Parker v. Matthews

Cite as: 567 U. S. ____ (2012) 1

Per Curiam

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

PHILIP PARKER, WARDEN v. DAVID EUGENE

MATTHEWS

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

No. 11–845. Decided June 11, 2012

PER CURIAM.

In this habeas case, the United States Court of Ap-

peals for the Sixth Circuit set aside two 29-year-old mur-

der convictions based on the flimsiest of rationales. The

court’s decision is a textbook example of what the Antiter-

rorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)

proscribes: “using federal habeas corpus review as a vehi-

cle to second-guess the reasonable decisions of state

courts.” Renico v. Lett, 559 U. S. ___, ___ (2010) (slip op.,

at 12). We therefore grant the petition for certiorari and

reverse.

I

Between 1 and 2 a.m. on the morning of June 29, 1981,

respondent David Eugene Matthews broke into the Louis-

ville home he had until recently shared with his estranged

wife, Mary Marlene Matthews (Marlene). At the time,

Matthews’ mother-in-law, Magdalene Cruse, was staying

at the home with her daughter. Matthews found Cruse in

bed and shot her in the head at point-blank range, using a

gun he had purchased with borrowed funds hours before.

Matthews left Cruse there mortally wounded and went

into the next room, where he found his wife. He had

sexual relations with her once or twice; stayed with her

until about 6 a.m.; and then shot her twice, killing her.

Cruse would die from her wound later that day.

Matthews was apprehended that morning at his moth-

er’s house, where he had already begun to wash the

2 PARKER v. MATTHEWS

Per Curiam

clothes he wore during the crime. Later in the day, police

officers found the murder weapon secreted below the

floorboards of a backyard shed on the property. At the

police station, Matthews made a tape-recorded statement

to a police detective in which he denied responsibility for

the murders.

A grand jury indicted Matthews for the two murders

and for burglary. At trial, he did not contest that he killed

the two victims. Instead, he sought to show that he had

acted under “extreme emotional disturbance,” which under

Kentucky law serves to reduce a homicide that would

otherwise be murder to first-degree manslaughter. Ky.

Rev. Stat. Ann. §§507.020(1)(a), 507.030(1)(b) (West 2006).

As support for that claim, Matthews pointed to the trou-

bled history of his marriage with Marlene. Matthews and

his wife had been frequently separated from one another,

and their periods of separation were marked by extreme

hostility. Marlene would regularly procure criminal war-

rants against Matthews; several weeks before the murders

she obtained one charging Matthews with sexual abuse of

Marlene’s 6-year-old daughter, which had led to Mat-

thews’ spending roughly three weeks in jail. Witnesses

also testified that Marlene sought to control Matthews

when they were together and would yell at him from

across the street when they were separated; and Mat-

thews’ mother recounted that Marlene would leave the

couple’s young child crying in the street late at night

outside the house where Matthews was sleeping in order

to antagonize him.

Matthews also introduced the testimony of a psychia-

trist, Dr. Lee Chutkow, who had evaluated Matthews. Dr.

Chutkow related what Matthews had told him about the

murders, including that Matthews had been drinking heav-

ily and taking Valium and a stimulant drug. Dr. Chut-

kow testified that he had diagnosed Matthews as suf-

fering from an adjustment disorder, which he described

Cite as: 567 U. S. ____ (2012) 3

Per Curiam

as a “temporary emotional and behavioral disturbance in

individuals who are subject to a variety of stresses,” that

would temporarily impair a person’s judgment and cause

symptoms such as “anxiety, nervousness, depression, even

suicide attempts or attempts to hurt other people.” 6

Record 558. Dr. Chutkow testified to his opinion that

Matthews was acting under the influence of extreme

emotional disturbance at the time of the murders—in

particular, that he experienced “extreme tension, irritabil-

ity, and almost a kind of fear of his late wife,” id., at 567,

whom he perceived as having tormented and emasculated

him.

The jury convicted Matthews on all charges, and he was

sentenced to death. The Kentucky Supreme Court af-

firmed the convictions and sentence, rejecting Matthews’

37 claims of error. Matthews v. Commonwealth, 709 S. W.

2d 414, 417 (1985). In response to Matthews’ argument

that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he had

acted in the absence of extreme emotional disturbance, the

court concluded that the evidence regarding Matthews’

“conduct before, during and after the offense was more

than sufficient to support the jury’s findings of capital

murder.” Id., at 421. A claim that the prosecutor had

committed misconduct during his closing argument was

rejected on the merits, but without discussion.

Following an unsuccessful state postconviction proceed-

ing, Matthews filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus

under 28 U. S. C. §2254 in the United States District

Court for the Western District of Kentucky. Matthews

contended, among other things, that the Kentucky Su-

preme Court had contravened clearly established federal

law in rejecting his claim that the evidence was insuffi-

cient to prove that he had not acted under the influence of

extreme emotional disturbance and in rejecting his claim

of prosecutorial misconduct. The District Court dismissed

the petition, but a divided panel of the Sixth Circuit re-

4 PARKER v. MATTHEWS

Per Curiam

versed with instructions to grant relief. 651 F. 3d 489

(2011).

II

Under AEDPA, the Sixth Circuit had no authority to

issue the writ of habeas corpus unless the Kentucky Su-

preme Court’s decision “was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States,” or “was based on an unreasonable determination

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.” 28 U. S. C. §2254(d). The Sixth Circuit

gave two grounds for its conclusion that Matthews was

entitled to relief under this “difficult to meet . . . and

highly deferential standard,” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563

U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 9) (internal quotation

marks omitted). Neither is valid.

A

First, the Sixth Circuit held that the Kentucky Supreme

Court had impermissibly shifted to Matthews the burden

of proving extreme emotional disturbance, and that the

Commonwealth had failed to prove the absence of extreme

emotional disturbance beyond a reasonable doubt. The

Sixth Circuit reasoned that, at the time Matthews com-

mitted his offenses, the allocation of the burden of proof on

extreme emotional disturbance was governed by the Ken-

tucky Supreme Court’s decision in Gall v. Commonwealth,

607 S. W. 2d 97, 108 (1980), which placed the burden of

producing evidence on the defendant, but left the bur-

den of proving the absence of extreme emotional disturb-

ance with the Commonwealth in those cases in which the

defendant had introduced evidence sufficient to raise a

reasonable doubt on the issue. According to the Sixth

Circuit, however, the Kentucky Supreme Court departed

from that understanding in Matthews’ case and placed the

Cite as: 567 U. S. ____ (2012) 5

Per Curiam

burden of proving extreme emotional disturbance “entirely

on the defendant,” 651 F. 3d, at 500.

The Sixth Circuit’s interpretation is supported by cer-

tain aspects of the Kentucky Supreme Court’s opinion in

Matthews’ case. For example, the state court indicated

that Matthews had “present[ed] extensive evidence” of his

extreme emotional disturbance, yet the court rejected his

sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim by finding the evidence

he had presented “far from overwhelming,” rather than by

stating that it failed to raise a reasonable doubt. Mat-

thews, 709 S. W. 2d, at 420–421. The state court also

observed that it had recently clarified in Wellman v. Com-

monwealth, 694 S. W. 2d 696 (1985), that “absence of

extreme emotional disturbance is not an element of the

crime of murder which the Commonwealth must affirma-

tively prove.” Matthews, supra, at 421. In the Sixth Cir-

cuit’s view, the Kentucky Supreme Court’s reliance on this

Wellman formulation of extreme emotional disturbance in

resolving Matthews’ appeal violated the Due Process

Clause, as construed by this Court in Bouie v. City of

Columbia, 378 U. S. 347, 354 (1964), because it involved

the retroactive application of an “ ‘unexpected and indefen-

sible’ ” judicial revision of the Kentucky murder statute.

The Kentucky Supreme Court’s initial assessment of

the evidence and reliance upon Wellman would be relevant

if they formed the sole basis for denial of Matthews’

sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim. It is not clear, however,

that they did. The Kentucky Supreme Court explained that

“[t]he trial court’s instructions in regard to extreme emo-

tional disturbance were adequate, and the proof supported

the jury’s findings of intentional murder.” 709 S. W. 2d,

at 421. Those jury instructions required the jury to find

beyond a reasonable doubt that Matthews had not acted

“under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for

which there was a reasonable justification or excuse under

the circumstances as he believed them to be.” 6 Record

6 PARKER v. MATTHEWS

Per Curiam

625, 628–629. The case had been submitted to the jury

with the burden assigned to the Commonwealth, the jury

had found that burden carried, and the Kentucky Su-

preme Court found the evidence adequate to sustain that

finding. That ground was sufficient to reject Matthews’

claim, so it is irrelevant that the court also invoked a

ground of questionable validity. See Wetzel v. Lambert,

565 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2012) (per curiam) (slip op., at

4–5).1

The Sixth Circuit’s opinion also challenges the conclu-

sion that the evidence supported a finding of no extreme

emotional disturbance. We have said that “it is the

responsibility of the jury—not the court—to decide what

——————

1 An ambiguously worded footnote in the Sixth Circuit’s opinion, see

651 F. 3d 489, 504, n. 5 (2011), suggests that the court may have found

an additional due process violation. The court referred to a statement

in the Kentucky Supreme Court’s decision in Gall v. Commonwealth

607 S. W. 2d 97, 109 (1980), that “[u]nless the evidence raising the

issue [of extreme emotional disturbance] is of such probative force that

otherwise the defendant would be entitled as a matter of law to an

acquittal on the higher charge (murder), the prosecution is not required

to come forth with negating evidence in order to sustain its burden of

proof.” Relying on its own opinion in Gall’s federal habeas proceeding,

Gall v. Parker, 231 F. 3d 265 (CA6 2000) (Gall II), the Sixth Circuit

suggested that the quoted statement “require[d] a defendant to bear the

heavy burden of disproving an element of a crime beyond a reasonable

doubt,” 651 F. 3d, at 504, n. 5, in violation of this Court’s decision in

Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684 (1975). That is not so. The state-

ment explicitly acknowledges that the burden of proof rests with the

prosecution, but merely asserts that when the burden of production is

assigned to the defendant the jury may find the prosecution’s burden of

proof satisfied without introduction of negating evidence, unless the

defendant’s evidence is so probative as to establish reasonable doubt as

a matter of law. That seems to us a truism. See 2 J. Strong, McCor-

mick on Evidence §338, pp. 419–420 (5th ed. 1999). Our opinion in

Mullaney addressed a situation in which the burden of persuasion was

shifted to the defendant, see 421 U. S., at 702, and n. 31; it does not

remotely show that the Kentucky Supreme Court’s truism contravened

clearly established federal law.

Cite as: 567 U. S. ____ (2012) 7

Per Curiam

conclusions should be drawn from evidence admitted at

trial,” Cavazos v. Smith, 565 U. S. 1, ___ (2011) (per curiam)

(slip op., at 1). The evidence is sufficient to support a

conviction whenever, “after viewing the evidence in the

light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier

of fact could have found the essential elements of the

crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia,

443 U. S. 307, 319 (1979). And a state-court decision

rejecting a sufficiency challenge may not be overturned on

federal habeas unless the “decision was ‘objectively unrea-

sonable.’ ” Cavazos, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 1).

In light of this twice-deferential standard, it is abun-

dantly clear that the Kentucky Supreme Court’s rejection

of Matthews’ sufficiency claim is controlling in this federal

habeas proceeding. The Sixth Circuit noted that Dr.

Chutkow expressed an opinion that Matthews was under

the influence of extreme emotional disturbance at the time

of the murders, and did not retreat from that opinion on

cross-examination. But there was ample evidence point-

ing in the other direction as well. As the Kentucky

Supreme Court observed, Matthews’ claim of extreme emo-

tional disturbance was belied by “the circumstances of the

crime,” 709 S. W. 2d, at 421—including the facts that he

borrowed money to purchase the murder weapon the day

of the murders, that he waited several hours after buying

the gun before starting for his wife’s home, and that he

delayed several hours between shooting his mother-in-law

and killing his wife. The claim was also belied by his

behavior after the murders, including his “[taking] steps to

hide the gun and clean his clothes,” and later “giv[ing]

a false statement to the police.” Ibid. The Sixth Circuit

discounted this evidence because Dr. Chutkow testified

that Matthews’ deliberateness and consciousness of

wrongdoing were not inconsistent with the diagnosis of

extreme emotional disturbance. 651 F. 3d., at 504, n. 4.

But expert testimony does not trigger a conclusive pre-

8 PARKER v. MATTHEWS

Per Curiam

sumption of correctness, and it was not unreasonable

to conclude that the jurors were entitled to consider the

tension between Dr. Chutkow’s testimony and their own

common-sense understanding of emotional disturbance.

In resolving the conflict in favor of Dr. Chutkow’s testi-

mony, the Sixth Circuit overstepped the proper limits of its

authority. See Jackson, supra, at 326.

More fundamentally, the Sixth Circuit did not appear to

consider the possibility that the jury could have found the

symptoms described by Dr. Chutkow inadequate to estab-

lish what is required to reduce murder to manslaughter

under Kentucky law: that Matthews “acted under the

influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which

there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the reason-

ableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint

of a person in the defendant’s situation under the circum-

stances as the defendant believed them to be.” Ky. Rev.

Stat. Ann. §507.020(1)(a). Dr. Chutkow himself agreed

that many people face tension and anxiety—two symptoms

he attributed to Matthews. 6 Record 579–580. And he

agreed that many people suffer from adjustment disor-

ders. Id., at 592. But of course very few people commit

murders. In light of these points, which bear on the

proper characterization of Matthews’ mental condition and

the reasonableness of his conduct, the Kentucky Supreme

Court made no objectively unreasonable error in conclud-

ing that the question of extreme emotional disturbance

was properly committed to the jury for resolution.

B

As a second ground for its decision, the Sixth Circuit

held that certain remarks made by the prosecutor during

his closing argument constituted a denial of due process.

This claim was rejected on the merits by the Kentucky

Supreme Court (albeit without analysis) and therefore

receives deferential review under the AEDPA standard.

Cite as: 567 U. S. ____ (2012) 9

Per Curiam

See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip

op., at 8). The “clearly established Federal law” relevant

here is our decision in Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U. S.

168 (1986), which explained that a prosecutor’s improper

comments will be held to violate the Constitution only if

they “ ‘so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the

resulting conviction a denial of due process.’ ” Id., at 181

(quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U. S. 637, 643

(1974)).

According to the Sixth Circuit, the prosecutor violated

Darden by suggesting that Matthews had colluded with

his lawyer, David Busse, and with Dr. Chutkow to manu-

facture an extreme emotional disturbance defense. But

although the Sixth Circuit quoted a lengthy section of the

prosecutor’s closing argument which could be understood

as raising a charge of collusion,2 the court did not address

——————

2 The full text of the section the Sixth Circuit found objectionable is as

follows:

“He’s arraigned, he meets with his attorney and either he tells his at-

torney, I did it or I didn’t do it. One or the other. But, the attorney

knows what the evidence is. By the way, the defendant knows what the

evidence is, because while he’s giving this statement, it’s sitting right in

front of him at the Homicide Office. Here’s the gun. Here’s the shoes,

David. ‘Nah, nah, I never saw it before. I never borrowed a gun. I

never borrowed any money. I wasn’t there. I was at home in bed

asleep.’ He’s denying it there.

“And what does his attorney think? His attorney sees all this evi-

dence, and he’s going through his mind, what kind of legal excuse can

I have? What is this man’s defense? Self protection? No, there’s no

proof of a gun found at that house on 310 North 24th Street. No proof

of that. Protection of another? The defendant’s mother is at home on

Lytle Street. He isn’t protecting her over there on North 24th Street.

Intoxication? Yeah, well, he was drinking that night. Maybe that will

mean something.

“But that isn’t enough, Ladies and Gentlemen. Mr. Busse has to

contact a psychiatrist to see his client, and he comes in and sees his

client one month after the day of his arrest, one month to the day, and

by that time, Mr. David Eugene Matthews sees his defense in the form

of Doctor Chutkow, and do you think this guy is aware of what’s going

10 PARKER v. MATTHEWS

Per Curiam

the prosecutor’s statement that immediately followed the

quoted portion and expressly disavowed any suggestion of

collusion:

“And that’s not to say that Mr. Busse is unethical.

Not at all. He is entitled to the best defense he can

get, but that’s the only defense he has, what the doc-

tor has to say, and that’s not to say that the doctor

gets on the stand and perjures himself. He’s telling

you the truth. He wouldn’t perjure himself for any-

thing. He’s telling you the truth, Ladies and Gentle-

men.” 7 Record 674.

With the prosecutor’s immediate clarification that he was

not alleging collusion in view, the Sixth Circuit’s conclu-

sion that this feature of the closing argument clearly

violated due process is unsupportable. Nor does the pros-

ecutor’s suggestion that Matthews had “enhance[d] his

story to Doctor Chutkow,” ibid., suffice to justify the Sixth

Circuit’s grant of habeas relief. In context, that statement

is clearly a part of a broader argument that Matthews

had a motive to exaggerate his emotional disturbance in

his meetings with Dr. Chutkow. Shortly after the quoted

statement, the prosecutor continued with a series of rhe-

torical questions:

“Don’t you think he would exaggerate his fears about

his wife, his mother-in-law, and all these other things

——————

on? He’s competent. He can work with his attorney, and he enhances

his story to Doctor Chutkow. Yeah, I was drinking. I was drinking a

lot. I was taking a lot of pills, too, and let me tell you about the pills I

was taking.

“Don’t you think he has a purpose in enhancing his story to the

psychiatrist? Don’t you think he would exaggerate his fears about his

wife, his mother-in-law, and all these other things about what other

people might be doing to his mother? Don’t you think he would over-

state the extent of his intoxication to his psychiatrist? It’s the defense

of last resort, Ladies and Gentlemen. He has no excuse for his conduct,

but that’s his only way out.” 7 Record 673–674.

Cite as: 567 U. S. ____ (2012) 11

Per Curiam

about what other people might be doing to his mother?

Don’t you think he would overstate the extent of his

intoxication to his psychiatrist?” Ibid.

The Sixth Circuit cited no precedent of this Court in sup-

port of its conclusion that due process prohibits a prosecu-

tor from emphasizing a criminal defendant’s motive to

exaggerate exculpatory facts.

The Sixth Circuit also suggested that the prosecutor

“denigrated the [extreme emotional disturbance] defense

itself,” 651 F. 3d, at 506, by stating that “[i]t’s the defense

of last resort, Ladies and Gentlemen. He has no excuse for

his conduct, but that’s his only way out.” 7 Record 674.

But the Kentucky Supreme Court could have understood

this comment too as having been directed at Matthews’

motive to exaggerate his emotional disturbance—i.e., as

emphasizing that the unavailability of any other defense

raised the stakes with respect to extreme emotional

disturbance.

Moreover, even if the comment is understood as direct-

ing the jury’s attention to inappropriate considerations,

that would not establish that the Kentucky Supreme

Court’s rejection of the Darden prosecutorial misconduct

claim “was so lacking in justification that there was an

error well understood and comprehended in existing law

beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.”

Harrington, 562 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 13). Indeed,

Darden itself held that a closing argument considerably

more inflammatory than the one at issue here did not

warrant habeas relief. See 477 U. S., at 180, n. 11 (prose-

cutor referred to the defendant as an “ ‘animal’ ”); id., at

180, n. 12 (“ ‘I wish I could see [the defendant] with no

face, blown away by a shotgun’ ”). Particularly because the

Darden standard is a very general one, leaving courts

“more leeway . . . in reaching outcomes in case-by-case

determinations,” Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U. S. 652,

12 PARKER v. MATTHEWS

Per Curiam

664 (2004)), the Sixth Circuit had no warrant to set aside

the Kentucky Supreme Court’s conclusion.

The Sixth Circuit also erred by consulting its own prec-

edents, rather than those of this Court, in assessing the

reasonableness of the Kentucky Supreme Court’s decision.

After quoting the governing standard from our decision in

Darden, the Sixth Circuit added that it would “engag[e] in

a two step inquiry to determine whether the prosecutorial

misconduct rises to the level of unconstitutionality. ‘To

satisfy the standard . . . , the conduct must be both im-

proper and flagrant.’ ” 651 F. 3d, at 505 (quoting Broom v.

Mitchell, 441 F. 3d 392, 412 (CA6 2006)). It went on to

evaluate the flagrancy step of that inquiry in light of four

factors derived from its own precedent: “ ‘(1) the likelihood

that the remarks . . . tended to mislead the jury or preju-

dice the defendant; (2) whether the remarks were isolated

or extensive; (3) whether the remarks were deliberately or

accidentally made; and (4) the total strength of the evi-

dence against [Matthews].’ ” 651 F. 3d, at 506 (quoting

Broom, supra, at 412). And it stated that “the prosecutor’s

comments in this case were sufficiently similar to” certain

comments held unconstitutional in its prior decision in

Gall II, 231 F. 3d 265 (CA6 2000), “that they rise to the

level of impropriety.” 651 F. 3d, at 506.

As we explained in correcting an identical error by the

Sixth Circuit two Terms ago, see Renico, 559 U. S., at ___

(slip op., at 11–12), circuit precedent does not constitute

“clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court,” 28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(1). It therefore

cannot form the basis for habeas relief under AEDPA. Nor

can the Sixth Circuit’s reliance on its own precedents be

defended in this case on the ground that they merely

reflect what has been “clearly established” by our cases.

The highly generalized standard for evaluating claims of

prosecutorial misconduct set forth in Darden bears scant

resemblance to the elaborate, multistep test employed by

Cite as: 567 U. S. ____ (2012) 13

Per Curiam

the Sixth Circuit here. To make matters worse, the Sixth

Circuit decided Gall II under pre-AEDPA law, see 231

F. 3d, at 283, n. 2, so that case did not even purport to

reflect clearly established law as set out in this Court’s

holdings. It was plain and repetitive error for the Sixth

Circuit to rely on its own precedents in granting Matthews

habeas relief.

* * *

The petition for a writ of certiorari and respondent’s

motion to proceed in forma pauperis are granted. The

judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is

reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.