United States v. Mack Doak

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[PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 19-15106

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross Appellant,

versus

MACK DOAK,

Defendant-Appellant,

JAYCEE DOAK,

Defendant-Appellant-Cross Appellee.

____________________

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Alabama

D.C. Docket No. 1:18-cr-00242-KD-B-1

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 19-15106

Before GRANT, LUCK, and HULL, Circuit Judges.

GRANT, Circuit Judge:

Mack Doak was convicted by a jury of transporting his three

adopted daughters across state lines so that he could sexually abuse

them. From the time he adopted the girls until family members

finally reported him five years later he subjected them to relentless

abuse.

Mack’s wife Jaycee knew what he was doing. Her adopted

daughters confided in her after Mack abused them, but she refused

to help. She denied their allegations. She also yelled at the girls,

blamed them for the abuse, and helped Mack travel across the

country to keep his acts hidden. The jury convicted her of aiding

and abetting.

The Doaks make an across-the-board effort to challenge

their convictions, claiming that their indictment was flawed and

that several evidentiary errors infected the trial. Mack also

challenges the district court’s restitution calculation and its finding

that he could afford a special assessment. On cross-appeal, the

government argues that Jaycee’s sentence—the statutory

minimum—was substantively unreasonable. Other than the

restitution order, which we partially vacate, we affirm the Doaks’

convictions and sentences.

I.

The tragic history of the Doak family began in Rhode Island,

where 27-year-old Mack Doak met 18-year-old Jaycee Thet.

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Despite the age gap, the two began a romantic relationship. Mack’s

interests, however, extended beyond Jaycee. While at work as a

city bus driver, he had his eyes set on one of his regular passengers:

14-year-old Nicole. 1 Mack eventually introduced himself to Nicole

and became very attentive, lavishing her with gifts on Valentine’s

Day and taking her to Boston for dinner. Nicole (unaware of

Mack’s relationship with Jaycee) came to believe that she was

Mack’s girlfriend—and that she owed him physical intimacy. She

began having sex with him almost every time they met, but then

Jaycee and Nicole learned about each other. Mack told Jaycee that

he planned to leave her for 14-year-old Nicole, but Jaycee got

Nicole’s father involved. Nicole ended her relationship with Mack,

but she never reported Mack to the police. Around the same time,

Jaycee gave birth to the couple’s first daughter.

Meanwhile, Mack also used his relationship with Jaycee to

get closer to her younger sister Natalie, who was in elementary

school. After Natalie turned ten or eleven, Mack began groping

her—constantly touching “anything that he could”—including her

breasts, her buttocks, and her genitals. The abuse progressed over

several years until one day, when Natalie was laying on the couch

sick, he offered to rub a balm on her back. As he was applying the

balm, he tried to pull down her pants. When Natalie, who was 12

or 13 years old, asked Mack what he was doing he told her to be

1The victims’ names were changed at trial to protect their privacy, and we

adopt those same pseudonyms.

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quiet. He pulled down her pants and raped her. She kept silent

and told no one for years.

Not long after he raped her little sister, Mack married Jaycee

and they moved to Rosharon, Texas with Jaycee’s family. Natalie

moved with them, but she did not remain silent indefinitely.

Nearly a decade after the move, Natalie told her family that Mack

had abused her, confronting Mack directly in the process. Jaycee,

however, leapt to Mack’s defense, and threatened that if Natalie

reported him to the police, she would report her for stealing

scratch-off lottery tickets from Jaycee and Mack’s store. Natalie

backed down.

Around that same time, Mack and Jaycee adopted six

siblings, including three girls who became victims: Brenda (11),

Laura (9), and Leah (6). Right after the children moved in with

their new parents, Mack started “touching” both Brenda and Laura.

The abuse was abhorrent. Laura remembers that one night,

as she slept next to Brenda, she woke up to Mack touching her

genitals. Mack stripped her naked, and Laura felt him push his

hand “inside [her] body.” The assault was so “scary” that Laura

kept silent and tried to forget about it. On another night, Brenda

awoke to Mack touching her, pulling down her pants, and raping

her. He held her down and ignored her pleas for him to stop.

Jaycee came to the door. When she opened it, she saw that Mack

and Brenda were naked from the waist down. When Brenda told

Jaycee that Mack had been raping her, she promised that she would

“handle it” and everything would be fine.

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Everything was not fine, and Jaycee apparently knew it. She

confided in her sister-in-law Donna that she and Mack had gotten

into an argument and that he had packed his bags and left to live

with a friend in Alabama. Jaycee also said that she had found a pair

of “wet” underwear in the laundry belonging to Brenda. Donna

urged Jaycee to seek medical treatment for Brenda and to report

the abuse. Jaycee told Donna the next day that she made the

appointment.

But when Donna checked in with Jaycee later, Jaycee had

changed her tune. She told Donna that she now doubted Brenda

because of her “disability” (Brenda struggled to read and write) and

told Donna that she planned to go to Alabama to help Mack find a

place to open a donut shop. That seemed odd to Donna because

of an earlier conversation with Mack, who had told her after he

started receiving government benefits to support his adopted

children, “Oh, since I got the kids, I don’t need to work anymore.”

Jaycee never reported the abuse. For a long time, neither did

Donna.

Around that same time, Jaycee called her brother (Donna’s

husband) telling him that Mack had a gun and was about to commit

suicide. When he rushed to the house to talk Mack down, Mack

admitted that “he had done something really bad and he would not

go to jail for it.”

He did not go to jail then. Nor did he kill himself. Instead,

the Doaks quickly moved away from Jaycee’s family to Butler,

Alabama. In their new home, Jaycee’s treatment of Brenda

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deteriorated. She began hitting her and calling her a “ho” and a

“slut.” Brenda was no more than 13 years old.

Within a year, the family moved again, this time to Florida.

The abuse continued. Mack followed Brenda to the laundry room,

pulled down her pants, and raped her. Brenda again asked Jaycee

for help. This time Jaycee did not comfort Brenda; instead, she

insisted that she was lying and that her “disability” was “playing

tricks” on her.

Mack often used the Doaks’ bedroom for cover. It was off

limits for the children (unless they were with Mack of course) and

both Brenda and the girls’ brother Eddie noticed that Mack would

call Laura or Leah to the bedroom and then play music loudly.

Brenda recognized the tactic from her own experience and feared

that Mack was also abusing her little sisters.

He was. Laura testified that Mack once called her to his

room and locked the door behind her. He then touched her

“private area” and, as Laura testified, put his penis “inside [her]

private part.” Mack also touched the younger girls while they were

doing the dishes, and once woke Leah and penetrated her with his

finger. All three of the girls told Jaycee about Mack’s abuse. When

they did, Jaycee had an argument with Mack—but the sexual abuse

continued. And instead of helping the girls, Jaycee became “more

strict,” yelling at them and hitting them.

Two years after they arrived in Florida, it was time to move

again, this time to Thomasville, Alabama. Mack’s abuses

continued. Leah, the youngest sister of the three, testified that he

would touch her in the kitchen and call her to his bedroom where

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he would force her to have sex with him. And Laura recalled that

one day, early in the morning, Mack picked her up and put her on

the washer or the dryer in the laundry room. He took off her bra

and began touching her breasts. This time her younger brother

Eddie walked in. Eddie remembered seeing Mack with his pants

down, one hand on Laura’s thigh and another on her genitals.

Mack told Eddie to go back to sleep. Eddie complied; he testified

that he “would have been hurt if [he] didn’t listen.” Mack told him

to forget what he’d seen, and he stayed quiet. His fears were well-

founded; at least one time Mack gave Eddie a “hard slap” on the

face, and Jaycee sometimes hit him with a wooden spoon.

Mack also abused Brenda in Thomasville. He woke her and

ordered her to do laundry in his room, but instead he raped her.

Brenda went to Jaycee again. But Jaycee again dismissed her,

accusing her of lying and calling her names. She also hit her. When

a teacher’s aide at school noticed the bruises on Brenda’s arms and

asked her what had happened, Brenda revealed that Jaycee had hit

her. The very next day the family left for Monroeville, Alabama;

they had been in Thomasville for less than a year.

After the move, nothing changed. Mack raped Brenda in the

house’s storage room when she was putting away groceries, and

again when she was doing laundry. He called Laura to his room

and, as Laura said, his “private area went into mine.” Mack

continued to “force [Leah] to have sex with him.” Laura again told

Jaycee about the abuse. At first Jaycee assured Laura that she

would be okay, but that attitude did not last; instead she hit Laura

and otherwise treated her poorly.

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The family also took two trips while they lived in

Monroeville. On the first, to Cambodia, Mack and Jaycee brought

Brenda, who was told that one purpose of the trip was to marry

her to one of Mack’s cousins. No marriage plans were set. But

Mack caught her alone while she was getting dressed and began

groping her. That time Brenda escaped; she managed to leave

“really quick because the door was still open.”

The second trip was to Rhode Island, a visit to extended

family. The Doaks’ large van was set up with a mattress in the very

back behind rows of seating for the rest of the family. Mack took

advantage of the long drive to abuse the girls. He inappropriately

touched Brenda while they were sitting in the back seat, and he

brought Laura back to the mattress and groped her. After they

arrived in Rhode Island, Mack also grabbed Brenda’s pubic area

while the two were alone in a hotel elevator.

The abuse continued when they returned to Alabama.

Mack raped Brenda; Brenda told Jaycee; and Jaycee did nothing.

“[T]ired of being sexually touched and abused,” Brenda finally told

another family member—Jaycee’s brother, Lay Thet. Jaycee’s

family held a meeting and decided to put up cameras in the Doaks’

house. Not long after, the family reported the abuse to the police,

who arrested both Mack and Jaycee. As part of the investigation,

police recovered a semen-stained mat from the Doaks’ house. The

mat contained DNA traceable to Mack and Brenda, but not to

Laura or Leah.

Mack was charged with six counts of transporting children

with the intent that they “engage in sexual activity for which any

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person can be charged with a criminal offense,” in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 2423(a). Jaycee was charged with aiding and abetting that

activity. See 18 U.S.C. § 2. The indictment also charged Mack with

three counts of aggravated sexual abuse under 18 U.S.C. § 2241(c),

specifically crossing a state line “with intent to engage in a sexual

act” with a child under the age of 12. The indictment included two

charts, listing the different trips involving “Victim 1” Brenda,

“Victim 2” Laura, and “Victim 3” Leah:

18 U.S.C. § 2423(a) Transportation of minors

Count Date Individual Transportation of Minor

1 August 2014 Victim 1 From Butler, Alabama to Florida.

Victim 2

Victim 3

2 November 2016 Victim 1 From Florida to Thomasville,

Victim 2 Alabama.

Victim 3

3 November 2017 Victim 1 From Monroeville, Alabama to

Cambodia.

4 December 2017 Victim 1 From Cambodia to Monroeville,

Alabama.

5 December 2017 Victim 1 From Monroeville, Alabama to

Victim 2 Rhode Island.

Victim 3

6 December 2018 Victim 1 From Rhode Island to

Victim 2 Monroeville, Alabama.

Victim 3

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18 U.S.C. § 2241(c) Aggravated sexual abuse

Count Date Person Travel by Defendant

7 August 2014 Victim 2 From Butler, Alabama to Florida.

8 August 2014 Victim 3 From Butler, Alabama to Florida.

9 November 2016 Victim 3 From Florida to Thomasville,

Alabama.

Before trial, the district court explained how it would

instruct the jury to assess Mack’s intent under § 2423(a). The court

proposed referring the jury to Alabama laws that criminalized the

sexual abuse Mack intended during each covered trip to inflict on

the girls. Mack objected, arguing that “the Alabama offenses had

varying degrees and that he had not received notice of which

degree the court intended to instruct the jury on.” The

government responded with its own last-minute proposal,

announcing that it would not rely on Alabama law. Instead, it

planned to rely on 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b), which outlawed “Travel

With Intent To Engage in Illicit Sexual Conduct,” and § 2423(c),

which barred “Engaging in Illicit Sexual Conduct in Foreign

Places,” to identify the criminal sexual abuse that Mack had

intended to inflict on the girls. The Doaks did not object to that

proposal.

At trial, the girls and other family members testified about

Mack raping and sexually abusing the girls, as well as Jaycee’s role

in concealing the abuse. The jury convicted both Mack and Jaycee

of all counts. The district court sentenced each of them to 10 years’

imprisonment for the transportation offenses, and Mack received

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an additional 30 years’ imprisonment for the aggravated-sexual-

assault offenses. The court also ordered them to pay $150,000 in

restitution to a conservatorship for the victims’ future therapy and

$75,000 in restitution to Jaycee’s sister Natalie to cover the costs

that she had accrued during 18 months of caring for the children.

Finally, the court imposed a special assessment of $30,900 on Mack,

and of $25,600 on Jaycee.

The Doaks appeal their convictions, and Mack challenges

the restitution order and his special assessment. For its part, the

government challenges Jaycee’s sentence as unreasonably low.

II.

The Doaks begin with their indictment. They argue that the

charges against Mack for transporting the girls (the § 2423(a)

offenses) must be dismissed because the government forgot to

include in the indictment the statutes criminalizing the sexual

abuse that Mack intended to commit. It was not enough, they say,

to charge Mack with a general intent to commit criminal sexual

abuse. The indictment needed to refer to specific sex-abuse

statutes to inform the Doaks of the accusations Mack faced.

The Doaks also argue that the government only made things

worse when it tried to select specific sex-abuse statutes. The two

statutes that the government eventually picked, they say, did not

criminalize sexual abuse at all—but only banned travel motivated

by illicit sex. In their view, the government ended up charging

Mack with transporting the girls with an intent to have them

illegally travel—which, at least under § 2423(a), is no crime at all.

But neither argument holds up.

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A.

When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of an

indictment, our review is de novo. United States v. Steele, 178 F.3d

1230, 1233 (11th Cir. 1999). An indictment is sufficient if it “(1)

presents the essential elements of the charged offense, (2) notifies

the accused of the charges to be defended against, and (3) enables

the accused to rely upon a judgment under the indictment as a bar

against double jeopardy for any subsequent prosecution for the

same offense.” United States v. Wayerski, 624 F.3d 1342, 1349

(11th Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted). These requirements derive

from “the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of notice to the accused

of the nature and the cause of the accusation, and the Fifth

Amendment’s assurance that a grand jury will return an indictment

only when it finds probable cause for all elements of the crime.”

Id. Simplicity is acceptable; an indictment is constitutionally

sufficient when it “tracks the wording of the statute, as long as the

language sets forth the essential elements of the crime.” Id. at 1350

(quoting United States v. Ndiaye, 434 F.3d 1270, 1299 (11th Cir.

2006)).

The Doaks argue that their indictment fails two of these

requirements. First, they argue that the government omitted an

essential element of the offense of transporting the girls for sexual

activity: the independent statutes that criminalize the sexual

activity Mack intended to commit. See 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a). The

Doaks say that the statutory language about intent is too broad on

its own because it “encompasses a multitude of crimes.” Second,

the Doaks argue that omitting the sexual-abuse statutes also

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deprived them of notice of the charges they faced. Neither

challenge succeeds.

To start, the Doaks’ indictment included all the statutory

elements when it charged Mack for transporting the girls with the

intent to sexually abuse them. It alleged that Mack “[1] knowingly

[2] transported an individual who had not attained the age of 18

years [3] in interstate and foreign commerce, with [4] intent that

such individual engage in sexual activity for which any person can

be charged with a criminal offense.” See id.

The critical question, then, is whether the statutes

criminalizing the intended sexual activity are themselves additional

elements or only means of proving the element of intent. We must

draw this distinction because an indictment need not provide those

facts showing which particular path the defendant took to commit

a crime—what it must do is include the elements of the crime itself.

Wayerski, 624 F.3d at 1350. The elements are required, in other

words, but the means are not (at least for sufficiency purposes).

Indeed, it is not unusual that “several possible sets of underlying

brute facts” could satisfy an element of a crime. United States v.

Jockisch, 857 F.3d 1122, 1127 (11th Cir. 2017) (quotation omitted).

We confronted substantially the same issue in United States

v. Jockisch. There the defendant was charged with attempting to

persuade a minor to engage in “any sexual activity for which any

person can be charged with a criminal offense.” Id. at 1124 & n.1;

see 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). Jockisch argued that the jury needed to

unanimously agree on which state criminal offense he had

attempted to violate because that crime was an element of the

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enticement offense. Jockisch, 857 F.3d at 1127. We disagreed,

explaining that the state offenses were only means of showing that

the pursued sexual activity was criminal. Id. at 1131. The jury did

not need to be “absolutely sure which precise sex act” the

defendant “would have actually pursued”; it only needed to be able

to “reasonably infer that any of these acts would have been

unlawful.” Id. The element was criminal sexual activity as a

general category, and the specific state statutes were only means

by which the jury could identify that the sexual activity was

criminal.

The same is true here. The intent language in the § 2423(a)

transport-for-sexual-activity offense mirrors the wording of the

§ 2422(b) enticement offense. And like in Jockisch, the Doaks’

convictions turned on whether Mack intended the girls to commit

some criminal sexual act—not whether he ultimately forced them

to commit one specific criminal sex act or another. Id. at 1128–29.

There were plenty of means of violating the two statutes, and the

government did not omit an element of the offense by failing to list

every possible law forbidding the sexual acts that Mack had in

mind.

There were, of course, many such laws. Sexual activity with

children is banned under numerous federal and state criminal

statutes. It is, to be more plain, never allowed, and that fact is

broadly understood. Florida, Alabama, and Rhode Island, the

States where Mack’s conduct took place, criminalize sexual

intercourse with—or rape of—young children. See Ala. Code

§ 13A-6-61(a)(3) (under 12); Ala. Code § 13A-6-62 (under 16); Fla.

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Stat. § 794.011; R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-8.1 (under 14); R.I. Gen.

Laws § 11-37-6 (14 to 16 if assailant over 18). And all three States

also criminalize sexually touching children’s genitals or digitally

penetrating them. Ala. Code § 13A-6-67(a)(2) (under 16); Fla. Stat.

§ 800.04(5) (under 16); R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-8.3 (under 14); R.I.

Gen. Laws § 11-37-4(2) (sexual contact using force, surprise, or

coercion). Because all of these independently illegal acts are means

of satisfying the same element—intent to criminally sexually abuse

a minor—including the statutory language in the indictment was

enough.

Even so, the Doaks argue, the indictment should still be

dismissed because omitting those statutes left them without notice

of the nature of the intent accusation against Mack. When we

assess an indictment to decide whether it provided sufficient

notice, we read it “as a whole” and give it “a common sense

construction.” United States v. Phillips, 4 F.4th 1171, 1176 (11th

Cir. 2021) (quotation omitted).

We see no such ambiguity here. When the indictment

charged the Doaks with transporting the girls to engage in illegal

sexual activity, it listed six trips between Alabama, Florida,

Cambodia, and Rhode Island; the dates of each trip; and the victims

Mack transported. See 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a). Mack was also charged

with crossing state lines on two of those same trips with the intent

to engage in a sexual act with the two younger girls. Read as a

whole, the indictment divulged the key detail about the criminal

sexual activity at issue—that Mack intended to sexually abuse the

girls himself. The Doaks were fully informed that Mack was

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accused of transporting his adopted daughters with the intent to

sexually abuse them and that Jaycee was accused of aiding and

abetting that transport. The Doaks were on notice that Mack’s

sexual interest in and abuse of his adopted daughters underpinned

the charges against them.

To be sure, it is best practice to include the statutes

criminalizing the sexual activity that the defendant planned to

inflict on the transported child. See, e.g., United States v.

Nicholson, 24 F.4th 1341, 1349 (11th Cir. 2022) (indictment citing

Florida and North Carolina sex crimes statutes). That best practice

was not followed here. Even so, the indictment was detailed

enough to notify the Doaks of the charges against them.

B.

The Doaks also claim to have found a jurisdictional flaw in

the indictment. The government, they say, failed to state an

offense against them because it used a statute that prohibits “travel

with intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct” and one that bars

“engaging in illicit sexual conduct in foreign places” to identify the

unlawful sexual activities Mack intended to commit when he

transported the girls in violation of § 2423(a). See 18 U.S.C.

§ 2423(b), (c). The Doaks argue that instead of banning

“prostitution or sexual activity” those statutes criminalize only

travel. In their view, that means the indictment not only failed to

charge Mack with intending to sexually abuse the girls, but also

charged Mack with no crime at all.

Though the Doaks failed to raise this issue below, we review

the claim de novo because it challenges our subject matter

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jurisdiction. United States v. Grimon, 923 F.3d 1302, 1305 (11th

Cir. 2019).

A district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over an

indictment only when it “alleges facts that conclusively negate the

existence of any offense against the laws of the United States.”

United States v. Leonard, 4 F.4th 1134, 1142 (11th Cir. 2021)

(alteration adopted and quotation omitted). That occurs “when

the alleged crime simply did not exist in the United States Code;

when the conduct alleged undoubtedly fell outside the sweep of

the cited statute; and where the violation was of a regulation that

was not intended to be a law for purposes of criminal liability.” Id.

(quotations omitted). The Doaks claim that their indictment fails

on the first ground.

It does not, for the very plain reason that it does not include

the statutory provisions that the Doaks complain render it

insufficient to charge a federal crime. In fact, the Doaks’ complaint

about the indictment all along has been that it omitted the

underlying statutes. And because those statutes were omitted, the

jurisdictional argument that they were wrongly included in the

indictment cannot succeed. “So long as the conduct described in

the indictment is a criminal offense,” even the complete “omission

of an element does not vitiate jurisdiction.” United States v.

Moore, 954 F.3d 1322, 1336 (11th Cir. 2020). Because the § 2423(a)

portion of the indictment properly charged a federal crime, the

Doaks’ jurisdictional challenge falls short. See id. at 1334.

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III.

Moving past the indictment, the Doaks challenge the

sufficiency of the evidence. They both say that Mack had innocent

intent when the family traveled between Alabama and Florida, and

when he brought his adopted daughters along with him on the trips

to Florida, Alabama, Cambodia, and Rhode Island. For her part,

Jaycee argues that even if Mack had a “hidden purpose” of sexually

abusing the girls, she was merely traveling with her family;

according to her, the government failed to prove that she “wished”

Mack would “succeed” in abusing their adopted daughters. These

sufficiency arguments fail.

A.

We review de novo whether sufficient evidence supports a

conviction. See United States v. Farley, 607 F.3d 1294, 1333 (11th

Cir. 2010). We resolve “all reasonable inferences in favor of the

verdict” and consider the evidence “in the light most favorable to

the government.” Id. (quotation omitted). And the evidence is

insufficient only if “no reasonable trier of fact could find guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.

To establish intent, the government had to prove that

Mack’s motive or purpose for traveling (the § 2241(c) offenses) and

for bringing the girls along on the different trips (the § 2423(a)

transport offenses) was to sexually abuse them. See Nicholson, 24

F.4th at 1349–50; Farley, 607 F.3d at 1335. That “illicit behavior

must be one of the purposes motivating the interstate

transportation”; it “need not be the dominant purpose,” but it

“may not be merely incidental to the trip.” United States v.

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Perkins, 948 F.3d 936, 939 (8th Cir. 2020) (quotation omitted).

Further, an alternative “plausible innocent explanation” is not

enough to prove that the conduct was not motivated by illicit

sexual activity. Farley, 607 F.3d at 1335.

The Doaks argue that the government cut corners by

presenting evidence of Mack’s regular “sex with minors who lived

in his home” alongside unrelated evidence that the family went on

a few trips. In their view, nothing “linked the family’s travel to the

alleged sexual abuse.” In fact, they say, the “overwhelming

evidence revealed that the purpose of the travel was financial or

social.”

Although the Doaks have offered other reasons for their

travels—say, to open a new business in Florida or to visit family in

Rhode Island—the jury could have readily concluded that Mack

intended to bring the girls along so that he could sexually abuse

them. Unsurprisingly, defendants charged with traveling to have

sex with children in violation of § 2241(c) are often able to produce

innocent purposes for their trips; Mack cannot elude liability by

claiming that he had other reasons for traveling. See id. The

question is whether Mack’s actions were motivated, at least in part,

by his desire to sexually abuse the girls.

Starting with the three charges that Mack moved to facilitate

the sexual abuse of the younger girls, sufficient evidence establishes

that Mack moved the family between Alabama and Florida to keep

his abuse concealed. See 18 U.S.C. § 2241(c). Before Mack and

Jaycee adopted the girls, the couple had lived in Rosharon, Texas

for around a decade. But when Mack began sexually abusing the

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20 Opinion of the Court 19-15106

girls, he also began to frequently uproot the family. Several of the

moves coincided with an imminent possibility that his sexual abuse

would be exposed. For example, as soon as Jaycee found out that

Mack was raping the girls—and discussed the issue with her sister-

in-law—the Doaks moved to Alabama, away from Jaycee’s family

in Texas. And the day after Brenda’s teacher started asking

questions about bruises on Brenda’s arm, the family moved from

Thomasville, Alabama to Monroeville, Alabama.

The jury surely could have concluded that Mack moved to

keep his adopted daughters isolated and avoid detection. Moving,

paired with other harsh treatment, kept them silent. Jaycee, for

example, verbally and physically abused the girls, escalating her

mistreatment whenever the girls asked her to protect them from

the abuse. A reasonable jury could identify the pattern and

conclude that staying on the move was part of Mack’s plan to

sexually abuse the girls. See United States v. Foster, 878 F.3d 1297,

1305 (11th Cir. 2018).

The charges that Mack transported the girls with the intent

to sexually abuse them referenced a broader set of trips, including

a short trip over Christmas to visit family in Rhode Island and the

trip to Cambodia. Because § 2423(a) is a transport offense, not a

travel offense, we ask why Mack brought the girls on the trips, not

why he planned the trips in the first place. So even if Mack can

provide innocent reasons for taking the trips, we consider all

aspects of his intent in bringing the girls along with him.

And here Mack’s consistent desire to sexually abuse the girls

provides the answer. See Nicholson, 24 F.4th at 1349–50. The

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evidence leaves no doubt that Mack dominated the girls’ lives and

coerced them into situations where he could sexually abuse them.

Sometimes he called them into his bedroom and played loud music

to disguise the fact that he was raping them. He would follow

them into the laundry room or the storage room and rape them

there too. Indeed, the jury heard evidence that he groped the girls

wherever he could—in the kitchen as they washed dishes, in the

back seat of the family van, and even in a public elevator.

A reasonable jury could easily conclude that Mack kept the

girls close by so that he could abuse them on demand. And it

follows that Mack brought the girls with him on the various trips

to have them accessible when he wanted to grope or rape them.

The jury had sufficient evidence to convict Mack of traveling and

bringing the girls with him to sexually abuse them.

B.

Jaycee separately challenges the sufficiency of the evidence

of her intent to aid and abet Mack’s violation of § 2423(a). Under

18 U.S.C. § 2, a person who aids and abets a criminal act can “be

found guilty as a principal.” United States v. Sosa, 777 F.3d 1279,

1292 (11th Cir. 2015) (quotation omitted). But such criminal

liability follows only if she “contributed to and furthered the

offense” and “intended to aid in its commission.” Id. Jaycee does

not dispute that she helped Mack transport the girls on their trips.

But she claims that she did not intend to help Mack violate

§ 2423(a)—she says she disapproved of his rampant sexual abuse.

But it does not matter whether Jaycee participated in the

trips “with a happy heart” or with “a sense of foreboding.”

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22 Opinion of the Court 19-15106

Rosemond v. United States, 572 U.S. 65, 80 (2014). For “purposes

of aiding and abetting law, a person who actively participates in a

criminal scheme knowing its extent and character intends that

scheme’s commission.” Id. at 77.

Jaycee does not dispute that she knew that Mack

consistently abused the girls or that it started as soon as the Doaks

adopted them. In Texas, she interrupted Mack raping Brenda in

the girls’ bedroom. And while the Doaks lived in Florida and

Alabama, Brenda asked Jaycee for help more than once after Mack

raped her. Laura and Leah also shared with Jaycee that Mack was

raping them. It follows that a reasonable jury could conclude from

this evidence that Jaycee knew that one reason Mack brought the

girls with him on the various trips was to sexually abuse them. Cf.

Nicholson, 24 F.4th at 1349–50. And despite knowing what the

girls would suffer, she helped Mack transport them anyway.

What’s more, Jaycee was no passive observer. A reasonable

jury could easily conclude that Jaycee helped Mack keep his abuse

a secret. She began abusing the girls herself—not sexually, it’s true,

but physically and verbally. She hit the girls, and called them

derogatory, sexualized names. She silenced them to conceal the

sexual abuse. Though Jaycee may have argued with Mack on a few

occasions and she almost took Brenda to the doctor after talking

with her sister-in-law—in the end, she refused to help. The

evidence of her initial resistance is not enough to preclude the jury

from finding that she acted with intent. See United States v.

Hurley, 755 F.2d 788, 790 (11th Cir. 1985) (proof of other acts can

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19-15106 Opinion of the Court 23

reveal a lack of intent). The evidence, in short, was sufficient to

support her conviction for aiding and abetting Mack’s abuse.

IV.

The Doaks also argue that the district court mishandled

several evidentiary issues. The court refused to admit evidence

that Jaycee’s adult brother Lay also had sex with Brenda. It allowed

expert testimony from an FBI forensic interviewer on debriefing

children suspected of suffering sexual abuse. It admitted a video of

Mack slapping Eddie to show that the Doaks used violence to

silence the children and keep Mack’s sexual abuse secret. Even if

these errors were individually harmless, they say, the cumulative

effect warrants reversal. But none of those evidentiary decisions,

in isolation or together, amount to reversible error.

A.

The Doaks say that the district court should have allowed

them to present evidence that Mack was not the true abuser. Their

theory of the case was that family members had fabricated the

sexual abuse allegations against Mack. Physical differences

between the girls would show, they asserted, that only Brenda had

experienced vaginal intercourse, and they wanted to admit

testimony that Lay, Jaycee’s brother, was her abuser. See United

States v. Culver, 598 F.3d 740, 749 (11th Cir. 2010).

Under Federal Rule of Evidence 412, “evidence offered to

prove that a victim engaged in other sexual behavior” is generally

inadmissible. Fed. R. Evid. 412(a)(1). But exceptions apply,

including for “evidence whose exclusion would violate the

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24 Opinion of the Court 19-15106

defendant’s constitutional rights.” Fed. R. Evid. 412(b)(1)(C). 2

Defendants have a right “under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to

introduce evidence in their defense.” Culver, 598 F.3d at 749

(quotation omitted). And while the district court retains “wide

latitude to impose reasonable limits on testimony” based on

concerns such as “harassment, prejudice, [or] confusion of the

issues,” those restrictions may not be “arbitrary or

disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve.” Id.

(alterations adopted and quotations omitted). We review a district

court’s application of Rule 412 for an abuse of discretion. Id.

Lay’s sexual relationship with Brenda, the Doaks say, would

have revealed why cameras were put up in the house and why Lay

went to the police and accused Mack of sexual abuse—to get Mack

out of the way and to conceal his own acts of statutory rape. Mack

also introduced evidence that, of the three sisters, only Brenda’s

hymen was not intact. The purpose of this evidence was to suggest

that only she had had vaginal intercourse. Mack wanted to

2 Mack also argues that he was entitled to introduce the evidence that Lay had

sex with Brenda to explain why her hymen was not intact under Rule

412(b)(1)(A), which permits “evidence of specific instances of a victim’s sexual

behavior, if offered to prove that someone other than the defendant was the

source of semen, injury, or other physical evidence.” But the exception applies

only when the government has “directly or indirectly asserted” that certain

“physical evidence originated with the accused.” Fed. R. Evid. 412 advisory

committee’s note to 1994 amendment. Here the government did not even

introduce the physical examinations of the three girls—Mack did. Mack

cannot fit the evidence through this exception.

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19-15106 Opinion of the Court 25

emphasize the story that Lay was the real abuser; he had not

demonstrated a sexual interest in the younger sisters.

We need not decide whether the district court erred

excluding the evidence, because at most it was only a harmless

error. To demonstrate the harmlessness of a constitutional error,

the government must prove “beyond a reasonable doubt that the

error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.”

United States v. Pon, 963 F.3d 1207, 1227 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting

Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967)). If the government

leaves us “firmly convinced that the evidence of guilt was so

overwhelming that the trier of fact would have reached the same

result without the tainted evidence,” then we will conclude that

the error was harmless. Cape v. Francis, 741 F.2d 1287, 1294–95

(11th Cir. 1984).

A review of the record shows that any error here was indeed

harmless. For one, the district court did not keep the Doaks from

arguing that other family members had ulterior motives in

accusing Mack of sexual abuse. It even allowed them to introduce

the fact that “Lay had a sexual interest in Brenda.” It recognized

that they needed a chance to explain “why the cameras were

installed” at their home, and to support their claim that Lay both

falsely reported Mack to the police and influenced Brenda’s siblings

“to make the same allegations.” The court also allowed the Doaks

to question Natalie about Lay’s relationship with Brenda. When

she denied having any concerns, they impeached her using her text

messages, which showed that she was monitoring Lay’s

interactions with Brenda. Lay and Jaycee’s father also testified he

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26 Opinion of the Court 19-15106

noticed Lay “sitting close by” Brenda and that Lay admitted having

“a sexual interest in Brenda.”

The government also produced physical evidence

confirming that Mack had sexually abused the girls. A semen-

stained mat was traced to Mack and Brenda, confirming Brenda’s

testimony that Mack had raped her in the storage room. And the

jury heard evidence that discounted any suggestion by Mack that

the fact that Laura’s and Leah’s hymens were still intact meant

their testimony that they were raped was false. A physician (that

Mack called as a witness) noted that a child might believe that a

man was having sex with her if his penis was simply touching her

vaginal opening, rubbing against it, ejaculating against it, or slightly

entering it—none of which would necessarily break the hymen.

The girls’ testimony of Mack’s repeated sexual abuse along

with the government’s other evidence leaves us no doubt that the

jury would have convicted the Doaks even if it had heard

testimony that Lay had also committed statutory rape against

Brenda. So even if it was error to exclude evidence that Lay had

sex with Brenda, the error was harmless.

B.

The Doaks also object to the FBI forensic interviewer’s

expert testimony. We review the district court’s decision to admit

expert testimony for abuse of discretion. United States v. Barton,

909 F.3d 1323, 1330 (11th Cir. 2018). The proponent of expert

testimony bears the burden of showing that its expert is qualified,

that the testimony is reliable, and that the explanations will help

the jury. United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1260 (11th Cir.

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19-15106 Opinion of the Court 27

2004) (en banc). To be admissible, “proposed expert testimony

must be supported by appropriate validation—i.e., ‘good grounds,’

based on what is known.” Id. at 1261 (alterations adopted) (quoting

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993)).

When a witness relies on experience, she must (1) explain how it

leads to and supports the conclusion she has reached and (2) show

how it can be reasonably applied to the facts. Id. (citing Fed. R.

Evid. 702 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment).

The Doaks claim that the expert’s testimony about how

“children disclose incidents of abuse” was not shown to be reliable

because she failed to explain how her experience supported her

opinions. They say that her testimony was not helpful to the

jury—that she only provided “common sense observations” and

that those observations prejudicially bolstered the girls’ credibility.

We disagree. The expert witness explained the forensic-

interview process and described how children pulled out of

suspected sexual-abuse situations disclosed that information. Her

testimony about the process was reliable because she had handled

six thousand such interviews herself. Her firsthand experience

equipped her to identify trends in how children process abuse and

disclose it. Because her testimony described her experience

interviewing children suspected to be sex abuse victims, it offered

a reliable framework to provide to the jury.

And it was a helpful framework, too. As the jurors prepared

to listen to Brenda, Laura, and Leah testify about being raped

repeatedly and suffering traumatic sex abuse, the expert testimony

provided context to help the jurors understand why the girls

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28 Opinion of the Court 19-15106

responded differently. See, e.g., United States v. Aungie, 4 F.4th

638, 645 (8th Cir. 2021). It helped the jurors assess why Brenda

disclosed the abuse almost immediately and only to Jaycee, and

why it took longer for the younger girls to ask for help.

The Doaks’ last resort is to claim that the testimony was

prejudicial and should have been excluded under Rule 403. But as

explained above, the expert testimony helped the jury, and we

conclude that its benefit was not substantially outweighed by any

prejudicial effect it might have had. See Fed. R. Evid. 403. The

district court thus did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the

expert testimony.

C.

The district court also acted within its discretion when it

admitted a video of Mack slapping Eddie, the girls’ brother, to

show that “the children did not report the alleged sexual abuse

because they were afraid of physical and verbal abuse if they did

report.” Mack says the slap was an unrelated act, requiring

exclusion as improper character evidence under Rule 404(b) or as

unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403.

The video was neither of those. For one thing, the

combination of threats and physical abuse the adopted children

suffered at the hands of the Doaks was “an integral and natural part

of an account of the crime” and were “necessary to complete the

story of the crime for the jury.” United States v. Edouard, 485 F.3d

1324, 1344 (11th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted). It was not

character evidence. The physical abuse displayed in the video

helped explain why the Doaks’ adopted children felt threatened by

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19-15106 Opinion of the Court 29

Mack and Jaycee, which may have contributed to the years they

silently endured his sexual abuse. The video was thus admissible

despite the limits of Rule 404(b). And the district court’s proper

limiting instruction—admonishing the jury not to rely on it as

“evidence that they committed the acts charged in the

indictment”—cured any prejudice. See Barton, 909 F.3d at 1338.

D.

That leaves Mack’s claim that cumulative error infected the

trial. “We review the cumulative impact of trial errors de novo,

and reverse only if, in total, the non-reversible errors result in a

denial of the constitutional right to a fair trial.” United States v.

Maurya, 25 F.4th 829, 842 (11th Cir. 2022) (quotation omitted). But

only one (harmless) error remains at most, and a harmless error

alone cannot have rendered Mack’s trial unfair. Id.

V.

The parties also raise several challenges to the district court’s

sentencing decisions—the government to Jaycee’s term of

imprisonment, and Mack to various financial penalties and

assessments. We consider each below.

A.

The government argues that Jaycee’s sentence—the

statutory minimum—is substantively unreasonable. We review

the substantive reasonableness of a sentence for an abuse of

discretion. United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir.

2010) (en banc). A district court strays beyond the range of

reasonable sentences when, based on the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)

sentencing factors, it “(1) fails to afford consideration to relevant

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30 Opinion of the Court 19-15106

factors that were due significant weight, (2) gives significant weight

to an improper or irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a clear error of

judgment in considering the proper factors.” Id. (quotation

omitted).

The government says that the district court veered from the

§ 3553(a) factors when it cut Jaycee’s sentence based on its doubts

about sufficiency (despite its own ruling that the evidence was

sufficient) and the fact that she did not rape the girls herself. But

§ 3553(a) directs the sentencing court to consider “the nature and

circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of

the defendant.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). Jaycee helping with

transport and concealing the sexual abuse rather than raping or

groping the girls herself is a relevant circumstance the district court

could at least consider. Whether we would put so much weight on

these facts is not the question—the abuse of discretion standard

offers wide latitude for district courts. Irey, 612 F.3d at 1189.

The government protests that the court’s consideration of

those facts conflicted with United States v. Jayyousi, where we

disapproved of reducing sentences for inchoate crimes on the

principle of “no harm, no foul.” See 657 F.3d 1085, 1118 (11th Cir.

2011). It is true that Jaycee must not receive better treatment

merely because she only helped Mack—an aider and abettor is as

culpable as and “punishable as a principal.” 18 U.S.C. § 2. If the

district court had reduced Jaycee’s sentence on the view that she

only helped Mack rather than violating § 2423(a) herself, that

would have been a mistake. But the district court did not do so.

Though it questioned the sufficiency of the evidence for Jaycee’s

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19-15106 Opinion of the Court 31

conviction, it properly suggested that appeal was the venue for

airing those concerns. The district court thus avoided weighing

improper factors.

The government also argues that the district court

overlooked Jaycee’s physical abuse of the children and her lack of

remorse when assessing the nature and circumstances of her

offense. The record shows otherwise. The court discussed how

Jaycee “was physically abusive to the children” and “fostered an

atmosphere” which allowed Mack to sexually abuse them. And it

considered how she “agreed to protect their welfare” when she

adopted them but then abdicated that responsibility.

The government’s final criticism is that the district court

prioritized the wrong factors. And that is certainly a close call here.

Each of the girls testified that Mack’s actions went far beyond a

transportation offense—throughout their years living with him, he

would on a whim pull them into his room or the laundry room and

rape them. Jaycee aiding and abetting Mack enabled him to inflict

serious harm on the girls. She even physically abused them herself.

While it may be unlikely that Jaycee will repeat this behavior,

Jaycee’s sentence should show that such cooperation will be firmly

punished.

But when reviewing for an abuse of discretion, there are

“occasions in which we affirm the district court even though we

would have gone the other way had it been our call.” Irey, 612 F.3d

at 1189 (quotation omitted). This is one of those cases. Jaycee’s

sentence falls at the very bottom of what could be a reasonable

sentence—indeed, it is the statutory minimum of the offense. 18

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32 Opinion of the Court 19-15106

U.S.C. § 2423(a). Given the discretion district courts have in

sentencing, though, we cannot conclude that this sentence is

unreasonable.

B.

Mack contests the special assessment the district court

imposed under 18 U.S.C. § 3014. He claims that the court clearly

erred when it held that he was not indigent, because he “has a

negative net worth, limited accessible assets, no current source of

income, and no ability to pay a fine.” We review the district court's

decision that a defendant can afford a special assessment for clear

error. See United States v. McGuinness, 451 F.3d 1302, 1307 (11th

Cir. 2006).

The district court held that Mack was not indigent because

he and Jaycee previously failed to disclose that they owned real

property in Rosharon, Texas. (After the property was discovered,

it was sold and the proceeds were allocated to cover restitution.)

“Evidence that a defendant has failed to disclose” assets may

“support a determination that the defendant is able to pay a fine

with those undisclosed assets.” Id. at 1308 (quotation omitted). So

it was not improper for the district court to rely on Mack’s omission

to conclude that he was not indigent and levy a special assessment.

C.

Mack also argues that requiring him to pay $225,000 in

restitution was unreasonable. The district court concluded that

therapy for the girls would cost at least $150,000, and that the

Doaks needed to pay Natalie $75,000 for caring for the children for

the 18 months leading up to sentencing. Mack claims that the

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19-15106 Opinion of the Court 33

therapist’s estimate of the girls’ therapy costs was unreasonable

because she practiced in Alabama, not Texas where the girls live.

And he argues that the living expenses Natalie provided were

inflated by the costs of caring for her own children and the siblings

of the victims; he also argues that the amount did not factor in the

Social Security benefits two of the girls received.

We review a district court’s award of restitution de novo,

but review underlying factual findings for clear error. United States

v. Washington, 434 F.3d 1265, 1267 (11th Cir. 2006). Mack

challenges only factual findings.

The purpose of restitution is to make victims whole by

reimbursing “the amount of loss actually caused by the defendant’s

conduct.” United States v. Sheffield, 939 F.3d 1274, 1277 (11th Cir.

2019) (quotation omitted). That includes estimated therapy costs,

“as long as the award reflects a reasonable estimate of those costs

and is based on record evidence.” United States v. Osman, 853 F.3d

1184, 1190 (11th Cir. 2017).

The district court calculated the girls’ expected therapy costs

based on the testimony of a licensed clinical psychologist who

specializes in child sexual abuse victims. She testified that the girls

should receive multiple years of weekly therapy followed by

sporadic therapy as needed throughout the rest of their lives. The

girls exhibited symptoms so severe that she recommended care

from a “doctoral level provider who has experience working with

trauma.” In Mobile, Alabama, those services would cost around

$165 per hour. Even though the girls had moved from Alabama to

Texas, the district court did not clearly err when it relied on this

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34 Opinion of the Court 19-15106

testimony to calculate the girls’ therapy costs. $150,000 was a

reasonable estimate.

The same cannot be said of calculation of the living

expenses. Natalie estimated that she spent between $3000 and

$4000 each month on living expenses—but admitted that the

amount is what she paid for all eight children in her care. The

district court did not account for that fact and ordered the Doaks

to pay Natalie over $4000 per month. Even though we do not

impose a rigid formula for calculating restitution, the government

must provide “reliable and specific evidence.” Sheffield, 939 F.3d

at 1278 (quotation omitted). And here the specific evidence shows

that the district court’s calculation was too high. It was clear error

to order the Doaks to pay more than what Natalie admitted was an

overestimate of the living expenses.

* * *

Mack Doak traveled with three young girls intending to

sexually abuse them. And despite knowing that her husband was

raping and abusing the girls, Jaycee Doak committed physical and

mental abuse of her own rather than helping the girls as she

sometimes promised. What she did help with was family travel,

which further perpetuated the abuse. Though the Doaks raise

numerous challenges to the indictment, to the sufficiency of the

evidence, and to the district court’s evidentiary decisions at trial,

none warrant reversal.

We therefore AFFIRM the Doaks’ convictions. We also

AFFIRM Jaycee Doak’s sentence and Mack Doak’s special

assessment, AFFIRM IN PART the restitution order as to therapy

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19-15106 Opinion of the Court 35

costs and VACATE IN PART as to living expenses, and REMAND

for proceedings consistent with this opinion.