Gwyniece Hutchins v. U.S. Department of Labor

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

GWYNIECE HUTCHINS, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

 No. 11-1375

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF

LABOR,

Defendant-Appellee.



Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of South Carolina, at Anderson.

J. Michelle Childs, District Judge.

(8:09-cv-00346-JMC)

Argued: March 20, 2012

Decided: June 21, 2012

Before NIEMEYER, GREGORY, and WYNN,

Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Wynn wrote the opin-

ion, in which Judge Niemeyer and Judge Gregory concurred.

2 HUTCHINS v. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Beth Drake, OFFICE OF THE UNITED

STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appel-

lee. ON BRIEF: Edwin L. Turnage, HARRIS & GRAVES,

PA, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellant. William N.

Nettles, United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina,

for Appellee.

OPINION

WYNN, Circuit Judge:

5 U.S.C. § 8132 states that "[i]f an injury or death for

which compensation is payable under" the Federal Employ-

ees’ Compensation Act "is caused under circumstances creat-

ing a legal liability in a person other than the United States to

pay damages, and a beneficiary entitled to compensation from

the United States for that injury or death receives money or

other property in satisfaction of that liability[,]" the benefi-

ciary "shall refund to the United States the amount of com-

pensation paid by the United States." Because we agree with

the Department of Labor that the Town of Ninety Six, South

Carolina qualifies as a "person other than the United States,"

we uphold the district court’s determination that Gwyniece

Hutchins must reimburse the Department of Labor out of a

money judgment she obtained in a state court action against

the Town of Ninety Six. Accordingly, we affirm the district

court’s grant of summary judgment in the Department of

Labor’s favor.

I.

In August 2004, Gwyniece Hutchins, a letter carrier with

the United States Postal Service, stepped on an improperly-

fitted manhole cover maintained by the Town of Ninety Six,

HUTCHINS v. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 3

South Carolina ("the Town"). The manhole cover flipped up,

and Hutchins fell into the manhole, sustaining serious injuries.

Because Hutchins was injured in the course of her duties as

a United States Postal Service employee, she filed a claim for

workers’ compensation under the Federal Employees’ Com-

pensation Act ("FECA"). The Department of Labor’s Office

of Workers’ Compensation Programs ("Office of Workers’

Compensation") accepted Hutchins’s claim as covered by

FECA and paid Hutchins lost wages and medical benefits.

In 2007, Hutchins accepted an offer of judgment, for

$275,000.00, arising from a South Carolina state court action

that she brought against the Town. The Department of Labor,

through its Office of Workers’ Compensation, asserted that it

was entitled to recover $87,905.37 from that judgment.

Hutchins opposed the Department of Labor’s assertion, argu-

ing that the Town was not a "person" under 5 U.S.C. §§ 8131

and 8132 and that if 5 U.S.C. § 8131 were construed to allow

such a claim, it would be unconstitutional. The Office of

Workers’ Compensation rejected Hutchins’s arguments and

determined that the Department of Labor was entitled to reim-

bursement of the $87,905.37 under 5 U.S.C. § 8132. Hutchins

paid the sum but appealed the Office of Workers’ Compensa-

tion’s decision to the Employees’ Compensation Appeals

Board ("Appeals Board"). The Appeals Board affirmed.

In February 2009, Hutchins filed a complaint in the United

States District Court for the District of South Carolina. With

her complaint, brought pursuant to the Administrative Proce-

dures Act, Hutchins claimed that the Department of Labor’s

taking the $87,905.37 violated both FECA and the Constitu-

tion. Hutchins and the Department of Labor ultimately filed

cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court

granted the Department of Labor’s motion, concluding that

Hutchins was required to reimburse the Department of Labor,

and denied Hutchins’s motion. Hutchins appeals.

4 HUTCHINS v. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

II.

On appeal, Hutchins argues, first, that the word "person" as

used in 5 U.S.C. § 8132 does not capture the Town and that

she is therefore not required by the statute to reimburse the

Department of Labor. Second, Hutchins argues that if the

word "person" does include political subdivisions such as the

Town, 5 U.S.C. § 8131 is unlawful. We address each issue in

turn, "review[ing the] district court’s decision to grant sum-

mary judgment de novo, [and] applying the same legal stan-

dards as the district court." Pueschel v. Peters, 577 F.3d 558,

563 (4th Cir. 2009).

A.

5 U.S.C. § 8132 states in relevant part that:

If an injury or death for which compensation is pay-

able under [FECA] is caused under circumstances

creating a legal liability in a person other than the

United States to pay damages, and a beneficiary enti-

tled to compensation from the United States for that

injury or death receives money or other property in

satisfaction of that liability as the result of suit or set-

tlement by him or in his behalf, the beneficiary, after

deducting therefrom the costs of suit and a reason-

able attorney’s fee, shall refund to the United States

the amount of compensation paid by the United

States.

5 U.S.C. § 8132 (emphasis added). The issue before this

Court is whether the Town qualifies as a "person other than

the United States" such that Hutchins is liable to reimburse

the Department of Labor out of her state court judgment.

"When confronted with a question of statutory interpreta-

tion, [this Court’s] inquiry begins with an examination of the

language used in the statute." Faircloth v. Lundy Packing Co.,

HUTCHINS v. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 5

91 F.3d 648, 653 (4th Cir. 1996). In cases where "the statu-

tory language is plain and admits of no more than one mean-

ing, the duty of interpretation does not arise, and . . . the sole

function of the courts is to enforce [the statute] according to

its terms." United States v. Murphy, 35 F.3d 143, 145 (4th Cir.

1994) (quotation marks omitted).

Further, where a word is not defined by statute, the Court

"normally construe[s] it in accord with its ordinary or natural

meaning." Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228 (1993).

"We customarily turn to dictionaries for help in determining

whether a word in a statute has a plain or common meaning."

Nat’l Coal. for Students with Disabilities Educ. & Legal Def.

Fund v. Allen, 152 F.3d 283, 289 (4th Cir. 1998).

Turning to the statute at hand, we agree with the district

court that the statute’s language, on its face, makes quite clear

that the term "person" includes political bodies, of which

municipalities such as the Town are one. The statute provides

that reimbursement is required where, among other things, a

beneficiary’s injuries are caused by circumstances "creating a

legal liability in a person other than the United States." 5

U.S.C. § 8132 (emphasis added).

Congress’s stating that the liable party must be a "person"

besides the United States makes plain that, at least for pur-

poses of this statute, the United States is a person. Logically,

then, political entities can be "persons." Hutchins’s contention

that "Congress did not intend for the word ‘person’ . . . to

include States and political subdivisions" thus cannot be

squared with the statute’s plain language. Appellant’s Br. at

8. Or, in the words of the district court, "Congress’s use of the

United States, a body politic, in comparison to a ‘person’ in

whom liability could be created suggests that Congress

intended like entities to be subsumed in the . . . Statute." J.A.

89.

6 HUTCHINS v. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

As the district court noted, FECA does not otherwise define

the term "person." Nevertheless, in the Dictionary Act, Con-

gress provided definitions for a number of common statutory

terms that courts are to apply "[i]n determining the meaning

of any Act of Congress, unless the context indicates other-

wise." 1 U.S.C. § 1. The Dictionary Act defines the term "per-

son" to include "corporations, companies, associations, firms,

partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as

individuals." Id.* The term "corporation," in turn, encom-

passes a "municipal corporation," that is, a "city, town, or

other local political entity formed by charter from the state

and having the autonomous authority to administer the state’s

local affairs." Black’s Law Dictionary 341-43, 1037 (7th ed.

1999). Further, Supreme Court precedent also indicates that

the term "person" encompasses municipal corporations unless

a more limited use is indicated by context. See, e.g., Monell

v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 687-89 (1978). As we

have already noted, not only does nothing about the context

of 5 U.S.C. § 8132 suggest that political bodies such as the

Town should be excluded from the statute’s ambit, but, to the

contrary, the statute’s language instead demonstrates to us

that, in this context, political bodies indeed constitute "per-

sons."

We also note with great interest United States v. Lorenzetti,

*Hutchins argues that the legislative history of the Dictionary Act sug-

gests that Congress did not intend for the term "person" as used in FECA

to encompass the Town. However, when Congress amended the Dictio-

nary Act definition of "person" in 1948, it broadened the definition of

"person." See Reuter v. Skipper, 4 F.3d 716, 719-20 (9th Cir. 1993)

("Congress amended the Dictionary Act in 1948 and inserted a broader

definition of ‘person,’ including ‘corporations, companies, associations,

firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as indi-

viduals.’ This amendment, although it omits ‘bodies politic and corporate’

from the definition, does not indicate that Congress intended to exclude

municipal corporations from coverage under [the federal act at issue]."

(citation omitted)). Hutchins points us to no authority suggesting that this

broader definition somehow excludes municipalities such as the Town.

HUTCHINS v. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 7

467 U.S. 167 (1984), in which the Supreme Court addressed

5 U.S.C. § 8132, albeit with respect to a different issue, and

framed the statute in broad language that clearly covers

Hutchins’s case. In Lorenzetti, a FECA beneficiary injured in

a vehicle accident obtained a judgment for non-economic

losses after settling a state court action against the driver of

the other vehicle. The Government sought reimbursement

from the settlement under 5 U.S.C. § 8132, and the question

before the Supreme Court was whether the Government was

entitled to reimbursement where the beneficiary’s tort recov-

ery was limited to non-economic losses, a type of loss

excluded from FECA coverage. Id.

The Supreme Court sweepingly stated that 5 U.S.C. § 8132

imposes "only two conditions precedent" to a beneficiary’s

obligation to reimburse FECA for compensation payments:

The first is that the employee must have suffered an

injury or death under circumstances creating a legal

liability in a third party to pay damages. The second

is that the employee or his beneficiaries must have

received money or other property in satisfaction of

that liability. Here, both conditions have been met

....

***

At no point did Congress suggest in its deliberations

that the federal right of reimbursement was to be

limited to particular categories of third-party recov-

eries for injury or death.

***

[W]e hold that § 8132 entitles the United States to be

reimbursed for FECA compensation out of any dam-

ages award or settlement made in satisfaction of

8 HUTCHINS v. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

third-party liability for personal injury or death . . .

.

Id. at 173-74, 176, 179 (emphasis added).

Here, as in Lorenzetti, both conditions precedent have been

satisfied. Hutchins was injured in a situation giving rise to lia-

bility in a third party—the Town; and she received

money—$275,000—in satisfaction of her claim against the

Town. She is therefore required, under Lorenzetti’s broad lan-

guage, which stresses "third parties" as opposed to "persons,"

to reimburse the Department of Labor under FECA. This

makes sense, given that "the purpose of § 8132 is . . . to mini-

mize the cost of the FECA program to the Federal Govern-

ment. . . . It is self-evident that [that] goal is directly advanced

by allowing the United States to obtain reimbursement out of

any third-party recovery . . . ." Lorenzetti, 467 U.S. at 177

(emphasis added).

B.

Hutchins also contends that "[i]f ‘person’ is construed

broadly it would allow the Department of Labor to sue States.

Such action by a federal agency, if actually permitted by the

FECA subrogation statute, would threaten state sovereignty

and violate the important Constitution principles of federal-

ism." Appellant’s Br. at 7. Specifically, Hutchins argues that

interpreting "person" to include the Town would permit the

Department of Labor, under 5 U.S.C. § 8131, to sue states and

their subdivisions, in violation of South Carolina’s Tort

Claims Act and the Constitution of the United States.

We, like the district court, decline to address this argument.

The Department of Labor never required Hutchins to assign

her claim to the government, nor did the government seek to

prosecute an action against the Town. Rather, Hutchins per-

sonally pursued the claim, and the Department of Labor

merely sought reimbursement afterwards. The legality of a

HUTCHINS v. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 9

case in which the federal government brings a claim against

a state is therefore simply not at hand, and we refrain from

addressing it.

III.

In sum, the statutory language and Supreme Court prece-

dent indicate that a municipality such as the Town constitutes

a "person" for purposes of reimbursement under 5 U.S.C.

§ 8132. The district court therefore correctly determined that

Hutchins’s recovery from the Town for her injuries sustained

when falling into a Town manhole was properly subject to

refund under FECA.

AFFIRMED