Opinion

Wilhelm v. Rotman

  • 680 F.3d 1113
  • 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 10647
  • 2012 WL 1889786
Court
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Filed
May 25, 2012
Status
Published
Author
Graber
On the bench
Schroeder, O'Scannlain, Graber
Cited by
2,210 cases
Authority
More cited than 99.7%

holding that a prisoner plausibly alleges an Eighth 1 || Amendment violation where a failure to treat a serious medical need “could result in further 2 || significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” and “the defendant’s 3 ||response to the need was deliberately indifferent.”

How later courts described this case

  • holding that a prisoner plausibly alleges an Eighth 1 || Amendment violation where a failure to treat a serious medical need “could result in further 2 || significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” and “the defendant’s 3 ||response to the need was deliberately indifferent.”
  • stating that “a plaintiffs showing of nothing more than a difference of medical opinion as to the need to pursue one course of treatment over another [is] insufficient, as a matter of law, to establish deliberate indifference.” (quotation omitted)
  • explaining that, to establish deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must show “(a) a purposeful act or failure to 2 24-2094 respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the indifference” (citation omitted)
  • explaining that “‘a plaintiff’s showing of nothing more than a difference of medical opinion as to the need to pursue one course of treatment over another [is] insufficient, as a matter of law, to establish deliberate indifference’”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

STEVEN HAIRL WILHELM, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, No. 11-16335

v.

 D.C. No.

1:10-cv-00001-GBC

DR. ARON ROTMAN; DR. CALVIN

SCHUSTER, and DR. JEAN PIERRE, OPINION

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Gerald B. Cohn, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

April 17, 2012—San Francisco, California

Filed May 25, 2012

Before: Mary M. Schroeder, Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, and

Susan P. Graber, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Graber

5843

WILHELM v. ROTMAN 5845

COUNSEL

Ivana Cingel, O’Melveny & Myers LLP, Los Angeles, Cali-

fornia, for the plaintiff-appellant.

Vickie P. Whitney, Supervising Deputy Attorney General,

Sacramento, California, for amicus curiae Attorney General

of California on behalf of the defendants-appellees.

5846 WILHELM v. ROTMAN

OPINION

GRABER, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff Steven Hairl Wilhelm filed a pro se complaint,

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against certain prison medical

providers—Dr. Aron Rotman and Dr. Calvin Schuster. Plain-

tiff alleged that the providers’ delay in treating his hernia

amounted to deliberate indifference to his medical needs, in

violation of the Eighth Amendment. At the screening stage, a

magistrate judge dismissed the case for failure to state a

claim, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Plaintiff appeals, argu-

ing that his complaint properly stated a claim for relief. Plain-

tiff also contests the magistrate judge’s jurisdiction to dismiss

his complaint with prejudice, arguing that he did not consent

to jurisdiction by that particular magistrate judge.

We hold that (1) Plaintiff voluntarily consented to the juris-

diction of any magistrate judge, including the one who

decided his case; (2) the allegations against Dr. Schuster can-

not support a deliberate indifference claim because they

amount to a claim of negligence; and (3) the allegations

against Dr. Rotman are sufficient to warrant ordering him to

file an answer. Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse and

remand in part.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Plaintiff’s Medical History1

1

Because the district court dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint without

requiring any defendant to file an answer, the stated facts come from his

complaint and its supporting documentation. For the purpose of reviewing

a dismissal, we accept those facts as true. See generally Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “When a plaintiff has attached various exhibits

to the complaint, those exhibits may be considered in determining whether

dismissal was proper without converting the motion to one for summary

judgment.” Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th

Cir. 1995).

WILHELM v. ROTMAN 5847

Plaintiff was diagnosed with a hernia on October 7, 2005.

Over the next three years, until he saw Dr. Rotman, Plaintiff’s

doctors took no action on that diagnosis. On July 15, 2008,

Dr. Rotman confirmed the diagnosis—a double inguinal

hernia—and recommended herniorrhaphy surgery. He reiter-

ated that diagnosis and treatment plan following another

examination on September 4, 2008.

On September 5, 2008, Dr. Schuster, the prison surgeon,

examined Plaintiff. Dr. Schuster noted the three-year-old her-

nia diagnosis, and he further noted that Plaintiff exhibited a

broad bulge on both sides of his groin. Nevertheless, Dr.

Schuster diagnosed “no definite hernia.” According to Plain-

tiff, the exam was extremely short in duration—“literally, a

two second exam.” Though Plaintiff complained of pain, Dr.

Schuster provided no treatment plan beyond instructing Plain-

tiff to return if his pain persisted.

Then, on September 8, 2008, Plaintiff requested another

appointment with Dr. Rotman. He received no response. He

submitted another request and received a response, but Dr.

Rotman did not see him until November 11, 2008. At that

appointment, Plaintiff asked for a test, such as an x-ray, MRI,

CT, or ultrasound, to confirm the hernia diagnosis. Dr. Rot-

man refused, stating that those tests would not show a hernia,

and he promised to discuss the hernia at Plaintiff’s next

appointment.

On December 7, 2008, after having received no call for a

follow-up, Plaintiff requested another appointment. Again, he

received no response and sent another request. Dr. Rotman

next saw Plaintiff on December 24, 2008, and again said that

he would examine the hernia at Plaintiff’s next appointment.

At Plaintiff’s next appointment, on January 27, 2009, Dr.

Rotman finally reexamined Plaintiff and confirmed the hernia

diagnosis, once again recommending surgery. According to

Plaintiff, Dr. Rotman also promised to put him on a list to see

5848 WILHELM v. ROTMAN

a surgeon at Bakersfield Hospital. At another appointment on

February 4, 2009, Dr. Rotman reiterated his diagnosis and

treatment plan. At a March 26, 2009 appointment, Dr. Rot-

man responded to Plaintiff’s inquiries by advising him to be

patient.

On June 25, 2009, Plaintiff filed an appeal with the Health

Care Appeals Office of his facility. On July 23, 2009, Plaintiff

also sent a letter to a public interest law firm. His appeal was

accepted, leading to another visit with Dr. Rotman on August

3, 2009, and another referral to surgery. This time, Plaintiff

saw a surgeon on August 19, 2009, and was scheduled for

surgery. Plaintiff’s brief states that he has since received the

surgery.

As a result of his administrative health care appeal and his

inquiries to the public interest law firm, Plaintiff discovered

that (1) Dr. Rotman’s January 27, 2009 referral to surgery had

been denied for inadequate documentation, and (2) Dr. Rot-

man had sent a second referral, on March 26, 2009, but he

later cancelled it by reporting that Plaintiff’s condition had

resolved.

B. District Court Proceedings

Plaintiff filed a § 1983 action at the end of 2009. The court

randomly assigned the case to Magistrate Judge Gary S. Aus-

tin, and Plaintiff received a form titled “ORDER RE CON-

SENT OR REQUEST FOR REASSIGNMENT.” That form

stated:

This case was randomly assigned to Magistrate

Judge Gary S. Austin. Without the written consent of

the parties presently appearing pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

Sec. 636(c), a magistrate judge cannot conduct all

proceedings and enter judgment in this case with

direct review by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,

in the event an appeal is filed. If a party declines to

WILHELM v. ROTMAN 5849

consent and the case is assigned to a district judge,

the assigned magistrate judge shall continue to per-

form all duties as required by Eastern District Local

Rule 302.

Accordingly, within 30 days, the parties shall

complete and return this form to the court.

The bottom of the form contained two boxes, along with

instructions to check and sign in only one of the boxes. The

first box was titled “CONSENT TO JURISDICTION OF

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.” That box con-

tained text reading:

The undersigned hereby voluntarily consents to

have a United States Magistrate Judge conduct all

further proceedings in this case.

The second box was titled, “DECLINE OF JURISDIC-

TION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE AND

REQUEST FOR REASSIGNMENT TO UNITED STATES

DISTRICT JUDGE.” That box contained text reading:

The undersigned declines to consent to the United

States Magistrate Judge assigned to this case and

requests random assignment to a United States Dis-

trict Judge.

Plaintiff returned the form to the court after completing the

first box—the one granting consent. Later, the Chief Judge for

the Eastern District of California issued an order reassigning

the case to visiting Magistrate Judge Gerald B. Cohn for all

further proceedings.

Magistrate Judge Cohn screened the complaint under 28

U.S.C. § 1915A2 and dismissed it for failure to state a claim,

2

That statute provides, in relevant part:

(a) Screening.—The court shall review, before docketing, if

5850 WILHELM v. ROTMAN

with leave to amend. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint.

Magistrate Judge Cohn screened the amended complaint and

again dismissed for failure to state a claim, this time without

leave to amend. Plaintiff timely appeals.3

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“We review de novo whether a magistrate judge has juris-

diction.” Anderson v. WoodCreek Venture Ltd., 351 F.3d 911,

915 (9th Cir. 2003). We also “review de novo a district

court’s dismissal of a prisoner complaint under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted.” Hamilton v. Brown, 630 F.3d 889, 892 (9th Cir.

2011).

feasible or, in any event, as soon as practicable after docketing,

a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress

from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a govern-

mental entity.

(b) Grounds for dismissal.—On review, the court shall iden-

tify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of

the complaint, if the complaint—

(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted; or

(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune

from such relief.

3

Because the complaint was dismissed at the screening stage, Defen-

dants were not served and made no appearance. Accordingly, no Defen-

dants appear in this appeal, and no answering brief was filed. But this

court granted Plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel and directed

the California Attorney General to appear and participate in the case. The

California Attorney General complied with that order by filing an amicus

curiae brief, limited to the jurisdictional issue.

WILHELM v. ROTMAN 5851

DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction

[1] “The Federal Magistrate Act provides that ‘[u]pon the

consent of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate

judge . . . may conduct any or all proceedings in a jury or non-

jury civil matter and order the entry of judgment in the case,

when specially designated to exercise such jurisdiction by the

district court.’ ” Roell v. Withrow, 538 U.S. 580, 585 (2003)

(alterations in original) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1)). “So

far as it concerns full-time magistrate judges, . . .

§ 636(c)(1)[ ] speaks only of ‘the consent of the parties,’ with-

out qualification as to form, and § 636(c)(3) similarly pro-

vides that ‘[t]he consent of the parties allows’ a full-time

magistrate judge to enter a final, appealable judgment of the

district court.” Id. at 587 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)

(second alteration in original). Although § 636(c)(2) and Fed-

eral Rule of Civil Procedure 73(b) provide “specific referral

procedures” for magistrate judges, “a defect in the referral to

a full-time magistrate judge under § 636(c)(2) does not elimi-

nate that magistrate judge’s ‘civil jurisdiction’ under

§ 636(c)(1) so long as the parties have in fact voluntarily con-

sented.” Id.

[2] Consent, then, is the “the touchstone of magistrate

judge jurisdiction.” Anderson, 351 F.3d at 914. We are satis-

fied that Plaintiff voluntarily consented to the exercise of

jurisdiction by Magistrate Judge Cohn. Plaintiff unambigu-

ously consented to the jurisdiction of “a United States Magis-

trate Judge” by selecting the “consent” box on the court-

provided form. (Emphasis added.) That same form provided

an alternative to decline jurisdiction of the particular magis-

trate judge named on that form (Magistrate Judge Austin).

The difference in wording between the “consent” option—

covering “a” magistrate judge generally—and the “decline”

option—which specifies the randomly assigned judge—

supports reading the completed form as expressing consent to

5852 WILHELM v. ROTMAN

jurisdiction by any magistrate judge (as opposed to an Article

III judge).4 Plaintiff asserts that his consent was limited to the

particular judge named in the form’s introduction (but not

referred to in the text associated with the “consent” option).

That reading is incorrect because it ignores the distinction

between the two options and because the listing of Magistrate

Judge Austin was merely informational; indeed, § 636(c)(2),

which provides the procedure for obtaining consent, does not

require that the form list the name of the judge. The extra

information does not render the consent ambiguous.

Plaintiff can identify only one real defect in the consent

form—that the form came from the magistrate judge himself

rather than from the clerk, as required by § 636(c)(2) and Fed-

eral Rule of Civil Procedure 73(b)(1).5 Under Roell, such a

procedural defect, especially one so minor, does not eliminate

jurisdiction if voluntary consent is present.

4

The written consent in this case contrasts with the written consent in

cases in which courts have limited consent to a particular magistrate judge.

See Kalan v. City of St. Francis, 274 F.3d 1150, 1151-52 (7th Cir. 2001)

(per curiam) (involving written consent that “specified [a particular magis-

trate judge] by name (as opposed to stating that the parties consented to

proceed before ‘a’ magistrate judge)”); Mendes Jr. Int’l Co. v. M/V Sokai

Maru, 978 F.2d 920, 921 (5th Cir. 1992) (involving document granting

“ ‘consent to have [a named magistrate judge] conduct any and all further

proceedings in the case, including . . . order the entry of judgment’ ”

(ellipsis in original)).

5

Plaintiff also argues that the form was defective for failing to advise

him that he was “free to withhold consent without adverse substantive

consequences.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(2); Fed. R. Civ. P. 73(b)(2). But that

requirement does not apply to the first communication asking a party to

state a preference regarding magistrate judge jurisdiction; it applies only

to repeated communications regarding consent. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(2)

(“Thereafter, either the district court judge or the magistrate judge may

again advise the parties of the availability of the magistrate judge, but in

so doing, shall also advise the parties that they are free to withhold consent

without adverse substantive consequences.” (emphasis added)); Fed. R.

Civ. P. 73(b)(2) (titled, “Reminding the Parties About Consenting”).

WILHELM v. ROTMAN 5853

[3] Even if Plaintiff’s consent were not clear from the con-

sent form itself, in the alternative he impliedly consented to

the jurisdiction of Magistrate Judge Cohn. As Roell held, a

court may infer consent where “the litigant or counsel was

made aware of the need for consent and the right to refuse it,

and still voluntarily appeared to try the case before the Magis-

trate Judge.” 538 U.S. at 590. Here, the initial form advised

Plaintiff of the need for consent and his right to refuse it. At

a minimum, he agreed to have Magistrate Judge Austin hear

his case. But then he presented his case to Magistrate Judge

Cohn without objection, voluntarily amending his complaint

after seeking an extension of time to do so. Those facts are

sufficient to meet the Roell standard for implied consent.6 To

the extent that we have previously held that we can never

infer consent, we have been overruled by the Supreme Court

in Roell. See, e.g., Nasca v. Peoplesoft (In re Nasca), 160

F.3d 578, 579 (9th Cir. 1999) (“’We will not permit our juris-

diction to depend on inferences when both the statute and

common sense call for precision.’ ” (quoting Alaniz v. Cal.

Processors, Inc., 690 F.2d 717, 720 (9th Cir. 1982) (per

curiam))); see also Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 900 (9th

Cir. 2003) (en banc) (explaining that a three-judge panel may

recognize that a precedent of this court has been “effectively

overruled” by a later Supreme Court case).

6

The facts of this case differ from the facts in cases where courts have

declined to infer consent under Roell. See Anderson, 351 F.3d at 915;

Phillips v. Beierwaltes, 466 F.3d 1217, 1221 (10th Cir. 2006). In Ander-

son, the only notice relating to consent failed to alert the parties of the

need to consent, of their right to decline, or of their right to a district

judge. See 351 F.3d at 912, 916. Furthermore, the parties’ appearances in

Anderson are distinguishable from Plaintiff’s actions here. In Anderson,

the objecting parties appeared before a magistrate judge but repeatedly and

“unequivocally refused to submit [their motions] to the magistrate judge’s

jurisdiction.” Id. at 916; see id. at 913. As noted, Plaintiff failed to object

at any time. Similarly, in Phillips, the Tenth Circuit refused to infer con-

sent under Roell because there was “no notification . . . of the need to con-

sent or the right to refuse consent.” 466 F.3d at 1221.

5854 WILHELM v. ROTMAN

In substantially similar circumstances, the Seventh Circuit

reached the same conclusion. See Stevo v. Frasor, 662 F.3d

880, 882 (7th Cir. 2011) (involving reassignment from a first

magistrate judge to a second). The Seventh Circuit requires

consent to § 636(c) jurisdiction to be “on the record, clear,

and unambiguous.” Id. at 883. Under that rule, the Seventh

Circuit found such consent with respect to a second magis-

trate judge by relying, in part, on the objecting party’s having

“expressly consented in writing” to a first magistrate judge.

Id. at 884. The court saw some ambiguity as to whether the

consent applied to “ ‘a’ magistrate judge generally [or] ‘the’

magistrate judge specifically,” but found that ambiguity insig-

nificant because the objecting party had “impliedly consented

to the reassignment to [the second magistrate judge] by pro-

ceeding . . . through discovery and summary judgment with-

out objection.” Id. (citing Roell, 538 U.S. at 590-91).7

In the wake of Roell, the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits also

have revised their previously strict consent rules. See Holt-

Orsted v. City of Dickson, 641 F.3d 230, 233-35 & n.3 (6th

Cir. 2011) (recognizing that circuit’s rule requiring a “clear

and unambiguous statement in the record indicating that the

parties consented to the exercise of plenary jurisdiction by the

Magistrate,” but finding implied consent under Roell (internal

quotation marks omitted)); Chambless v. La.-Pac. Corp., 481

F.3d 1345, 1350 (11th Cir. 2007) (“Although we have

required that consent to a magistrate judge’s jurisdiction be

express and on the record, the Supreme Court held in [Roell]

that consent to a magistrate judge’s jurisdiction can be

inferred from a party’s conduct during litigation.” (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted)).

7

The Seventh Circuit also noted that the original consent form contained

the following notice: “Should this case be reassigned to a magistrate judge

other than the magistrate judge designated . . . , the undersigned may

object within 30 days of such reassignment.” Stevo, 662 F.3d at 885 (inter-

nal quotation marks omitted). We do not read the result in Stevo to depend

on that kind of notice, which was not given here.

WILHELM v. ROTMAN 5855

The Fifth Circuit had a long-standing pre-Roell rule that

“ ‘[c]onsent to trial by a magistrate under section 636(c) can-

not be implied.’ ” Mendes Jr. Int’l Co. v. M/V Sokai Maru,

978 F.2d 920, 924 (5th Cir. 1992) (quoting EEOC v. W. La.

Health Servs., Inc., 959 F.2d 1277, 1281 (5th Cir. 1992)); see

also Trufant v. Autocon, Inc., 729 F.2d 308, 309 (5th Cir.

1984) (per curiam) (“We have held before that such consent

must be explicit, and will not be casually inferred from the

conduct of the parties.” (citing Glover v. Ala. Bd. of Corr.,

660 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1981))). Although the Fifth Circuit has

not squarely addressed Roell’s effect on its implied consent

rule in a published opinion, we do not think that its pre-Roell

rule survives because Roell itself reversed a Fifth Circuit case

in which that court had “reaffirmed its prior holding that

‘§ 636(c) consent must be express; it cannot be implied by the

parties’ conduct.’ ” 538 U.S. at 585 (quoting Withrow v.

Roell, 288 F.3d 199, 201 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing W. La. Health

Servs., 959 F.2d at 1281; Trufant, 729 F.2d at 309)). The Fifth

Circuit seems to have recognized as much in unpublished

decisions. See, e.g., Marquez v. Woody, 440 F. App’x 318,

321 n.4 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (although “Woody did

not explicitly consent to proceed before a magistrate judge,”

“the Supreme Court has held that ‘consent can be inferred’ ”

and, “[i]n this case, Woody’s conduct indicates that she con-

sented to proceed before a magistrate judge” (quoting Roell,

538 U.S. at 582)); Bejaran v. Cruz, 79 F. App’x 73, 73 (5th

Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (“Although the record does not con-

tain written consent by the defendants to proceed before the

magistrate judge as required by 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), we may

infer their consent from the record as a whole.” (citing Roell,

538 U.S. at 586-91)).

[4] Accordingly, we hold that Plaintiff consented to have

Magistrate Judge Cohn decide his case.

B. Dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint

Failure to state a claim under § 1915A incorporates the

familiar standard applied in the context of failure to state a

5856 WILHELM v. ROTMAN

claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See

Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing

Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 623 (9th Cir. 1998), which

involved Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal); see also Weiss v. Cooley,

230 F.3d 1027, 1029 (7th Cir. 2000) (“This standard, derived

from Rule 12(b)(6), also applies to the dismissal of claims

under § 1915A.”). The Rule 12(b)(6) standard requires a com-

plaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,

to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

Plaintiff filed his complaint pro se. “We construe pro se

complaints liberally and may only dismiss a pro se complaint

for failure to state a claim if it appears beyond doubt that the

plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim

which would entitle him to relief.” Silva v. Di Vittorio, 658

F.3d 1090, 1101 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks

omitted). Iqbal did not alter the rule that, “where the peti-

tioner is pro se, particularly in civil rights cases, [courts

should] construe the pleadings liberally and . . . afford the

petitioner the benefit of any doubt.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d

338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).

[5] Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim alleges a violation of the

Eighth Amendment arising from allegedly deficient medical

treatment, on a theory of deliberate indifference to serious

medical needs. Our test for deliberate indifference to medical

need is two-pronged:

First, the plaintiff must show a serious medical need

by demonstrating that failure to treat a prisoner’s

condition could result in further significant injury or

the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Sec-

ond, the plaintiff must show the defendant’s

response to the need was deliberately indifferent.

Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted).

WILHELM v. ROTMAN 5857

[6] Plaintiff’s hernia was a serious medical need. See Jones

v. Johnson, 781 F.2d 769, 771 (9th Cir. 1986) (“[The plain-

tiff’s] complaint . . . states a serious medical need. He alleges

suffering and pain from his herniated condition and the inabil-

ity to perform his work at the prison.”); see also McGuckin v.

Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 1992) (“The exis-

tence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would

find important and worthy of comment or treatment; the pres-

ence of a medical condition that significantly affects an indi-

vidual’s daily activities; or the existence of chronic and

substantial pain are examples of indications that a prisoner

has a ‘serious’ need for medical treatment.”), overruled on

other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133

(9th Cir. 1997) (en banc).

[7] The second prong requires showing:

(a) a purposeful act or failure to respond to a prison-

er’s pain or possible medical need and (b) harm

caused by the indifference.

Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. More generally, deliberate indifference

“may appear when prison officials deny, delay or intention-

ally interfere with medical treatment, or it may be shown by

the way in which prison physicians provide medical care.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted). Under Jett, “[a] prisoner

need not show his harm was substantial.” Id.; see also

McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060 (“[A] finding that the defen-

dant’s activities resulted in ‘substantial’ harm to the prisoner

is not necessary.”).

[8] The deliberate indifference doctrine is limited in scope.

“[A]n inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care”

does not, by itself, state a deliberate indifference claim for

§ 1983 purposes. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060 (internal quota-

tion marks omitted); see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,

106 (1976) (“[A] complaint that a physician has been negli-

gent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not

5858 WILHELM v. ROTMAN

state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth

Amendment. Medical malpractice does not become a consti-

tutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.”

(emphasis added)). Thus, “a plaintiff’s showing of nothing

more than a difference of medical opinion as to the need to

pursue one course of treatment over another [is] insufficient,

as a matter of law, to establish deliberate indifference.” Jack-

son v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

In Jett, we applied our definition of deliberate indifference

to reverse a summary judgment rejecting a § 1983 claim.

There, the prison doctor recognized the plaintiff’s need to see

a specialist (in that case, an orthopedist), as evidenced by the

prison doctor’s own referral, but the plaintiff was not taken to

see the specialist for at least six months. Jett, 439 F.3d at

1097-98. We concluded that a trier of fact could find that the

doctor was aware of the plaintiff’s need for treatment and that

the doctor’s “failure to see [the plaintiff] to ensure [adminis-

tration of the prescribed treatment] was deliberate indiffer-

ence to a serious medical condition.” Id. at 1097.8

[9] Plaintiff’s complaint alleges facts that are materially

similar to those in Jett, at least as to Dr. Rotman. Dr. Rotman

repeatedly diagnosed Plaintiff as suffering from a hernia, and

he repeatedly concluded that referral to surgery was neces-

8

McGuckin similarly suggests that unnecessary delay in administration

of prescribed treatment can amount to deliberate indifference. There, we

observed that a delay in treating the plaintiff’s condition forced him “to

endure over seven months of unnecessary pain” and no explanation was

available for a failure to provide the plaintiff with a “CT scan and surgery

. . . promptly after his need for those services was unambiguously diag-

nosed.” McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1062. We affirmed summary judgment in

favor of the defendants who had prescribed and knew of the need for those

services, but only because the plaintiff had failed to show that those defen-

dants had caused the delay. Id. at 1062-63. Here, by contrast, Plaintiff

alleges that Dr. Rotman caused the delay, and Plaintiff’s supporting docu-

mentation establishes the plausibility of that allegation.

WILHELM v. ROTMAN 5859

sary. But Plaintiff failed to receive the prescribed treatment

for more than a year, and Plaintiff’s complaint and exhibits,

taken as true, demonstrate that the delay was attributable to

Dr. Rotman’s failure to request the referral properly and,

more troublingly, his inexplicable cancellation of a second

referral request. Those actions and omissions do not represent

a mere failure to diagnose or prescribe treatment, and they are

not explained by a difference of medical opinion. Dr. Rotman

exercised his own medical judgment in diagnosing a hernia

and prescribing surgery. Plaintiff’s complaint does not allege

any failure in those actions; rather, it alleges a deliberate

indifference in implementing the prescribed treatment.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s allegations against Dr. Rotman are

sufficient to meet the low threshold for proceeding past the

screening stage.

[10] By contrast, the allegations against Dr. Schuster are

directed at a misdiagnosis. Plaintiff alleges that he had a her-

nia and that Dr. Schuster should have operated on it. But Dr.

Schuster decided not to operate because he thought that Plain-

tiff was not suffering from a hernia. Thus, Dr. Schuster’s

alleged failure was negligent misdiagnosis, or a disagreement

with Dr. Rotman. Therefore, the allegations are insufficient to

establish deliberate indifference by Dr. Schuster.

[11] In summary, we reverse the dismissal as to Dr. Rot-

man and affirm the dismissal as to Dr. Schuster. On remand,

the district court shall order service of the complaint on Dr.

Rotman.

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED and REMANDED in

part.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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