Wheeler v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc.

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

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No. 12-1806

ANTHONY WHEELER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC., et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Illinois.

No. 11-cv-0839-MJR — Michael J. Reagan, Judge.

____________________

SUBMITTED JULY 20, 2012— DECIDED JULY 23, 2012†

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Before EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, and WOOD and

HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge. In September 2011, Anthony

Wheeler filed a complaint alleging that prison officials and the

prison’s medical provider, Wexford Health Sources, have re-

fused to provide effective care for his golf-ball-size hemor-

rhoids, leaving him in excruciating pain. Documents submitted

with the complaint show that Wheeler is not fantasizing. (The

complaint presents other grievances too, but this is the only

one we need consider on this appeal.)

District judges must screen prisoners’ complaints before or

“as soon as practicable after” docketing to ensure that the tar-

gets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of

† This opinion is being issued in typescript. A printed copy will follow.

No. 12-1806 Page 2

responding. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(a). Yet even though this com-

plaint alleges that defendants have ignored severe ongoing pain

from a medical condition—allegations that state a claim for re-

lief under the eighth amendment and 42 U.S.C. §1983, see

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.

97 (1976)—the district judge to this day has not screened the

complaint under §1915A. Defendants have not been served; the

litigation is stalled. Congress has the authority to require judges

to expedite particular matters, see Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327

(2000), and §1915A(a) exercises that authority. Ten months ex-

ceeds any understanding of “as soon as practicable”. Delay is

especially hard to understand when the complaint plausibly al-

leges a serious ongoing injury.

Contemporaneously with his complaint, Wheeler requested

a preliminary injunction that would compel the defendants to

arrange for the operation he thinks essential. He also asked the

judge to recruit counsel to assist him. The district judge did not

act on either motion. On January 5, 2012, Wheeler filed a se-

cond motion for injunctive relief; the court did not address that

one either. Nor did the court rule on Wheeler’s renewed re-

quest for counsel, or either of his motions for the appointment

of a medical expert.

On January 24 Wheeler filed his third motion for injunctive

relief. In a brief order on March 28 the judge declined to afford

relief. The court stated (emphasis in original): “Plaintiff’s allega-

tions fail to set forth specific facts demonstrating the likelihood

Plaintiff will suffer immediate and irreparable harm before the

Defendants can be heard. Moreover, Plaintiff’s motions seek simi-

lar relief to that sought in his complaint, which is still awaiting

preliminary review by this Court. Furthermore, federal courts

must exercise equitable restraint when asked to take over the

administration of a prison, something that is best left to correc-

tional officers and their staff.” Wheeler has appealed, as 28

U.S.C. §1292(a)(1) allows.

The district court’s three grounds for denying Wheeler’s

motions are inadequate, individually and collectively. The judge

was right to say that equitable relief depends on irreparable

harm, even when constitutional rights are at stake. See Sampson

v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 88–92 (1974). To the extent the judge

may have believed that pain never constitutes irreparable injury,

however, he was mistaken. See Harris v. Board of Supervisors, 366

F.3d 754, 766 (9th Cir. 2004). To the extent that the judge be-

No. 12-1806 Page 3

lieved that his delay in screening the complaint justifies denying

relief (the apparent import of the italicized clause in the first

sentence, and the whole of the second sentence), he was very

far wrong. A judge’s failure to act earlier is a reason to act now,

not a reason to deny an otherwise meritorious motion. Just as

prison administrators must deal promptly with their charges’

serious medical problems, so federal judges must not leave liti-

gants to bear pain indefinitely. As for the third reason: Wheeler

did not ask the judge to “take over administration of a prison”;

he asked the judge to order the prison to honor his constitu-

tional right to care for a serious medical condition. A prisoner’s

view of optimal medical treatment can be a weak ground for

superseding the views of competent physicians, but prisoners

are not invariably wrong. Judges regularly must decide whether

physicians have ignored a serious medical problem (or, in tort

litigation, whether physicians have committed malpractice).

Until evidence has been submitted, it is not possible to

know whether Wheeler really is suffering irreparable harm and

otherwise has a good claim for relief. (Irreparable injury is only

one of the conditions a plaintiff must satisfy to obtain a prelim-

inary injunction. See Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council,

Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).) But the district court’s failure to

comply with the statutory command to screen complaints

promptly has made the receipt and consideration of evidence

impossible.

This complaint should have been screened before the end of

September 2011. The district court must complete that task

swiftly. On the day our mandate is received, the judge must au-

thorize service of process on all defendants involved in the

treatment of Wheeler’s hemorrhoids. The court must give the-

se defendants a short time to respond to the motion for a pre-

liminary injunction and promptly conduct an evidentiary hear-

ing to determine whether Wheeler is entitled to relief. Because

the hearing may require evidence from medical experts, the dis-

trict judge should give serious consideration to recruiting coun-

sel to assist Wheeler. See Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647 (7th Cir.

2007) (en banc).

Wheeler did himself no favors by filing a complaint naming

36 defendants, several of whom (including the current and im-

mediate past governors of Illinois) have no conceivable relation

to his medical care. The more claims and defendants in a com-

plaint, the longer screening will take. The more frivolous claims

No. 12-1806 Page 4

in a complaint, the more a judge is apt to infer (if only subcon-

sciously) that the plaintiff is crying wolf with respect to all of

the claims.

The judge might have been justified in directing Wheeler to

file separate complaints, each confined to one group of injuries

and defendants. A litigant cannot throw all of his grievances,

against dozens of different parties, into one stewpot. Joinder

that requires the inclusion of extra parties is limited to claims

arising from the same transaction or series of related transac-

tions. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 18, 20; George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605

(7th Cir. 2007). (To be precise: a plaintiff may put in one com-

plaint every claim of any kind against a single defendant, per

Rule 18(a), but a complaint may present claim #1 against De-

fendant A, and claim #2 against Defendant B, only if both

claims arise “out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series

of transactions or occurrences”. Rule 20(a)(1)(A).) A district

judge should be able to spot a complaint violating Rules 18 and

20 within days of its filing, and solve the problem by severance

(creating multiple suits that can be separately screened) or dis-

missing the excess defendants under Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. See Lee

v. Cook County, 635 F.3d 969 (7th Cir. 2011). It is never necessary

to wait months on end to deal with a complaint that contains

unrelated claims against multiple defendants.

The order under review is vacated, and the case is remanded

with directions to proceed according to this opinion. The man-

date will issue today.