Gregg v. Ham

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

SHIRLEY GREGG, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JON E. HAM; QUICK SILVER BAIL

BONDS LLC,

Defendants-Appellants,  No. 10-1738

and

SUMTER COUNTY SHERIFF’S

DEPARTMENT; SENIOR DEPUTY JUSTIN

YELTON,

Defendants.



Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of South Carolina, at Columbia.

Cameron McGowan Currie, District Judge.

(3:08-cv-04040-CMC)

Argued: January 26, 2012

Decided: April 30, 2012

Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Diaz wrote the opinion,

in which Judge Niemeyer and Judge Motz joined.

2 GREGG v. HAM

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Adam Tremaine Silvernail, LAW OFFICE OF

ADAM T. SILVERNAIL, LLC, Columbia, South Carolina,

for Appellants. William Elvin Hopkins, Jr., BEASLEY,

ALLEN, CROW, METHVIN, PORTIS & MILES, PC, Mont-

gomery, Alabama, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: James T.

McBratney, III, MCBRATNEY LAW FIRM, PA, Florence,

South Carolina, for Appellants. Paul M. Fata, STUCKEY,

FATA & SEGARS, LLC, Bishopville, South Carolina, for

Appellee.

OPINION

DIAZ, Circuit Judge:

Shirley Gregg sued bail bondsman Jon Ham and others

alleging civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well

as various state law tort claims. The claims stem from Ham’s

efforts to apprehend a fugitive in and around Gregg’s home.

A jury found in Gregg’s favor on her § 1983, trespass, and

assault claims—awarding a total of $100,000 in compensatory

and punitive damages. Ham appealed, challenging the jury’s

verdict and damages award.

Among the issues Ham raises is a challenge to the court’s

jury instruction on qualified immunity. As part of his defense,

Ham asserted that he was entitled to qualified immunity from

the § 1983 claim. Ham now contends for the first time on

appeal that the district court erred by submitting the legal

issue of qualified immunity to the jury. Reviewing for plain

error, we find Ham’s argument unpersuasive. There was no

error—plain or otherwise—because as a bail bondsman Ham

was not entitled to qualified immunity. Finding no merit in

any of Ham’s other claims, we affirm.

GREGG v. HAM 3

I.

A.

Jon Ham, through his company Quick Silver Bail Bonds

LLC, posted a $20,000 bond for Tyis Rose following his

arrest for assault with intent to kill in Florence County, South

Carolina. After Rose failed to appear, the court issued a fugi-

tive warrant for Rose’s arrest. Ham concentrated his search

for Rose in Sumter County, South Carolina in the community

where Rose’s parents lived. Shirley Gregg lived in the same

community, approximately a mile and a half from Rose’s par-

ents. Gregg was acquainted with Rose’s family but did not

know them well. Gregg suffered from several physical ail-

ments—including rheumatoid arthritis and the effects of sev-

eral joint replacements—that prevented her from working and

left her largely confined to her home.

After months of searching for Rose, Ham observed some-

one driving a white car that he suspected belonged to Rose.

Ham pursued the vehicle, and a chase ensued. The car, which

was in fact driven by Rose, ultimately came to rest on Gregg’s

property. At that point, Rose fled the vehicle and began run-

ning from Ham. Rose took several steps toward Gregg’s

house before running into a nearby wooded area. Ham gave

chase on foot and fired several shotgun blasts over Rose’s

head. Despite his efforts, Ham failed to apprehend Rose.

Ham purportedly conducted surveillance from the woods at

the edge of Gregg’s property later that evening and saw Rose

enter Gregg’s house. Two days later, Ham returned to

Gregg’s property at 7:30 a.m. along with Sumter County

Sheriff’s Deputy Justin Yelton and several other bail bonds-

men. Ham called the Sheriff’s Department for assistance "to

make sure there were no problems," J.A. 178, but did not ask

the sheriff to obtain a search warrant—nor was one ever

issued. According to Yelton, Ham was in charge during the

visit to Gregg’s house and did most of the talking.

4 GREGG v. HAM

Ham and Yelton stepped onto Gregg’s porch, while the

other bail bondsmen surrounded the house. The pair knocked

on Gregg’s door and requested entry to search for Rose.

Gregg, who was in bed when she heard the knock, responded

through the door that there was no one else inside. Gregg tes-

tified that Ham was "shaking the door like he was going to

break it" and warned her that she "had to let them come in or

he was going to come in." Id. 79–80. Through the window,

Gregg observed that Ham was armed with a shotgun but was

unable to see Yelton until she opened the door. Gregg ulti-

mately allowed Ham and Yelton to enter because she felt

threatened and "wasn’t going to try to get killed." Id. 80.

According to Ham and Yelton, Gregg verbally consented sev-

eral times to the search both prior to and after their entry.

Gregg observed that upon entering the house, Ham aimed his

shotgun head-high or at chest level and kept it pointed up

while searching throughout the house. Unable to locate Rose,

Ham became agitated and started yelling questions at Gregg

about Rose’s whereabouts. After Gregg began crying, Yelton

intervened and asked Ham to leave her alone.

Following Ham and Yelton’s departure, Gregg called 911

to complain about the entry and search. Yelton, who was still

in the area, responded to the call. Gregg indicated that she did

not wish to speak to Yelton but instead asked to speak to his

supervisor. Later that day, Gregg’s brother warned Ham not

to return to his sister’s house. Despite the warning, Ham

returned to tell Gregg that he had raised the reward for Rose’s

apprehension. In response, Gregg called her sister, who con-

fronted Ham and told him to leave. According to Gregg, Ham

responded that "he can do whatever he wanted to do." Id. 93.

As a result of her encounters with Ham, Gregg was scared

to stay by herself, began locking her doors, felt anxious and

insecure, and had trouble sleeping. Gregg ultimately sought

counseling from a psychologist, who concluded that Gregg

suffered from depression and anxiety and diagnosed her with

post-traumatic stress disorder. The psychologist also noted

GREGG v. HAM 5

that Gregg’s preexisting disabilities exacerbated the impact of

the incident, causing her to feel more threatened.

B.

Gregg sued Ham, Quick Silver, the Sumter County Sher-

iff’s Department, and Yelton in the Court of Common Pleas

in Sumter County, South Carolina. She alleged causes of

action for (1) gross negligence and recklessness, (2) constitu-

tional violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments

under § 1983, (3) trespass, (4) intentional infliction of emo-

tional distress, and (5) assault. Based on the issue of federal

law presented in Gregg’s § 1983 claim, the defendants

removed the case to federal court. Gregg subsequently settled

her claims against the Sheriff’s Department and Yelton.

The claims against Ham and Quick Silver were tried before

a jury. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for

a directed verdict on the intentional infliction of emotional

distress claim. The jury returned a verdict for Gregg, award-

ing nominal damages on Gregg’s § 1983 and trespass claims

and $50,000 in compensatory damages on her assault claim.

The jury also awarded a total of $50,000 in punitive damages,

including $30,000 on the § 1983 claim and $10,000 each on

the trespass and assault claims.

Ham filed a motion under Rules 50 and 59 of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking a judgment notwithstanding

the verdict, a new trial, and alteration or amendment of the

judgment. The district court denied Ham’s motion. On appeal,

Ham contends that (1) the district court erred by submitting

the issue of qualified immunity to the jury, (2) he is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law on the § 1983 and assault

claims, and (3) the damages awards on the various claims

were inconsistent, unsupported by the facts, and excessive.

We consider each claim in turn.

6 GREGG v. HAM

II.

Ham contends that he is entitled to a new trial on the

§ 1983 claim because the district court improperly submitted

the legal question of qualified immunity to the jury. Because

Ham did not object to the jury instruction at trial, we review

for plain error. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 51(d)(2) ("A court may

consider a plain error in the instructions that has not been pre-

served . . . if the error affects substantial rights."). Applying

plain error review, we will not reverse unless Ham can estab-

lish: "(1) there is an error; (2) the error is plain; (3) the error

affects substantial rights; and (4) the court determines . . . that

the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public rep-

utation of judicial proceedings." In re Celotex Corp., 124 F.3d

619, 630–31 (4th Cir. 1997) (citing United States v. Olano,

507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993)). Ham is unable to show that the

district court committed plain error.

The defense of qualified immunity involves a two-step pro-

cedure "that asks first whether a constitutional violation

occurred and second whether the right violated was clearly

established." Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 531 (4th Cir.

2011) (en banc) (quoting Melgar v. Greene, 593 F.3d 348,

353 (4th Cir. 2010)). In determining whether a right is clearly

established, courts consider "whether it would be clear to a

reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situa-

tion he confronted." Id. at 534 (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533

U.S. 194, 202 (2001)). Qualified immunity is typically an

immunity from suit, rather than a mere defense to liability,

and is effectively lost if a case is permitted to go to trial. Witt

v. W. Va. State Police, Troop 2, 633 F.3d 272, 275 (4th Cir.

2011). Nevertheless, in Willingham v. Crooke, 412 F.3d 553,

560 (4th Cir. 2005), we explained that if "a dispute of material

fact precludes a conclusive ruling on qualified immunity at

the summary judgment stage, the district court should submit

factual questions to the jury and reserve for itself the legal

question of whether the defendant is entitled to qualified

immunity on the facts found by the jury."

GREGG v. HAM 7

In Willingham, the district court committed reversible error

when it instructed the jury to find whether a reasonable officer

in the defendant’s position would have known that his actions

violated the law. Id. at 558.1 Noting the "essentially legal

nature of the question of whether the right at issue was clearly

established," we held that "the legal question of a defendant’s

entitlement to qualified immunity under a particular set of

facts should be decided by the court, not by the jury." Id. at

559–60 (quotation omitted).

Here, the district court asked the jury, "Could defendant

Jon E. Ham, based upon the totality of the circumstances,

have reasonably believed that plaintiff had given him know-

ing and voluntary consent to search her home?" J.A. 327, 384.2

Neither party objected to the court’s instruction. Relying on

the rule announced in Willingham, Ham now contends that the

jury instruction constituted plain error because it required the

jury to answer the legal question of qualified immunity. We

need not resolve this issue, however, because even assuming

the instruction was improper, there was no error because Ham

was not entitled to a qualified immunity defense.

A private party may be liable under § 1983 if acting "under

color of state law"3 but is not necessarily entitled to assert a

1

In Willingham, the district court instructed the jury in part that "[i]f . . .

you find that [defendant] had a reasonable belief that his action did not

violate the constitutional rights of [plaintiff], then you cannot find [him]

liable even if [plaintiff’s] rights were, in fact, violated as a result of his

objectively reasonable action." 412 F.3d at 558.

2

The jury concluded that Ham could not have reasonably believed

Gregg knowingly and voluntarily consented to the search.

3

A private party is considered a state actor for purposes of § 1983 if "the

deprivation [is] caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created

by the State . . . [and] the party charged with the deprivation [is] a person

who may fairly be said to be a state actor." Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,

457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982). The second part of this test is satisfied if the

defendant "has acted together with or has obtained significant aid from

state officials." Id. Applying these principles, we have held that a bail

bondsman executing a search for a fugitive with the assistance of a police

officer is a state actor and therefore subject to § 1983 liability. See Jackson

v. Pantazes, 810 F.2d 426, 429–30 (4th Cir. 1987).

8 GREGG v. HAM

qualified immunity defense. Although § 1983 "creates a spe-

cies of tort liability that on its face admits of no immunities,"

courts have recognized qualified immunity in cases in which

"the tradition of immunity was so firmly rooted in the com-

mon law and was supported by such strong policy reasons that

Congress would have specifically so provided had it wished

to abolish the doctrine." Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 163–64

(1992) (quotations omitted). Thus, when determining whether

a private party acting under color of state law is entitled to

qualified immunity, the Supreme Court has instructed courts

"to look both to history and to the purposes that underlie gov-

ernment employee immunity." Richardson v. McKnight, 521

U.S. 399, 404 (1997). If "[h]istory does not reveal a firmly

rooted tradition of immunity" and the policy considerations

underlying qualified immunity do not apply to the category of

private persons of which the defendant is a part, then he is not

entitled to qualified immunity. See id. at 404, 407–08.4

Applying the test articulated in Richardson, we conclude

that the history and policy behind the qualified immunity

defense do not support extending it to bail bondsmen. First,

there is no evidence that bail bondsmen have historically been

afforded immunity for their actions. In fact, courts have

rejected the notion that bail bondsmen act as an arm of the

court or perform a public function. See, e.g., Ouzts v. Md.

Nat’l Ins. Co., 505 F.2d 547, 554–55 (9th Cir. 1974) (reject-

ing the "strange thesis" that a bail bondsman is "an arm of the

4

In Filarsky v. Delia, No. 10-1018, slip op. at 11 (U.S. Apr. 17, 2012),

the Supreme Court recently held that "immunity under § 1983 should not

vary depending on whether an individual working for the government does

so as a full-time employee, or on some other basis." In affording qualified

immunity to an attorney hired by a local municipality to conduct an inves-

tigation, the Court considered "the ‘general principles of tort immunities

and defenses’ applicable at common law, and the reasons [it has] afforded

protection from suit under § 1983." Id. at 5. (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman,

424 U.S. 409, 418 (1976)). The Court’s decision, however, did nothing to

disturb the test outlined in Richardson but instead, by looking to history

and the purposes of § 1983, endorsed the analysis we apply here.

GREGG v. HAM 9

court"); Fitzpatrick v. Williams, 46 F.2d 40, 40 (5th Cir. 1931)

("The right of the surety to recapture his principal is not a

matter of criminal procedure, but arises from the private

undertaking implied in the furnishing of the bond.").

Second, the policy justifications underlying qualified

immunity do not apply to bail bondsmen. See generally Bailey

v. Kenney, 791 F. Supp. 1511, 1523–25 (D. Kan. 1992) (con-

cluding that "[w]ith respect to bail bondsmen, the court finds

none of the compelling policy reasons that traditionally justify

the availability of qualified immunity to state actors perform-

ing discretionary functions").5 Courts have traditionally

afforded qualified immunity to public officials because sus-

ceptibility to suit would distract them from performing their

public functions, inhibit discretionary action, and deter desir-

able candidates from performing public service. See Harlow

v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 816 (1982). There is no need,

however, for qualified immunity to shield bondsmen from

suit, as they are not entrusted with a public function. To the

contrary, while the law certainly allows a bail bondsman to

apprehend a fugitive, that right is exercised in tandem with

the obligation of law enforcement to accomplish the same

objective. See Bailey, 791 F. Supp. at 1524.

Moreover, rather than operating in the interest of public

service, the work of a bail bondsman is fueled primarily by a

strong profit motive. See Richardson, 521 U.S. at 409–10

(highlighting the importance of "ordinary marketplace pres-

sures"). Accordingly, even if bail bondsmen are entrusted

with a public function, the economic incentives inherent in the

system would "ensure an ample number of qualified persons

5

Although Bailey preceded Wyatt and Richardson, the court’s analysis

tracks the Supreme Court’s later articulation of the standard for evaluating

whether a private individual is entitled to qualified immunity. Specifically,

the Bailey court examined whether the history and purpose of qualified

immunity supports extending the defense to bail bondsmen. 791 F. Supp.

at 1524.

10 GREGG v. HAM

willing to assume the occupational risks of apprehending fugi-

tives." Bailey, 791 F. Supp. at 1524.

In sum, neither history nor policy support extending the

qualified immunity defense to bail bondsmen.6 Ham is there-

fore unable to show error, plain or otherwise, based on the

district court’s jury instruction on a defense to which he was

not entitled.7

6

The Court’s recent decision in Filarsky—holding that immunity under

§ 1983 does not vary based on whether an individual works full-time for

the government or does so on some other basis—does nothing to change

the result in this case. Filarsky, slip op. at 11. As we have explained, Ham

was a bail bondsman, not an "arm of the court," and thus operated in pur-

suit of his own financial self-interest. He was not employed by the Sher-

iff’s Department and did not report to law enforcement. Moreover, the

sheriff did not call on Ham to assist in its efforts to apprehend Rose;

instead, it was Ham who called on Deputy Yelton to pre-

vent—unsuccessfully it turns out—a breach of the peace at Gregg’s home.

Finally, as Yelton confirmed, Ham was in charge of the search and did not

act at Yelton’s direction. Because Ham was not hired by or working on

behalf of the government in any capacity, Filarsky is inapposite and, for

the reasons discussed, Ham is not entitled to qualified immunity.

7

Even if Ham was entitled to assert a qualified immunity defense, any

error in the contested instruction did not affect his substantial rights

because he nevertheless fails to satisfy the requirements of the defense. To

prevail under qualified immunity, Ham has to show either that there was

no constitutional violation or that the right violated was not clearly estab-

lished. Henry, 652 F.3d at 531. He can do neither. First, the jury con-

cluded that Ham committed a constitutional violation when it found, in

response to the district court’s appropriate factual interrogatory, that Ham

searched Gregg’s home without her "knowing and voluntary consent."

Contra Willingham, 412 F.3d at 561 (remanding where we were unable to

determine based on the form of the verdict whether the jury’s decision

rested on the factual question of whether a constitutional violation

occurred or on the separate legal question of whether the violation trans-

gressed clearly established law). Second, Supreme Court precedent clearly

establishes that an officer may not conduct a warrantless search of a home

without consent under the circumstances presented here. Groh v. Ramirez,

540 U.S. 551, 564 (2004) ("No reasonable officer could claim to be

unaware of the basic rule, well established by our cases, that, absent con-

sent or exigency, a warrantless search of the home is presumptively

unconstitutional."). Accordingly, even if the court erroneously submitted

the legal issue of qualified immunity to the jury, Ham cannot satisfy plain

error review because he is unable to show that he would otherwise have

been entitled to the defense.

GREGG v. HAM 11

III.

Ham also appeals the denial of his Rule 50(b) motion for

judgment as a matter of law on the § 1983 and assault claims.

We review the denial of a Rule 50(b) motion de novo, view-

ing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing

party, and will affirm the denial of such a motion unless the

jury lacked a legally sufficient evidentiary basis for its ver-

dict. First Union Comm’l Corp. v. GATX Capital Corp., 411

F.3d 551, 556 (4th Cir. 2005).

A.

Ham contends that there was insufficient evidence support-

ing Gregg’s § 1983 claim that, while acting under color of

state law, Ham violated Gregg’s constitutional rights by enter-

ing and searching her home. According to Ham, the undis-

puted evidence showed that Gregg consented to the search.

We disagree.

"Valid consent is a well-recognized exception to the Fourth

Amendment prohibition against warrantless searches."

Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 401 (4th Cir. 2001). Consis-

tent with our cases, the jury here was properly instructed to

examine the totality of the circumstances to determine if

Gregg’s consent was knowing and voluntary. Id. As part of

the totality of the circumstances analysis, the district court

instructed the jury to look to the characteristics of the individ-

ual providing consent, as well as the conditions under which

the consent to search was given. See United States v. Latti-

more, 87 F.3d 647, 650 (4th Cir. 1996).

Here, the evidence shows that Gregg, a physically disabled

woman, was alone in her bed when Ham came to her door at

7:30 in the morning armed with a shotgun and accompanied

by a sheriff’s deputy and at least two other bail bondsmen.

Gregg testified that Ham was "shaking the door like he was

going to break it" and warned that she "had to let them come

12 GREGG v. HAM

in or he was going to come in." J.A. 79–80. Under these cir-

cumstances, there was sufficient evidence to support the

jury’s conclusion that Gregg’s consent was involuntary.

Accordingly, we affirm the verdict on the § 1983 claim.8

B.

Ham next contends that he is entitled to judgment as a mat-

ter of law on the assault claim because no reasonable juror

could conclude that Gregg was in reasonable fear of bodily

harm. Viewing the evidence, as we must, in the light most

favorable to Gregg, we reject Ham’s contention.

Under South Carolina law, the elements of assault are "(1)

conduct of the defendant which places the plaintiff, (2) in rea-

sonable fear of bodily harm." Mellen v. Lane, 659 S.E.2d 236,

244 (S.C. Ct. App. 2008). The evidence shows that Ham

arrived at Gregg’s house early in the morning armed with a

shotgun. According to Gregg’s account of the incident, which

the jury was entitled to credit, Ham shook the door, demanded

entry, threatened Gregg, and then entered with his shotgun

aimed head-high or at chest level. Based on these facts, there

was a sufficient basis to support the jury’s conclusion that

Gregg was in reasonable fear of bodily harm.

IV.

Ham also argues that the district court erred by denying his

Rule 59 motion for a new trial or remittitur on damages. Ham

asserts that the jury’s damages awards on the § 1983 and

assault claims were inconsistent, the actual damages awarded

on the assault claim lacked support, and the punitive damages

award was excessive. We review the denial of a motion for a

8

Ham also contends that the evidence shows that he did not violate a

clearly established constitutional right and therefore was entitled to quali-

fied immunity as a matter of law. We reject this argument for the reasons

we have discussed previously.

GREGG v. HAM 13

new trial under Rule 59 for abuse of discretion. Robinson v.

Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 560 F.3d 235, 242 (4th Cir. 2009).

"A district court abuses its discretion by upholding an award

of damages only when the jury’s verdict is against the weight

of the evidence or based on evidence which is false." Id. (quo-

tations omitted).

A.

Ham moved for a new trial based on what he contends were

inconsistent damages awards on the § 1983 claim and the

assault claim. The jury awarded nominal damages for the con-

stitutional violation underlying Gregg’s § 1983 claim but

awarded $50,000 in actual damages for the assault. According

to Ham, the awards were inconsistent because both claims

were based on the same conduct. The district court disagreed

and denied Ham’s motion for a new trial. We affirm.

Contrary to Ham’s contention, the § 1983 and assault

claims constituted separate violations. The § 1983 claim

alleged an unconstitutional entry into Gregg’s home, while

the assault claim alleged that Ham placed Gregg in reasonable

fear of bodily harm by, among other things, threatening her

and pointing a shotgun in her direction. Because the claims

relate to separate conduct, the jury could reasonably conclude

that Ham committed both violations but that Gregg’s actual

damages stemmed only from the assault. Accordingly, the dis-

trict court did not abuse its discretion by denying Ham’s

motion for a new trial under this theory.

B.

Ham also sought a remittitur of the $50,000 in actual dam-

ages awarded in conjunction with Gregg’s assault claim.

According to Ham, the evidence of Gregg’s medical expenses

did not justify the amount of the award. The district court

rejected Ham’s argument, concluding that there was more

14 GREGG v. HAM

than enough evidence to support the award. We find no abuse

of discretion.

Gregg testified that the assault caused her to change her

behavior, left her scared, and disrupted her sleep. Further-

more, Gregg’s psychologist concluded that she suffered from

depression and anxiety as a result of her encounter with Ham

and diagnosed her with post-traumatic stress disorder, a con-

dition that was exacerbated by her physical disabilities. Based

on this testimony, we cannot say that the $50,000 damages

award was "against the weight of the evidence or based on

evidence which is false." Id. at 242. Accordingly, we affirm

the district court’s denial of Ham’s motion regarding the

actual damages award.

C.

Finally, Ham claims that the district court abused its discre-

tion by failing to reduce the jury’s punitive damages award.

The jury awarded a total of $50,000 in punitive damages:

$30,000 on the § 1983 claim and $10,000 each on the assault

and trespass claims. We again find no abuse of discretion.

"When there is no constitutional challenge to a jury’s award

of punitive damages, a federal district court reviews such an

award by applying the state’s substantive law of punitive

damages." King v. McMillan, 594 F.3d 301, 312–13 (4th Cir.

2010) (quotation omitted). Under South Carolina law, to

receive an award of punitive damages the plaintiff must show

that the defendant’s misconduct was "willful, wanton, or in

reckless disregard of the plaintiff’s rights." Taylor v.

Medenica, 479 S.E.2d 35, 46 (S.C. 1996). A trial judge may

only set aside an award if it is "so grossly excessive so as to

shock the conscience of the court and clearly indicates that the

figure reached was the result of caprice, passion, prejudice,

partiality, corruption, or other improper motives." Rush v.

Blanchard, 426 S.E.2d 802, 805 (S.C. 1993).

GREGG v. HAM 15

In denying Ham’s request for a remittitur or new trial on

punitive damages, the district court highlighted Gregg’s testi-

mony describing her encounter with Ham and concluded that

"his actions were threatening, dangerous, and reprehensible."

J.A. 439. The district court also found that the punitive dam-

ages award bore a reasonable relationship to the compensa-

tory damages. Based on our review, we find no abuse of

discretion in the district court’s decision to leave the punitive

damages award undisturbed.

V.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the

district court.

AFFIRMED