Dontray Chaney v. City of Orlando, FL

[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FILED

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

APR 11, 2007

No. 06-12647 THOMAS K. KAHN

________________________ CLERK

D. C. Docket No. 04-00515-CV-ORL-22KRS

DONTRAY CHANEY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

CITY OF ORLANDO, FLORIDA,

a municipal corporation, and

JONATHAN CUTE,

Defendants-Appellees.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

_________________________

(April 11, 2007)

Before BIRCH and PRYOR, Circuit Judges, and NANGLE,* District Judge.

BIRCH, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff-Appellant Dontray Chaney brought an action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, against the City of Orlando, Florida, and Officer Jonathan Cute, an

Orlando police officer, alleging claims for wrongful arrest, excessive force, and

malicious prosecution. After the jury returned a special verdict in Chaney’s favor,

Officer Cute made a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, pursuant to

Rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which the district court

granted. Because we conclude that the district court erred in granting Officer

Cute’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, we REVERSE the district

court’s judgment as to Officer Cute and REMAND this case for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. BACKGROUND

The evidence adduced at trial, which we must view in a light most favorable

to Chaney as the party against whom judgment was entered as a matter of law, is as

follows. In the early evening of 5 June 2003, Chaney was en route to Mercy

Market, a convenience store located at 1430 Mercy Drive in Orlando, to pick up a

few items. Chaney was driving a 1996 Pontiac Grand Am that belonged to his

*

Honorable John F. Nangle, Senior U.S. District Judge for the Eastern District of

Missouri, sitting by designation.

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cousin, Antawain Green. The Grand Am had a plastic cover over the vehicle’s rear

license tags. After Chaney made a right turn onto Mercy Drive from the Palms

Apartment complex, Officer Cute stopped him. Officer Cute illuminated his police

cruiser’s blue lights, and Chaney pulled the Grand Am into the parking lot of the

Mercy Market and placed it in park.

After stopping the vehicle, Chaney opened his car door and began to exit the

vehicle in an attempt to ascertain the reason for the traffic stop. At that time

Chaney was holding his license in his hand. As Chaney was stepping out of the

car, Officer Cute, who was approximately four to five feet away and was fast

approaching, told Chaney to “get back in the fucking car.” R14 at 8; R3-65, Exh. 1

at 13. Chaney then sat back down in the driver’s seat, placed his feet back inside

the vehicle with the driver side door still “cracked,” and placed his hands in his lap

with his driver’s license in his hand. Chaney asked Officer Cute the reason for the

stop, but instead of answering him, Officer Cute reached into the vehicle to pull the

keys out of the car’s ignition. Chaney attempted to stop Officer Cute by placing

his hand over the ignition, and asked the officer what he was doing. Officer Cute

then grabbed Chaney’s arm and twisted it behind his back, grabbed Chaney by the

neck in a “choke hold,” and pulled Chaney out of the car. R14 at 9; R3-65, Exh. 1

at 15.

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After pulling Chaney out of the vehicle, Officer Cute dropped Chaney to the

ground and placed his knee between Chaney’s shoulder blades in an attempt to pin

Chaney on his stomach. Officer Cute placed one of Chaney’s hands in handcuffs.

Officer Cute then held a “Taser” 1 to Chaney’s head and asked Chaney: “do [you]

want some?” R14 at 10. Chaney testified that he did not attempt to resist arrest or

struggle with Officer Cute while he was pinned to the ground, but that he again

asked Officer Cute what he was doing. At this time, only one of Chaney’s hands

had been placed in handcuffs; Chaney’s other hand was still loose. Officer Cute

then stood up and, with Chaney still pinned on the ground, tased him. Chaney

testified that being tased caused him to lose control over his body, and that he “felt

like [he] was going to die.” R3-65, Exh.1 at 17-18.

After being tased, Chaney rolled over onto his back and attempted to sit up,

but Officer Cute tased Chaney a second time and rolled him back onto his stomach.

Officer Cute then placed his foot on Chaney’s head and “squish[ed]” it on the

1

The term “Taser” refers to an electronic device used to subdue persons without causing

fatal harm. A Taser is a battery-charged unit approximately the size and appearance of a

flashlight. It holds two replaceable cartridges, each containing a hooked barb, or dart, attached

to the cartridge by a long, electricity-conducting insulated wire. Each dart can be fired

independently by depressing the corresponding lever located on the frame of the Taser. When

the probes make contact with the target, the Taser transmits high voltage electrical current along

the wires and into the body of the target. In addition, after the Taser’s initial “shot” has been

fired and contact has been made, an electrical current may be transmitted through the wire to the

target by repeatedly pressing on the Taser’s lever. See Draper v. Reynolds, 369 F.3d 1270, 1273

n.3 (11th Cir. 2004) (describing a Taser); Russo v. City of Cincinnati, 953 F.2d 1036, 1040 n.1

(6th Cir. 1992) (same).

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pavement “like he put out a cigarette,” R14 at 13, which caused an abrasion on

Chaney’s cheek. Officer Cute placed the other handcuff on Chaney’s loose hand.

Chaney remained on the ground while other officers arrived at the scene. Chaney

claims that he recalls an officer, apparently one of Officer Cute’s superiors,

arriving at the scene and telling Officer Cute that “[Chaney] didn’t need to be

[t]ased any more.” R3-65, Exh.1 at 19. Chaney was helped up from the ground

and was led to a police cruiser.

At this point a crowd of onlookers had gathered at the Mercy Market. As

the officers led Chaney to a police car, he asked a member of the crowd if she

would call his mother and tell her what had happened to him. The bystander asked

Chaney for his phone number. As Chaney began to answer, Officer Cute “grabbed

. . . a pressure point in [Chaney’s] throat by [his] Adam’s apple,” and told him

“don’t say a fucking word.” R14 at 14. Officer Cute then slammed Chaney’s

head onto the trunk of the police cruiser.

Chaney was subsequently taken to a location near the incident, for further

questioning. Chaney testified that, en route, an officer in the cruiser asked him:

“how did the fucking Taser feel?” R3-165, Exh. 1 at 23. After sitting in the

cruiser for a short time, Chaney was taken to a warehouse area, where he met with

a Sergeant in the Orlando Police Department and was asked a series of questions

5

about the tasing incident. The officers took pictures of Chaney’s wounds; they

removed the Taser hooks out of Chaney’s back (they had been lodged in his back

for approximately 15 minutes); and took detailed notes on Chaney’s version of

events. At that time, Chaney was informed that Officer Cute had stated that he had

stopped Chaney because the rear license tag cover on the Grand Am had been

obscured. Chaney disputed this allegation, telling the Sergeant that the license tag

was not obscured. When Chaney was told that he was going to be taken to jail, he

asked the Sergeant if he would personally transport him to the station, because he

was uncomfortable riding in the same car with Officer Cute. Chaney was

informed, however, that, as the arresting officer, Officer Cute was required to take

him to the station.

Officer Cute transported Chaney to the Orange County Correctional Facility

without incident. Chaney was given a traffic citation for operating a vehicle with

an obscured license plate, in violation of Fla. Stat. § 316.605.2 He was also

charged with the misdemeanor offense of resisting an officer without violence, in

2

That provision states, in pertinent part, that “all letters, numerals, printing, writing, and

other identification marks upon the [license] plates regarding the word ‘Florida,’ the registration

decal, and the alphanumeric designation shall be clear and distinct and free from defacement,

mutilation, grease, and other obscuring matter, so that they will be plainly visible and legible at

all times 100 feet from the rear or front. Nothing shall be placed upon the face of a Florida plate

except as permitted by law or by rule or regulation of a governmental agency. . . . A violation of

this subsection is a noncriminal traffic infraction, punishable as a nonmoving violation . . . .”

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violation of Fla. Stat. § 843.02.3 A traffic court later found Chaney not guilty of

driving with an obscured license. The charge for resisting an officer without

violence was nolle prossed.

In March 2004 Chaney brought the present § 1983 action in the Ninth

Judicial Circuit of Orange County, Florida against Officer Cute and the City of

Orlando. Chaney’s amended complaint alleged claims against Officer Cute for

wrongful arrest, excessive force, and malicious prosecution in pursuing the traffic

violation, all in violation of Chaney’s Fourth Amendment rights. He also lodged

three counts against the City of Orlando, alleging that the excessive use of Tasers

by Orlando police officers was an official custom or policy of the Department; that

the Department failed to properly train its officers in the use of Tasers; and that the

Department failed to monitor officers who used Tasers in an excessive manner.

The defendants removed the action to the Middle District of Florida.

A four-day jury trial was held in March 2006. At the close of Chaney’s

case-in-chief, Officer Cute moved for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a). The court denied that motion. Officer Cute

renewed this motion at the close of all of the evidence. The court reserved a ruling

3

That statute states that “[w]hoever shall resist, obstruct, or oppose any officer . . . in the

lawful execution of any legal duty, without offering or doing violence to the person of the

officer, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree.”

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on that motion, and submitted the case to the jury.

After reading the jury its instructions, the court directed the jury to make

findings on a special verdict form. The special verdict form contained a number of

specific issues for the jury to decide. The jury made the following pertinent

findings. First, the jury found that Officer Cute “reasonably believed that the tag

of the vehicle driven by [Chaney] was obstructed in violation of Florida law when

he stopped [Chaney].” R9-152 at 1. Second, the jury found that Officer Cute

“reasonably believed that [Chaney] resisted his lawful directives or attempted

arrest.” Id. Third, the jury found that Officer Cute “intentionally committed acts

that violated [Chaney]’s federal constitutional right not to be subjected to excessive

force,” and that Officer Cute “used unreasonable force” both in effecting the arrest

of Chaney and in tasing him. Id. at 2. Fourth, the jury found that Officer Cute

“acted with malice in pursuing the traffic citation against [Chaney].” Id.

Separately, the jury found that the City of Orlando did not have any “custom or

policy that resulted in the constitutional violations” that Chaney suffered at the

hands of Officer Cute. Id.

The jury then imposed nominal damages ($972.15) to compensate for the

cost of Chaney’s post-incident medical treatment; for his bond; and for his having

to defend against the traffic citation. Id. at 3. The jury also imposed punitive

8

damages against Officer Cute in the amount of $100,000, based on its finding that

Officer Cute had acted with malice or reckless indifference to Chaney’s rights. Id.

After the verdict, Officer Cute made a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of

law pursuant to Rule 50(b), based on a theory of qualified immunity. Separately,

Officer Cute moved for a new trial, pursuant to Rule 59, on the basis of qualified

immunity, alleged inconsistencies in the jury verdict, and the contention that the

punitive damages award was excessive.

The district court addressed Officer Cute’s renewed motion for judgment as

a matter of law in a detailed order. With respect to Chaney’s wrongful arrest

count, the court observed that “[t]he jury found that Officer Cute reasonably

believed that [Chaney] resisted Officer Cute’s lawful directives or attempted

arrest.” R9-165 at 11. The court reasoned that because an arrest supported by

probable cause is, by law, not a “wrongful arrest” in violation of the Fourth

Amendment,4 and because, according to the court, the jury’s verdict had made

clear that Officer Cute had probable cause to arrest Chaney for resisting, the court

concluded that Chaney’s wrongful arrest claim failed. The court then granted

Officer Cute judgment as a matter of law on that count.

4

See, e.g., Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S. Ct. 1536, 1557

(2001) (“If an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very

minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest

the offender.”).

9

With respect to Chaney’s excessive force count, the court noted that the jury

had concluded that Officer Cute had probable cause to arrest Chaney, but had

nevertheless found that the force used by Chaney was excessive. The court

observed, however, that it was obligated to determine whether Chaney was entitled

to qualified immunity as a matter of law on the excessive force count. The court

thus applied the two-part analysis set forth in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201,

121 S. Ct. 2151, 2156 (2001), assessing whether the facts alleged, taken in the light

most favorable to the party asserting the injury, showed that the officer’s conduct

violated a constitutional right, and, if so, whether that right was clearly established

under federal law.

Applying the Saucier analysis, the court first suggested that it was unclear

whether Officer Cute’s conduct was excessive as a matter of law, or whether it was

de minimis so as to fail to implicate Chaney’s Fourth Amendment rights.5 The

court then reverted to the fact that “the jury concluded that Officer Cute had

probable cause and the authority to make the arrest,” and stated that “[t]he

authority to make an arrest permits an officer to use reasonable force.” R9-165 at

18. In light of the jury finding that probable cause existed, the court concluded that

5

See Nolin v. Isbell, 207 F.3d 1253, 1257 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he application of de

minimis force, without more, will not support a claim for excessive force in violation of the

Fourth Amendment.”) (alteration added).

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the force used by Officer Cute in connection with a lawful arrest was reasonable

under the circumstances, and that therefore Chaney’s constitutional rights had not

been violated.

As to the second step of the Saucier framework–whether the right not to be

tasered was clearly established–the court found that there was no case law in this

circuit recognizing such a right. And with respect to a more general right to be free

from excessive force at the hands of police officers, the court reiterated that the

jury had found that Officer Cute had probable cause to make his arrest, and that,

“consequently,” the force used was reasonable under the circumstances. As a

result, the court concluded that Officer Cute was entitled to qualified immunity on

Chaney’s excessive force count, and granted Officer Cute’s renewed motion for

judgment as a matter of law.

Finally, with respect to the malicious prosecution count based on Chaney’s

alleged traffic violation, the court again concluded that the jury had found that

Officer Cute had probable cause to effectuate the traffic stop, and that, because a

malicious prosecution action under Florida law requires an absence of probable

cause,6 Chaney’s malicious prosecution count was not viable. Relying on the

6

See Kingsland v. City of Miami, 382 F.3d 1220, 1234 (11th Cir. 2004) (applying

Florida law).

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jury’s finding that Officer Cute had probable cause, the court granted Officer

Cute’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law on the malicious

prosecution count.

After granting Officer Cute’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of

law on the three counts pending against him, the district court then entered final

judgment in favor of Officer Cute and the City of Orlando.7 The court never

addressed the alternative motion for a new trial. This appeal followed.

II. DISCUSSION

A. District Court’s Order Granting Officer Cute Judgment as a Matter of Law

Chaney argues that the district court erred in granting Officer Cute’s

renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law. We review a district court’s

ruling on a motion for judgment as a matter of law de novo. See Doe v. Celebrity

Cruises, Inc., 394 F.3d 891, 902 (11th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). Under Rule

50, “[a] party’s motion for judgment as a matter of law can be granted at the close

of evidence or, if timely renewed, after the jury has returned its verdict, as long as

7

Defendant-Appellee City of Orlando did not file a motion for judgment as a matter of

law in this case. The district court’s entry of final judgment in favor of the City of

Orlando–based on the jury’s express finding in Interrogatory #6 that there was no custom or

policy in place that condoned excessive force by Orlando police officers–has not been appealed,

nor is it implicated by our review of the court’s analysis as to Officer Cute’s Rule 50(b) motion.

Thus, our decision addresses the court’s decision to grant Officer Cute’s renewed motion for

judgment as a matter of law; we do not disturb the court’s separate entry of final judgment in

favor of the City of Orlando.

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‘there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find’” for

the non-moving party. Lipphardt v. Durango Steakhouse of Brandon, Inc., 267

F.3d 1183, 1186 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 50).

Regardless of timing, however, in deciding on a Rule 50 motion a district

court’s proper analysis is squarely and narrowly focused on the sufficiency of

evidence. The question before the district court regarding a motion for judgment

as a matter of law remains whether the evidence is “legally sufficient to find for the

party on that issue,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1), regardless of whether the district

court’s analysis is undertaken before or after submitting the case to the jury. See

Cleveland v. Home Shopping Network, Inc., 369 F.3d 1189, 1192 (11th Cir. 2004)

(stating that judgment as a matter of law should only be granted “when there is no

legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for the party on that

issue”); Arthur Pew Constr. Co. v. Lipscomb, 965 F.2d 1559, 1563 (11th Cir.

1992) (stating that the “usual inquiry” under Rule 50 is “sufficiency, i.e. whether

the evidence was sufficient to submit [the issue] to the jury”); see also 9A Charles

Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2537 (2d ed.

1995) (stating that “[t]he standard for granting a renewed motion for judgment as a

matter of law under Rule 50(b) is precisely the same as the standard for granting

the pre-submission motion [under 50(a)]”). Accordingly, we have stated that in

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ruling on a party’s renewed motion under Rule 50(b) after the jury has rendered a

verdict, a court’s sole consideration of the jury verdict is to assess whether that

verdict is supported by sufficient evidence. See Lipphardt, 267 F.3d at 1186

(citation omitted); Arthur Pew, 965 F.2d at 1563.

In this case, the jury rendered a verdict in Chaney’s favor, awarding

$100,000 in damages based on its finding that Officer Cute had acted with malice

or reckless indifference to Chaney’s rights. Subsequent to this verdict, Officer

Cute renewed his motion for judgment as a matter of law on the basis of qualified

immunity, having already made this argument at the close of Chaney’s case and

again at the close of all of the evidence.

In this case, the district court, in ruling on Officer Cute’s renewed motion for

judgment as a matter of law, effectively based its conclusions on the jury findings

contained in the special verdict form. In discussing Chaney’s count for wrongful

arrest, for example, the court observed that the jury had found that Officer Cute

had probable cause that Chaney was resisting arrest, and then stated, “[s]ince

Officer Cute had probable cause [Chaney]’s cause of action for false arrest fails.”

R9-165 at 11. Likewise, in discussing Chaney’s claim for excessive force, the

court again observed the jury had found that Officer Cute had probable cause to

arrest Chaney, and that therefore Officer Cute was entitled to use a reasonable

14

amount of force in connection with that arrest. Id. at 18, 23. In light of the jury’s

finding that probable cause existed–as well as the court’s separate conclusion that

the force used was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances–the court

granted qualified immunity to Officer Cute on the excessive force count. Finally,

in assessing Chaney’s malicious prosecution count, the court once again observed

that the jury had found that Officer Cute had probable cause to effectuate the traffic

stop. Relying on the jury finding that there was probable cause to initiate the

traffic stop, the court concluded that Chaney’s malicious prosecution claim also

failed as a matter of law. Id. at 12.

The court’s order granting Officer Cute’s renewed motion for judgment as a

matter of law was predicated almost entirely on the special findings that the jury

had made on the verdict form, and not on an assessment of whether there was

sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could have rendered a verdict in

Chaney’s favor. The court based its conclusions–in whole or in part–on the jury’s

determination that Officer Cute had acted with probable cause. In doing so, the

court failed to comport with the proper legal standard for ruling on a motion

pursuant to Rule 50 and impermissibly credited the jury’s findings.

The fact that Rule 50(b) uses the word “renew[ed]” makes clear that a Rule

50(b) motion should be decided in the same way it would have been decided prior

15

to the jury’s verdict, and that the jury’s particular findings are not germane to the

legal analysis. See, e.g., Celebrity Cruises, 394 F.3d at 903 (“This Court

repeatedly has made clear that any renewal of a motion for judgment as a matter of

law under Rule 50(b) must be based upon the same grounds as the original request

for judgment as a matter of law made under Rule 50(a) at the close of the evidence

and prior to the case being submitted to the jury.”); Caban-Wheeler v. Elsea, 71

F.3d 837, 842 (11th Cir. 1996) (stating that a Rule 50(b) motion “may be used to

renew consideration of issues initially raised in a pre-verdict motion [under Rule

50(a)],” but that the court cannot consider matters not raised in the initial motion).

The jury’s findings should be excluded from the decision-making calculus on a

Rule 50(b) motion, other than to ask whether there was sufficient evidence, as a

legal matter, from which a reasonable jury could find for the party who prevailed at

trial.

Here, in ruling on Officer Cute’s renewed motion under Rule 50(b), the

court should have limited its inquiry as to whether there was sufficient evidence in

the record to support a jury’s finding of excessive force and its imposition of

liability on Officer Cute. By placing an undue emphasis on the jury’s particular

findings as to probable cause–and by repeatedly making decisions on the Rule 50

motion through the lens of what the jury found–the court engaged in an erroneous

16

analysis in deciding Officer Cute’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of

law. As a result, we conclude that the analysis of district court’s judgment granting

Officer Cute judgment as a matter of law was flawed and that the judgment must

be reversed. We remand this case to permit the district court to address Officer

Cute’s renewed motion in a manner consistent with this opinion.

B. District Court’s Failure to Decide Officer Cute’s Motion For a New Trial

The district court also failed to rule on Officer Cute’s motion for a new trial

pursuant to Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Officer Cute’s motion

sought a new trial on the basis of qualified immunity, as well as on the grounds

that the verdict was inconsistent and the punitive damages award was excessive.

Rule 50, which permits a party to “alternatively request a new trial” in

connection with a motion for judgment as a matter of law, Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b),

makes clear that

[i]f the renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law is granted, the

court shall also rule on the motion for a new trial, if any, by

determining whether it should be granted if the judgment is thereafter

vacated or reversed, and shall specify the grounds for granting or

denying the motion for the new trial.

Fed. R. Civ. P 50(c)(1) (emphasis added). By its plain language, the Rule obligates

the court to rule on a motion for a new trial when issuing its ruling on a renewed

motion for judgment as a matter of law. Here, the district court failed to do so.

17

Thus we also remand this case to permit the district court to properly consider not

only Officer Cute’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law but also

Officer Cute’s separate motion for a new trial.

III. CONCLUSION

Chaney appealed the district court’s judgment as to Officer Cute, contending

that the district court erred in granting Officer Cute judgment as a matter of law

under Rule 50(b). Having reviewed the district court’s opinion, we conclude that

the district court used an improper legal analysis in deciding Officer Cute’s

renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law. Specifically, we conclude that

the district court’s decision placed an undue weight on the findings of the jury as to

probable cause. Because a reliance on the findings of the jury was incompatible

with the proper standard for deciding a Rule 50 motion, we REVERSE the

judgment in favor of Officer Cute and REMAND this case for the district court to

consider the merits of Officer Cute’s renewed motion in a manner consistent with

this opinion. In addition, because the district court failed to rule on Officer Cute’s

motion for a new trial as mandated by Rule 50(c)(1), we REMAND this case for

the district court to address the merits of Officer Cute’s motion for a new trial.

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