Javier Vanegas v. City of Pasadena

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JAVIER VANEGAS, No. 21-55478

Plaintiff-Appellant,

D.C. No.

v. 2:20-cv-07845-

SVW-AGR

CITY OF PASADENA; CITY OF

PASADENA POLICE DEPARTMENT;

KLOTZ, Individually; in his/her OPINION

capacity as Police Officer for

Pasadena Police Department;

ARELLANES, Individually; in his/her

capacity as Police Officer for

Pasadena Police Department; STARK,

Individually; in his/her capacity as

Police Officer for Pasadena Police

Department; RIEHL, Individually; in

his/her capacity as Police Officer for

Pasadena Police Department;

MURREN, Individually; in his/her

capacity as Police Officer for

Pasadena Police Department;

LEMOS, Individually; in his/her

capacity as Police Officer for

Pasadena Police Department;

SALAZAR, Individually; in his/her

capacity as Police Officer for

Pasadena Police Department;

BUNDY, Individually; in his/her

capacity as Police Officer for

2 VANEGAS V. CITY OF PASADENA

Pasadena Police Department; DOES,

1–10, individually, and in their

capacity as Police officers for

Pasadena Police Department,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Stephen V. Wilson, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted March 2, 2022

Pasadena, California

Filed August 31, 2022

Before: Daniel A. Bress and Patrick J. Bumatay, Circuit

Judges, and Roger T. Benitez, * District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Bumatay;

Concurrence by Judge Bumatay;

Concurrence by Judge Bress;

Concurrence by Judge Benitez

*

The Honorable Roger T. Benitez, United States District Judge for

the Southern District of California, sitting by designation.

VANEGAS V. CITY OF PASADENA 3

SUMMARY **

Civil Rights

The panel affirmed the district court’s summary

judgment in favor of the City of Pasadena and Pasadena

police officers in an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 alleging that plaintiff was unlawfully arrested.

At issue was whether police officers had probable cause

to arrest plaintiff either for reports that he followed and

harassed an attorney outside a courthouse or for plaintiff’s

refusal to identify himself during an investigatory stop.

Defendants asserted that they had probable cause to arrest

plaintiff on two grounds: (1) disturbing the peace under

California Penal Code § 415(2); and (2) obstructing an

officer under California Penal Code § 148(a)(1).

Plaintiff first argued that, because he was arrested under

California Penal Code § 148(a)(1), that means it was

disputed whether probable cause existed under § 415(2).

The panel disagreed, stating first that it was well-established

that if the facts support probable cause for one offense, an

arrest may be lawful even if the officer invoked, as the basis

for the arrest, a different offense which lacked probable

cause. Second, by the time of plaintiff’s arrest, the officers

learned enough facts to believe that plaintiff had violated

§ 415(2) and therefore had probable cause to make the arrest.

Having found no violation of the Fourth Amendment, there

was no need to proceed to the second question of the

**

This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

4 VANEGAS V. CITY OF PASADENA

qualified immunity analysis—whether the unlawfulness of

the officers’ conduct was not “clearly established.”

Plaintiff next asserted that the officers lacked probable

cause to arrest him under California Penal Code § 148(a)(1)

because the failure to identify oneself by itself does not

violate the law. The panel held that no “controlling

authority” or “robust consensus of cases” prohibited Officer

Klotz from arresting plaintiff under the facts confronting

him. Neither this court nor the Supreme Court has said that

arresting a person for failing to provide an identification

violates the Constitution. Thus, even if plaintiff’s failure to

identify himself did not provide probable cause to arrest

under § 148(a)(1)—a question that the panel did not need to

decide—Officer Klotz had breathing room to make the

purported mistake of law and he and the other officers were

entitled to qualified immunity for plaintiff’s arrest. The

panel further affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff’s claim

against the City on a failure-to-train theory because plaintiff

failed to establish a pattern of similar constitutional

violations by untrained employees.

Concurring, Judge Bumatay stated that although the

panel properly affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff’s false-

arrest claim on qualified immunity, he was left wondering

whether California Penal Code § 148(a)(1) authorizes

officers to arrest a person based on the refusal to produce

identification during a police investigation. Judge Bumatay

found no California court case that categorically holds that

the failure to identify oneself to an officer during a police

investigation—without more—furnishes probable cause to

arrest under § 148(a)(1). So even though the officers must

receive qualified immunity here, plaintiff might be right that

officers lacked probable cause to arrest him for violating

§ 148(a)(1). In rebuttal to Judge Bress’s concurrence, Judge

VANEGAS V. CITY OF PASADENA 5

Bumatay stated that his concern is that federal courts may

have gotten ahead of California courts in interpreting the

law; it promotes the law to clarify whether the officers made

a mistake by arresting plaintiff; this question was squarely

presented in this appeal; and if California law was so clear it

should have been an easy task to come up with California

caselaw supporting Judge Bress’s view.

Concurring, Judge Bress was compelled to write

separately in this straightforward case only to address Judge

Bumatay’s separate concurring opinion, which expounds on

California criminal law and suggests that various federal

court decisions interpreting California law may be wrongly

decided. Judge Bress wrote to make clear that, in his

respectful view, Judge Bumatay’s evaluation of California

law was both unnecessary to the resolution of this case and

substantively incorrect, advocating a narrow interpretation

of California Penal Code § 148(a)(1) that California courts

have not embraced. Here, plaintiff threatened an attorney

following a court proceeding. That alone provided probable

cause for his arrest under California Penal Code § 415(2), as

the majority opinion correctly held. And so that was

sufficient to dispose of Vanegas’s § 1983 claim asserting a

Fourth Amendment violation for allegedly wrongful arrest.

Concurring, Judge Benitez agreed with the court that

summary judgment was properly granted for the City of

Pasadena and its police officers. He wrote separately to

explain that this was an easy case. Although, undoubtedly,

an arrest for refusing to give one’s name without at least

reasonable suspicion would be an unreasonable seizure

under the Fourth Amendment, that was not this case. Here,

a crime had been reported. Plaintiff’s name was reasonably

related to the circumstances justifying the stop and central to

the investigation of a crime, whether the crime was stalking

6 VANEGAS V. CITY OF PASADENA

(Cal. Pen. Code § 646.9) or maliciously disturbing another

by loud noise (Cal. Pen. Code § 415). At that point, the

detective had probable cause to arrest for either offense and

he had probable cause to arrest for violating Cal. Pen. Code

§ 148(a)(1) when plaintiff refused to disclose his name.

COUNSEL

Krista R. Hemming (argued), The Hemming Firm, San

Pedro, California, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Arnold F. Lee (argued), Assistant City Attorney; Michele

Beal Bagneris, City Attorney; Office of the City Attorney,

Pasadena, California; for Defendants-Appellees.

VANEGAS V. CITY OF PASADENA 7

OPINION

BUMATAY, Circuit Judge:

At issue in this civil rights lawsuit is whether police

officers had probable cause to arrest Javier Vanegas either

for reports that he followed and harassed an attorney outside

a courthouse or for his refusal to identify himself during an

investigatory stop. The district court found that officers had

probable cause for both crimes. We hold that Vanegas’s

42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim fails, and we affirm.

I.

Background

This lawsuit stems from events immediately following

Vanegas’s 2019 divorce proceedings at the Superior

Courthouse in Pasadena, California. Vanegas appeared at

the family court hearing, along with his ex-wife, Sandra

Kerguelen, and her attorney, Karen Suri. According to Suri,

Vanegas raised his voice and yelled at Suri and the judge

during the hearing. As a result, the judge admonished

Vanegas to control himself or face sanctions. After the

hearing, Suri asked a court bailiff to help her and Kerguelen

leave without Vanegas following them. The bailiff stood in

front of Vanegas, blocking the way so that Suri and

Kerguelen could exit.

After Suri and Kerguelen left the courthouse, Vanegas

followed them. Vanegas started yelling aggressively at Suri.

Suri and Kerguelen tried to walk away, but Vanegas

continued to follow while calling Suri a “scumbag” and

“liar.” Vanegas eventually came within arm’s reach of Suri.

Feeling threatened, Suri told Vanegas that she would call the

police. But he still didn’t leave. Suri then dialed 911. Suri

8 VANEGAS V. CITY OF PASADENA

told the operator that there was a man following her, yelling

at her on the street, and that she was afraid and needed help.

At that point, Suri saw a Pasadena Police Department

Community Service Officer and flagged him down. Suri

told the officer that Vanegas was following her and that she

did not feel safe. The officer asked Suri to walk to the police

station across the street to file a report. Suri and Kerguelen

did so.

Pasadena Police Officer Philip Klotz was at the

courthouse on other business. While there, he heard an alert

over the police radio about a 911 caller being followed

outside the courthouse. So Officer Klotz exited the

Courthouse and headed toward the southeast corner of

Garfield Avenue and Walnut Street. As he walked to the

intersection, Officer Klotz received an update, advising that

the suspect, named “Javier Vanegas,” was walking

northbound on Garfield Avenue. After Officer Klotz

reached the intersection, he observed only one man, later

identified as Vanegas, heading north on Garfield Avenue.

Officer Klotz asked Vanegas whether his name was

“Javier.” Vanegas responded by asking Officer Klotz who

he was. Officer Klotz identified himself as a law

enforcement officer and asked Vanegas for his

identification. Despite at least three requests for

identification, Vanegas did not comply and instead took out

his cell phone to record the interaction. Officer Klotz then

gave Vanegas the option of either producing his

identification or being placed in handcuffs. Vanegas still

refused to identify himself.

After several other officers arrived, Officer Klotz placed

Vanegas in handcuffs for officer safety. Afterward, Officer

Klotz received a radio call that Vanegas violated California

VANEGAS V. CITY OF PASADENA 9

Penal Code § 415—a disturbing-the-peace ordinance.

Officer Klotz asked other officers to have Suri identify

Vanegas. Officer Klotz received confirmation over the radio

that Suri positively identified Vanegas as the person who

was following her.

While other officers remained with Vanegas, Officer

Klotz walked across the street to speak with Suri. Officer

Klotz saw Suri almost crying and visibly shaking. Suri

relayed that Vanegas began following her and Kerguelen

after the family court hearing. After interviewing Suri,

Officer Klotz walked back to Vanegas and advised him that

he was under arrest. The officers then took Vanegas to the

Pasadena police station for booking. Vanegas was

eventually released with a citation for violating California

Penal Code § 148(a)(1), which punishes obstructing a peace

officer. The Office of the City Attorney for Pasadena

declined to pursue charges and Vanegas was never convicted

of any offense stemming from his arrest.

A few months later, Vanegas sued the police officers

involved and the City of Pasadena alleging, among other

claims, violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment

rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The officers and the City

moved for summary judgment. In granting summary

judgment, the district court ruled that probable cause existed

to arrest Vanegas under California Penal Code §§ 148(a)(1)

and 415(2) and so there was no Fourth Amendment

violation. The court also held that Vanegas did not establish

Monell liability against the City. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.

Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).

Vanegas appeals the dismissal of his § 1983 claim. We

review the grant of summary judgment de novo. Branch

Banking & Tr. Co. v. D.M.S.I., LLC, 871 F.3d 751, 759 (9th

Cir. 2017). We first address Vanegas’s claim against the

10 VANEGAS V. CITY OF PASADENA

officers and then turn to his claim against the City. As to

both claims, we affirm.

II.

§ 1983 Claim Against the Officers

To prevail under § 1983, Vanegas must show that

(1) Pasadena police officers “violated a federal statutory or

constitutional right” and (2) “the unlawfulness of their

conduct was clearly established at the time.” District of

Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589 (2018) (simplified).

So the inquiry is two-fold. Did the officers violate

Vanegas’s constitutional rights? And if so, were those rights

clearly established at the time?

On the first question, Vanegas’s challenge implicates the

Fourth Amendment since he claims he was unlawfully

“seized.” In the context of a § 1983 action, a Fourth

Amendment violation occurs when a person is arrested

“without probable cause or other justification.” Lacey v.

Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 918 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc)

(simplified). Probable cause to arrest exists when there is a

“fair probability or substantial chance of criminal activity”

by the arrestee based on the totality of the circumstances

known to the officers at the time of arrest. Id. (simplified).

This “is not a high bar.” Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S.

320, 338 (2014).

On the second question, even with a constitutional

violation, officers may still receive qualified immunity if the

unlawfulness of their conduct was not “clearly established”

at the time of arrest. By “clearly established,” we mean that

the “contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a

reasonable official would understand that what he is doing

violates that right.” Acosta v. City of Costa Mesa, 718 F.3d

VANEGAS V. CITY OF PASADENA 11

800, 824 (9th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (simplified). In other

words, “existing law must have placed the constitutionality

of the officer’s conduct beyond debate.” Wesby, 138 S. Ct.

at 589 (simplified). And we only look to “controlling

authority” or “a robust consensus of cases of persuasive

authority” to determine settled law. Id. at 589–90

(simplified).

While Vanegas asserts he was unlawfully arrested, the

officers maintain that they had probable cause to arrest him

on two grounds: (1) disturbing the peace under California

Penal Code § 415(2); and (2) obstructing an officer under

California Penal Code § 148(a)(1). And even if no probable

cause existed under state law, they contend they are still

entitled to qualified immunity given there was no violation

of clearly established law. We look at each basis for arrest

in turn.

A.

California Penal Code § 415(2)

California Penal Code § 415(2) punishes “[a]ny person

who maliciously and willfully disturbs another person by

loud and unreasonable noise.” “Maliciously” means a wish

to “vex, annoy, or injure another person, or an intent to do a

wrongful act, established either by proof or presumption of

law.” Cal. Penal Code § 7(4). “Willfully” means “a purpose

or willingness to commit the act.” Id. § 7(1). To comply

with the First Amendment, California courts have construed

§ 415(2) to prohibit loud noises in only two circumstances:

(1) “where there is a clear and present danger of imminent

violence,” or (2) “where the purported communication is

used as a guise to disrupt lawful endeavors.” In re Brown,

510 P.2d 1017, 1023 (Cal. 1973). So the ordinance only

12 VANEGAS V. CITY OF PASADENA

criminalizes loud noise “designed to disrupt rather than

communicate.” Id. at 1022.

Under California law, “making loud noises, shouting

obscenities, and making threats” constitute a violation of

§ 415(2). In re Curtis S., 155 Cal. Rptr. 3d 703, 763–64 (Cal.

Ct. App. 2013). In that case, a defendant shouted and used

obscene language at the victim, told her to “get back, you

better get back,” called her a “bitch,” and swung his fist at

her. Id. at 760. The defendant’s speech caused the victim to

back away in fear. Id. The court upheld the charge under

§ 415(2) because the defendant’s speech “presented a clear

and present danger of imminent violence and was designed

to disrupt a lawful endeavor.” Id. at 763.

Vanegas argues that, because he was arrested under

California Penal Code § 148(a)(1), that means it’s disputed

whether probable cause existed under § 415(2). We

disagree.

First, it does not matter that Officer Klotz stated that the

basis of Vanegas’s arrest was under § 148(a)(1). It is well-

established that “[i]f the facts support probable cause . . . for

one offense,” an arrest may be lawful “even if the officer

invoked, as the basis for the arrest, a different offense” which

lacks probable cause. United States v. Magallon-Lopez,

817 F.3d 671, 675 (9th Cir. 2016); see also Edgerly v. City

& Cnty. of San Francisco, 599 F.3d 946, 954 (9th Cir. 2010)

(“[P]robable cause supports an arrest so long as the arresting

officers had probable cause to arrest the suspect for any

criminal offense, regardless of their stated reason for the

arrest.”).

Second, by the time of Vanegas’s arrest, the officers

learned of enough facts to believe that Vanegas had violated

§ 415(2). Suri called 911 and reported that a man was

VANEGAS V. CITY OF PASADENA 13

following her, yelling at her on the street, and that she was

afraid and needed help. She then told a Pasadena

Community Service Officer that she feared Vanegas because

he was following her and shouting at her. Suri also

positively identified Vanegas to officers as the person who

followed her. Finally, when Officer Klotz walked over to

Suri, he saw she was visibly shaking. Based on the

collective knowledge of the officers, there was a fair

probability that Vanegas’s noises constituted “a clear and

present danger of imminent violence” and a “disrupt[ion of]

lawful endeavors.” In re Brown, 510 P.2d at 1023.

There is one wrinkle. Violation of § 415(2) is a

misdemeanor. See Cal. Penal Code § 17(b). Under

California law, an officer may only make a warrantless arrest

for a misdemeanor if he has probable cause to believe that

the person committed the offense in the officer’s presence.

Cal. Penal Code § 836(a)(1). So if Vanegas’s arrest was

based on § 415(2), then the officers may have violated

California law because his conduct was not in Officer

Klotz’s presence. But that does not change the result. That’s

because “[t]he requirement that a misdemeanor must have

occurred in the officer’s presence to justify a warrantless

arrest is not grounded in the Fourth Amendment.” Barry v.

Fowler, 902 F.2d 770, 772 (9th Cir. 1990). So to establish a

violation of the Fourth Amendment, it does not matter if

Officer Klotz was present when Vanegas committed the

misdemeanor. Rather, the “crucial inquiry” is whether

Officer Klotz had probable cause to make the arrest. Id. at

773. Here, we hold that he did.

Having found no violation of the Fourth Amendment, we

need not proceed to the second question of whether the

officers violated a “clearly established” right for Vanegas’s

14 VANEGAS V. CITY OF PASADENA

offense under § 415(2). So on this basis alone, Officer Klotz

lawfully arrested Vanegas.

B.

California Penal Code § 148(a)(1)

California Penal Code § 148(a)(1) punishes “[e]very

person who willfully resists, delays, or obstructs any public

officer [or] peace officer, . . . in the discharge or attempt to

discharge any duty of his or her office or employment.” The

officers contend that Vanegas’s actions fall within its

prohibition since his refusal to identify himself obstructed

Officer Klotz’s investigation of a potential stalking case. In

response, Vanegas argues that California law does not

require a person to identify himself to police officers. He

contends that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest him

under California Penal Code § 148(a)(1) because the failure

to identify oneself by itself does not violate the law.

But to succeed on his § 1983 claim, Vanegas must

overcome qualified immunity by showing that the officers

violated a clearly established right at the time of his arrest.

Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 589. “A right is clearly established

when it is sufficiently clear that every reasonable official

would have understood that what he is doing violates that

right.” Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, 142 S. Ct. 4, 7 (2021)

(per curiam) (simplified). This is a forgiving standard: it

“protects all but the plainly incompetent.” Ashcroft v. al-

Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011) (simplified).

“Qualified immunity gives government officials

breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments

about open legal questions.” Lopez ex rel. Lopez v. Gelhaus,

871 F.3d 998, 1005 (9th Cir. 2017) (simplified). So, it’s not

enough that the legal answer be “suggested by then-existing

VANEGAS V. CITY OF PASADENA 15

precedent”; the answer must be “so well defined” that “the

legal principle clearly prohibit[s] the officer’s conduct in the

particular circumstances before him.” Wesby, 138 S. Ct.

at 590. In other words, qualified immunity still attaches

when officers “reasonably but mistakenly concluded that

probable cause [wa]s present.” Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 591

(simplified); see also Fuller v. M.G. Jewelry, 950 F.2d 1437,

1442–43 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Even absent probable cause,

qualified immunity is available if a reasonable police officer

could have believed that his or her conduct was lawful, in

light of clearly established law and the information the

searching officers possessed.”).

No “controlling authority” or “robust consensus of

cases” prohibited Officer Klotz from arresting Vanegas

under the facts confronting him. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 589

(simplified). Neither this court nor the Supreme Court has

said that arresting a person for failing to provide an

identification violates the Constitution. In fact, we have both

said the opposite. See Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. of Humboldt

Cnty., 542 U.S. 177, 187–88 (2004) (upholding a state law

permitting arrest for failure to identify oneself—where the

request for identification is reasonably related to

circumstances justifying the stop—as “consistent with

Fourth Amendment prohibitions against unreasonable

searches and seizures”); United States v. Landeros, 913 F.3d

862, 869 (9th Cir. 2019) (“In some circumstances, a

suspect may be required to respond to an officer’s request

to identify herself, and may be arrested if she does not.”).

And no California case clearly establishes that Officer

Klotz should have known he lacked probable cause to arrest

Vanegas for failing to identify himself in the course of the

stalking investigation. Indeed, multiple district courts,

including the one here, thought Officer Klotz could make the

16 VANEGAS V. CITY OF PASADENA

arrest. See Nakamura v. City of Hermosa Beach, 2009 WL

1445400, at *8 (C.D. Cal. 2009); Abdel-Shafy v. City of San

Jose, 2019 WL 570759, at *7 (N.D. Cal. 2019); Vanegas v.

City of Pasadena, 2021 WL 1917126, at *6 (C.D. Cal. 2021).

And so did we. See Kuhlken v. Cnty. of San Diego, 764 F.

App’x 612 (9th Cir. 2019).

Thus, even if Vanegas’s failure to identify himself did

not provide probable cause to arrest under § 148(a)(1)—a

question we need not and do not decide—Officer Klotz had

“breathing room” to make the purported mistake of law and

he and the other officers are entitled to qualified immunity

for Vanegas’s arrest.

III.

§ 1983 Claim Against the City

Vanegas also appeals the dismissal of his § 1983 claim

against the City of Pasadena. Civil rights suits against local

governments for constitutional violations by its officers

cannot proceed on respondeat superior liability. AE ex rel.

Hernandez v. Cnty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 636 (9th Cir.

2012). Known as Monell liability, a plaintiff must instead

establish that “the local government had a deliberate policy,

custom, or practice that was the moving force behind the

constitutional violation they suffered.” Id. (simplified); see

also Monell, 436 U.S. at 691.

Monell liability can turn on a municipality’s failure to

train its officers, but the failure must amount to a “deliberate

indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police

come into contact.” Flores v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 758 F.3d

1154, 1158 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting City of Canton v. Harris,

489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)). To allege such a failure, the

plaintiff must establish “sufficient facts to support a

VANEGAS V. CITY OF PASADENA 17

reasonable inference (1) of a constitutional violation; (2) of

a municipal training policy that amounts to a deliberate

indifference to constitutional rights; and (3) that the

constitutional injury would not have resulted if the

municipality properly trained their employees.” Benavidez

v. Cnty. of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1153−54 (9th Cir.

2021). Monell liability is “at its most tenuous where a claim

turns on a failure to train.” Id. at 1154 (simplified).

Vanegas alleged a failure to train and argues that factual

disputes exist on whether the City of Pasadena failed to train

its officers on the “well-established” right to refuse to

identify oneself prior to arrest. But, as we discussed above,

we doubt that any such right is so “well established” that its

alleged omission from training would constitute deliberate

indifference on the part of the City. See Flores, 758 F.3d

at 1158 (the failure to train must be “a conscious or

deliberate choice on the part of a municipality” (simplified)).

And a failure-to-train theory of Monell liability usually

requires a “pattern of similar constitutional violations by

untrained employees.” See id. at 1159 (quoting Connick v.

Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62 (2011)). Vanegas fails to

establish such a pattern here. See also Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs

of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 407–08 (1997)

(explaining that a “one-time negligent administration” of a

training program does not “tend to show . . . the lack of

proper training”). We thus affirm the dismissal of Vanegas’s

claim against the City.

IV.

Because probable cause supports his arrest under

California Penal Code § 415(2) and qualified immunity

shields the officers from liability for his arrest under

18 VANEGAS V. CITY OF PASADENA

California Penal Code § 148(a)(1), we hold that Vanegas is

not entitled to relief under § 1983.

AFFIRMED.

BUMATAY, Circuit Judge, concurring:

Although we properly affirmed the dismissal of Javier

Vanegas’s false-arrest claim on qualified immunity, I’m left

wondering whether California Penal Code § 148(a)(1)

authorizes officers to arrest a person based on the refusal to

produce identification during a police investigation.

This question is important because probable cause

generally defeats a claim like Vanegas’s, Nieves v. Bartlett,

139 S. Ct. 1715, 1727 (2019), and we look to state law to

determine “[w]hether an officer is authorized to make an

arrest,” Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 36 (1979).

So, I think it’s reasonable to consider whether

§ 148(a)(1) provided the probable cause to arrest Vanegas

under the facts here. I suspect it doesn’t.

*

California Penal Code § 148(a)(1) punishes “[e]very

person who willfully resists, delays, or obstructs any public

officer [or] peace officer, . . . in the discharge or attempt to

discharge any duty of his or her office or employment.”

Several federal cases have interpreted the law to mandate

cooperation with an officer’s request to produce

identification during a valid police investigation. See, e.g.,

Kuhlken v. Cnty. of San Diego, 764 F. App’x 612, 613 (9th

VANEGAS V. CITY OF PASADENA 19

Cir. 2019) (unpublished) (“Deputy Smith had probable

cause to arrest Fox for a violation of California Penal Code

§ 148(a)(1) . . . . It is undisputed that Fox refused to provide

identification upon request[.]”); Abdel-Shafy v. City of San

Jose, 2019 WL 570759, at *7 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (“Once

Plaintiff refused to identify herself, the Officers then had the

probable cause to arrest her for resisting, obstructing, or

delaying the investigation under Cal. Penal Code

§ 148(a)(1).”); Nakamura v. City of Hermosa Beach, 2009

WL 1445400, at *8 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (“Plaintiff . . .

hamper[ed] the investigation by refusing to provide either

his name or identification,” which provided probable cause

to arrest under § 148(a)(1)). As a matter of plain text and

common sense, these decisions are reasonable

interpretations of the law. After all, failing to produce an

identification will often delay a police investigation.

But California courts have not been so quick to endorse

that view of § 148(a)(1). Instead, under California law, the

scope of the law appears more nuanced. No California court,

for example, has definitively ruled that § 148(a)(1)

criminalizes the mere failure to identify oneself to police

officers during a valid police investigation. While several

California cases have blessed § 148(a)(1) arrests involving

the failure to produce identification, those cases seemingly

required something more.

Take a recent example—People v. Knoedler, 257 Cal.

Rptr. 3d 586, 589 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 2019). There,

the defendant was caught with an open beer can on the street

and an officer asked him for an identification to issue him a

citation. Id. at 587. The defendant refused and was charged

with resisting under § 148(a)(1). Id. at 588. While accepting

that the “failure to identify oneself cannot, on its own, justify

an arrest” under § 148(a)(1), the court upheld the arrest

20 VANEGAS V. CITY OF PASADENA

because the “officer was attempting to write defendant a

citation for a municipal code infraction.” Id. at 589. The

arrest was valid because officers had both “reasonable

suspicion for the initial detention and probable cause to cite

[the] defendant.” Id. “Without any way to identify the

person who is being cited,” the court concluded that “the

police cannot perform their duties.” Id.

Another California court suggested that “a simple refusal

to identify one’s self” doesn’t violate § 148(a)(1). People v.

Lopez, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 921, 924 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004). In

that case, the court affirmed a § 148(a)(1) conviction when

the defendant was “belligerent, refused to give his name,

refused to keep his hands visible, and refused to submit to a

patdown.” Id. But the court made clear that the defendant’s

arrest was a “far cry” from a mere “refusal to identify

himself.” Id. Instead, the lack of cooperation was “coupled

with” belligerent conduct that interfered with the officer’s

patdown search. Id.

On the other hand, a § 148(a)(1) charge is appropriate for

failing to disclose one’s identity in the “narrow context of a

booking interview” for a felony arrest. People v. Quiroga,

20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 446, 450–51 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993). After a

felony arrest takes place, the court held that “[w]ithout

knowing the identity of a suspect, it is impossible to arrange

for bail or to conduct an arraignment” and it would

“impede[] the administration of justice.” Id. at 452. But the

court drew the distinction narrowly. Before a felony arrest,

the court warned that “the statute must be applied with great

caution.” Id. at 450. So, for example, the court noted that a

person who protested repeatedly before complying with an

officer’s orders could not be prosecuted under § 148(a)(1)

because such actions were protected by the First

Amendment. Id. at 448. Indeed, one California court has

VANEGAS V. CITY OF PASADENA 21

held that even refusing to give identification after a

misdemeanor arrest, but pre-booking, isn’t prosecutable

under § 148(a)(1). See In re Chase C., 196 Cal. Rptr. 3d 381,

392 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015).

And finally, back in 1980, another California court

questioned whether “a person who merely refuses to identify

himself or to answer questions” violates § 148(a)(1). In re

Gregory S., 169 Cal. Rptr. 540, 548 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).

There, when a 15-year-old boy refused to identify himself or

respond to the questions of an officer investigating a

neighbor’s complaint of “mischief,” the court held the

officer had no ground to arrest him. Id. at 543, 548. In part,

the court concluded that the officer already partially knew

the boy’s identity so it was doubtful that his refusal to

identify himself delayed the investigation. Id. at 548. But

the court also noted that the California Legislature had

required persons to identify themselves in several prescribed

situations, see, e.g., Cal. Veh. Code §§ 40302, 12951, and

that because none of those statutory conditions existed, a

§ 148(a)(1) charge was improper. Id.

In sum, I have found no California court case that

categorically holds that the failure to identify oneself to an

officer during a police investigation—without more—

furnishes probable cause to arrest under § 148(a)(1). Indeed,

California courts have suggested the opposite. Nor have the

officers here offered a California case finding probable cause

for § 148(a)(1) under similar facts. See Edgerly v. City &

Cnty. of San Francisco, 599 F.3d 946, 954 (9th Cir. 2010)

(Probable cause “must . . . exist under some specific criminal

statute.”). So even though the officers must receive qualified

22 VANEGAS V. CITY OF PASADENA

immunity here, Javier Vanegas might be right that officers

lacked probable cause to arrest him for violating § 148(a)(1).

*

I welcome Judge Bress’s spirited disagreement with my

analysis of California law. Such debates, I hope, will help

clarify the law. I make just a few points in rebuttal.

First, I am truly agnostic on whether § 148(a)(1) should

permit the arrest of a person who fails to identify themselves

to investigating officers. My concern here is that federal

courts may have gotten out ahead of California courts in

interpreting the law.

Second, I agree with Judge Bress that the Fourth

Amendment protects officers who make reasonable mistakes

about whether the law supports an arrest. See Heien v. North

Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 66 (2014). But it promotes the law

to clarify whether a mistake was made in the first place.

Third, contrary to Judge Bress’s view, this question was

squarely presented in this appeal. Deciding this case on

other grounds doesn’t make the issue irrelevant.

And finally, if Judge Bress is right that California law is

so clear, it should have been an easy task to come up with

California caselaw supporting his view. The lack of any

should give us all pause.

BRESS, Circuit Judge, concurring:

I am compelled to write separately in this straightforward

case only to address Judge Bumatay’s separate concurring

VANEGAS V. CITY OF PASADENA 23

opinion, which expounds on California criminal law and

suggests that various federal court decisions interpreting

California law may be wrongly decided. I write to make

clear that, in my respectful view, Judge Bumatay’s

evaluation of California law is both unnecessary to our

resolution of this case and substantively incorrect,

advocating a narrow interpretation of California Penal Code

§ 148(a)(1) that California courts have not embraced. 1

I

Judge Bumatay writes separately on the question of

whether California law “holds that the failure to identify

oneself to an officer during a police investigation—without

more—furnishes probable cause to arrest under

§ 148(a)(1).” Concurrence 21. That question is not

presented in this case. Vanegas threatened an attorney

following a court proceeding. That alone provided probable

cause for his arrest under California Penal Code § 415(2), as

the majority opinion correctly holds. Maj. Op. 11–12. And

so that is sufficient to dispose of Vanegas’s § 1983 claim

asserting a Fourth Amendment violation for allegedly

wrongful arrest.

There was also independent probable cause to arrest

Vanegas for violating California Penal Code § 148(a)(1),

which punishes “[e]very person who willfully resists, delays,

or obstructs any public officer [or] peace officer, . . . in the

discharge or attempt to discharge any duty of his or her office

or employment.” Officer Klotz did not just stop Vanegas

1

All my references to the concurring opinion refer to Judge

Bumatay’s separate concurring opinion, not Judge Benitez’s separate

concurrence (the latter expresses some views that are similar to mine

here).

24 VANEGAS V. CITY OF PASADENA

randomly on the street and demand identification; he stopped

Vanegas in response to a report of a person who was

threatening another near a courthouse. Given the centrality

of Vanegas’s identity to the investigation, officers had

probable cause to arrest Vanegas under § 148(a)(1) for

“resist[ing], delay[ing], or obstruct[ing]” a lawful

investigation into a § 415(2) violation—a violation for

which officers already had probable cause to arrest Vanegas

in the first place. See Edgerly v. City & County of San

Francisco, 599 F.3d 946, 953 (9th Cir. 2010) (an officer has

probable cause to arrest if the facts and circumstances “were

sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the

[suspect] had committed or was committing an offense”)

(quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964)).

The majority opinion holds that the officers should

receive qualified immunity for any arrest under § 148(a)(1)

because it was not clearly established that they lacked

probable cause to make an arrest on that basis. Maj. Op. 14–

16. That is true as far as it goes, which is what allows me to

join the majority opinion in full. Of course, this holding is

itself merely an alternative ground for decision because

officers had probable cause to arrest Vanegas for violating

§ 415(2), as the majority opinion earlier concludes. So, this

is an easy case: Vanegas violated at least two California

criminal laws, there was probable cause to arrest him under

either or both, and at the very least the officers get qualified

immunity.

Judge Bumatay’s concurrence nonetheless opines on

whether “the failure to identify oneself to an officer during a

police investigation—without more—furnishes probable

cause to arrest under § 148(a)(1)” (by “more,” I take the

concurrence to mean “more” than refusal to provide

identification in response to a valid Terry stop, see Terry v.

VANEGAS V. CITY OF PASADENA 25

Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)). Concurrence 21. There is no

reason to opine on that issue here because even if “more” is

required for a violation of California criminal law, we have

the “more” here, namely, the earlier violation of § 415(2),

for which there was already independent probable cause to

arrest Vanegas. We cannot disaggregate the sequence of

events here into the earlier harassment and the later refusal

to provide identification; the latter was directly connected to

the former.

As a matter of federal constitutional law under the Fourth

Amendment, the Supreme Court’s decision in Hiibel v. Sixth

Judicial District Court of Nevada, Humboldt County,

542 U.S. 177, 187–88 (2004), resolves that a person can be

lawfully arrested for failure to provide identification during

a valid Terry stop, if the request for identification is

reasonably related to the stop. There is no question that

officers here at the very least had reasonable suspicion to

stop Vanegas under Terry (indeed, the majority opinion

holds they had probable cause to arrest him under § 415(2)).

So the only point on which Judge Bumatay’s concurrence is

separately opining is whether California’s substantive

criminal law in § 148(a)(1) should be interpreted more

narrowly than the nearly identically worded Nevada law that

the Supreme Court addressed in Hiibel.

That question of California law is not only not presented

on the facts of this case, deciding it would be unnecessary

even with the right facts. With sufficient supporting

information, officers are entitled to make arrests based on

reasonable, even if ultimately mistaken, views of the law.

See, e.g., Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 66 (2014);

Barrera v. City of Mt. Pleasant, 12 F.4th 617, 620–21 (6th

Cir. 2021). Even if the facts presented it in this case, we still

would not need to resolve whether California law would

26 VANEGAS V. CITY OF PASADENA

criminalize a failure to provide identification in response to

a valid Terry stop, or whether something “more” would be

required.

Why? Because the officers’ belief that they had probable

cause to arrest in that situation would at least be a reasonable

interpretation of California law. And because it is

reasonable, “we need not decide exactly what [§ 148(a)(1)]

means.” Barrera, 12 F.4th at 621; see also id. at 624

(explaining that “we need not resolve each mete and bound

of” a state criminal statute because “[w]e need only decide

whether the officers’ interpretation sinks to unreasonable”).

The majority opinion winds up in essentially the same place

by resolving the § 148(a)(1) question under the second prong

of the qualified immunity analysis. See Maj. Op. 14–16; see

also Barrera, 12 F.4th at 624–25 (noting that whether a court

concludes there is no constitutional violation or no clearly

established law, “either one permits a federal court to resolve

a qualified-immunity defense without deciding exactly what

state law means”).

I thus see no reason to broach the not-presented, legally

irrelevant question of California state law that Judge

Bumatay’s concurrence considers. Questions of state law,

including the reach of state criminal law, are for the states in

the first instance. Sometimes we find ourselves needing to

address them in a given case. But there is no reason to do so

here, especially when the interpretation of California law

that seemingly concerns Judge Bumatay would be

constitutional under Hiibel.

II

Because Judge Bumatay’s concurring opinion has raised

the issue, however, it is worth making clear that I do not

think its reading of California law is correct. The

VANEGAS V. CITY OF PASADENA 27

concurrence asserts that “California courts have suggested”

that a person cannot be arrested based on the refusal to

produce identification to a police officer during a valid Terry

stop. Concurrence 21. That seems to me incorrect: the

California cases the concurrence cites do not demonstrate

that something more than a valid Terry stop is required

before a refusal to provide identification comes within the

prohibitory bounds of § 148(a)(1).

Consider People v. Knoedler, 257 Cal. Rptr. 3d 586 (Cal.

App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 2019). The concurrence suggests

Knoedler “accept[ed]” that “the ‘failure to identify oneself

cannot, on its own, justify an arrest’ under § 148(a)(1).”

Concurrence 19 (quoting Knoedler, 257 Cal. Rptr. 3d

at 589). But rather than “accepting” that proposition,

Knoedler—which affirmed a § 148(a)(1) conviction—

merely quoted it from Belay v. City of Gardena, 2017 WL

1628398 at *4 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2017). Belay, in turn,

quoted and relied on earlier Ninth Circuit cases that were

decided before Hiibel, and that contain statements of law

squarely at odds with that case. See Belay, 2017 WL

1628398 at *4 (quoting United States v. Christian, 356 F.3d

1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 2004)) (citing Martinelli v. City of

Beaumont, 820 F.2d 1491, 1494 (9th Cir. 1987); Lawson v.

Kolender, 658 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1981); and Carey v.

Nevada Gaming Control Bd., 279 F.3d 873, 881 (9th Cir.

2002)). Knoedler therefore does not support the

concurrence’s interpretation of California law.

The concurrence points also to People v. Lopez, 13 Cal.

Rptr. 3d 921 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004), claiming that the court

there “suggested” that “‘a simple refusal to identify one’s

self’ does not violate § 148(a)(1).” Concurrence 20. But

Lopez does not “suggest” that. The defendant in Lopez, who

was suspected of threatening a woman and potentially

28 VANEGAS V. CITY OF PASADENA

carrying a gun, was “combative,” kicked officers who were

attempting to pat him down, and refused to comply even

after officers shot him with a nonlethal beanbag. 13 Cal.

Rptr. 3d at 923. Lopez therefore presented a clear-cut

violation of § 148(a)(1). In noting that the defendant’s

resistance went far beyond refusing to identify himself,

Lopez did not suggest that a refusal to self-identify cannot

amount to a violation of § 148(a)(1). See id. The court was

merely emphasizing that the case before it was an easy one,

and it was distinguishing Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47

(1979), in which officers demanded identification while

“lack[ing] any reasonable suspicion” of criminal conduct.

See Lopez, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 924 (quoting Brown, 443 U.S.

at 53) (emphasis added). Lopez was not purporting to define

any kind of floor for violating § 148(a)(1).

The other cases the concurrence cites were themselves

distinguished in Knoedler. Knoedler distinguished People v.

Quiroga, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 446 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993), on the

grounds that it considered the defendant’s refusal to identify

himself after arrest. Knoedler 257 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 589.

Knoedler explained that a misdemeanor defendant’s post-

arrest failure to disclose his identity does “not delay or

obstruct the arresting officer because ‘[t]he arrest ha[s]

already been effected’ and the defendant ha[s] not yet been

brought to the jail for booking.” Id. (quoting Quiroga,

20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 449) (alteration in original). Knoedler

distinguished In re Chase C., 196 Cal. Rptr. 3d 381 (Cal. Ct.

App. 2015), for the same reason. See Knoedler, 257 Cal.

Rptr. 3d at 589–90.

In contrast, Vanegas here refused to identify himself to

an officer who had not yet arrested him and who was

searching for him by name. And although the concurrence

correctly notes that Quiroga called for “great caution” when

VANEGAS V. CITY OF PASADENA 29

applying § 148(a)(1), this warning was based upon the

court’s concern that applying the statute to speech could

sometimes run afoul of the First Amendment. Quiroga,

20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 450. No such concern has been raised

here. Even so, Quiroga itself noted that “[n]o decision has

interpreted [§ 148(a)(1)] to apply only to physical acts, and

the statutory language does not suggest such a limitation.”

Id.

Finally, Knoedler also distinguished In re Gregory S.,

169 Cal. Rptr. 540, 548 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980), another case

on which the concurrence relies. Although that case found

no violation of § 148(a)(1) based on the defendant’s failure

to identify himself, “the court made it clear its holding was

fact-specific.” Knoedler, 257 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 590 (citing In

re Gregory S., 169 Cal. Rptr. at 548). Indeed, in that case,

the officer recognized the defendant from previous

interactions, and already knew his surname and address. In

re Gregory S., 169 Cal. Rptr. at 543, 548. Under those

circumstances, the defendant’s failure to provide his first

name “could not have ‘delayed the officer to a degree

justifying arrest.’” Knoedler 257 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 590

(quoting In re Gregory S. 169 Cal. Rptr. at 548).

Gregory S. thus does not support any broader

conclusions about the reach of § 148(a)(1), as the

concurrence would ascribe. The concurrence quotes

Gregory S. as “question[ing] whether ‘a person who merely

refuses to identify himself or to answer questions’ violates

§ 148(a)(1).” Concurrence 21 (quoting Gregory S., 169 Cal.

Rptr. at 548). But the full quote is: “We find no authority to

support the [trial] court’s legal conclusion that a person who

merely refuses to identify himself or to answer questions in

a context similar to that before us thereby violates Penal

30 VANEGAS V. CITY OF PASADENA

Code section 148 or otherwise furnishes ground for arrest.”

Gregory S., 169 Cal. Rptr. at 548 (emphasis added).

In sum, California courts have not suggested that a mere

refusal to identify oneself cannot justify a conviction or

arrest under § 148(a)(1) unless there is something “more”

than reasonable suspicion for the precipitating stop.

California courts could of course so hold. But I would have

refrained from unnecessarily suggesting that they have. 2

Because Judge Bumatay’s concurrence rests on an

overreading of California case law, it also errs in implying

that three federal decisions—Kuhlken v. County of San

Diego, 764 F. App’x 612 (9th Cir. 2019), Abdel-Shafy v. City

of San Jose, 2019 WL 570759 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2019)

(Koh, J.), and Nakamura v. City of Hermosa Beach, 2009

WL 1445400 (C.D. Cal. May 20, 2009) aff’d, 372 F. App’x

787 (9th Cir. 2010)—may have misinterpreted the scope of

§ 148(a)(1). Concurrence 18–19. There is no reason to think

that is true. And none of these cases involved a random

demand from a police officer for identification.

In Kuhlken, an officer responded to a report that a

woman had used her car to run over another person.

Kuhlken v. County of San Diego, 2018 WL 454444 at *2

(S.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2018), aff’d, 764 F. App’x 612 (9th Cir.

2019). Because of the involvement of a vehicle, the woman

was obligated to provide her driver’s license to the officer

under California Vehicle Code § 12951. Id. at *6. Yet when

2

Judge Bumatay faults me for not citing a California case

definitively stating that failure to provide identification in response to a

valid Terry stop qualifies as a violation of § 148(a)(1). Concurrence 22.

But it is not my position that such a case exists. My position is that Judge

Bumatay’s concurrence errs in suggesting that California courts have

endorsed the opposite rule.

VANEGAS V. CITY OF PASADENA 31

the officer requested the woman’s identification, she refused

to provide it and physically resisted being detained. Id.

at *4. Under these circumstances, we did not err when we

concluded that the officer had probable cause to arrest the

woman under § 148(a)(1) (and § 12951(b)), in the course of

investigating “a potentially serious crime.” 764 F. App’x

at 613.

Similarly, in Abdel-Shafy, 2019 WL 570759, the plaintiff

was arrested for violating § 148(a)(1). The plaintiff had

taken part in a verbal altercation with a man she did not

know, and the plaintiff’s husband subsequently showed up

and apparently assaulted the man. Id. at *1–2 & n.1. When

officers arrived, the man identified the plaintiff and her

husband as the parties involved in the dispute. Id. at *1. The

plaintiff refused to identify herself despite repeated requests

and warnings that she would be arrested if she continued to

refuse. Id. at *2. The plaintiff was arrested and ultimately

charged with violating § 148(a)(1). Id.

When she later brought unlawful arrest claims under

§ 1983, the district court dismissed her claims. Id. at *8. The

court’s holding was explicitly premised on its

determinations that the plaintiff was subject to a lawful Terry

stop, and that the officers’ request for identification was

reasonably related to that stop. Id. I see no reason to doubt

the district court’s conclusion in that case.

Finally, the concurrence suggests that Nakamura, 2009

WL 1445400, held that a mere refusal to identify oneself

alone provides probable cause to arrest under § 148(a)(1).

Concurrence 19. But in Nakamura, a person identified as a

possible stalker had failed to stop walking away despite an

officer’s repeated instructions to stop, giving the officer the

reasonable impression that the suspect was trying to flee.

2009 WL 1445400 at *4, *6, *8. Even once the suspect

32 VANEGAS V. CITY OF PASADENA

acknowledged the officer and stopped, he refused to provide

his identification. Id. at *8. The district court concluded

that, “[t]aken as a whole, [the suspect’s] uncontroverted

behavior provided [the officer] with probable cause to arrest

him” for violating § 148(a)(1). Id. (emphasis added). Again,

nothing in California case law suggests this reasonable

determination was infirm. Indeed, Judge Bumatay’s

concurrence itself acknowledges that the three federal cases

he identifies reflect “reasonable interpretations of the law”

based on “plain text and common sense.” Concurrence 19.

* * *

In short, California case law does not support the

limitations Judge Bumatay’s concurrence would impose on

§ 148(a)(1), nor is there reason to question the federal cases

he identifies. But my broader point is that the debate here is

beside the point: future § 1983 cases involving § 148(a)(1)

will not need to resolve the exact scope of that provision, just

as we have no need to resolve it here. Nor could we resolve

it anyway. The matter is for the California courts to decide.

BENITEZ, District Judge, concurring:

I agree with the court that summary judgment was

properly granted for the City of Pasadena and its police

officers. I write separately to explain that this is an easy

case.

Appellant paints this as a case of the police

unconstitutionally arresting him for simply refusing to

divulge his identity. Although, undoubtedly, an arrest for

refusing to give one’s name without at least reasonable

suspicion would be an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth

VANEGAS V. CITY OF PASADENA 33

Amendment, that is not this case. This was not a slow crime

day for the police. Time was not passing idly by with no

police work to do and a quiet police radio. The officer was

not walking down streets and interrogating citizens about

crimes yet to come. That would be an unreasonable seizure.

Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979).

No. In this case, a crime had been reported. From his

police radio, the police officer had a description (a man), a

place (walking north near the courthouse on Garfield

Avenue), and a name: Javier Vanegas. When Officer Klotz

found a lone man walking near the courthouse travelling

north on Garfield Avenue he stopped the suspect and asked

for his name. Vanegas’ name was reasonably related to the

circumstances justifying the stop. His name was central to

the investigation of a crime, whether the crime was stalking

(Cal. Pen. Code § 646.9) or maliciously disturbing another

by loud noise (Cal. Pen. Code § 415). At that point, the

detective had probable cause to arrest for either offense and

he had probable cause to arrest for violating Cal. Pen. Code

§ 148(a)(1) when Vanegas refused to disclose his name.

Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177, 187–88

(2004). Otherwise, the police officer would have been

facing a Hobson’s choice: if the suspect did not identify

himself, the officer would have to either let the suspect

escape or possibly arrest and traumatize an innocent citizen.

That would be unreasonable.

Even if the officer did not have probable cause to arrest

for the reported crime, Vanegas obstructed a permissible

investigation. “The Fourth Amendment does not require a

policeman who lacks the precise level of information

necessary for probable cause to arrest to simply shrug his

shoulders and allow a crime to occur or a criminal to escape.

On the contrary, Terry recognizes that it may be the essence

34 VANEGAS V. CITY OF PASADENA

of good police work to adopt an intermediate response. . . .

A brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine

his identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while

obtaining more information, may be most reasonable in light

of the facts known to the officer at the time.” Adams v.

Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145–146 (1972) (emphasis added).

And reasonableness is the cornerstone of the Fourth

Amendment.