Project Vote/Voting for America, Inc. v. Long

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

PROJECT VOTE / VOTING FOR 

AMERICA, INCORPORATED,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ELISA LONG, in her official

capacity as General Registrar of

Norfolk, Virginia; DONALD

PALMER, in his official capacity as

Secretary, State Board of

Elections,

Defendants-Appellants.

 No. 11-1809

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; THE

REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR

FREEDOM OF THE PRESS; AMERICAN

SOCIETY OF NEWS EDITORS; THE

ASSOCIATED PRESS; ASSOCIATION OF

CAPITOL REPORTERS AND EDITORS;

ATLANTIC MEDIA INC.; CITIZEN

MEDIA LAW PROJECT; LIN MEDIA;

THE NATIONAL PRESS CLUB;

NATIONAL PRESS PHOTOGRAPHERS

ASSOCIATION; NEWSPAPER

ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA;



2 PROJECT VOTE v. LONG

NORTH JERSEY MEDIA GROUP, 

INCORPORATED; RADIO TELEVISION

DIGITAL NEWS ASSOCIATION; THE

SEATTLE TIMES COMPANY;

SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONAL

JOURNALISTS; STUDENT PRESS LAW



CENTER; USA TODAY; VIRGINIA

COALITION FOR OPEN GOVERNMENT,

Amici Supporting Appellee.



Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk.

Rebecca Beach Smith, District Judge.

(2:10-cv-00075-RBS-DEM)

Argued: May 17, 2012

Decided: June 15, 2012

Before WILKINSON, DIAZ, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed and remanded by published opinion. Judge Wilkin-

son wrote the opinion, in which Judge Diaz and Judge Floyd

joined.

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Earle Duncan Getchell, Jr., OFFICE OF THE

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Vir-

ginia, for Appellants. Ryan Morland Malone, ROPES &

GRAY, LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellee. Erin H. Flynn,

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washing-

PROJECT VOTE v. LONG 3

ton, D.C., for Amici Supporting Appellee. ON BRIEF: Ken-

neth T. Cuccinelli, II, Attorney General of Virginia, Charles

E. James, Jr., Chief Deputy Attorney General, Wesley G.

Russell, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, Stephen M. Hall,

Assistant Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY

GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia; Jeff W.

Rosen, Lisa Ehrich, PENDER & COWARD, PC, Virginia

Beach, Virginia, for Appellants. Douglas Hallward-

Driemeier, Augustine M. Ripa, ROPES & GRAY, LLP,

Washington, D.C., for Appellee. Thomas E. Perez, Assistant

Attorney General, Diana K. Flynn, UNITED STATES

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for the

United States, Amicus Supporting Appellee. Lucy A. Dal-

glish, Mark R. Caramanica, You-Jin J. Han, THE REPORT-

ERS COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS,

Arlington, Virginia; Kevin M. Goldberg, FLETCHER,

HEALD & HILDRETH, PLC, Arlington, Virginia, for Amer-

ican Society of News Editors and Association of Capitol

Reporters and Editors; Karen Kaiser, Associate General

Counsel, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, New York, New

York; Bruce L. Gottlieb, General Counsel, ATLANTIC

MEDIA, INC., Washington, D.C.; Jeffrey P. Hermes, CITI-

ZEN MEDIA LAW PROJECT, Berkman Center For Internet

& Society, Cambridge, Massachusetts; Joshua N. Pila, Regu-

latory Counsel, LIN MEDIA, Providence, Rhode Island;

Charles D. Tobin, HOLLAND & KNIGHT LLP, Washington,

D.C., for the National Press Club; Mickey H. Osterreicher,

East Amherst, New York, for the National Press Photogra-

phers Association; Rene P. Milam, Vice President/General

Counsel, NEWSPAPER ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA,

Arlington, Virginia; Jennifer Borg, General Counsel, NORTH

JERSEY MEDIA GROUP INC., Hackensack, New Jersey;

Kathleen A. Kirby, WILEY REIN LLP, Washington, D.C.,

for the Radio Television Digital News Association; Bruce E.

H. Johnson, DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP, Seattle,

Washington, for The Seattle Times Company; Bruce W. San-

ford, Bruce D. Brown, Laurie A. Babinski, BAKER

4 PROJECT VOTE v. LONG

HOSTETLER LLP, Washington, D.C., for the Society of Pro-

fessional Journalists; Frank D. LoMonte, STUDENT PRESS

LAW CENTER, Arlington, Virginia; Barbara W. Wall, Vice

President, Senior Associate General Counsel, GANNETT

CO., INC., McLean, Virginia, for USA Today; Megan Rhyne,

VIRGINIA COALITION FOR OPEN GOVERNMENT, Wil-

liamsburg, Virginia, Amici Supporting Appellee.

OPINION

WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:

The question here is whether Section 8(i)(1) of the National

Voter Registration Act ("NVRA"), which requires public dis-

closure of "all records concerning the implementation of pro-

grams and activities conducted for the purpose of ensuring the

accuracy and currency of official lists of eligible voters," 42

U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(i)(1), applies to completed voter registra-

tion applications. The district court concluded that Section

8(i)(1) does apply to such applications and held that

defendants—Virginia election officials—had violated the

NVRA by refusing to disclose the completed applications

with voters’ Social Security numbers redacted. Because the

district court correctly interpreted Section 8(i)(1), we now

affirm the judgment.

I.

Plaintiff Project Vote/Voting for America, Inc. ("Project

Vote") is a nonprofit organization seeking to increase voter

registration among young, low-income, and minority voters.

This suit arose after Project Vote learned that students at Nor-

folk State University, a historically African-American college,

experienced problems in registering to vote in the November

2008 primary and general elections in Virginia. In particular,

Project Vote worried that the students’ registration applica-

PROJECT VOTE v. LONG 5

tions had been erroneously rejected by the Norfolk General

Registrar, defendant Elisa Long, who is responsible for pro-

cessing voter registration applications.

On May 11, 2009, a Project Vote affiliate—Advancement

Project—requested that Registrar Long "make available for

inspection and copying the completed voter registration appli-

cations of any individual who timely submitted an application

at any time from January 1, 2008, through October 31, 2008,

who was not registered to vote in time for the November 4,

2008 general election," as well as "documents identifying the

reasons the applications were rejected." The request was made

pursuant to NVRA Section 8(i)(1), which provides:

Each State shall maintain for at least 2 years and

shall make available for public inspection and, where

available, photocopying at a reasonable cost, all

records concerning the implementation of programs

and activities conducted for the purpose of ensuring

the accuracy and currency of official lists of eligible

voters, except to the extent that such records relate

to a declination to register to vote or to the identity

of a voter registration agency through which any par-

ticular voter is registered.

42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(i)(1). Registrar Long responded to the

request on May 13, 2009, indicating that she would not allow

inspection or copying of the requested materials. Martha Bris-

sette, an attorney and policy analyst with the Virginia State

Board of Elections ("VSBE"), then emailed Advancement

Project in support of Long’s refusal.

On May 15, 2009, representatives from Project Vote and

Advancement Project visited Registrar Long’s office in per-

son and repeated their request, which was again refused.

Accordingly, the organizations wrote to the Secretary of the

VSBE, giving notice that Registrar Long was allegedly violat-

ing NVRA Section 8(i)(1) and requesting remedial measures.

6 PROJECT VOTE v. LONG

On September 25, 2009, VSBE forwarded to Project Vote and

Advancement Project an informal opinion of the Attorney

General of Virginia. The opinion concluded that "the com-

pleted voter registration application of any individual is not a

part of the record of the implementation of programs and

activities conducted for the purposes of ensuring the accuracy

and currency of official lists of eligible voters covered by [the

Public Disclosure Provision]." To date, defendants have not

disclosed the requested records.

Project Vote filed a complaint against Registrar Long and

the Secretary of the VSBE on February 16, 2010, alleging

violations of Section 8(i)(1) and asking the court to require

disclosure of the requested materials. Defendants moved to

dismiss the complaint, asserting that Project Vote lacked

standing to sue under the NVRA and that Section 8(i)(1) does

not mandate public access to completed voter registration

applications. The district court denied defendants’ motion on

October 29, 2010. The court concluded that plaintiff had

standing and that "the common and ordinary meaning of the

terms of [Section 8(i)(1)] encompass voter registration appli-

cations, as these records concern ‘the implementation of pro-

grams and activities conducted for the purpose of ensuring the

accuracy and currency of official lists of eligible voters.’"

Project Vote/Voting for America, Inc. v. Long, 752 F. Supp.

2d 697, 708 (E.D. Va. 2010) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-

6(i)(1)).

Project Vote then moved for summary judgment. Defen-

dants opposed the motion, reasserting their original arguments

and also claiming that the district court’s interpretation of the

NVRA was incompatible with two other federal statutes, the

Help America Vote Act ("HAVA"), 42 U.S.C. § 15301 et

seq., and the Military and Overseas Voter Empowerment

("MOVE") Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973ff et seq.On July 20, 2011,

the district court entered final judgment in favor of Project

Vote. Rejecting defendants’ arguments based on HAVA and

the MOVE Act, the court concluded that NVRA Section

PROJECT VOTE v. LONG 7

8(i)(1) "grants the plaintiff access to completed voter registra-

tion applications with the voters’ [Social Security numbers]

redacted for inspection and photocopying." Project

Vote/Voting for America, Inc. v. Long, 813 F. Supp. 2d 738,

743 (E.D. Va. 2011). The court subsequently stayed its judg-

ment pending this appeal. See J.A. 449-52.

II.

The NVRA reflects the view of Congress that the right to

vote "is a fundamental right," that government has a duty to

"promote the exercise of that right," and that discriminatory

and unfair registration laws can have a "damaging effect on

voter participation" and "disproportionately harm voter partic-

ipation by various groups, including racial minorities." 42

U.S.C. § 1973gg(a). Congress enacted the NVRA in order to

"increase the number of eligible citizens who register to vote"

in federal elections, "enhance[ ] the participation of eligible

citizens as voters," "protect the integrity of the electoral pro-

cess," and "ensure that accurate and current voter registration

rolls are maintained." Id. § 1973gg(b).

The NVRA directs states to establish at least three methods

of voter registration for federal elections: "(1) by application

made simultaneously with an application for a motor vehicle

driver’s license," "(2) by mail application" using a federally

prescribed form, and "(3) by application in person" at desig-

nated voter registration agencies. Id. § 1973gg-2(a). It further

requires that states conduct a general program to remove inel-

igible voters from official voter lists without engaging in

improper voter removal. Id. § 1973gg-6(a)(3)-(4).

Finally, as explained above, Section 8(i)(1) of the NVRA

mandates public disclosure of voter registration activities. Id.

§ 1973gg-6(i)(1). It generally requires states to "make avail-

able for public inspection and, where available, photocopying

at a reasonable cost, all records concerning the implementa-

tion of programs and activities conducted for the purpose of

8 PROJECT VOTE v. LONG

ensuring the accuracy and currency of official lists of eligible

voters." Id. This language embodies Congress’s conviction

that Americans who are eligible under law to vote have every

right to exercise their franchise, a right that must not be sacri-

ficed to administrative chicanery, oversights, or inefficiencies.

Under the district court’s interpretation, this provision man-

dates disclosure of the records requested by Project Vote.

III.

A.

We begin by considering the Commonwealth’s argument

that the text of Section 8(i)(1) does not require public disclo-

sure of completed voter registration applications. This issue of

statutory interpretation is one that we review de novo. United

States v. Ide, 624 F.3d 666, 668 (4th Cir. 2010). The starting

point for any issue of statutory interpretation is of course the

language of the statute itself. United States v. Bly, 510 F.3d

453, 460 (4th Cir. 2007). "[W]hen the words of a statute are

unambiguous, . . . this first canon is also the last [and] judicial

inquiry is complete." Willenbring v. United States, 559 F.3d

225, 235 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Appellants assert that "[t]he plain and ordinary meaning of

[Section 8(i)(1)] does not encompass voter applications, much

less the rejected applications initially sought." Appellants’ Br.

at 10. Instead, they claim, the "‘programs and activities’

referred to in Section 8(i)(1) of the NVRA are programs and

activities related to the purging of voters from the list of regis-

tered voters." Id. at 11.

Contrary to appellants’ insistence, the plain language of

Section 8(i)(1) does not allow us to treat its disclosure

requirement as limited to voter removal records. As the dis-

trict court concluded, completed voter registration applica-

tions are clearly "records concerning the implementation of

programs and activities conducted for the purpose of ensuring

PROJECT VOTE v. LONG 9

the accuracy and currency of official lists of eligible voters."

42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(i)(1).

First, the process of reviewing voter registration applica-

tions is a "program" and "activity." Under Virginia law, elec-

tion officials must examine completed voter registration

applications and register applicants that possess the necessary

qualifications. See Va. Code § 24.2-417. This process of

review is a "program" because it is carried out in the service

of a specified end—maintenance of voter rolls—and it is an

"activity" because it is a particular task and deed of Virginia

election employees.

Moreover, the "program" and "activity" of evaluating voter

registration applications is plainly "conducted for the purpose

of ensuring the accuracy and currency of official lists of eligi-

ble voters." 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(i)(1). It is unclear what

other purpose it would serve. As the district court reasoned,

the process of reviewing voter registration applications keeps

official voter lists both "accurate"—free from error—and

"current"—most recent. See Project Vote, 752 F. Supp. 2d at

706. Indeed, voter lists are not "accurate" or "current" if eligi-

ble voters have been improperly denied registration or if ineli-

gible persons have been added to the rolls. Id. By registering

eligible applicants and rejecting ineligible applicants, state

officials "ensure that the state is keeping a ‘most recent’ and

errorless account of which persons are qualified or entitled to

vote within the state." Id. Accordingly, the process of assess-

ing voter registration applications is a "program[ ] and

activit[y] conducted for the purpose of ensuring the accuracy

and currency of official lists of eligible voters." 42 U.S.C.

§ 1973gg-6(i)(1).

Furthermore, the registration applications requested by

Project Vote are clearly "records concerning the implementa-

tion of" this "program[ ] and activit[y]." Id. The requested

applications are relevant to carrying out voter registration

activities because they are "the means by which an individual

10 PROJECT VOTE v. LONG

provides the information necessary for the Commonwealth to

determine his eligibility to vote." Project Vote, 752 F. Supp.

2d at 707. Without verification of an applicant’s citizenship,

age, and other necessary information provided by registration

applications, state officials would be unable to determine

whether that applicant meets the statutory requirements for

inclusion in official voting lists. Thus, completed applications

not only "concern[ ] the implementation of" the voter registra-

tion process, but are also integral to its execution.

Finally, "the fact that [Section 8(i)(1)] very clearly requires

that ‘all records’ be disclosed brings voter registration appli-

cations within its reach." Id. at 707-08 (emphasis added). As

this court has recognized, "the use of the word ‘all’ [as a mod-

ifier] suggests an expansive meaning because ‘all’ is a term

of great breadth." Nat’l Coal. for Students with Disabilities

Educ. & Legal Def. Fund v. Allen, 152 F.3d 283, 290 (4th Cir.

1998). Given that the phrase "all records concerning the

implementation of programs and activities conducted for the

purpose of ensuring the accuracy and currency of official lists

of eligible voters" unmistakably encompasses completed

voter registration applications, such applications fall within

Section 8(i)(1)’s general disclosure mandate.

B.

Although Section 8(i)(1) generally requires disclosure of

applicable records, it creates exceptions "to the extent that

such records relate [(1)] to a declination to register to vote or

[(2)] to the identity of a voter registration agency through

which any particular voter is registered." 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-

6(i)(1). The completed voter registration applications at issue

here do not fall within either of these two exceptions. First,

such applications represent attempts to become a registered

voter, not "declination[s] to register to vote." Moreover, Vir-

ginia’s voter registration application form does not contain

any information related to "the identity of a voter registration

agency through which any particular voter is registered." See

PROJECT VOTE v. LONG 11

J.A. 66. Because the requested applications do not fall within

either of these two exceptions—and because they are covered

by Section 8(i)(1)’s general mandate—they must be made

"available for public inspection and . . . photocopying." 42

U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(i)(1).

C.

Appellants next argue that NVRA Section 8(i)(2)—which

immediately follows Section 8(i)(1)—limits the records sub-

ject to public disclosure. Section 8(i)(2) provides:

The records maintained pursuant to [Section 8(i)(1)]

shall include lists of the names and addresses of all

persons to whom notices described in subsection

(d)(2) of this section are sent, and information con-

cerning whether or not each such person has

responded to the notice as of the date that inspection

of the records is made.

Id. § 1973gg-6(i)(2) (emphasis added). According to appel-

lants, the term "shall include" in Section 8(i)(2) "acts as a lim-

itation, not an enlargement." Appellants’ Br. at 16. Appellants

assert that "[t]he records specifically identified by Congress in

Section 8(i)(2) are those which should be disclosed under

Section 8(i)(1)," and that "[b]ecause voter registration appli-

cations are not such records, they are not subject to [public

disclosure]." Id.

Appellants’ interpretation, under which only the documents

described in Section 8(i)(2) must be disclosed, is incorrect for

several reasons. First, the statute clearly states that "all

records" falling under Section 8(i)(1) must be publicly dis-

closed, not just those explicitly listed in Section 8(i)(2). 42

U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(i)(1) (emphasis added). Moreover, as the

district court recognized at the motion to dismiss hearing, the

term "shall include" sets "a floor, not a ceiling." J.A. 223.

Courts have repeatedly indicated that "shall include" is not

12 PROJECT VOTE v. LONG

equivalent to "limited to." See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind

v. FTC, 420 F.3d 331, 338 (4th Cir. 2005) (stating that the

language "shall include" is "not exhaustive," and merely indi-

cates that the listed items, "among others," are covered by the

relevant provision); see also Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct.

2278, 2287 (2010); P.C. Pfeiffer Co. v. Ford, 444 U.S. 69, 77

n.7 (1979). Because Section 8(i)(2) merely describes a spe-

cific set of records that must be maintained—and not an

exclusive list—it does not shield completed voter registration

applications from Section 8(i)(1)’s public disclosure mandate.

D.

In sum, the NVRA’s disclosure requirement is not limited

to voter removal records. The NVRA, including Section

8(i)(1), concerns voter registration, not simply voter removal.

Notably, the statute is entitled the "National Voter Registra-

tion Act," 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg note (emphasis added), and is

codified under a subchapter designated "National Voter Reg-

istration," id. § 1973gg et seq. (emphasis added). Moreover,

Section 8(i)(1) is located in a section titled "Requirements

with respect to administration of voter registration," id.

§ 1973gg-6 (emphasis added), and a subsection titled "Public

disclosure of voter registration activities," id. § 1973-gg(6)(i)

(emphasis added). These statutory labels reinforce the conclu-

sion that Section 8(i)(1) governs voter registration records.

See INS v. Nat’l Ctr. for Immigrants’ Rights, Inc., 502 U.S.

183, 189 (1991) (noting that "the title of a statute or section

can aid in" textual interpretation). Because the NVRA

requires disclosure of all materials described in Section

8(i)(1), including voter registration records, defendants must

permit inspection of the completed applications, as instructed

by the district court.

IV.

Appellants further contend that the district court’s interpre-

tation of the NVRA causes the statute to conflict with HAVA

PROJECT VOTE v. LONG 13

and the MOVE Act. Given that the requested registration

applications unquestionably fall within the plain language of

Section 8(i)(1), we need not look outside that plain language

in construing the statute. Where "the language is plain and

‘the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent,’ there is no

need to inquire further." In re JKJ Chevrolet, Inc., 26 F.3d

481, 483 (4th Cir. 1994). Accordingly, we need not consider

the impact of HAVA and the MOVE Act on the language of

Section 8(i)(1), which clearly requires public disclosure of

completed voter registration applications.

Appellants insist, however, that all three statutes address

related electoral proceedings and that to interpret them at

cross-purposes would lead to real confusion. We are not per-

suaded by this view. Even considering these statutes, both are

entirely consistent with the district court’s interpretation of

Section 8(i)(1). The Help America Vote Act requires, among

other things, that states establish a free access system through

which provisional voters can determine whether their votes

were counted, and if not, why not. 42 U.S.C.

§ 15482(a)(5)(B). The provision cited by appellants, HAVA

Section 302(a), provides in relevant part: "The appropriate

State or local official shall establish and maintain reasonable

procedures necessary to protect the security, confidentiality,

and integrity of personal information collected, stored, or oth-

erwise used by the free access system . . . ." Id. § 15482(a).

It also limits "[a]ccess to information about an individual pro-

visional ballot . . . to the individual who cast the ballot." Id.

According to appellants, these privacy provisions "would

make no sense if Congress intended the same type of personal

information to be publicly available under Section 8(i)(1) of

the NVRA from voter applications." Appellants’ Br. at 21.

Appellants’ argument fails to recognize that HAVA’s

security provisions only concern the "personal information

collected, stored, or otherwise used by the free access sys-

tem," 42 U.S.C. § 15482(a), which allows the voter—and

only the voter—to ascertain whether his ballot was counted.

14 PROJECT VOTE v. LONG

HAVA therefore protects the right to the secret ballot, and

does not pertain to the voter registration procedures governed

by the NVRA. In addition, HAVA explicitly states that "noth-

ing in this [Act] may be construed . . . to supersede, restrict,

or limit the application of . . . The National Voter Registration

Act." Id. § 15545(a). Thus, by its own terms, HAVA cannot

restrict or limit the application of the NVRA’s public disclo-

sure requirement.

Appellants next point to the Military and Overseas Voter

Empowerment Act as evidence that Congress did not want

Section 8(i)(1) to apply to voter registration applications. The

MOVE Act requires states to establish procedures "for absent

uniformed services voters and overseas voters to request by

mail and electronically voter registration applications and

absentee ballot applications" and for states to send such appli-

cations by mail and electronically. Id. § 1973ff-1(a)(6). The

Act further provides that

[t]o the extent practicable, [these procedures] shall

ensure that the privacy of the identity and other per-

sonal data of an absent uniformed services voter or

overseas voter who requests or is sent a voter regis-

tration application or absentee ballot application . . .

is protected throughout the process of making such

request or being sent such application.

Id. § 1973ff-1(e)(6)(B). According to appellants, "it would

make no sense to require these privacy protections if Con-

gress understood and expected that the registration applica-

tions at the end of ‘the process’ would be made publicly

available under Section 8(i)(1) of the NVRA." Appellants’ Br.

at 21.

Appellants’ argument ignores the plain language of the

MOVE Act, which expressly limits the application of its

security and privacy provisions to personal data conveyed

during the voter form request process. The provision cited by

PROJECT VOTE v. LONG 15

appellants—42 U.S.C. § 1973ff-1(e)(6)(B)—ensures that the

personal information of an overseas voter "who requests or is

sent a voter registration application or absentee ballot applica-

tion . . . is protected throughout the process of making such

request or being sent such application" (emphasis added).

Likewise, § 1973ff-1(e)(6)(A) requires states to "ensure that

the procedures established under subsection (a)(6) protect the

security and integrity of the voter registration and absentee

ballot application request processes." 42 U.S.C. § 1973ff-

1(e)(6)(A) (emphasis added). Because these privacy provi-

sions protect information transmitted during the process of

requesting—not submitting—a registration application, the

MOVE Act does not conflict with the NVRA’s requirement

that completed applications be disclosed.

V.

Finally, appellants’ proffered privacy concerns do not

necessitate reversal of the district court’s decision. In support

of their argument to the contrary, appellants point to Greid-

inger v. Davis, 988 F.2d 1344 (4th Cir. 1993), in which we

held that a statute that conditions voting on public release of

a voter’s Social Security number "creates an intolerable bur-

den on that right as protected by the First and Fourteenth

Amendments." Id. at 1355. Greidinger is inapposite here,

however, because the district court did not require public dis-

closure of Social Security numbers, which the court recog-

nized "are uniquely sensitive and vulnerable to abuse."

Project Vote, 752 F. Supp. 2d at 711-12. The district court

expressly concluded that Section 8(i)(1) "grants the plaintiff

access to completed voter registration applications with the

voters’ SSNs redacted for inspection and photocopying."

Project Vote, 813 F. Supp. 2d at 743 (emphasis added). Plain-

tiff has never requested completed applications with unredac-

ted Social Security numbers and does not object to the district

court’s redaction requirement. Accordingly, there is no danger

that this uniquely sensitive information will be compromised

by Section 8(i)(1)’s public disclosure requirement.

16 PROJECT VOTE v. LONG

Appellants next argue that "information other than appli-

cants’ SSNs, such as responses to requests regarding criminal

history, mental incompetency, and even home addresses,

phone numbers, and birth dates implicate real privacy inter-

ests." Appellants’ Reply Br. at 20. Because the Virginia voter

registration application form requires this personal informa-

tion, appellants contend, "it must be reasonably supposed that

conditioning voting on the public release of such information

will suppress registration contrary to congressional intent."

Appellants’ Br. at 22.

We do not think appellants’ privacy concerns unfounded.

By requiring public disclosure of personal information,* Sec-

tion 8(i)(1) may conceivably inhibit voter registration in some

instances. However, this potential shortcoming must be bal-

anced against the many benefits of public disclosure. It is self-

evident that disclosure will assist the identification of both

error and fraud in the preparation and maintenance of voter

rolls. State officials labor under a duty of accountability to the

public in ensuring that voter lists include eligible voters and

exclude ineligible ones in the most accurate manner possible.

Without such transparency, public confidence in the essential

workings of democracy will suffer.

It is not the province of this court, however, to strike the

proper balance between transparency and voter privacy. That

is a policy question properly decided by the legislature, not

the courts, and Congress has already answered the question by

enacting NVRA Section 8(i)(1), which plainly requires disclo-

*It is not clear, however, that applicants need to disclose information

regarding felony convictions and rulings on mental incapacity, as 42

U.S.C. § 1973gg-4(a)(1) requires states to accept and use the federal voter

registration form, which does not ask for such information, see U.S. Elec-

tion Assistance Commission, Register To Vote in Your State by Using

This Postcard Form and Guide (2006). Moreover, appellants’ position

with respect to prior felony convictions and mental incapacity appears to

discount the extent to which such information may already be a matter of

public record.

PROJECT VOTE v. LONG 17

sure of completed voter registration applications. Public dis-

closure promotes transparency in the voting process, and

courts should be loath to reject a legislative effort so germane

to the integrity of federal elections.

VI.

In the end, appellants ask us to revisit issues already

resolved by the Congress. It may or may not be that Section

8(i)(1) is the most effective means of promoting the NVRA’s

stated purposes. The public disclosure provision may or may

not "increase the number of eligible citizens who register to

vote" in federal elections and "enhance[ ] the participation of

eligible citizens as voters." 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg(b). But this

debate belongs in the legislative arena, not the courts. We also

decline to address every particular question that may arise

with respect to the implementation of Section 8(i)(1). That is

best left to the trial court upon remand. We do hold, however,

that completed voter registration applications are subject to

disclosure under the NVRA, as they are unquestionably "re-

cords concerning the implementation of programs and activi-

ties conducted for the purpose of ensuring the accuracy and

currency of official lists of eligible voters." Id. § 1973gg-

6(i)(1). Where, as here, "the statute’s language is plain, the

sole function of the courts . . . is to enforce it according to its

terms." Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004) (internal

quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, we affirm the judg-

ment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this

decision.

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED