Jaime Ruiz v. U.S. Attorney General

[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

FILED

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

JANUARY 4, 2006

No. 05-13987 THOMAS K. KAHN

Non-Argument Calendar CLERK

________________________

BIA Nos. A96-292-319 & A79-451-588

JAIME RUIZ,

SANDRA MILENA SANCHEZ CABRERA,

Petitioners,

versus

U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondent.

________________________

Petitions for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

_________________________

(January 4, 2006)

Before CARNES, PRYOR and FAY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Jaime Ruiz and Sandra Milena Sanchez Cabrera, through counsel, petition

this Court for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA’s”) order

summarily affirming the immigration judge’s (“IJ’s”) order of removal and denial

of the petitioners’ application for asylum and withholding of removal under the

Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), filed pursuant to INA §§ 208, 241, 8

U.S.C. §§ 1158, 1231.1 The petitioners challenge on appeal whether substantial

evidence supported the IJ’s (1) adverse credibility determination, and

(2) alternative determination that the petitioners failed to establish statutory

eligibility for either asylum or withholding of removal. For the reasons set forth

more fully below, we affirm.

On September 12, 2002, Ruiz, a native and citizen of Colombia, entered the

United States as a non-immigrant visitor for pleasure, with authorization to remain

in the United States for a period not to exceed March 11, 2003. On December 1,

2002, Ruiz filed an application for asylum and withholding of removal, asserting

that, if he returned to Colombia, he would be persecuted by the Revolutionary

Armed Forces of Colombia (“FARC”), a guerilla organization, on account of his

1

Congress recently directed that all petitions for review will be governed under the

permanent provisions of the Illegal Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“the

IIRIRA”). See Huang v. U.S. Att’y Gen., No. 04-15455, slip op. at 382 n.3 (11th Cir. Sept. 8,

2005) (citing the REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub.L. 109-13, 119 Stat 231 (May 11, 2005)).

2

membership in a particular social group and his political opinion.2 Ruiz

specifically contended that the FARC had threatened to kill him if he returned to

Colombia, due to his campaign work for the United Popular Movement (“UPM”),

during the August 2002 mayoral election in the Municipality of Patia, Colombia.

In April 2003, the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”)3

served Ruiz and his wife with notices to appear (“NTAs”), charging them

respectively with removability for remaining in the United States for a period

longer than permitted, pursuant to INA § 237(a)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B),

and for being present in the United States without being admitted or paroled,

pursuant to INA § 212(a)(6)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). Ruiz appeared

before an IJ and, through counsel, conceded the petitioners’ removability.

In December 2003, at a hearing on the petitioners’ application for asylum

and withholding of removal, Ruiz, who was the only witness, offered the following

testimony. As a member of the UPM, which was affiliated with the Liberal Party,

Ruiz managed social-work projects and actively campaigned for the party’s

2

Ruiz also included in his application for relief his wife, Sandra Milena Sanchez

Cabrera , who also was a native and citizen of Colombia and who had entered the United States

without inspection on or about September 27, 2002. After entering the United States, Ruiz’s

wife gave birth to a son on November 17, 2002. References in this opinion to Ruiz also will

include his wife.

3

On November 25, 2002, President Bush signed into law the Homeland Security Act of

2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135. This legislation created a new Department of

Homeland Security, abolished the INS, and transferred its functions to the new department.

3

candidate during the mayoral election in Patia in August 2002. As part of this

campaign work, Ruiz organized weekly meetings of approximately 100 people, at

which he and the candidate discussed the UPM’s goals, including the importance

of not cooperating with the FARC. On August 27, 2002, two days after the UPM’s

candidate lost this mayoral election, at approximately noon, two unidentified

armed men on a motorcycle stopped Ruiz, called him by name, and told him to

leave the region because “the activities [he] was carrying out with their people

[were] not well looked upon.” These men did not state that they belonged to a

particular political group, and Ruiz did not report immediately this threat to the

police or any other governmental authority.

On September 1, 2002, while Ruiz was in the City of Popayan, Colombia,

three men in a gray Toyota camper stopped him on the street, forced him into their

vehicle, held him at gunpoint for approximately half an hour, and again ordered

him to leave the region. These men also insulted Ruiz, beat him, and dumped him

on the Pan American Highway. They told Ruiz that Commandant de Felipe, a

member of the FARC, had ordered Ruiz to leave. Ruiz also did not report this

incident to the police because he was frightened.

Ruiz further testified that, on September 4, 2002, two armed men on a

motorcycle, one of whom previously had threatened Ruiz, stopped Ruiz as he was

leaving his parents’ farm, approached Ruiz with a gun in his hand, and told him

4

that, unless he left the region by the following weekend, he and his family would

“suffer the consequences.” On September 5, 2002, Ruiz moved with his family to

Popayan, and they stayed there until they moved to Ruiz’s in-laws’ home in Cali,

Colombia, which was 100 kilometers from their home. Ruiz flew to the United

States on September 12, 2002.

On the other hand, Ruiz’s wife, who did not have a visa to enter the United

States, did not leave Colombia until September 24, 2002. In the intervening

period, Ruiz’s wife, who was living with her in-laws in Cali, received four

threatening phone calls from men who identified themselves as FARC guerillas.

During these calls, the men asked about Ruiz’s whereabouts and threatened that

they would find him, kill him, and kill anyone who was hiding him. Ruiz stated

that he believed he could not relocate within Colombia because the FARC was “all

over the country,” and because members of the FARC wanted him killed.4 Ruiz,

however, did not assert that his ten-year-old son, who was still living in Cali with

his in-laws, and his parents, who continued living in Patia, had been harmed.

In addition to this testimony, Ruiz submitted a translated “penal

denouncement,” which his attorney had filed on his behalf with the Public

Defender’s Office in Popayan (“the Complaint”), on September 9, 2002. Although

4

When the government asked Ruiz why members of the FARC did not kill him during

any of their three encounters, Ruiz responded: “I think that it would not be to their benefit to

have killed me due to the relationship I had with the farming people.”

5

Ruiz described in the Complaint the same three harassing incidents that he

identified during the evidentiary hearing, he stated in the Complaint that he could

not identify the source of the alleged threats because, due to “all kind[s] of illegal

organizations” operating in the region, it was impossible to determine which one

made the threats.5 He explained that he had no documentary evidence, and that his

parents and siblings were scared because they did not know the origin of the

threats. Furthermore, Ruiz did not allege in the Complaint that men held him at

gunpoint and beat him on September 1, 2002, and, instead, stated that he was afraid

that “something more serious was going to happen.”

The government submitted for the IJ’s review the U.S. State Department’s

2002 Country Report on Human Rights Practices for Colombia (“2002 Country

Report”). The 2002 Country Report included that Colombia is a constitutional,

multiparty democracy, but that the government’s human-rights record remained

poor. Internal security was maintained by both the armed forces and the national

police. As a result of armed conflict between the government, right-wing

paramilitary groups, leftist guerillas, including the FARC, and the National

Liberation Army (“ELN”), 5,000 to 6,000 civilians were killed during 2002,

including combat casualties, political killings, and forced disappearances. The

5

When the IJ stated that he was concerned by the fact that the Complaint did not include

that members of the FARC had harassed Ruiz, and the IJ asked Ruiz about this omission, Ruiz

did not explain it.

6

guerillas, particularly the FARC, were responsible for a large percentage of civilian

deaths and appeared to have committed a higher percentage of Colombia’s

unlawful killings than the previous year, often targeting noncombatants. In 2002,

the FARC also committed numerous politically motivated kidnapings in an attempt

to destabilize the government.

Additionally, the record included the U.S. State Department’s June 1997

Profile of Asylum Claims and Country Conditions for Colombia (“Profile”), which

stated that an estimated 10,000 to 15,000 full-time guerrillas had organized in over

100 groups and represented a “growing challenge to [g]overnment security forces,”

along with influencing more than half of the country’s municipalities. Guerilla

targets included those persons who (1) refused to submit to recruitment or

extortion, and (2) were suspected of collaborating with authorities. This Profile,

however, also discussed that Colombia is a large country of more than a million

square kilometers and 35.5 million people, that violence generally is centered in a

few provinces, and that persons “fleeing guerillas or police/military harassment or

threats in conflictive zones usually are able to find peaceful residence elsewhere in

the country.”

In an oral decision, the IJ found the petitioners removable, denied their

application for asylum and withholding, and ordered them removed to Colombia.

The IJ explained that, in denying the petitioners relief from removal, he was

7

relying on both an adverse credibility determination and his conclusion that Ruiz

had failed to establish eligibility for either asylum or withholding of removal. In

reaching his adverse credibility determination, the IJ discussed that he had “taken

into account not only [Ruiz’s] demeanor while testifying, but also the rationality,

internal consistency and inherent persuasiveness of his testimony.” The IJ also

stated that, although Ruiz had testified about three specific incidents, he had not

included in the Complaint his attempted kidnaping on September 2001, along with

failing to report any of these events to the Colombian police. The IJ discussed that

he had not found plausible Ruiz’s testimony that he could not relocate within

Colombia because (1) Ruiz did not include this belief in the Complaint; (2) Ruiz

testified that members of the FARC only had told him to leave the area; (3) if

members of the FARC had wanted to kill Ruiz, they could have done so during any

of the three harassing incidents; and (4) members of Ruiz’s family remaining in

Colombia had not been harmed. Moreover, the IJ found that, if Ruiz’s family had

been threatened, Ruiz would not have left his son in the same home where these

threats were made.

In alternatively explaining why Ruiz had failed to show his eligibility for

asylum, the IJ discussed that Ruiz neither had shown that the FARC had targeted

him, or that the FARC had targeted him because of his political opinion. The IJ

stated that, although Ruiz submitted in support of his application the Complaint, he

8

had not alleged in the Complaint that the threats were made by the FARC and, in

fact, had stated that it was impossible to determine who had made the threats

because of all of the illegal organizations operating in the region. Moreover, as

discussed above, the IJ determined that Ruiz could have avoided future persecution

by relocating within Colombia. The IJ also determined that Ruiz had failed to

satisfy the higher burden required for withholding of removal. The IJ concluded

that the petitioners were not eligible for either asylum or withholding of removal.

Ruiz appealed the IJ’s decision to the BIA, arguing that the IJ had erred in

concluding that he was not statutorily eligible for asylum or withholding of

removal. In a supporting brief, Ruiz contended that the record reflected that (1) he

had participated in political activities on behalf of the UPM; (2) the FARC, in

harassing him and his family, had been motivated, at least in part, by Ruiz’s actual

and imputed political opinion; and (3) considering Ruiz’s past harassment and the

current country conditions, a reasonable person in his position would fear future

persecution. The BIA summarily adopted and affirmed the IJ’s decision.

As discussed above, the petitioners are arguing on appeal that the IJ erred in

reaching his adverse credibility determination. The petitioners contend that, to the

extent the IJ concluded that Ruiz’s testimony was inconsistent with his statements

in the Complaint, (1) the IJ never gave him the opportunity to explain these

inconsistencies during the evidentiary hearing, and (2) Ruiz would have explained

9

that he did not reference the FARC in the Complaint because he feared that the

FARC had infiltrated the police and the Public Defender’s Office. The petitioners

also assert that Ruiz’s testimony generally was consistent with his asylum

application, and that both of these documents referenced the FARC, as well as

identifying three specific incidents of past persecution.

When a single member of the BIA summarily affirms the IJ’s decision

without an opinion, such as here, the IJ’s decision becomes the final removal order

subject to review. Mendoza v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 327 F.3d 1283, 1284 n.1 (11th Cir.

2003). To the extent that the IJ’s decision was based on a legal determination, our

review is de novo. D-Muhumed v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 388 F.3d 814, 817 (11th Cir.

2004). On the other hand, the IJ’s factual determinations are reviewed under the

substantial evidence test, and we “must affirm the [IJ’s] decision if it is supported

by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a

whole.” Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1262, 1283-84 (11th Cir. 2001) (quotation

and internal marks omitted).

We “cannot engage in fact-finding on appeal, nor may [it] weigh evidence

that was not previously considered below.” Id. at 1278. Moreover, “[u]nder the

substantial evidence test, we review the record evidence in the light most favorable

to the agency’s decision and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that

decision.” Adefemi v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1022, 1027 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc),

10

cert. denied, 125 S.Ct. 2245 (2005). Thus, a finding of fact will be reversed “only

when the record compels a reversal; the mere fact that the record may support a

contrary conclusion is not enough to justify a reversal of the administrative

findings.” Id.

A credibility determination, which is a factual finding, is reviewed under the

substantial evidence test; thus, we “may not substitute [our] judgment for that of

the [IJ] with respect to credibility findings.” D-Muhumed, 388 F.3d at 818.

Indications of reliable testimony include consistency on direct examination,

consistency with the written application, and the absence of embellishments. See

In re B-, 21 I & N Dec. 66, 70 (BIA 1995); see also Dailide v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 387

F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2004) (affirming the BIA’s adverse credibility

determination, which was based upon its finding that the alien’s testimony

conflicted with his answers to interrogatories and other documentary evidence).

If credible, an alien’s testimony may be sufficient, without corroboration, to

sustain his burden of proof in establishing his eligibility for relief from removal.

Forgue v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 401 F.3d 1282, 1287 (11th Cir. 2005). “Conversely, an

adverse credibility determination alone may be sufficient to support the denial of

an asylum application.” Id. However, “an adverse credibility determination does

not alleviate the IJ’s duty to consider other evidence produced by an asylum

applicant.” Id. If an applicant produces evidence beyond his own testimony, “it is

11

not sufficient for the IJ to rely solely on an adverse credibility determination in

those instances.” Id. Furthermore, “the IJ must offer specific, cogent reasons for

an adverse credibility finding.” Id. “Once an adverse credibility finding is made,

the burden is on the applicant alien to show that the IJ’s credibility decision was

not supported by ‘specific, cogent reasons[,]’ or was not based on substantial

evidence.” Id. (quotation omitted).

In the instant case, the IJ offered “specific, cogent reasons” for his adverse

credibility finding by stating that, although Ruiz had testified about three specific

incidents of past persecution, he had not included in the Complaint his attempted

kidnaping on September 1, 2002, along with failing to report these harassing

incidents to the Colombian police. The IJ discussed that he had not found

plausible Ruiz’s testimony that he could not relocate to another part of Colombia

because (1) Ruiz did not include this belief in the Complaint; (2) Ruiz testified that

members of the FARC only told him to leave the region; (3) if members of the

FARC wanted to kill Ruiz, they could have done so during any of the three

harassing incidents; and (4) members of Ruiz’s family who had remained in

Colombia had not been harmed. Moreover, the IJ found that, if Ruiz’s family had

been threatened, Ruiz would not have allowed his son to remain in the same house

where these threats were made.

12

Furthermore, the record reflects that, although Ruiz testified that he could

not relocate within Colombia because members of the FARC wished him dead, he

also testified that, during each contact he had with the FARC, he simply was

ordered to leave the area. Moreover, Ruiz’s parents continued to live on their

farm, and his son continued to live with his in-laws, in the same areas where the

FARC allegedly had threatened Ruiz and his family. Indeed, although Ruiz stated

that he was kidnaped and held at gunpoint in Popayan on September 1, 2002, he

moved his family to Popayan on September 5, 2002.

Examining the petitioners’ alleged corroborating evidence, although Ruiz

conceded in the Complaint that he could not identify the source of the alleged

threats because “all kinds of illegal organizations” operated in the region, and it

was impossible to determine which one made the threats, and that his parents and

siblings were scared because they did not know the origin of the threats, he

testified that he was harassed by members of the FARC based on his activities with

the UPM. Contrary to Ruiz’s argument on appeal, the IJ gave him the opportunity

to explain this inconsistency during the evidentiary hearing. Regardless, as

discussed below, Ruiz—not the IJ—bears the burden of proving eligibility for

asylum. See D-Muhumed, 388 F.3d at 818. Additionally, although Ruiz testified

that the men who kidnaped him on September 1, 2002, held him at gunpoint and

beat him, he omitted these allegations in the Complaint, and stated, instead, that he

13

was afraid that “something more serious was going to happen.” Thus, the IJ’s

reasons for his adverse credibility determination are supported by substantial

evidence, and nothing in the record compels us to substitute our judgment. See D-

Muhumed, 388 F.3d at 818; see also Adefemi, 386 F.3d at 1027.

The petitioners also argue that the IJ erred in alternatively concluding that

they were not statutorily eligible for asylum or withholding of removal based on

Ruiz’s political opinion.6 The petitioners contend that they established that the

alleged harassment was based on Ruiz’s political opinion as a member of the UPM

by testifying that (1) he was a leader in the UPM who spoke openly against the

FARC, (2) the men who harassed him identified themselves as members of the

FARC, and (3) these persons instructed him to leave the area and to stop his

activities. The petitioners also assert that they established a “well-founded fear” of

future persecution through both the above testimony, as well as statements in the

2002 Country Report reflecting the FARC’s country-wide activities in Colombia.

Finally, the petitioners argue that the IJ should have granted them withholding of

removal because, in light of Ruiz’s past opposition to the FARC, statements in the

2002 Country Report reflecting FARC’s country-wide capacity to harm, and a

6

Because the petitioners have not argued on appeal that the IJ should have granted them

either asylum or withholding of removal based on Ruiz’s membership in a social group, they

have abandoned this issue. See Sepulveda v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 401 F.3d 1226, 1228 n.2 (11th

Cir. 2005) (concluding that the petitioners abandoned an issue by failing to raise it in their initial

appellate brief).

14

report by the INS’s Resource Information Center (“RIC”),7 it is more likely than

not that the petitioners will be persecuted on account of Ruiz’s political opinion if

they return to Colombia.

As discussed above, an IJ’s factual determinations are reviewed under the

substantial evidence test, and we “must affirm the [IJ’s] decision if it is supported

by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a

whole.” See Al Najjar, 257 F.3d at 1283-84. An alien who arrives in, or is present

in, the United States may apply for asylum. INA § 208(a)(1), 8 U.S.C.

§ 1158(a)(1). The Secretary of Homeland Security or the Attorney General has

discretion to grant asylum if the alien meets the INA’s definition of a “refugee.”

INA § 208(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1).8 A “refugee” is defined as

any person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality or,

in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in

which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or

unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or

herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a

well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,

7

To the extent Ruiz is relying on this RIC Report, he states that it includes that “[t]he

FARC has a presence in virtually all of the nation’s 32 departments and urban centers and has a

country-wide capability to harm . . . anyone whom . . . the guerillas believe opposes the FARC’s

. . . leftist politics or their use of armed tactics.” However, because this document is not part of

the record on appeal, we will not consider it. See Forgue, 401 F.3d at 1286 (holding that we

“cannot find, or consider, facts not raised in the administrative forum”).

8

Pursuant to the REAL ID Act, INA § 208(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1), was amended

to add “The Secretary of Homeland Security or the Attorney General,” as if enacted on March 1,

2003. See Pub.L. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (May 11, 2005), Division B, Sec. 101, 8 U.S.C.

§ 1158(b)(1) and note (1).

15

nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political

opinion . . ..

INA § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). “The asylum applicant carries

the burden of proving statutory ‘refugee’ status.” D-Muhumed, 388 F.3d at 818.

To establish asylum eligibility, the petitioner must, with specific and

credible evidence, demonstrate (1) past persecution on account of a statutorily

listed factor, or (2) a “well-founded fear” that the statutorily listed factor will cause

future persecution. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a), (b); Al Najjar, 257 F.3d at 1287. If the

petitioner demonstrates past persecution, there is a rebuttable presumption that he

has a well-founded fear of future persecution. 8 C.F.R § 208.13(b)(1). If he

cannot show past persecution, then the petitioner must demonstrate a well-founded

fear of future persecution that is both subjectively genuine and objectively

reasonable. Al Najjar, 257 F.3d at 1289. The subjective component can be proved

“by the applicant’s credible testimony that he or she genuinely fears persecution,”

while the objective component “can be fulfilled either by establishing past

persecution or that he or she has a good reason to fear future persecution.” Id.

(quotation omitted).

An alien seeking withholding of removal under the INA similarly must show

that his “life or freedom would be threatened in that country because of the alien’s

race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political

16

opinion.” See INA § 241(b)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). The burden of

proof for withholding of removal, however, is “more likely than not,” and, thus, is

“more stringent” than the standard for asylum relief. Sepulveda, 401 F.3d at 1232.

The statutes governing asylum and withholding of removal protect not only

against persecution by government forces, but also against persecution by non-

governmental groups that the government cannot control, such as the FARC. See

Sanchez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 392 F.3d 434, 437 (11th Cir. 2004). However,

“[p]ersecution on account of . . . political opinion . . . is persecution on account of

the victim’s political opinion, not the persecutor’s.” Id. at 437-38 (quoting INS v.

Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 482, 112 S.Ct. 812, 816, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992)

(emphasis in original)). The applicant must present “specific, detailed facts

showing a good reason to fear that he will be singled out for persecution on

account of such an opinion.” Al Najjar, 257 F.3d at 1287. Thus, evidence that

either is consistent with acts of private violence or the petitioner’s failure to

cooperate with guerillas, or that merely shows that a person has been the victim of

criminal activity, does not constitute evidence of persecution based on a statutorily

protected ground. Sanchez, 392 F.3d at 438.

In Sanchez, we examined a petitioner’s challenge to the IJ’s decision that the

petitioner was not eligible for withholding of removal because the petitioner had

not shown that the FARC’s interest in her was related to a statutorily protected

17

ground. See id. at 436. In support of the petitioner’s argument that this decision

was erroneous, she cited to her testimony that, after she refused to cooperate with

the FARC, and because she was “not in agreement with the way [FARC had]

destroyed the country,” the FARC had demanded money from her, and, after she

had left Colombia, had threatened her and another family member who had refused

to cooperate. See id. We determined that the petitioner merely had established

that the FARC had harassed her due to her refusal to cooperate with it, and had

failed to show actual or imputed political opinion, much less any connection

between the petitioner’s alleged political opinion and the FARC’s alleged

persecution. See id. at 438. We, therefore, concluded that the petitioner was not

eligible for withholding of removal. See id.

Here, Ruiz contended in his application that the FARC had declared him an

enemy and threatened to kill him due to his work with the UPM. Additionally,

Ruiz testified that (1) he organized weekly meetings, at which he discussed the

UPM’s goals, including the importance of not cooperating with the FARC;

(2) members of the FARC stopped and threatened to kill him on three occasions,

based on his work with the UPM; and (3) persons who identified themselves as

members of the FARC made four phone calls to Ruiz’s wife, after Ruiz left for the

United States, threatening to kill him and anyone who was hiding him.

18

However, as discussed above, the IJ’s determination that Ruiz’s testimony

was not credible was supported by the evidence. Indeed, if Ruiz had been

kidnaped and threatened in Popayan, it is illogical that he would have moved his

family to this location four days after the threats were made. Moreover, although

Ruiz explained in the Complaint the alleged incidents of past persecution, he failed

to make any reference to the FARC. See Yang v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 418 F.3d 1198,

1201 (11th Cir. 2005) (explaining that “[t]he weaker an applicant’s testimony . . .

the greater the need for corroborative evidence”). To the contrary, in the

Complaint, Ruiz contended that he could not identify the source of the threats

because of the prevalence of illegal organizations in the area. See Sanchez, 392

F.3d at 438. Thus, Ruiz did not present “specific, detailed facts” that demonstrated

that his political participation with the UPM was causally connected with the

harassment, or that he had an objective well-founded fear of future persecution

based on this activity. See Al Najjar, 257 F.3d at 1287.

The petitioners also failed to demonstrate, in the alternative, a future threat

to their life or freedom in Colombia, based on Ruiz’s political opinion, or that they

could not avoid a threat by relocating to a different region of Colombia. See

Mazariegos v. Office of U.S. Att’y Gen., 241 F.3d 1320, 1327 (11th Cir. 2001)

(explaining that an alien either must pursue an “internal resettlement alternative” in

his own country, or establish that this is not possible, before seeking asylum here).

19

As discussed above, the IJ’s finding as not credible Ruiz’s testimony that he could

not relocate to avoid future persecution was supported by substantial evidence in

the record. In addition, Ruiz’s claim was contradicted by his testimony that his son

and his parents have remained unharmed in the region of Colombia where Ruiz

allegedly was threatened. Cf. Tawm v. Ashcroft, 363 F.3d 740, 743 (4th Cir.

2004) (concluding as persuasive authority that an alien did not establish a well-

founded fear where, among other things, his family continued to live in Lebanon

without incident).

To the extent Ruiz cites in support to statements in the 2002 Country Report

as evidence that the FARC’s influence in Colombia was widespread, the IJ may

“rely heavily” on State Department reports. See Reyes-Sanchez v. U.S. Att’y

Gen., 369 F.3d 1239, 1243 (11th Cir. 2004). However, the Profile included that

persons in Colombia who are “fleeing guerillas or police/military harassment or

threats in conflictive zones usually are able to find peaceful residence elsewhere in

the country.” Regardless, a contrary conclusion is not compelled by this evidence

in the 2002 Country Report because, as discussed above, the petitioners failed to

demonstrate that they will be singled out for persecution on account of Ruiz’s

political activities with the UPM. See Sepulveda, 401 F.3d at 1232 n.7 (affirming

IJ’s opinion denying asylum despite the inclusion in the relevant country reports

that guerillas exercised an influence throughout Colombia because the petitioner

20

had failed to establish that she would be singled out for persecution on account of a

protected ground). Thus, the IJ’s denial of asylum and withholding of removal was

supported by substantial evidence. See Adefemi, 386 F.3d at 1027; see also

Mazariegos, 241 F.3d at 1324-25 n.2 (explaining that, “if an applicant is unable to

meet the ‘well-founded fear’ standard for asylum, he is generally precluded from

qualifying for either asylum or withholding of [removal]”).

Accordingly, we conclude that substantial evidence supported the IJ’s

adverse credibility determination, along with the IJ’s alternative determination that

the petitioners failed to establish statutory eligibility for either asylum or

withholding of removal. We, therefore, deny the petition for review.

PETITION DENIED.

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