Coleman v. Johnson

Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012) 1

Per Curiam

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

BRIAN COLEMAN, SUPERINTENDENT, STATE COR-

RECTIONAL INSTITUTION AT FAYETTE, ET AL.

v. LORENZO JOHNSON

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 11–1053. Decided May 29, 2012

PER CURIAM.

Respondent Lorenzo Johnson was convicted as an ac-

complice and co-conspirator in the murder of Taraja Wil-

liams, who was killed by a shotgun blast to the chest in

the early morning hours of December 15, 1995, in Har-

risburg, Pennsylvania. After his conviction was affirmed

in state court, Johnson exhausted his state remedies and

sought a writ of habeas corpus in Federal District Court

pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penal-

ty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U. S. C. §2254. The District

Court denied habeas relief but the U. S. Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit reversed, holding that the evidence

at trial was insufficient to support Johnson’s conviction

under the standard set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443

U. S. 307 (1979).

We have made clear that Jackson claims face a high bar

in federal habeas proceedings because they are subject to

two layers of judicial deference. First, on direct appeal, “it

is the responsibility of the jury—not the court—to decide

what conclusions should be drawn from evidence admitted

at trial. A reviewing court may set aside the jury’s verdict

on the ground of insufficient evidence only if no rational

trier of fact could have agreed with the jury.” Cavazos v.

Smith, 565 U. S. 1, ___ (2011) (per curiam) (slip op., at 1).

And second, on habeas review, “a federal court may not

overturn a state court decision rejecting a sufficiency of

the evidence challenge simply because the federal court

2 COLEMAN v. JOHNSON

Per Curiam

disagrees with the state court. The federal court instead

may do so only if the state court decision was ‘objectively

unreasonable.’ ” Ibid. (quoting Renico v. Lett, 559 U. S.

___, ___ (2010) (slip op., at 5)).

Because the Court of Appeals failed to afford due respect

to the role of the jury and the state courts of Pennsylvania,

we now grant certiorari and reverse the judgment below.

* * *

The parties agree that Williams was shot and killed

by Corey Walker, who was subsequently convicted of first-

degree murder. Johnson was with Walker on the night of

the crime, and the two were tried jointly. Johnson was

charged as an accomplice and co-conspirator. See 18 Pa.

Cons. Stat. §2502 (2008) (defining first-degree murder

as “willful, deliberate and premeditated” killing); §306(c)

(imposing accomplice liability for anyone who, “with the

intent of promoting or facilitating the commission of the

offense . . . aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other

person in planning or committing it”); Commonwealth v.

Montalvo, 598 Pa. 263, 274, 956 A. 2d 926, 932 (2008)

(criminal conspiracy liability for anyone who takes an

overt act in furtherance of a crime he has agreed to abet or

commit).

At trial, the Commonwealth called Victoria Doubs, who

testified that she, Johnson, and Walker were “close

friends” who “ran the streets together.” Tr. 213. On the

morning of December 14, the three of them awoke at the

same residence, bought marijuana, and then went to a

Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurant, where they encoun-

tered Williams. Walker announced that he was going to

“holler at” Williams about a debt Williams owed. Id., at

217. According to Doubs, Walker and Williams “were

talking about the money that [Williams] had owed us,”

with Walker “asking [Williams], confronting him, about

his money and what’s up with the money and why is it

Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012) 3

Per Curiam

taking you so long to give us the money.” Id., at 217–218.

Williams was “cussing [Walker] out, telling him he’d

give it to him when he felt like it and he ain’t scared of

[Walker].” Id., at 218. A fight ensued, which ended

when Williams beat Walker with a broomstick in front

of the crowd of people that had gathered.

After the fight, Doubs testified, Walker “was mad, be-

cause he got beat by a crackhead. . . . He was saying, yo,

that crackhead beat me. I’m going to kill that crackhead.

I’m going to kill that kid. . . . He was hot. He was heated.”

Id., at 220–221. Johnson was present when Walker made

these statements. Later that afternoon, Doubs recounted

the beating to others, who laughed at Walker. Walker

“repeated it for a while that I’m going to kill that kid.

That kid must think I’m some type of joke. I’m going to

kill that kid. Who he think he is[?]” Id., at 222. Once

again, Johnson was present for these statements.

Another witness was Carla Brown, a friend of the victim,

who testified that she was at the Midnight Special Bar

on the night of December 14–15, where she saw Walker,

Johnson, and Williams engaged in a heated argument.

Although she could not hear what they were saying, she

could tell they were arguing because they were making “a

lot of arm movements.” Id., at 104. The bouncer soon told

them to leave, and Brown followed them into the street

because she “wanted to know what was going on.” Ibid.

Brown observed the three men walking in a single-file

line, with Walker in front, Williams in the middle, and

Johnson in the back. Walker was wearing a long leather

coat, walking as if he had something concealed under-

neath it. Brown followed the three men to an alleyway, at

which point Williams recognized Brown and told her to “go

ahead” and pass. Id., at 107. Walker then entered the

alleyway, followed by Williams, while Johnson remained

standing at the entrance. As Brown walked past the alley,

she heard a loud “boom,” causing her to run away. Id., at

4 COLEMAN v. JOHNSON

Per Curiam

143. On cross-examination, Brown stated: “They walked

[Williams] in that alley. He stood inside the alley. He

walked him in the alley. I heard a boom.” Ibid.

The Commonwealth also called Aaron Dews, who testi-

fied that he was in a building bordering the alleyway at

12:45 a.m. on the morning of December 15. He heard a

loud boom that caused him to look out into the alley from

his second-story window, where he saw two silhouettes

fleeing.

After Dews the Commonwealth called Brian Ramsey,

who had been selling cocaine on a nearby street corner at

the time of the murder. He testified that he saw Williams

walking toward an alleyway with two males and a female,

and he heard a loud boom shortly after Williams entered

the alley. When pressed on cross-examination, he stated:

“I would say that [Williams] was forced in that alley.” Id.,

at 189.

The jury also heard testimony from police who searched

the alley shortly after the murder and found a shotgun

with the barrel missing. A medical examiner who exam-

ined Williams’ body testified that the cause of death was a

shotgun wound to the chest.

After the jury convicted Johnson, he filed a post-trial

motion arguing that the evidence was insufficient to sup-

port his conviction. The court denied his motion, and

the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the conviction

on direct appeal. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 726

A. 2d 1079 (1998). After the Pennsylvania Supreme Court

denied his petition for review, Johnson unsuccessfully

sought state postconviction relief. He then filed a habeas

petition in Federal District Court, which denied his

claims. See Johnson v. Mechling, 541 F. Supp. 2d 651

(MD Pa. 2008). Finally, Johnson appealed to the Third

Circuit, which reversed the District Court and ordered his

conviction overturned.

Under Jackson, evidence is sufficient to support a con-

Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012) 5

Per Curiam

viction if, “after viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact

could have found the essential elements of the crime be-

yond a reasonable doubt.” 443 U. S., at 319.

In light of the testimony at Johnson’s trial, the Court of

Appeals acknowledged that “[a] trier of fact could reason-

ably infer . . . that Johnson and Walker shared a common

intent to confront, threaten or harass Williams.” Johnson

v. Mechling, 446 Fed. Appx. 531, 540 (CA3 2011). As for

the notion that “Johnson shared Walker’s intent to kill

Williams,” however, the court concluded that was “mere

speculation” that no rational factfinder could accept as

true. Ibid. The court stated that “a reasonable inference

is one where the fact inferred is ‘more likely than not to

flow from the proved fact on which it is made to depend.’ ”

Id., at 539–540 (quoting Commonwealth v. McFarland,

452 Pa. 435, 439, 308 A. 2d 592, 594 (1973)). In order for a

jury’s inferences to be permissible, the court reasoned,

they must “ ‘flow from facts and circumstances proven in

the record’ ” that are “ ‘of such volume and quality as to

overcome the presumption of innocence.’ ” 446 Fed. Appx.,

at 539 (quoting Commonwealth v. Bostick, 958 A. 2d 543,

560 (Pa. Super. 2008)).

At the outset, we note that it was error for the Court of

Appeals to look to Pennsylvania law in determining what

distinguishes a reasoned inference from “mere specula-

tion.” Under Jackson, federal courts must look to state

law for “the substantive elements of the criminal offense,”

443 U. S., at 324, n. 16, but the minimum amount of evi-

dence that the Due Process Clause requires to prove the

offense is purely a matter of federal law.

Under the deferential federal standard, the approach

taken by the Court of Appeals was flawed because it un-

duly impinged on the jury’s role as factfinder. Jackson

leaves juries broad discretion in deciding what inferences

to draw from the evidence presented at trial, requiring

6 COLEMAN v. JOHNSON

Per Curiam

only that jurors “draw reasonable inferences from basic

facts to ultimate facts.” Id., at 319. This deferential

standard does not permit the type of fine-grained factual

parsing in which the Court of Appeals engaged. For ex-

ample, in addressing Brown and Ramsey’s testimony that

Williams was “walked” and “forced” into the alleyway, the

court objected that the witnesses did not describe any

“physical action” supporting the conclusion that force was

used. 446 Fed. Appx., at 541. Absent some specific testi-

mony that “Johnson actively pushed, shoved, ordered or

otherwise forced the victim into the alley, or prevented

him from leaving it,” ibid., the court could see no reason-

able basis for the jury’s conclusion that Johnson had a

specific intent to help kill Williams.

That analysis is flawed for two reasons. First, the coer-

cive nature of Johnson and Walker’s behavior could be

inferred from other circumstances not involving the direct

use of force: Walker was noticeably concealing a weapon,

and he had been heatedly threatening to kill Williams

after a violent confrontation earlier in the day. Johnson

and Walker kept Williams between them in a single-file

line on the way to the alley, where Johnson stood at the

entrance while the other two entered, suggesting that

Johnson may have been prepared to prevent Williams

from fleeing. And second, even if Williams was not co-

erced into the alley, the jury still could have concluded

that Johnson helped lead or lure him there to facilitate the

murder.

Taken in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the

trial testimony revealed that Johnson and Walker “ran

the streets together,” and had attempted to collect a debt

from Williams earlier on the day of the murder. Williams

resisted the collection, managing to humiliate Walker in

the process by giving him a public thrashing with a

broomstick. This enraged Walker to the point that he

repeatedly declared over the course of the day in Johnson’s

Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012) 7

Per Curiam

presence that he intended to kill Williams. Then, while

Walker was noticeably concealing a bulky object under his

trenchcoat, Johnson helped escort Williams into an alley,

where Johnson stood at the entryway while Walker pulled

out a shotgun and shot Williams in the chest.

On the basis of these facts, a rational jury could infer

that Johnson knew that Walker was armed with a shot-

gun; knew that he intended to kill Williams; and helped

usher Williams into the alleyway to meet his fate. The

jury in this case was convinced, and the only question

under Jackson is whether that finding was so insupporta-

ble as to fall below the threshold of bare rationality. The

state court of last review did not think so, and that deter-

mination in turn is entitled to considerable deference

under AEDPA, 28 U. S. C. §2254(d).

Affording due respect to the role of the jury and the

state courts, we conclude that the evidence at Johnson’s

trial was not nearly sparse enough to sustain a due pro-

cess challenge under Jackson. The evidence was sufficient

to convict Johnson as an accomplice and a co-conspirator

in the murder of Taraja Williams. The Commonwealth’s

petition for certiorari and the motion to proceed in forma

pauperis are granted, the judgment of the Court of Ap-

peals for the Third Circuit is reversed, and the case is

remanded for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

It is so ordered.