Opinion

Kathryn Keys v. Humana, Inc.

  • 684 F.3d 605
  • 95 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 44,545
  • 115 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 588
  • 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 13427
  • 2012 WL 2505534
Court
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Filed
Jul 2, 2012
Status
Published
Author
Stranch
On the bench
Cook, Stranch, Lawson
Cited by
713 cases
Authority
More cited than 99.0%

finding that plaintiff plausibly alleged discrimination claims under § 1981 and Title VII where her assertion that defendant “had a pattern or practice of discrimination against African American managers and professional staff in hiring, compensation, promotion, discipline, and termination” was supported by “details [of] several specific events in each of those employment-action categories where [plaintiff] alleges she was treated differently than her Caucasian management counterparts”

How later courts described this case

  • finding that plaintiff plausibly alleged discrimination claims under § 1981 and Title VII where her assertion that defendant “had a pattern or practice of discrimination against African American managers and professional staff in hiring, compensation, promotion, discipline, and termination” was supported by “details [of] several specific events in each of those employment-action categories where [plaintiff] alleges she was treated differently than her Caucasian management counterparts”
  • finding the plaintiff carried her pleading burden because the complaint “detail[ed] several specific events . . . where [the plaintiff] alleges she was treated differently than her Caucasian management counterparts; it identifies the key supervisors and other relevant persons by race and either name or company title; and it alleges that [the plaintiff] and other African Americans received specific adverse employment actions notwithstanding satisfactory employment performances”
  • holding that “[t]he district court’s requirement that [the plaintiff]’s complaint establish a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas and its progeny [wa]s contrary to Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit precedent” because “[i]n Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, the Supreme Court unanimously held that the prima face case under McDonnell Douglas is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement
  • finding that plaintiff stated a claim for employment discrimination where she alleged that she was treated “differently than her Caucasian management counterparts” and that she “and other African Americans received No. 23-5557 Ogbonna-McGruder v. Austin Peay State Univ. Page 11 specific adverse employment actions notwithstanding satisfactory employment performances”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206

File Name: 12a0204p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

_________________

X

-

KATHRYN KEYS,

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Plaintiff-Appellant,

-

-

No. 11-5472

v.

,

>

-

Defendant-Appellee. -

HUMANA, INC.,

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N

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Kentucky at Louisville.

No. 3:09-CV-834—Charles R. Simpson, III, District Judge.

Decided and Filed: July 2, 2012

Before: COOK and STRANCH, Circuit Judges; LAWSON, District Judge.*

_________________

COUNSEL

ON BRIEF: David A. Branch, LAW OFFICE OF DAVID A. BRANCH &

ASSOCIATES, PLLC, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Craig Peter Siegenthaler,

Cynthis Blevins Doll, William C. Vail, Jr., FISHER & PHILLIPS LLP, Louisville,

Kentucky, for Appellee.

_________________

OPINION

_________________

JANE B. STRANCH, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-Appellant Kathryn Keys filed a

class-action lawsuit against her former employer Defendant-Appellee Humana, Inc.,

alleging claims of race discrimination under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C.

§ 1981, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. The

*

The Honorable David M. Lawson, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Michigan, sitting by designation.

1

No. 11-5472 Keys v. Humana, Inc. Page 2

district court granted Humana’s Motion to Dismiss Keys’s Amended Complaint after

finding that Keys failed to plead a prima facie case of race discrimination under the

burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas. This appeal followed. Because the

McDonnell Douglas framework does not apply at the pleading stage and for the

following reasons, we REVERSE the judgment of the district court and REMAND for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. BACKGROUND

Because this appeal arises from a decision at the motion to dismiss stage, we

draw the facts from the allegations of the Amended Complaint. Kathryn Keys, an

African American female, began working for Humana in March 2005. Keys was

recruited from Washington, D.C., interviewed for a Director position, and offered the

position on the day of her interview. She was part of a group of directors being hired to

work for Anita Teets, a Caucasian female. Keys was the only African American

Director on Teets’s new management team. When Keys received her offer letter, she

was offered a position with the title of “Consultant Leader,” instead of Director.

Caucasian candidates who accepted Director positions under Teets received the correct

title. Following Keys’s complaints, her title ultimately was corrected to state the

position she had been offered and had accepted. Caucasian Directors who reported to

Teets were also given a compensation plan that included a Management Incentive

Program (“MIP”) of 25%, while Keys was initially given only a MIP of 15%. When she

began employment, Keys reported to a Vice President and supervised ten to twelve

employees.

In October 2005, Teets announced that James Thomas, a Caucasian male, would

be a support person to all of the Directors. Thomas immediately began focusing on

accounts managed by Keys and was later assigned her duties. Around this time, Keys

was no longer invited to the weekly sales meetings organized by the Vice President even

though the other Directors, all Caucasian, were invited.

No. 11-5472 Keys v. Humana, Inc. Page 3

In February 2006, Humana reorganized its management staff and removed Keys

from her position, placing her in the role of Individual Contributor. None of the

Caucasian Directors who reported to Teets or any other Vice President were removed

from their Director positions in this reorganization. In her new role, Keys no longer

supervised ten to twelve employees and she was required to report to a Director, a

position she previously held, rather than to a Vice President. In August 2006, Keys was

placed on a performance improvement plan despite the fact that she met her performance

expectations. The Amended Complaint alleges that “[s]imilarly situated Caucasian

employees at the director or individual contributor level” were not placed on

performance improvement plans; however, around the same time, ten to twelve African

American manager-level employees were placed on performance plans and then forced

to resign or were terminated.

In October 2006, Keys filed a complaint with the Associate Relations Department

alleging she was not being treated fairly due to her race and/or gender. Humana began

an investigation, but concluded that Keys’s complaint was unfounded. Keys stayed in

her Individual Contributor position and remained under the performance plan. In June

2007, Keys requested an interim assessment to counter the 2006 performance assessment

and, in October 2007, she received a favorable written assessment.

In January 2008, Keys’s management team reorganized again and another

management level was created above her position. Keys then reported to Jerry Brewer,

a lower-level Caucasian director, and occupied a position two levels down from the

position into which Humana had originally hired her. On June 20, 2008, Humana

terminated Keys’s employment, citing the 2006 negative performance assessment but

ignoring the 2007 favorable performance appraisal. No Caucasian Directors or

Individual Contributors were terminated at that time. The Amended Complaint alleges

Keys’s termination was consistent with the manner in which Humana terminated or

forced the resignation of several African American professional staff members, a number

of whom were named. The Amended Complaint also alleges several specific instances

throughout her employment when Caucasian employees of Humana acted disrespectfully

No. 11-5472 Keys v. Humana, Inc. Page 4

toward Keys and humiliated her. On each of these occasions, Keys reported the behavior

to her supervisor and no action was taken.

On October 15, 2009, Keys filed this class-action suit against Humana alleging

race discrimination claims under both the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981,

and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. On January 4,

2010, Humana moved to dismiss Keys’s Amended Complaint, asserting Keys had not

alleged facts sufficient to establish a prima facie case of intentional discrimination. The

district court agreed. Specifically, the district court held Keys failed to allege plausibly

that she was treated differently than similarly situated nonprotected employees. Because

the court found Keys had not plausibly alleged her individual claims of discrimination,

the court also dismissed her class-action claims. On appeal, Keys challenges the district

court’s requirement that the complaint must allege a prima facie case as articulated in

McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and its progeny. Alternatively, she

challenges the district court’s determination that she has not satisfied that standard.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

We review a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss de novo. Pedreira v.

Ky. Baptist Homes for Children, Inc., 579 F.3d 722, 727 (6th Cir. 2009). We must

construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept all

allegations as true. See Harbin-Bey v. Rutter, 420 F.3d 571, 575 (6th Cir. 2005).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” “Specific facts are not necessary;

the statement need only give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the

grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (internal

quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555

(2007)). However, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above

the speculative level” and to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570. A plaintiff must “plead[] factual content that allows the

No. 11-5472 Keys v. Humana, Inc. Page 5

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

B. Applying McDonnell Douglas at the Pleading Stage

1. The District Court Decision

Humana argued in its Motion to Dismiss, and the district court found, that Keys

did not state a claim of race discrimination under either § 1981 or Title VII because the

Amended Complaint failed to allege facts that plausibly establish a prima facie case of

race discrimination. The district court relied upon our decision in White v. Baxter

Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381, 391 (2008), which applied the burden-shifting

framework of McDonnell Douglas to review of a district court’s grant of summary

judgment in a claim of race discrimination based on circumstantial evidence. The district

court recited the components of a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas that White

had applied on summary judgment, noting a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) she is

a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified for her job; (3) she suffered an

adverse employment decision; and (4) she was replaced by a person outside the protected

class or treated differently than similarly situated nonprotected employees. White, 533

F.3d at 391. The district court then held that the Amended Complaint failed to allege

sufficiently that Keys was treated differently than similarly situated nonprotected

employees. Specifically, the court noted Keys’s failure to allege facts suggesting that

the white employees to whom Keys would like the court to compare her

were performing similar tasks to the same standards as she. Productivity

and competence being relevant factors in making employment decisions,

the absence of any such allegations from the complaint prevents the court

from inferring that the employees who were not terminated were

similarly situated to the plaintiff.

Keys v. Humana, Inc., No. 3:09-CV-834-S, 2010 WL 2961186, at *3 (W.D. Ky. July 26,

2010).

No. 11-5472 Keys v. Humana, Inc. Page 6

2. Governing Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit Precedent

The district court’s requirement that Keys’s complaint establish a prima facie

case under McDonnell Douglas and its progeny is contrary to Supreme Court and Sixth

Circuit precedent. In Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, the Supreme Court unanimously held that

the prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading

requirement. 534 U.S. 506, 510 (2002). As the Court reasoned, “it is not appropriate

to require a plaintiff to plead facts establishing a prima facie case because the McDonnell

Douglas framework does not apply in every employment discrimination case.” Id. at

511. The Court explained that the precise requirements of a prima facie case can vary

depending on the context and before discovery has unearthed the relevant facts and

evidence, it may be difficult to define the appropriate formulation. Id. at 512.

Significantly, the Supreme Court identified the possibility that discovery may produce

direct evidence of discrimination, rendering the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting

framework inapplicable to a plaintiff’s claims. Id. at 511-12. The Supreme Court

concluded that the ordinary rules of notice pleading apply and upheld the complaint

because it gave “fair notice” of the basis of the plaintiff’s claims. Id. at 514.

The Supreme Court’s subsequent decisions in Twombly and Iqbal did not alter

its holding in Swierkiewicz. Twombly distinguished Swierkiewicz, explaining that the

prior case “did not change the law of pleading,” but simply reemphasized that

application of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case at the pleading stage “was

contrary to the Federal Rules’ structure of liberal pleading requirements.” Twombly, 550

U.S. at 570 (explaining that a plaintiff need not allege “‘specific facts’ beyond those

necessary to state [her] claim and the grounds showing entitlement to relief”). Since

Twombly and Iqbal, we have also recognized the continuing viability of Swierkiewicz’s

holding. See, e.g., Pedreira, 579 F.3d at 728 (holding that the McDonnell Douglas

prima facie case is not a pleading requirement and that “the ordinary rules for assessing

the sufficiency of a complaint apply”); Back v. Hall, 537 F.3d 552, 558 (2008) (same).

Recently, in HDC, LLC v. City of Ann Arbor, we again recognized the applicability of

Swierkiewicz’s holding and further noted that it would be “inaccurate to read [Twombly

No. 11-5472 Keys v. Humana, Inc. Page 7

and Iqbal] so narrowly as to be the death of notice pleading and we recognize the

continuing viability of the ‘short and plain’ language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

8.” 675 F.3d 608, 614 (6th Cir. 2012). Therefore, it was error for the district court to

require Keys to plead a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas in order to survive

a motion to dismiss.

Still, the Supreme Court established a “plausibility” standard in Twombly and

Iqbal for assessing whether a complaint’s factual allegations support its legal

conclusions, and that standard applies to causation in discrimination claims. HDC, LLC,

675 F.3d at 612-13 (affirming dismissal of Fair Housing Act claim where alleged facts

did not support plausible inference of intentional discrimination); Pedreira, 579 F.3d at

728 (affirming dismissal of religious discrimination claim where plaintiff failed to allege

facts plausibly linking her termination to religious beliefs). Thus, although the Amended

Complaint need not present “detailed factual allegations,” it must allege sufficient

“factual content” from which a court, informed by its “judicial experience and common

sense,” could “draw the reasonable inference,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 679, that Humana

“discriminate[d] against [Keys] with respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions,

or privileges of employment, because of [her] race, color, religion, sex, or national

origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (emphasis added); see Barrett v. Whirlpool Corp,

556 F.3d 502, 512 (6th Cir. 2009) (“[W]e review § 1981 claims under the same standard

as Title VII claims.”). According to the Supreme Court, “plausibility” occupies that

wide space between “possibility” and “probability.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. If a

reasonable court can draw the necessary inference from the factual material stated in the

complaint, the plausibility standard has been satisfied.

C. Sufficiency of Keys’s Individual Allegations

Keys’s Amended Complaint tenders more than the “‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid

of ‘further factual enhancement’” that Twombly and Iqbal prohibit. See Iqbal, 556 U.S.

at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). The Amended Complaint contains

allegations that are neither speculative nor conclusory; it alleges facts that easily state

a plausible claim. The Amended Complaint alleges Humana had a pattern or practice

No. 11-5472 Keys v. Humana, Inc. Page 8

of discrimination against African American managers and professional staff in hiring,

compensation, promotion, discipline, and termination. It details several specific events

in each of those employment-action categories where Keys alleges she was treated

differently than her Caucasian management counterparts; it identifies the key supervisors

and other relevant persons by race and either name or company title; and it alleges that

Keys and other African Americans received specific adverse employment actions

notwithstanding satisfactory employment performances. These factual allegations are

at least as detailed, if not more so, than those the Supreme Court found “easily satisfie[d]

the requirements of Rule 8(a)” in Swierkiewicz. See 534 U.S. at 514 (“His complaint

detailed the events leading to his termination, provided relevant dates, and included the

ages and nationalities of at least some of the relevant persons involved with his

termination.”).

D. Keys’s Class-Action Claims

Because we find the district court erroneously dismissed Keys’s individual claims

of discrimination, it was error to dismiss her class-action claims on the basis that she was

not a member of the alleged class. Keys adequately alleged the components of her claim

and of her class action case, both of which now may be defined further through the

discovery process. We express no opinion on whether the class ought to be certified.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the district court’s dismissal of Keys’s

Amended Complaint and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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