stating, in a Title VII retaliation case, that “[t]he burden of causation can be met by showing close temporal proximity between the statutorily protected activity and the adverse employment action,” but that “mere temporal proximity, without more, must be very close” (internal quotation marks omitted)
How later courts described this case
- stating, in a Title VII retaliation case, that “[t]he burden of causation can be met by showing close temporal proximity between the statutorily protected activity and the adverse employment action,” but that “mere temporal proximity, without more, must be very close” (internal quotation marks omitted)
- holding that while temporal proximity can alone establish a causal connection between protected activity and adverse employment action, a three to four month gap between the statutorily protected expression and the adverse employment action is too long to establish causality
- explaining that our caselaw requires a “very close” temporal relationship between protected activity and adverse action and that a three-to-four- month “disparity between the statutorily protected [action] and the adverse employment action is not enough”
- holding that for retaliation claims “mere temporal proximity, without more, must be very close,” and a “three to four month disparity between the statutorily protected expression and the adverse employment action is not enough”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
___________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 07-10233 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
November 9, 2007
____________________________
THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 06-00193-CV-W-N
CECILIA THOMAS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
COOPER LIGHTING, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
___________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama
____________________________
(November 9, 2007)
Before MARCUS and PRYOR, Circuit Judges, and HANCOCK,* District Judge.
PER CURIAM:
______________________
*Honorable James Hughes Hancock, Senior United States District Judge for the Northern
District of Alabama, sitting by designation.
Cecilia Thomas appeals the decision of the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Alabama dismissing her Title VII retaliation claim on summary
judgment. After review and oral argument, we affirm.
I. Background
Cecilia Thomas worked at Cooper Lighting, Inc. (“Cooper”) on a full time
basis as an assembler and floater from February 2004 until July 2005 under the
supervision of Eddie Cain. On the evening of April 8, 2005, Thomas accused Cain
of sexual harassment. On April 11, 2005, Thomas presented the Human Resource
Manager of the facility, James Davis, with a written complaint of sexual harassment.
That complaint outlined two specific sexually-tinged comments and stated that Cain’s
communication was “sexually nasty.”
Thomas’s employment with Cooper was terminated effective July 7, 2005. The
reason given by Cooper for the separation was excessive absenteeism consistent with
the company’s “no fault” Absentee Policy and Procedure.
On March 1, 2006, Thomas commenced this employment discrimination action
against Cooper, alleging hostile work environment sexual harassment and retaliation
in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C.
sections 2000e et seq. In her October 24, 2006 Response to Defendant's Motion to
Compel Discovery of Plaintiff's Health Records and Rule 35 Examination, Thomas
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voluntarily dismissed the sexual harassment cause of action, leaving only the
retaliation claim. She contends that Cooper retaliated against her by terminating her
employment on July 7, 2005.
At the close of discovery, Cooper filed a motion for summary judgment on the
remaining claim. The district court granted that motion, finding that Thomas’s
allegations did not come close to the threshold of a hostile work environment required
by Title VII, and therefore Thomas did not have an objectively reasonable belief that
the complained-of conduct violated Title VII.
II. Standard of Review
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. See Damon v. Fleming
Supermarkets of Fla., Inc., 196 F.3d 1354, 1357 (11th Cir. 1999). Summary
judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine issue of material fact and . . . the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L. Ed.2d 265
(1986). A genuine factual dispute exists “if the jury could return a verdict for the
non-moving party.” Damon, 196 F.3d at 1358 (quoting United States v. Four Parcels
of Real Property, 941 F.2d 1428, 1437 (11th Cir. 1991) (en banc)). In examining the
record, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
See Damon, 196 F.3d at 1358.
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III. Discussion
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, “the plaintiff must
show (1) that she engaged in statutorily protected expression; (2) that she suffered an
adverse employment action; and (3) that there is some causal relation between the two
events.” Meeks v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, 15 F.3d 1013, 1021 (11th Cir. 1994)
(internal citations omitted). The parties hotly contest whether Thomas held an
objectively reasonable belief that the complained-of conduct constituted an unlawful
employment practice and thus, necessarily, whether Thomas established the first
element of her prima facie case for the retaliation claim. See Berman v. Orkin
Exterminating Co., Inc., 160 F.3d 697, 702 (11th Cir. 1998) (“In order to state a
retaliation claim, the plaintiff need only show that he had a ‘reasonable belief’ that
an unlawful employment practice was occurring, and is not required to show that the
employer actually engaged in an unlawful employment practice.”); see also Lipphardt
v. Durango Steakhouse of Brandon, Inc., 267 F.3d 1183, 1187 (11th Cir. 2001)
(explaining that the plaintiff is required to show that a “good faith, reasonable belief”
of harassment led her to report the conduct). However, this court need not decide
whether Thomas held such a “good faith, reasonable belief” because the record
reveals that Thomas has failed to produce evidence from which a reasonable jury
could find a causal connection between the April 8 and 11, 2005 complaints and the
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July 7, 2005 termination. The causation issue was expressly raised in Cooper’s
Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, and
the parties had the opportunity to thoroughly brief this issue. We may affirm the
district court's judgment on any ground that appears in the record, whether or not that
ground was relied upon or even considered by the court below. See Powers v. United
States, 996 F.2d 1121, 1123-24 (11th Cir. 1993).
The burden of causation can be met by showing close temporal proximity
between the statutorily protected activity and the adverse employment action. See
Brungart v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 231 F.3d 791, 798-99 (11th Cir. 2000). But
mere temporal proximity, without more, must be “very close.” Clark County Sch.
Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273, 121 S.Ct. 1508, 1511, 149 L. Ed.2d 509 (2001)
(internal citations omitted). A three to four month disparity between the statutorily
protected expression and the adverse employment action is not enough. See id.
(citing Richmond v. ONEOK, 120 F.3d 205, 209 (10th Cir. 1997) (3 month period
insufficient) and Hughes v. Derwinski, 967 F.2d 1168, 1174-75 (7th Cir. 1992) (4
month period insufficient)). Thus, in the absence of other evidence tending to show
causation, if there is a substantial delay between the protected expression and the
adverse action, the complaint of retaliation fails as a matter of law. See Higdon v.
Jackson, 393 F.3d 1211, 1220 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Wascura v. City of South
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Miami, 257 F.3d 1238, 1248 (11th Cir. 2001)).
In opposing summary judgment, Thomas failed to present evidence from which
a reasonable jury could find any causal connection between her April 2005
complaint(s) of sexual harassment and the termination of her employment three (3)
months later in July 2005. That three (3) month period, without more, does not rise
to the level of “very close.” See Clark County Sch. Dist., 532 U.S. at 273.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the decision of the district court.
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