Reilly v. Vadlamudi

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206

File Name: 12a0153p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

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JOSHUA REILLY,

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Plaintiff-Appellee,

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No. 11-1252

v.

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Defendants-Appellants, -

SEETHA VADLAMUDI and PHILLIP PAYNE,

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TERRY D. SMITH and CORRECTIONAL

Defendants. -

MEDICAL SERVICES,

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit.

No. 2:09-cv-13832—Stephen J. Murphy III, District Judge.

Argued: April 12, 2012

Decided and Filed: May 25, 2012

Before: DAUGHTREY and ROGERS, Circuit Judges; ZOUHARY, District Judge.*

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COUNSEL

ARGUED: Clifton Schneider, OFFICE OF THE MICHIGAN ATTORNEY

GENERAL, Lansing, Michigan, for Appellants. Derek J. Brackon, McKEEN &

ASSOCIATES, P.C., Detroit, Michigan, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Clifton Schneider,

OFFICE OF THE MICHIGAN ATTORNEY GENERAL, Lansing, Michigan, for

Appellants. Derek J. Brackon, McKEEN & ASSOCIATES, P.C., Detroit, Michigan, for

Appellee.

*The Honorable Jack Zouhary, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Ohio,

sitting by designation.

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OPINION

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ZOUHARY, District Judge. This is a prisoner civil rights action brought by

Plaintiff-Appellee Joshua Reilly against the doctor and nurses who treated him in prison.

Plaintiff began experiencing severe headaches and swelling in his left eye in 2007 while

incarcerated at the Mound Correctional Facility in Detroit, Michigan. In 2008, shortly

after his release, Plaintiff was diagnosed with Ewing’s Sarcoma, a serious form of bone

cancer. According to Plaintiff, surgery would have been sufficient to treat the disease

had prison staff detected it earlier. However, due to the late diagnosis, chemotherapy

and radiation is now necessary. This action claims Eighth Amendment violations under

42 U.S.C. § 1983 as well as medical malpractice under Michigan law.

Defendants, Dr. Seetha Vadlamudi and nurses Phillip Payne and Terry Smith,

moved for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Civil Rule 12(c), asserting that they

are immune from liability. Following a hearing, the district court denied the motion,

holding Plaintiff pled “sufficient facts upon which one could draw the inference that

[Defendants] violated the Eighth Amendment and committed medical malpractice.” Dr.

Vadlamudi and nurse Payne filed this interlocutory appeal, arguing their involvement

with Plaintiff was minimal and cannot form the basis for a finding of deliberate

indifference or gross negligence. Nurse Smith, who evaluated Plaintiff after eleven

months of eye pain, severe headaches, and vomiting, did not join the appeal.

For reasons set forth below, we REVERSE and order the entry of judgment in

favor of Dr. Vadlamudi and Payne.

MEDICAL HISTORY

Michigan prisoners are able to receive medical attention in prison by filing a

“kite” request with the prison warden, who then refers the prisoner to a physician or

nurse provided to the prison system by Correctional Medical Services, a Missouri

No. 11-1252 Reilly v. Vadlamudi, et al. Page 3

corporation. Plaintiff’s medical history is laid out in some detail in the Complaint, as

follows.

Plaintiff first requested medical assistance on February 13, 2007, reporting a

headache and swelling over his left eye. He was referred to Dr. Vadlamudi, who

recommended applying a warm compress to the eye. Three days later, Plaintiff was

treated (records do not disclose by whom) for a headache and was told to take Tylenol

and drink coffee. The Complaint does not indicate whether these remedies were

effective in treating Plaintiff’s pain in the short term.

On June 6, Plaintiff submitted another request, this time reporting a bump over

his left eye. Payne examined Plaintiff, concluded the bump was an innocuous calcium

nodule, and recommended no treatment. Plaintiff returned on July 8, but there is no

indication who treated Plaintiff or what happened during this visit. Payne saw Plaintiff

a second time on October 7, and referred him to an optometrist who prescribed eye drops

and glasses. Finally, on December 27, Smith treated Plaintiff who relayed an eleven-

month history of left eye problems. Smith noted a small nodule under Plaintiff’s left

brow, recommended he take Tylenol, and told him to report back if he experienced

continued vomiting.

Soon after his consultation with Smith, Plaintiff was released from prison. He

visited the Kellogg Eye Center at the University of Michigan for evaluation of the

nodule above his eye and his headaches. A CT scan performed in April 2008 revealed

the nodule was cancerous, and doctors ultimately diagnosed Plaintiff with Ewing’s

Sarcoma, a rare form of cancer that develops in bone or soft tissue.

The Complaint indicates Dr. Vadlamudi treated Plaintiff only once, and Plaintiff

presented with no pre-existing condition. Further, Payne treated Plaintiff twice and

referred him to an optometrist for further evaluation. These Defendants argue on appeal

that their involvement with Plaintiff was minimal and cannot form the basis for a finding

of deliberate indifference or gross negligence.

No. 11-1252 Reilly v. Vadlamudi, et al. Page 4

ANALYSIS

Standard of Review

This Court reviews a district court’s denial of qualified immunity de novo.

Gregory v. City of Louisville, 444 F.3d 725, 742 (6th Cir. 2006). The applicability of

governmental immunity under Michigan law is also reviewed de novo. Herman v. City

of Detroit, 680 N.W.2d 71, 74 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004). This interlocutory appeal is

properly before this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 because the denial of qualified

immunity constitutes a “final decision” of a district court when, as here, it turns on pure

issues of law. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985); see also Rich v. City of

Mayfield Heights, 955 F.2d 1092, 1094 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding denials “on the basis of

qualified immunity are immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine”).

A district court’s denial of a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Federal

Civil Rule 12(c) is “analyzed under the same de novo standard as motions to dismiss

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).” Sensations, Inc. v. City of Grand Rapids, 526 F.3d 291, 295

(6th Cir. 2008). In scrutinizing a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), this Court is required

to “accept all well-pleaded factual allegations of the complaint as true and construe the

complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Dubay v. Wells, 506 F.3d 422,

426 (6th Cir. 2007). Although a complaint need not contain “detailed factual

allegations,” it does require more than “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 555 (2007). Thus, a complaint survives a motion to dismiss if it “contain[s]

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). And, “[a] claim

has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Hensley Mfg. v. ProPride, Inc., 579 F.3d 603, 609 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 129

S. Ct. at 1949).

No. 11-1252 Reilly v. Vadlamudi, et al. Page 5

Section 1983 and Qualified Immunity

Plaintiff argues Defendants are liable because their medical treatment—or failure

to treat—amounted to “deliberate indifference” in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

This claim arises under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which creates a civil cause of action against

individuals who, while acting under color of state law, deprive a person of the “rights,

privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws” of the United States. See

Bennett v. City of Eastpointe, 410 F.3d 810, 817 (6th Cir. 2005); Gregory, 444 F.3d at

738. Section 1983 claims, however, are subject to the affirmative defense of qualified

immunity which, if applicable, shields individuals not just against liability, but against

the suit itself. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). The burden rests on

Plaintiff to show Defendants are not entitled to immunity. Untalan v. City of Lorain,

430 F.3d 312, 314 (6th Cir. 2005).

Qualified immunity protects state officials, including prison employees, so long

as “their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of

which a reasonable person would have known.” Cochran v. Gilliam, 656 F.3d 300, 306

(6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). In resolving

qualified immunity claims, we ask whether: (1) the facts, viewed in the light most

favorable to Plaintiff, show a violation of a constitutional right; and (2) the right at issue

was “clearly established” at the time of the alleged misconduct. Id. (citing Saucier v.

Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)). While this Court can consider these prongs in either

order, Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236, we do not need to reach the “clearly established” prong

in this case because, as discussed below, there are no allegations of a constitutional

violation.

Eighth Amendment Liability

Plaintiff’s constitutional claims under Section 1983 are based on alleged

violations of the Eighth Amendment, which “forbids prison officials from ‘unnecessarily

and wantonly inflicting pain’ on an inmate by acting with ‘deliberate indifference’

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toward [his] serious medical needs.” Blackmore v. Kalamazoo County, 390 F.3d 890,

895 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)).1

The Eighth Amendment embodies “broad and idealistic concepts of dignity,

civilized standards, humanity, and decency” against which courts must evaluate penal

measures. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102. “These elementary principles establish the

government’s obligation to provide medical care for those whom it is punishing by

incarceration.” Id. at 103. In Wilson v. Seiter, the Supreme Court set forth a two-step

framework for determining whether certain conditions of confinement constitute “cruel

and unusual punishment” prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. 501 U.S. 294, 298

(1991). That framework consists of an objective and a subjective component.

Blackmore, 390 F.3d at 895.

First, Plaintiff must plead facts which, if true, establish the existence of a

“sufficiently serious” medical need. Id. Seriousness is measured objectively, in

response to “contemporary standards of decency.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8

(1992) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103). Essentially, a prisoner “must show that he is

incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.” Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).

Second, Plaintiff must establish the subjective element: he must demonstrate

Defendants acted with “a sufficiently culpable state of mind in denying medical care.”

Blackmore, 390 F.3d at 895. Only “deliberate indifference” to serious medical needs

will implicate the protections of the Eighth Amendment. Deliberate indifference is

characterized by obduracy or wantonness—it cannot be predicated on negligence,

inadvertence, or good faith error. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). For

liability to attach, Defendants must have been “aware of facts from which the inference

could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exist[ed].” Farmer, 511 U.S. at

837. Indeed, “[k]nowledge of the asserted serious needs or of circumstances clearly

1

The Complaint does not allege a specific constitutional violation; it merely states “the gross

negligence and breaches of care . . . resulted in a violation of [Plaintiff’s] constitutional rights set forth by

42 USC 1983.” As the district court recognized, if Plaintiff has a Section 1983 claim, it necessarily falls

under the “deliberate indifference” strain of the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.

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indicating the existence of such needs, is essential to a finding of deliberate

indifference.” Blackmore, 390 F.3d at 896.

In the medical context, the Supreme Court emphasized that “an inadvertent

failure to provide adequate medical care cannot be said to constitute ‘an unnecessary and

wanton infliction of pain’ or to be ‘repugnant to the conscience of mankind.’” Estelle,

429 U.S. at 105–06. Therefore, “a complaint that a physician has been negligent in

diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical

mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment.” Id. To state a cognizable claim, Plaintiff

“must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference

to serious medical needs”—indifference that offends the “evolving standards of

decency” under the Eighth Amendment. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106.

The Complaint Does Not Support a Constitutional Violation

In the proceedings below, the parties agreed that Plaintiff’s condition meets the

objective component of his claim. We also agree. There is no doubt that a rare and

potentially fatal form of cancer meets the objective criteria of an Eighth Amendment

claim. See, e.g., Jones v. Muskegon County, 625 F.3d 935, 942 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding

colorectal cancer is a “sufficiently serious medical need”). The remaining issue becomes

whether the Complaint supports Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants Dr. Vadlamudi and

Payne acted with deliberate indifference to his medical needs.

Because it is well-settled that qualified immunity must be assessed in the context

of each individual’s specific conduct, this Court analyzes separately the allegations

concerning the conduct of each Defendant. See Heyne v. Metro. Nashville Pub. Sch.,

655 F.3d 556, 564 (6th Cir. 2011); see also Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948 (“[A] plaintiff must

plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual

actions, has violated the Constitution.”) (emphasis added).

No. 11-1252 Reilly v. Vadlamudi, et al. Page 8

Dr. Vadlamudi

Plaintiff paid a single visit to Dr. Vadlamudi in February 2007. During that visit,

Dr. Vadlamudi examined Plaintiff for a headache and left-eye swelling. Plaintiff

reported no history of headaches or swelling, nor any other continuous symptoms.

Based on these minimal symptoms, Dr. Vadlamudi administered warm compresses to

the left eye. Plaintiff alleges no further contact with the doctor.

In denying Defendants’ motion, the district court relied on McElligott v. Foley,

182 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 1999). But the facts of that case are not analogous. Defendants

in McElligott—also a doctor and nurse—were both aware of the prisoner’s ongoing

complaints of abdominal pain for a period of five months. The doctor’s treatment notes

reflected “he was aware that [plaintiff] was suffering from serious abdominal pain.” Id.

at 1256. Defendants were “aware that plaintiff’s condition was, in fact, deteriorating,

and still did nothing to treat this deteriorating state.” Id. at 1259. The medication “was

not treating the severe pain [plaintiff] was experiencing,” yet defendants “did nothing

to treat [him].” Id. at 1257. The court held “[a] jury could infer deliberate indifference

from the fact that [defendants] knew the extent of [plaintiff’s] pain, knew that the course

of treatment was largely ineffective, and declined to do anything more to attempt to

improve [his] condition.” Id. at 1257–58 (citation omitted).

Here, there are no allegations that Dr. Vadlamudi knew of a serious condition,

or of circumstances clearly indicating such condition, which “is essential to a finding of

deliberate indifference.” Blackmore, 390 F.3d at 896. Indeed, the linchpin in McElligott

was defendants’ awareness coupled with their disregard of the prisoner’s deteriorating

and serious condition. Even so, McElligott recognized defendants could not be held

liable for failing to diagnose what turned out to be a serious case of colon cancer. 182

F.3d at 1256. That failure could only be deemed “extremely negligent,” not deliberate

indifference. Id.

Here, Dr. Vadlamudi had a lone contact with Plaintiff, with no history of any

symptoms suggesting cancer. The Complaint alleges Dr. Vadlamudi failed to: “[o]btain

and appreciate an appropriate [medical] history;” “obtain appropriate diagnostic

No. 11-1252 Reilly v. Vadlamudi, et al. Page 9

studies;” “include malignant tumor in the [] diagnosis;” “promptly refer [Plaintiff] to or

consult with [a] . . . specialist;” “provide timely . . . medical care;” and ensure Plaintiff

“is evaluated by a physician.” These allegations may support a claim for professional

negligence, but under established law, deliberate indifference “entails something more

than mere negligence.” Blackmore, 390 F.3d at 895 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835);

see also Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105–06. Absent allegations that Dr. Vadlamudi was “aware

of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm

exist[ed],” and that he actually “[drew] the inference,” Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment

claim cannot survive. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.

This conclusion is supported by Sanderfer v. Nichols, a case that, while resolved

on summary judgment, is strikingly similar to this case. 62 F.3d 151, 154 (6th Cir.

1995). Much like Plaintiff here, the plaintiff in Sanderfer alleged the defendant failed

to: review his medical history; discover a serious medical need; recognize he should

have been referred to a specialist; restrict his activities to those appropriate for one with

his condition; and prescribe appropriate medication. Id. at 154. Plaintiff suffered a heart

attack and died in jail. Id. at 153. In reversing the district court’s denial of qualified

immunity, we held the defendant “obviously was not aware that [plaintiff] was at a

substantial risk of heart failure” and “could not be ‘deliberately indifferent’ to this risk

when she made her diagnosis.” Id. at 155. Because the record did not show defendant

was aware “of facts from which she could and did draw the inference that her conduct

posed a substantial risk of serious harm,” qualified immunity was appropriate. Id.

To be sure, in hindsight, looking at Plaintiff’s subsequent medical history,

additional treatment may have been appropriate in this case. However, when Dr.

Vadlamudi treated Plaintiff, there was no indication he was suffering from a rare form

of bone cancer—only minor symptoms. Simply put, the Complaint, construed in a light

most favorable to Plaintiff, does not contain sufficient facts to support the claim that Dr.

Vadlamudi unnecessarily and wantonly inflicted pain by acting with deliberate

indifference toward his serious medical needs.

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Nurse Payne

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim against Payne fails for the same reasons

explained above. Payne examined Plaintiff twice: once in June 2007, and then again in

October 2007. During Plaintiff’s first visit, Payne “noted a small raised area over the

left eye,” which he described “as a soft nodule, appearing to be a calcium deposit.” This

diagnosis warranted no treatment. There are no allegations from which it can be inferred

Payne was, or should have been, aware of a serious medical condition. Plaintiff had not

visited Payne before, did not tell Payne about prolonged or continuous symptoms, and

never previously complained “of a bump over the left eye”—only of headaches and eye

swelling.

Approximately four months later, Plaintiff, complaining of “left eye ball pain,”

made a second visit to Payne. Plaintiff claims Payne took “no steps” during this visit to

ensure Plaintiff was evaluated by a capable professional who could determine a course

of treatment for his condition. But that claim is contradicted by the Complaint. Payne

made a referral to an optometrist—a specialist—to assess the complaint of eyeball pain.

While Payne’s referral to an optometrist, instead of some other specialist, could be

characterized as negligent, it does not satisfy the standard of deliberate indifference. As

Plaintiff conceded during oral argument, optometrists are health care professionals

capable of identifying health problems of the eye. Therefore, even if the optometrist was

himself incapable of treating Plaintiff’s ultimate condition, Payne’s good-faith referral

does not amount to deliberate indifference. Indeed, none of the allegations against Payne

demonstrate an act or omission “sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference

to serious medical needs.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106.

In denying Payne’s motion, the district court appears to have imputed knowledge

of Plaintiff’s entire set of complaints to Payne (as well as to Dr. Vadlamudi). But

Plaintiff’s most severe symptoms occurred after his contacts with these Defendants.

Further, Plaintiff must state a plausible constitutional violation against each individual

defendant—the collective acts of defendants cannot be ascribed to each individual

defendant. See Heyne, 655 F.3d at 564; Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948. While the Mound

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Correctional Facility may have been aware of Plaintiff’s entire medical history, there are

no allegations that Payne was aware. In fact, the only allegations against Payne are the

failure to “[o]btain and appreciate an appropriate [medical] history;” “[r]efrain from

diagnosing a calcium deposit;” and ensure Plaintiff “is evaluated by a physician.”2 As

was the case with Dr. Vadlamudi, such allegations might support negligence, but not an

Eighth Amendment violation. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105–06.

Immunity Under Michigan Law and the “Gross Negligence” Standard

Michigan law offers government employees immunity from tort liability under

certain circumstances. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 691.1407(2). Defendants are immune from

liability if they acted or reasonably believed they acted within the scope of their

employment, engaged in the discharge of a government function, and their “conduct

[did] not amount to gross negligence that [was] the proximate cause of the injury or

damage.” Id. Therefore, the question is whether the Complaint contains “sufficient

factual matter” allowing this Court to draw a reasonable inference that Defendants

committed gross negligence, proximately causing Plaintiff’s injuries. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.

at 1949.

While the federal standard for deliberate indifference appears to be similar to

Michigan’s standard for gross negligence, we have clarified that they are different. See

Jones, 625 F.3d at 947. Specifically, deliberate indifference is “akin to criminal

recklessness,” a very high standard of culpability that exceeds gross negligence. Id. The

Michigan Supreme Court held gross negligence is “akin to willful, wanton, or reckless

misconduct.” Dedes v. Asch, 521 N.W.2d 488, 493 (Mich. 1999). “[E]vidence of

ordinary negligence does not create a material question of fact concerning gross

negligence.” Maiden v. Rozwood, 597 N.W.2d 817, 824 (Mich. 1999). A valid claim

for gross negligence requires “proof of conduct ‘so reckless as to demonstrate a

2

In Count II of his Complaint, Plaintiff also alleges Payne “owed a duty” to “[r]efrain from

repeatedly prescribing and/or dispensing Tylenol . . . ” That allegation, however, is unsupported by the

same Complaint. Payne did not prescribe any treatment. The Tylenol was prescribed by “an unidentified

person” who examined Plaintiff three days after Dr.Vadlamudi’s examination, as well as by nurse Smith

who is not a party on appeal.

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substantial lack of concern for whether an injury results.’” Id. (citing MICH. COMP.

LAWS § 691.1407(7)(a)). For that reason:

Simply alleging that an actor could have done more is insufficient under

Michigan law, because, with the benefit of hindsight, a claim can always

be made that extra precautions could have influenced the result.

However, saying [Defendants] could have taken additional precautions

is insufficient to find ordinary negligence, much less recklessness. Even

the most exacting standard of conduct, the negligence standard, does not

require one to exhaust every conceivable precaution to be considered not

negligent. The much less demanding standard of care–gross

negligence–suggests, instead, almost a willful disregard of precautions

or measures to attend to safety and a singular disregard for substantial

risks. It is as though, if an objective observer watched the actor, he could

conclude, reasonably, that the actor simply did not care about the safety

or welfare of those in his charge.

Tarlea v. Crabtree, 687 N.W.2d 333, 339 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004).

Defendants’ Alleged Treatment Does Not Amount to Gross Negligence

It is improper to consider all the facts of this case together as a whole, holding

each Defendant potentially liable for every alleged action, irrespective of their individual

involvement. When each Defendant’s conduct is separately analyzed, the allegations of

gross negligence fail.

The Complaint makes clear that Dr. Vadlamudi examined Plaintiff ten months

before his complaints of severe “headaches that cause[d] him to vomit.” During Dr.

Vadlamudi’s single contact with Plaintiff, Plaintiff had a headache and left eye swelling

and no other symptoms. This hardly forms the basis for Dr. Vadlamudi to diagnose

cancer. These minor symptoms cannot, as a matter of law, support a claim for willful,

wanton, or reckless treatment. No objective observer could reasonably conclude Dr.

Vadlamudi “simply did not care about the safety or welfare of” Plaintiff. Tarlea, 687

N.W.2d at 339.

Similarly, there are no allegations that Payne demonstrated “a substantial lack

of concern for whether an injury result[ed]” to Plaintiff. Id. at 335. Payne examined

Plaintiff for a small raised area over his left eye that Payne believed to be a benign

No. 11-1252 Reilly v. Vadlamudi, et al. Page 13

calcium deposit. During his second visit with Payne, Plaintiff complained of eyeball

pain. Had Payne done nothing at this point, Plaintiff’s claim might be more compelling.

However, Payne did not willfully disregard Plaintiff’s safety. To the contrary, he

referred him to an optometrist. As with Dr. Vadlamudi, nothing leads to the conclusion

that Payne “simply did not care about [Plaintiff’s] safety or welfare.” Id. at 339.

In their motion to the district court, Defendants relied on Jackson v. County of

Saginaw, a Michigan Supreme Court case holding summary judgment was appropriate

on a prisoner’s claim that medical staff failed to diagnose his throat cancer. 580 N.W.2d

870 (Mich. 1998). The court below declined to rely on Jackson because it was decided

after discovery and not during the pleadings stage. That distinction, while important,

does not dictate a different outcome. The lengthy allegations in the Complaint in this

case similarly cannot support a finding of gross negligence.

CONCLUSION

The district court understandably struggled with granting Defendants immunity

at an early stage in the litigation. However, as previously emphasized, the purpose of

qualified immunity is “to ensure that insubstantial claims against government officials

are resolved at the earliest possible stage in litigation.” See Rondigo, LLC v. Twp. of

Richmond, 641 F.3d 673, 681 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231 (holding

the “driving force” behind qualified immunity is the desire to resolve insubstantial

claims against government officials “prior to discovery”)). For that reason, district

courts in some cases “will be able to establish entitlement to qualified immunity . . . even

before discovery.” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 234 (1991). This is one of those

cases.

A thorough review of the pleadings reveals that Dr. Vadlamudi and nurse Payne

may have been negligent in diagnosing or treating Plaintiff. However, neither negligent

medical care, nor the delay in providing medical care, can rise to the level of a

constitutional violation absent specific allegations of sufficiently harmful acts or

omissions reflecting deliberate indifference. Likewise, a valid claim for gross

negligence under Michigan law requires allegations of conduct “akin to willful, wanton,

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or reckless misconduct.” Here, there are no such allegations, and judgment on the

pleadings is appropriate.

Accordingly, we REVERSE the district court’s denial of immunity and remand

for entry of judgment in favor of Defendants Vadlamudi and Payne.