Opinion

Libertarian Party v. District of Columbia Board of Elections & Ethics

  • 682 F.3d 72
  • 401 U.S. App. D.C. 179
  • 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 11602
  • 2012 WL 2053652
Court
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
Filed
Jun 8, 2012
Status
Published
Author
Tatel
On the bench
Tatel, Garland, Kavanaugh
Cited by
4 cases
Authority
More cited than 45.8%

analyzing under Burdick plaintiffs’ First and Fifth Amendment claims that the District “consistent with its regulations, never reported which individuals were penciled in 22 by voters choosing the write-in option or how many votes any such individual accrued”

How later courts described this case

  • analyzing under Burdick plaintiffs’ First and Fifth Amendment claims that the District “consistent with its regulations, never reported which individuals were penciled in 22 by voters choosing the write-in option or how many votes any such individual accrued”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 10, 2012 Decided June 8, 2012

No. 11-7029

LIBERTARIAN PARTY, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA BOARD OF ELECTIONS AND ETHICS,

ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:09-cv-01676)

Oliver B. Hall argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellants.

Rudolph M.D. McGann argued the cause and filed the

brief for appellee District of Columbia Board of Elections and

Ethics. Kenneth J. McGhie entered an appearance.

James C. McKay Jr., Senior Assistant Attorney General,

Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia,

argued the cause for appellees Vincent C. Gray and Irvin B.

Nathan. With him on the brief were Irvin B. Nathan, Attorney

2

General for the District of Columbia, Todd S. Kim, Solicitor

General, and Donna M. Murasky, Deputy Solicitor General.

Before: TATEL, GARLAND, and KAVANAUGH, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.

TATEL, Circuit Judge: The District of Columbia’s Board

of Elections and Ethics published the total number of write-in

votes cast in the 2008 presidential election but, consistent

with its regulations, never reported which individuals were

penciled in by voters choosing the write-in option or how

many votes any such individual accrued. The Libertarian

Party, along with its 2008 presidential candidate Bob Barr, a

write-in candidate, contends that the District’s failure to

report the number of votes cast for Barr violates the First and

Fifth Amendments. The district court granted the Board’s

motion for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth in

this opinion, we affirm.

I.

Bob Barr was listed on the ballots of forty-five states and

qualified as a write-in candidate in one other. He also

qualified as a write-in candidate in the District of Columbia.

District voters could either vote for a ballot candidate, such as

John McCain or Barack Obama, or they could opt to pencil in

a vote for Bob Barr or one of the other write-in candidates. Of

the 265,853 votes cast, 245,800 went to the future president,

Barack Obama, and of the remaining 20,053 votes, a total of

1,138 were counted as votes for write-in candidates. The D.C.

Board of Elections and Ethics tallied and reported all of these

votes, including the 1,138 write-in votes, as required by its

rules. See D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 3, § 806.12. But because the

“total number of write-in votes” was not “sufficient to elect a

3

write-in candidate,” id. § 806.13, the Board, pursuant to

section 806.13 of its rules, did not individually tally and

report the total number of votes cast for Barr or any other

write-in candidate. The Libertarian Party, Bob Barr, and

several citizens who voted for Barr sued in the United States

District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging that the

Board’s failure to do so violated their First Amendment

speech and associational rights and their Fifth Amendment

equal protection rights. Throughout this opinion, we shall

refer to the plaintiffs as “the Party.”

The district court granted summary judgment for the

Board. After observing that whether speech and associational

rights “extend to the manner in which votes are reported is a

close question,” the district court determined that it had no

need to resolve the issue because “when an election law

imposes only ‘reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions’

upon the constitutional rights of voters, ‘the State’s important

regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify the

restrictions.’ ” Libertarian Party v. D.C. Bd. of Elections &

Ethics, 768 F. Supp. 2d 174, 180, 181–82 (D.D.C. 2011)

(quoting Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992)). The

district court concluded that “[t]he burden Section 806.13 puts

on Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights is accordingly very

limited,” and here, “the District’s regulatory interests trump

Plaintiffs’ limited interest in having write-in votes tabulated

and reported on a candidate-by-candidate basis.” Id. at 187.

The Party now appeals, and our review is de novo. See,

e.g., Maydak v. United States, 630 F.3d 166, 174 (D.C. Cir.

2010).

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II.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Burdick v. Takushi, 504

U.S. 428, provides the framework for our analysis. There, the

Court explained that “[e]lection laws will invariably impose

some burden upon individual voters,” and that not all laws

burdening the right to vote are subject to strict scrutiny. Id. at

433–34. Rather, as explained in Anderson v. Celebrezze,

courts must “consider the character and magnitude of the

asserted injury” to the plaintiff’s constitutional right, as well

as “the precise interests put forward by the State as

justifications for the burden imposed by its rule.” 460 U.S.

780, 789 (1983). When a voter’s rights are “subjected to

severe restrictions, the regulation must be narrowly drawn to

advance a state interest of compelling importance.” Burdick,

504 U.S. at 434 (internal quotation marks omitted). But when

election laws impose only “reasonable, nondiscriminatory

restrictions” upon the constitutional rights of voters, “the

State’s important regulatory interests are generally sufficient

to justify the restrictions.” Id. (internal quotation marks

omitted). The question, then, is whether the District’s

regulations impose “severe restrictions” on the Party’s

constitutional rights and are thus subject to strict scrutiny (as

the Party argues), or whether they impose “reasonable,

nondiscriminatory restrictions” and are thus permissible in

light of the District’s “important regulatory interests” (as the

district court found).

Acknowledging that the Supreme Court in Burdick

upheld Hawaii’s outright ban on write-in voting, the Party

argues that the Court only did so in the context of Hawaii’s

particular statutory scheme, which provides candidates with

“easy access to the ballot.” Appellants’ Br. 11. By contrast,

the Party points out that the District, unlike Hawaii, requires

that candidates seeking to appear on the general election

ballot submit a nomination petition signed by one percent of

5

all registered voters. D.C. Code § 1-1001.08(f). The Party

does not challenge this requirement. Instead, it argues that in

light of the burden the District imposes on candidates seeking

access to the ballot, the Board’s unwillingness to count and

report the number of votes cast for each individual write-in

candidate “severe[ly]” burdens the Party’s constitutional

rights. Appellants’ Br. 14. It does so, the Party argues, by

burdening “ ‘the right of qualified voters, regardless of their

political persuasion, to cast their votes effectively,’ ” as well

as the “ ‘right of individuals to associate for the advancement

of political beliefs.’ ” Id. at 19 (quoting Williams v. Rhodes,

393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968)). Elaborating, the Party explains:

[A] voter who casts a valid write-in ballot for a declared

candidate like Barr is entitled to know whether she has

acted in concert with other like-minded voters or whether

her vote is a lone statement in the political wilderness.

The voting public is entitled to know how Barr fared at

the polls. The Libertarian Party is entitled to know

whether its stature has grown or been diminished by the

votes cast for Barr. None of this vital information, laden

with associative and communicative value, is available if

the Board fails to count and report the Barr vote.

Id. at 19–20. Finally, the Party points to case law recognizing

that each voter’s vote “must be correctly counted and

reported.” Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 380 (1963).

The District’s laws no doubt impose burdens on write-in

candidates, but, like the district court, we have no basis for

concluding that these burdens are “severe,” or anything but

“reasonable [and] nondiscriminatory.” Libertarian Party, 768

F. Supp. 2d at 181 (internal quotation marks omitted). The

Party nowhere disputes that its members were perfectly free

to associate, to campaign freely and zealously, to mobilize

6

supporters, and to vote as they wished. Nor does it dispute

that the Board accurately counted all votes, including the

write-in votes, or that the Board reported the number of votes

for the named candidates, as well as the number of votes cast

for the write-in option in general. Yet it insists that the Board

“effectively disenfranchises . . . registered District of

Columbia voter[s] who cast a valid write-in vote for plaintiff

Barr in the 2008 presidential election.” Appellants’ Br. 17.

We fail to see how. They were free to vote. They voted. The

number of write-in votes was counted. The Party knows it

“received between 3 and 1,138 votes out of a total 265,853

votes cast—at most, less than 0.5 percent of the total vote.”

Libertarian Party, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 186. And, as the district

court pointed out, “their votes would have been further

tabulated on a candidate-by-candidate basis, pursuant to

Section 806.13, if there had been a sufficient number of write-

ins to have a determinative effect on the election.” Id. at 185.

In the context of an election, like this one, where write-in

votes could have no possible effect on the outcome, the

District’s refusal to tally and report the precise number of

voters who penciled in Bob Barr as their candidate of choice

hardly amounts to disenfranchising those voters or, more

precisely for our purposes, imposing a severe burden on their

rights. Of course, the Party would benefit from knowing how

many people voted for its candidate. And it seems reasonable

to think that having such information may facilitate further

and future speech and association. But that alone does not

render the regulation a severe burden. It just makes the

regulation inconvenient for candidates unable to obtain

signatures from one percent of District voters in advance of

the election.

Arguing otherwise, the Party contends that a precise

count is necessary because under federal law, 26 U.S.C.

§ 9004, a minor party presidential candidate polling at least

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five percent of the national vote can qualify for public funding

in the next election. But as the district court pointed out,

“[e]ven if all 1,138 write-in votes from the District of

Columbia were allotted to Barr, his vote total would still be

approximately 0.40%—nowhere near the 5% threshold

required for public funding.” Libertarian Party, 768 F. Supp.

2d at 187. Thus, any such harm is, at least in this case, purely

hypothetical.

Indeed, the District’s regime is no stricter and no more

severe than the one in Hawaii upheld by the Supreme Court in

Burdick. There, Hawaii banned write-in voting and required

candidates to run in an open primary in order to appear on the

general election ballot. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 435. A

nonpartisan candidate could get on the primary ballot by

filing paperwork containing, depending on the office sought,

fifteen to twenty-five signatures, but could only advance to

the general election by receiving either ten percent of the

primary vote or the number of votes that would have allowed

the nonpartisan candidate to be nominated had she run as a

partisan candidate. Id. at 436. By contrast, a partisan

candidate—including one outside the major parties—was

required to file a party petition containing the signatures of

one percent of the state’s registered voters. Id. at 435. In

holding that Hawaii’s election scheme did not constitute a

severe burden, the Court explained that it had “previously

upheld party and candidate petition signature requirements

that were as burdensome or more burdensome than Hawaii’s

one-percent requirement.” Id. at 435 n.3. Given this, we

cannot see how the District’s regulations—which, unlike

Hawaii’s, allow voters to write in a candidate of choice, and

which provide for the counting and reporting of the total

number of write-ins, though not how many votes each

individual write-in candidate received—can be considered a

severe burden.

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Although we certainly understand why the Party is

interested in the ballot count for reasons other than figuring

out who won the election, so too was the plaintiff in Burdick

who sued because he wanted to register a protest vote for

Donald Duck. See id. at 438. As the Supreme Court put it,

“the function of the election process is to winnow out and

finally reject all but the chosen candidates, not to provide a

means of giving vent to short-range political goals.” Id.

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly,

“[a]ttributing to elections a more generalized expressive

function would undermine the ability of States to operate

elections fairly and efficiently.” Id. Likewise, in Timmons v.

Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997), the

Supreme Court rejected a challenge to the constitutionality of

Minnesota’s law prohibiting candidates from appearing on the

ballot as the candidate of more than one party. In doing so, the

Court explained that it was “unpersuaded . . . by the party’s

contention that it has a right to use the ballot itself to send a

particularized message, to its candidate and to the voters,

about the nature of its support for the candidate. Ballots serve

primarily to elect candidates, not as forums for political

expression.” Id. at 363.

Moreover, any burden imposed is to some extent

mitigated by the District’s Freedom of Information Act,

which provides that “[a]ny person has a right to

inspect . . . any public record of a public body,” D.C. Code

§ 2-532(a), and expressly defines the term “public record” to

include “vote data (including ballot-definition material, raw

data, and ballot images),” id. § 2-502(18). Invoking this law,

the Party, as the Board emphasized at oral argument, can

obtain the ballots and count exactly how many were cast for

Bob Barr. To be sure, like any other FOIA request, this would

cost the Party some time and resources. Thus, what is really at

9

stake here is the allocation of cost—whether the Board has to

manually count every write-in vote, even when the write-in

votes could not possibly affect the election’s outcome, or

whether it is sufficient for the Board to count and report the

total number of write-in votes, determine that they are

irrelevant to the outcome, and leave interested parties free to

rummage through the ballots and count specifically how many

votes their write-in candidate received.

Because the Party has failed to show that the District’s

law places a severe burden on its rights, the District’s

“ ‘important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to

justify’ the restrictions.” Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (quoting

Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788). Here, in elections where a write-

in candidate could not possibly be declared the victor, the

District seeks to avoid the needless cost of tabulating each

write-in ballot by hand. As a declaration from the Board’s

Executive Director states, the write-in ballots would have to

be sorted from the hundreds of thousands of ballots cast and

manually counted, an undertaking that would require D.C. to

hire and train employees for a task that would “require at least

a few weeks to complete.” Decl. of Rokey Suleman ¶¶ 5–6.

The Party does not contest this declaration. Instead, it cites

cases like Dunn v. Blumstein, where the Court explained that

“states may not casually deprive a class of individuals of the

vote because of some remote administrative benefit to the

State.” 405 U.S. 330, 351 (1972) (internal quotation marks

omitted). But in Dunn and the other cases cited by the Party,

the Court was applying strict scrutiny because the states had

actually disenfranchised a segment of voters. In Dunn, the

Court invalidated a “durational residence requirement,” 405

U.S. at 338, and in Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn.,

479 U.S. 208 (1986), it struck down a law that had banned

political parties from allowing independent voters to vote in

their primary. In such instances—where voting is literally

10

prohibited—mere administrative costs are insufficient to

survive strict scrutiny. In a case like this, however, where the

challenged regulation imposes no severe burden, strict

scrutiny has no place and the District’s general regulatory

interests are sufficient to uphold its law.

III.

We affirm the judgment of the district court.

So ordered.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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