust enrichment for which there

is no justification in law or contract. In other words, an enrichment

is justified if it is the result of, or finds its explanation in, the term

of a valid juridical act between the impoverishee and the enrichee

or between a third party and the enrichee.

SMP Sales Mgmt., Inc. v. Fleet Credit Corp., 960 F.2d 557, 560 (5th Cir. 1992)

(quoting Carter v. Flanagan, 455 So.2d 689, 692 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984)).

Here, we agree with BellSouth that any enrichment it has received post-

2006 from its use of the City’s rights-of-way does not warrant equitable relief

because there is “justification in . . . contract.” Id. (citation omitted).

Specifically, we hold that the district court’s unjust enrichment award rests on

two erroneous premises: (1) the 1906 Agreement gave BellSouth an unknown

benefit and (2) the parties intended for BellSouth to continue to pay for its

unknown benefits under the 1906 Agreement even if neither of the “further

consideration” conditions had been satisfied.

First, the 1906 Agreement did not grant the company some “indeterminate

right” other than exclusivity. For one, the district court’s holding to the contrary

runs counter to the plain text of the documents creating the 1906 Agreement.

In its letter offering to tender 3% of its local telephone rental proceeds to the

City, BellSouth clearly indicated that it would make the payments in exchange

for exclusivity. The letter explicitly stated that the company was already “in the

enjoyment of a grant, made in 1879, which gave it for legal consideration the

right to conduct its business and make use of the streets, and cannot therefore

make any payment or contribution to the City as a consideration for a grant

already required.” However, in recognition of the great benefit the grant had

bestowed upon it, BellSouth stated that it was “willing to pay” the City 3% “of

its gross receipts from” local telephone rentals “so long as [BellSouth] is alone

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operating in the city.” The company then further clarified the qualification to

its offer: “Should any other person or company acquire the right to conduct a

telephone exchange or business in the City, the Company would not feel justified

in continuing its payments, and would cease to make them.” Under a plain

reading of the 1906 tender letter, BellSouth (1) premised its payments on being

the exclusive operator in the City and (2) acknowledged that it could not make

additional payments under the 1879 grant.

The City’s acceptance of BellSouth’s tender did not alter the benefit for

which BellSouth began making payments. To be sure, the City’s acceptance

reserved the right to allow competition from other telephone companies in the

future. Specifically, when the City Council accepted BellSouth’s tender of 3% of

its gross receipts for local telephone rentals, it did so “with the reservation that

said tender . . . and the acceptance of said 3% . . . shall in nowise constitute a

contract between [BellSouth] and the City . . . or bind the City . . . to hereafter

grant no other privileges for the use of streets in connection with the telephone

business.” However, the City’s reservation of its ability to introduce competition

in the future did not somehow mean, as the district court found, that “the

payments made by BellSouth to the City pursuant to the 1906 Agreement

constituted compensation for some benefit other than exclusivity.”

Nor does the fact that BellSouth continued to make payments under the

1906 Agreement once competition entered the City change the material terms

of the parties’ contract, especially given the language of the 2001 Settlement

Agreement. In the Settlement Agreement the City expressly recognized that

BellSouth’s tender under the 1906 Agreement was in exchange for the exclusive

right to operate a telephone business in the City. Accordingly, the City is now

precluded from arguing that the 1906 Agreement granted the company any

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rights other than exclusivity. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3076; Brown, 630 So. 2d at

748–50.

Similarly, we conclude that the second premise behind the district court’s

unjust enrichment award was erroneous. Namely, the district court erred by

determining that the “further consideration” provisions of the 2001 Settlement

Agreement were not the exclusive methods for BellSouth to compensate the City

after 2006—other than BellSouth’s obligation to pay the City $376,886.52

annually under the 1984 Concession Agreement.

As part of the Settlement Agreement, BellSouth agreed to pay the City a

fixed annual amount of $5.5 million for six years, terminating in 2006. The

Agreement included two additional sections wherein the parties agreed to

“further consideration for the settlement embodied in this Agreement.” That is,

(1) the Mayor agreed to publicly support state Simplified Tax Legislation; and

(2) if Louisiana did not pass that legislation prior to January 2007, the parties

agreed that the City could elect, by ordinance “during the calendar year 2007,”

to enter into a LMA.

The district court interpreted the “further consideration” provisions of the

2001 Settlement Agreement to establish that the parties intended for BellSouth

to continue making payments to the City after 2006, in addition to its payments

under the 1984 Concession Agreement. Although the court acknowledged that

the conditions triggering the “further consideration” provisions of the Settlement

Agreement had not been satisfied, the court concluded that the parties did not

intend for the “further consideration” provisions to be the “exclusive methods of

compensation post-2006.” The court primarily based this conclusion on its prior

erroneous finding that the 1906 Agreement granted some benefit to BellSouth

other than exclusivity and separate from its franchise rights under the 1879

Ordinance. Specifically, the court concluded that the failure of the “further

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consideration” provisions to be satisfied did “not foreclose the City from receiving

compensation from BellSouth post-2006 for the benefits BellSouth has enjoyed

and continued to enjoy which were granted originally in the 1906 Agreement.”

However, as we have already held, exclusivity was the only benefit

BellSouth received from the 1906 Agreement. Thus, the district court erred by

concluding that the parties intended for BellSouth to continue paying the City

after 2006 for the benefits it would continue to receive under the 1906

Agreement. The parties expressly agreed in the 2001 Settlement Agreement

that the 1906 Agreement had terminated when BellSouth had lost the exclusive

right to operate a telephone company in the City. Accordingly, the court’s

interpretation of the “further consideration” provisions runs directly counter to

the Agreement’s plain terms.

Further, other portions of the 2001 Settlement Agreement confirm that the

“further consideration” provisions were intended to be exclusive. For instance,

the Agreement provided that the “further consideration [was] for the settlement

embodied in this Agreement.” Thus, the “further consideration” was intended

to be consideration for concessions made in the Settlement Agreement itself, not

as compensation for “indeterminate” franchise rights. Moreover, because

BellSouth made the six annual payments required by the Agreement, the City

released and discharged BellSouth “from all claims, actions, causes of action, and

disputes whether known or unknown, asserted or unasserted, that in any way

concern the 1879 Ordinance, the 1906 Agreement, or the Concession

Agreement.” Given the broad scope of this release, the parties clearly intended

to settle all of their disputes regarding the compensation owed by BellSouth for

its use of the City’s rights-of-way. Accordingly, if the parties intended to allow

the City to pursue additional compensation post-2006 in the event that the

“further consideration” provisions had not been triggered, then the parties

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needed to expressly declare that intent since it runs counter to the plain

language of the “release” and “intent” provisions of the Agreement.

Thus, we conclude that the “further consideration” provisions of the

Agreement were the exclusive method under which the City could receive

compensation from BellSouth post-2006 for the use of its rights-of-way—other

than under the 1984 Concession Agreement.

Because we have rejected the two premises supporting the district court’s

unjust enrichment award, we also reject the district court’s conclusion that

“since no agreed upon method of payment has been in place from 2006,” it must

award unjust enrichment damages “to define the extent of BellSouth’s obligation

to pay the City for the benefits it has been receiving post-2006 which originally

derived from the 1906 Agreement and later were recognized in the 2001

Settlement Agreement.”

Contrary to the district court’s conclusion, we determine that BellSouth

has “justification in . . . contract” for any enrichment it may be enjoying from its

use of the City’s rights-of-way. SMP Sales, 960 F.2d at 560 (citations omitted).

Put another way, any enrichment BellSouth is receiving from its use of the City’s

rights-of-way is not unjust because “it is the result of, or finds its explanation in,

the term of a valid juridical act between the impoverishee and the enrichee.” Id.

(citation omitted). Here, the City released its claims for additional compensation

from BellSouth in exchange for substantial consideration under the terms of the

Settlement Agreement. Thus, the Settlement Agreement justifies whatever

“impoverishment” that has been suffered by the City. Id.

Accordingly, we reverse and vacate the district court’s judgment awarding

the City unjust enrichment damages.

C

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BellSouth has also appealed the district court’s order denying its request

for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement of the 2011 Ordinance

pending appeal. The 2011 Ordinance attempts to legislate future unjust

enrichment damages by setting the compensation BellSouth must pay the City

in future years for the benefits it receives “in excess of such benefits received by

said company pursuant to [the 1879 Ordinance].”

However, as we have already held, the district court’s unjust enrichment

award was based on an erroneous assumption that BellSouth received some

“indeterminate benefit” from the 1906 Agreement apart from exclusivity and the

franchise rights granted in the 1879 Ordinance. Thus, the 2011 Ordinance

merely seeks to increase the consideration BellSouth owes to the City for the

rights granted to it under the 1879 Ordinance. Accordingly, the 2011 Ordinance

violates the Great Southern court’s holding that “the city is powerless to set [the

grant of authority to BellSouth] aside or to interpolate new or more onerous

considerations therein.” 3 So. at 535.

Given our conclusion that the district court erred by awarding unjust

enrichment damages, the City necessarily lacks the authority to enforce the 2011

Ordinance, which attempts to codify those unjust enrichment damages.

Accordingly, we need not address BellSouth’s motion for a preliminary

injunction because we remand to the district court with instructions to

permanently enjoin the City from enforcing the 2011 Ordinance.

D

The City alternatively asks the panel to certify a question to the Louisiana

Supreme Court concerning the proper interpretation and scope of the court’s

holding in Great Southern. Louisiana Supreme Court Rule 12 provides that the

circuit may certify questions of law to the state court “when it appears” to the

circuit that (a) questions of Louisiana law are determinative of the case and (b)

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“there are no controlling precedents in the decisions” of the Louisiana Supreme

Court on the question.

Because Great Southern “appears” to be a “controlling precedent” of the

Louisiana Supreme Court on the determinative questions presented by the City’s

appeal, this case does not seem to be eligible for certification. However, the City

does contend that the 1879 Ordinance violates a provision of Louisiana’s 1974

Constitution, an argument which could not have been raised when the court

decided Great Southern.5

Regardless, we decline to certify any question to the Louisiana Supreme

Court because the City recognized the validity of the Great Southern decision in

the 2001 Settlement Agreement. In the agreement, the City

expressly recognize[d] the grant of rights conferred to BellSouth by

the 1879 Ordinance, as interpreted and confirmed by the Great

Southern court. Specifically and without limitation, the City

recognizes, as the Great Southern Court held, that the City is not

entitled to seek additional compensation or consideration from

BellSouth for the rights conferred by the 1879 Ordinance.

Given this acknowledgment of the continuing force of Great Southern, we

conclude that the City is precluded from arguing that Great Southern improperly

limits the consideration it can demand for the rights granted to BellSouth by the

1879 Ordinance. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3076; Brown, 630 So. 2d at

748–50.

III

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s order denying

the City’s claims for damages under the contracts between the parties. We

5

BellSouth has not claimed that the City could have made a similar argument under

a provision of the Louisiana Constitution of 1879. Accordingly, we will assume that the 1879

Constitution did not contain a similar provision.

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REVERSE and VACATE the district court’s judgment awarding unjust

enrichment damages to the City. We also REMAND to the district court with

instructions to enter a permanent injunction, enjoining the City from enforcing

the 2011 Ordinance.

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