holding an accused must prove his counsel’s performance was deficient in order to overcome the presumption of competence
How later courts described this case
- holding an accused must prove his counsel’s performance was deficient in order to overcome the presumption of competence
- “[T]o prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellant must demonstrate both (1) that his counsel’s performance was deficient, and (2) that this deficiency resulted in prejudice.”
- placing the burden on an appellant to demonstrate both deficient performance and prejudice
- cit- ing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 ; United States v. Mazza, 67 M.J. 470, 474 (C.A.A.F. 2009)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
James M. GREEN, Technical Sergeant
U.S. Air Force, Appellant
No. 09-0523
Crim. App. No. 37074
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued January 12, 2010
Decided February 24, 2010
STUCKY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which EFFRON,
C.J., and BAKER, ERDMANN, and RYAN, JJ., joined.
Counsel
For Appellant: Captain Andrew J. Unsicker (argued); Colonel
James B. Roan and Major Shannon A. Bennett (on brief); Captain
Tiffany M. Wagner.
For Appellee: Captain Michael T. Rakowski (argued); Colonel
Douglas P. Cordova, Lieutenant Colonel Jeremy S. Weber, and
Gerald R. Bruce, Esq. (on brief).
Military Judge: Ronald A. Gregory
THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO REVISION BEFORE FINAL PUBLICATION.
United States v. Green, No. 09-0523/AF
Judge STUCKY delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted review to determine whether Appellant’s counsel
was ineffective, and whether the United States Air Force Court
of Criminal Appeals (CCA) erred in not granting Appellant’s
request for the victim’s (CM) mental health records. We hold
that Appellant has failed to demonstrate prejudice under
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Because
Appellant has not demonstrated ineffective assistance of
counsel, we need not reach the issue of whether the CCA erred in
not obtaining CM’s records.
I.
A panel of officer members sitting as a general court-
martial convicted Appellant, contrary to his pleas, of one
specification of sodomy with a child between the ages of twelve
and sixteen, three specifications of assault consummated by a
battery of a child under the age of sixteen, and two
specifications of committing indecent acts with a child under
the age of sixteen, in violation of Articles 125, 128, and 134,
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. §§ 925, 928,
934 (2006). The members sentenced Appellant to a dishonorable
discharge, confinement for four years, forfeiture of all pay and
allowances, reduction to E-1, and a reprimand. The convening
authority approved the findings and sentence, and the CCA
affirmed in an unpublished opinion. United States v. Green, No.
2
United States v. Green, No. 09-0523/AF
ACM 37074, 2009 CCA LEXIS 54, 2009 WL 367577 (A.F. Ct. Crim.
App. Feb. 10, 2009).
II.
Appellant’s convictions largely stem from his conduct
towards CM, his wife’s younger sister. When CM was thirteen
years old, she moved from her parents in order to live with
Appellant and his wife. CM testified at trial that Appellant
began sexually abusing her when she was fourteen years old, and
this abuse continued for the next nine months. According to
CM’s testimony, this sexual abuse included regular sexual
intercourse, fellatio, cunnilingus, and touching her vagina and
breasts. CM’s testimony also alleged that Appellant choked her,
threw a remote control at her head, slammed a door into her
shoulder, and hit her. CM’s close friend, LS, testified that
Appellant fondled her breast on one occasion. An Air Force
Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) agent and a forensic
expert testified that Appellant’s semen was found on the carpet
in an area where, according to CM, Appellant ejaculated
following one of their sexual encounters.
Immediately before CM moved in with Appellant, her parents
forced her to spend approximately one and a half to two months
at a lock-down facility called Lakeside Behavioral Health System
(Lakeside). Appellant and his civilian defense counsel have
submitted conflicting affidavits concerning what Appellant and
3
United States v. Green, No. 09-0523/AF
his wife had told the civilian defense counsel prior to trial
about Lakeside. Appellant’s affidavit claims that he told his
civilian defense counsel that Lakeside was a psychiatric
facility. The civilian defense counsel’s affidavit states that
Appellant and his wife never told her that Lakeside is a
psychiatric facility. The CCA did not resolve the conflicting
affidavits, instead finding that Appellant could not demonstrate
prejudice from any deficiency in his counsel’s performance
regardless of whether the performance was actually deficient.
Green, 2009 CCA LEXIS 54, at *8, 2009 WL 367577, at *3. The
record does not disclose whether any mental health records
relating to CM exist at Lakeside.
III.
Appellant argues that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel because his civilian defense counsel did not seek to
subpoena CM’s mental health records from Lakeside.
In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, an appellant must demonstrate both (1) that his
counsel’s performance was deficient, and (2) that this
deficiency resulted in prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687;
United States v. Mazza, 67 M.J. 470, 474 (C.A.A.F. 2009)
(citations omitted). We may address these prongs in any order
we choose, because Appellant must meet both in order to prevail.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697; Loving v. United States, 68 M.J. 1,
4
United States v. Green, No. 09-0523/AF
6 (C.A.A.F. 2009). We review ineffective assistance of counsel
claims de novo. United States v. Anderson, 55 M.J. 198, 201
(C.A.A.F. 2001); United States v. Wiley, 47 M.J. 158, 159
(C.A.A.F. 1997).
In order to show prejudice under Strickland, “[t]he
defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability
is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 698; Loving, 68 M.J. at 6-7.
The civilian defense counsel conducted a thorough cross-
examination of CM in which she elicited the following
information: CM had spent between a month and a half to two
months at a lock-down facility for children with drug and
alcohol abuse problems or with significant behavioral problems;
CM talked with her father every day and never told him about the
alleged sexual abuse; CM initially said that she had sex with
Appellant ten times a week, but she later reduced this number to
two to three times a week; CM stated at the Article 32, UCMJ, 10
U.S.C. § 832 (2006), hearing that Appellant had not punched her
in the face with his fist, even though she later testified on
direct examination that he had punched her with his fist; CM had
regular fights with Appellant and his wife because they grounded
her too much for having bad grades and not doing work around the
5
United States v. Green, No. 09-0523/AF
house; and CM enjoyed her life with Appellant and his wife more
than her life with her parents. Most notably, CM admitted
during cross-examination that she had told someone that she had
never had sexual intercourse or oral sex with Appellant and that
Appellant had never touched her in any sexual sort of way.
Appellant’s attorney was successful in obtaining his
acquittal of seven of the thirteen specifications of which he
was charged, and two of his convictions excepted the language
charging that he committed offenses “on divers occasions.”
Appellant was not convicted of any offense for which CM’s
testimony was the only evidence.1 For example, CM testified that
Appellant had sexual intercourse with her twice a week for a
year, but the members acquitted Appellant of the carnal
knowledge charge. CM testified that she and Appellant had
performed oral sex on each other five to six times; yet the
members excepted “on divers occasions” from the specification
and specifically noted that the conviction was based on the
alleged instance of sodomy where AFOSI later identified semen on
the carpet. CM testified to many occasions on which Appellant
had committed indecent acts with her, but the members convicted
Appellant of only two of the five specifications alleged. Both
of these specifications stemmed from an incident in which
1
In reaching this conclusion, we did not consider the post-trial
statements of the court members to that effect.
6
United States v. Green, No. 09-0523/AF
Appellant grabbed CM’s and LS’s breasts when they were all in
the room together. Appellant was charged with four
specifications of assaulting CM, yet the members only convicted
Appellant of three of these. LS testified that she witnessed
the acts that resulted in two of these assault convictions, and
the third was based on Appellant choking CM, which was
corroborated by the AFOSI finding fluids on the floor where CM
testified that she vomited during the choking episode.
We do not believe that CM’s mental health records, if any
existed, would have further discredited her to the extent that
there is a reasonable probability that Appellant would have been
acquitted of additional specifications.
IV.
In determining that there was no reasonable probability
that the result of the trial would have been different if CM’s
psychiatric records had existed and had been introduced, the CCA
noted that the court members had advised counsel in post-trial
discussions that they had only convicted Appellant of offenses
for which there was corroborating evidence. Green, 2009 CCA
LEXIS 54, at *8, 2009 WL 367577, at *3. Courts in the military
justice system may not consider members’ testimony about their
deliberative processes. Military Rule of Evidence (M.R.E.) 509;
M.R.E. 606(b); see United States v. Matthews, 68 M.J. 29
(C.A.A.F. 2009). However, this error did not affect the factual
7
United States v. Green, No. 09-0523/AF
sufficiency review, and only affected the CCA’s legal analysis
to the extent that the CCA determined that Appellant had not met
the prejudice prong of Strickland. This error does not affect
our legal analysis because we review ineffective assistance of
counsel claims de novo.
In light of our decision that Appellant suffered no
prejudice from the failure of his counsel to obtain CM’s mental
health records, we need not determine whether the CCA erred in
not granting Appellant’s request to subpoena those records on
appellate review. Appellant sought to obtain these records to
support his argument that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel. As Appellant did not demonstrate prejudice under
Strickland, the issue of whether the CCA erred in not
subpoenaing these records is moot.
V.
The decision of the United States Air Force Court of
Criminal Appeals is affirmed.
8