United States v. Terrance Shelton

[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FILED

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

FEBRUARY 25, 2005

No. 04-12602 THOMAS K. KAHN

Non-Argument Calendar CLERK

________________________

D. C. Docket No. 03-80098-CR-DTKH

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

TERRANCE SHELTON,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

_________________________

(February 25, 2005)

Before CARNES, HULL and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.

HULL, Circuit Judge:

Terrance Shelton appeals his 190-month sentence, imposed after he pled

guilty to drug and firearms offenses.

In his initial brief on appeal, Shelton timely raised the numerous issues we

address in this case based on Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct.

2348 (2000); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), and

now United States v. Booker, – U.S. –, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), which we

collectively refer to herein as the “Booker issues.”

After review, we conclude there were no Sixth Amendment violations in

Shelton’s sentence under Booker. However, the district court erred under Booker

in sentencing Shelton under a mandatory Guidelines regime, and Shelton has

established a reasonable probability that the district court would have imposed a

lesser sentence but for the mandatory Guidelines regime. Thus, for the reasons

outlined in this opinion, we vacate Shelton’s sentence and remand for resentencing

under Booker.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Shelton’s Guilty Plea

On July 17, 2003, Shelton was indicted for: (1) knowingly and intentionally

distributing “at least five (5) grams” of crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§

841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), and (b)(1)(C), and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (counts 1, 2, and 4); (2)

knowingly and intentionally distributing crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.

2

§§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), and (b)(1)(C), and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (counts 5 and 6); (3)

being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1),

924(a)(2) (counts 3, 7, and 10); (4) knowingly carrying a firearm during and in

relation to a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c) and 2

(count 9); and (5) knowingly possessing with intent to distribute cocaine, in

violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C).1

In a written plea agreement, Shelton pled guilty to the drug charge in count 4

and the firearms charge in count 9. During the plea colloquy under Rule 11, the

district court explained that the mandatory minimum for the drug charge in count 4

was 10 years’ imprisonment (120 months) and the maximum was life

imprisonment. Shelton’s three prior drug convictions increased Shelton’s

statutory, mandatory minimum sentence from five to ten years’ imprisonment and

his statutory maximum penalty from forty years’ to life imprisonment. 21 U.S.C. §

841(b)(1)(B).2 During the plea colloquy, the district court further explained that as

to the firearm charge in count 9, Shelton would face a mandatory minimum

sentence of 5 years’ imprisonment (60 months) to run consecutively to his drug

1

Shelton’s co-defendant, Jermaine Hunter, also was indicted on the above-listed counts,

except count 12. Further, Hunter was indicted individually on several counts that we do not

discuss here.

2

The government gave Shelton written notice listing his three prior drug convictions and

explaining the increased penalty. See 21 U.S.C. § 851.

3

sentence for count 4.

Also during the plea colloquy, the government offered facts showing that

Shelton and codefendant Hunter sold drugs and two firearms to a confidential

informant (“CI”) under surveillance on June 23, 2003. According to the

government’s recitation of the facts, Shelton’s drug transaction with the CI on that

one day involved 16.7 grams of crack and 15 grams of cocaine powder. During the

plea colloquy, Shelton agreed to the government’s recitation of the facts. The

district court then accepted Shelton’s guilty plea as to counts 4 and 9, and the

remaining counts in the indictment were dismissed on the government’s motion.

B. The Presentence Report

The Presentence Investigation Report (“PSI”) reported that Shelton had

participated not only in the above drug offense on June 23, 2003, but also in two

other drug transactions with the CI on June 18 and 20, 2003, respectively. The PSI

also reported that, on June 26, 2003, an additional amount of drugs were found in a

car abandoned by Shelton.

According to the PSI, Shelton’s total drug quantity for sentencing purposes

was 47 grams of crack cocaine and 87.2 grams of cocaine powder, which

represented the total amount of drugs in these four events: (1) the offense conduct

on June 23, 2003 that involved 16.7 grams of crack and 15 grams of cocaine

4

powder; (2) the drug transaction on June 18, 2003 that involved 17.1 grams of

crack transferred to a confidential informant; (3) the drug transaction on June 20,

2003 that involved 13.2 grams of crack transferred to a confidential informant; and

(4) the 72.2 grams of cocaine powder recovered from a car abandoned by Shelton

on June 26, 2003.

The PSI noted a marijuana equivalency of 957 kilograms for the total

quantity of 47 grams of crack and 87.2 grams of cocaine powder. The marijuana

equivalency corresponded to a base offense level of 30. See U.S.S.G. §

2D1.1(c)(5) (providing for base offense level of 30 when drug quantity is at least

700 but less than 1,000 kilograms of marijuana). Shelton filed no objection to the

factual statements in the PSI that detailed his offense conduct and the above

relevant conduct and drug quantities.

Shelton’s PSI further recommended a two-level reduction for acceptance of

responsibility and a one-level reduction for assistance to the government, resulting

in an adjusted offense level of 27. Based on his prior convictions, the PSI noted

that Shelton had 13 criminal history points, which corresponded to a criminal

history category of VI. According to the PSI, the sentencing range for offense

level 27 and criminal history category VI was 130-162 months’ imprisonment for

count 4, followed by a mandatory term of 60 months’ imprisonment for count 9, to

5

run consecutively with the term for count 4. Shelton did not object to any of the

PSI’s calculations.

C. Sentencing Hearing

At the sentencing hearing, Shelton again raised no objections to the factual

statements in the PSI. When the district court inquired about the PSI, Shelton’s

counsel stated that he had reviewed the report with Shelton and that they did not

dispute the factual matters. The district court then sentenced him to 130 months’

imprisonment for count 4 and 60 months’ imprisonment for count 9, to run

consecutively.3

In sentencing Shelton, the district court expressed dissatisfaction with

Shelton’s sentence, but indicated the Sentencing Guidelines and the relevant

statutes dictated the result. For example, the district court commented that

Shelton’s sentence was “very, very severe” due to Shelton’s criminal history points

and the mandatory, consecutive five-year sentence on the § 924(c) firearms count.

The district court noted that “unfortunately” the Guidelines criminal-history

calculation takes into account each of the defendant’s past charges and does not

take into account the fact that the sentences imposed on those charges were short as

a result of such factors as the youth of the defendant or amount of drugs involved.

3

The district court also sentenced Shelton to 8 years’ supervised release for count 4 and 5

years’ supervised release for count 9, to run concurrently.

6

The district court later expressed its disapproval of the severity of the sentence

again, stating that Congress has taken a “very, very hard stance when it comes to

guns and drugs.” Most significantly for Shelton, the district court indicated that

the most lenient sentence it could impose, a sentence at the low end of the

Guidelines range, was “more than [was] appropriate in this situation.”

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

While Shelton’s initial brief on appeal timely raised various Booker issues in

this case, he did not raise these issues in the district court. Thus, our review is only

for plain error. United States v. Rodriguez, – F.3d –, 2005 WL 272952, at *6 (11th

Cir. Feb. 4, 2005). “An appellate court may not correct an error the defendant

failed to raise in the district court unless there is: ‘(1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3)

that affects substantial rights.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625,

631, 122 S. Ct. 1781, 1785 (2002)). “‘If all three conditions are met, an appellate

court may then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the

error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial

proceedings.’” Id. (quoting Cotton, 535 U.S. at 631, 122 S. Ct. at 1785).

III. DISCUSSION

As noted above, on appeal, Shelton raises several Booker issues, which we

address here.

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A. Sentencing Enhancements

Shelton first argues that the district court erred when it enhanced his

sentence based on a judicial fact-finding of drug quantity and based on his prior

convictions. We readily dispense with that issue. The Supreme Court consistently

has rejected Shelton’s argument that a district court errs when it considers prior

convictions in sentencing a defendant under the Guidelines. In Almendarez-Torres

v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 118 S. Ct. 1219 (1998), the Supreme Court “held

that the government need not allege in its indictment and need not prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that a defendant had prior convictions for a district court to use

those convictions for purposes of enhancing a sentence.” United States v.

Marseille, 377 F.3d 1249, 1257 (11th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). This

conclusion was left undisturbed by Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker.

Moreover, in Booker, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding in Apprendi.

See Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 756 (opinion of Stevens, J.) (reaffirming that “[a]ny fact

(other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding

the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury

verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable

doubt” (emphasis added)). Thus, a district court does not err by relying on prior

8

convictions to enhance a defendant’s sentence.4

Nor did the district court err in sentencing Shelton based on a drug quantity

greater than the quantity alleged in the indictment. We recognize that count 4 of

his indictment, to which Shelton pled guilty, charged only “at least five (5) grams

of a mixture and substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine base,

commonly known as crack cocaine,” which corresponds to a base offense level of

26. It is also clear that the district court started with a base offense level of 30

based on its finding that Shelton’s offense and relevant conduct together involved a

total of 47 grams of crack and 87.2 grams of cocaine powder, which was converted

to a marijuana equivalent of 957 kilograms.

Nonetheless, the first prong of the plain-error test is not satisfied in this case

because Shelton’s sentence was not enhanced as a result of judicial findings as to

drug quantity that went beyond the facts admitted by Shelton. Shelton admitted to

part of this drug quantity in his plea colloquy and to the rest of this drug quantity at

sentencing. Not only did Shelton raise no objections to the PSI’s factual

4

Other circuits post-Booker also have recognized that enhancements for prior convictions

are for the judge, not the jury, to determine. See, e.g., United States v. Barnett, – F.3d.– , 2005

WL 357015, at *8 (6th Cir. Feb. 16, 2005) (“[T]here is no language in Booker suggesting that

the Supreme Court, as part of its remedial scheme adopted in that case, intended to alter the

exception to Apprendi allowing district courts to consider the fact and nature of prior

convictions, without submitting those issues to the jury.”); United States v. Vieth, – F.3d. – ,

2005 WL 284724, at *4 (8th Cir. Feb. 8, 2005) (“As to the enhancement for a prior conviction,

the Supreme Court has consistently said that the fact of a prior conviction is for the court to

determine, not the jury.”).

9

statements about his relevant conduct, but Shelton’s counsel also stated, “[W]e

don’t dispute the factual matters” in the PSI. Thus, Shelton has admitted the facts

in the PSI. See United States v. Walters, 269 F.3d 1207, 1213 (10th Cir. 2001)

(“Walters did not challenge the accuracy of the relevant facts contained in the PSR.

Therefore, under the law of this circuit, they are deemed admitted as true.” (citation

omitted)); United States v. Joshua, 40 F.3d 948, 952 (8th Cir. 1994) (“Joshua did

not dispute the PSR’s rendition of his criminal history, and the facts therein

therefore stand as admitted.” (citation omitted)). Because Shelton admitted to the

facts that enhanced his sentence, there is no Sixth Amendment violation under

Booker in this case. See United States v. Frye, – F.3d – , 2005 WL 315563, at *4

(11th Cir. Feb. 10, 2005).

B. “Mandatory” Nature of the Guidelines Error

In this case, Shelton was sentenced under the pre-Booker mandatory

Sentencing Guidelines. Thus, we must determine whether under Booker there is

error in Shelton’s sentence because the district court considered and applied the

Guidelines as binding.

1. Error

In Booker, the Supreme Court excised the two parts of the Sentencing

Reform Act that rendered the mandatory Guidelines system unconstitutional: the

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part in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) making the Guidelines result binding on the

sentencing court; and the part in § 3742(e) requiring de novo review of sentences

on appeal. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 764. In doing so, the Supreme Court stated that

“[w]ith these two sections excised (and statutory cross-references to the two

sections consequently invalidated), the remainder of the Act satisfies the Court’s

constitutional requirements.” Id. The Supreme Court in Booker further instructed

that its remedial holding applies to cases on direct review. Id. at 769 (“[W]e must

apply today’s holdings – both the Sixth Amendment holding and our remedial

interpretation of the Sentencing Act – to all cases on direct review.”).5

Although the district court followed the correct sentencing procedure when

it sentenced Shelton, the Supreme Court has now excised the mandatory nature of

the Guidelines in Booker. Thus, we conclude that it was Booker error for the

district court to sentence Shelton under a mandatory Guidelines scheme, even in

the absence of a Sixth Amendment enhancement violation.6

5

We emphasize, however, that Shelton timely raised his Booker issues on direct appeal,

which distinguishes his case from those in which the defendant defaulted, waived, or abandoned

at the appellate stage the Apprendi, Blakely, or Booker issues. See United States v. Levy, 379

F.3d 1241, 1242 (11th Cir. 2004) (declining to consider issue raised for the first time in petition

for rehearing), reh’g en banc denied, 391 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2004); United States v. Ardley,

242 F.3d 989, 990 (11th Cir. 2001) (stating that “we apply our well-established rule that issues

and contentions not timely raised in the briefs are deemed abandoned” (citation omitted)).

6

We note that this conclusion is consistent with those of at least two other circuits that

have considered this issue. See United States v. Barnett, – F.3d –, 2005 WL 357015, at *8 (6th

Cir. Feb. 16, 2005) (“[W]e hold that it was plain error for Barnett to be sentenced under a

11

In reaching this conclusion, we note that Booker error, as succinctly stated in

Rodriguez, is as follows:

The constitutional error is the use of extra-verdict enhancements to

reach a guidelines result that is binding on the sentencing judge; the

error is the mandatory nature of the guidelines once the guidelines

range has been determined.

Rodriguez, 2005 WL 272952, at *9. As a result of Booker’s remedial holding,

Booker error exists when the district court misapplies the Guidelines by

considering them as binding as opposed to advisory.

2. Plain

The next issue is whether the error was “plain.” In this case, “[a]lthough the

error was not ‘plain’ at the time of sentencing, ‘where the law at the time of trial

was settled and clearly contrary to the law at the time of appeal – it is enough that

the error be ‘plain’ at the time of appellate consideration.’” Rodriguez, 2005 WL

272952, at *7 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468, 117 S. Ct.

1544, 549 (1997)). Booker made plain the district court’s error in sentencing

Shelton under a mandatory Guidelines scheme that is now advisory. See Barnett,

2005 WL 357015, at *8. Thus, we move on to the third prong of plain error, which

is exceedingly difficult for defendants to overcome. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 2005

mandatory Guidelines regime that has now become advisory.”); United States v. Labastida-

Segura, 396 F.3d 1140, 2005 WL 273315, at *2 (10th Cir. Feb. 4, 2005) (concluding it was error

to sentence the defendant under a mandatory Guidelines system).

12

WL 272952, at *6.7

3. Effect on Shelton’s substantial rights

Under the third prong of plain-error review, Shelton is required to

demonstrate that the plain error “affects [his] substantial rights.” United States v.

Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 631, 122 S. Ct. 1781, 1785 (2002) (quotation marks,

citation, and brackets omitted). In this third prong, “[i]t is the defendant rather

than the [g]overnment who bears the burden of persuasion with respect to

prejudice.” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 1778

(1993). “The Supreme Court has instructed us that plain error review should be

exercised ‘sparingly.’” Rodriguez, 2005 WL 272952, at *6 (citation omitted).

Further, “the plain error test is difficult to meet,” and in particular, the “burden of

showing prejudice to meet the third-prong requirement is anything but easy.” Id. at

*6-7 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

Further, the defendant’s burden with respect to prejudice is to show that the

error “actually did make a difference.” Rodriguez, 2005 WL 272952, at *8. In

7

We disagree with the Sixth Circuit’s view in Barnett, 2005 WL 357015, at *13-15

(Gwin, J., concurring), that § 3742(f)(1), which provides for and requires a remand upon an

incorrect application of the Guidelines, would apply in this instance. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(f)(1).

Rather, Booker error is subject to both harmless-error and plain-error review and for that reason

does not always require a remand, and often will not. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 769 (cases on direct

review should be reviewed using “ordinary prudential doctrines” and applying the “‘plain-error’

test” and not every appeal will “lead to a new sentencing hearing”). Thus, Shelton is required to

establish all four prongs of the plain-error test.

13

other words, in post-Booker sentencing cases, “in applying the third prong, we ask

whether there is a reasonable probability of a different result if the guidelines had

been applied in an advisory instead of binding fashion by the sentencing judge in

this case.” Id. at *9.8 A reasonable probability of a different result means a

probability “sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at *7

(quotation marks and citations omitted).

A defendant sentenced pre-Booker faces difficulty in establishing that a

mandatory, as opposed to an advisory, Guidelines scheme actually affected the

outcome of the proceedings. To establish the third prong takes something more

than showing the district court sentenced within the Guidelines range and felt

bound to do so, especially given that the Guidelines range remains an important

8

We also disagree with the Sixth Circuit’s conclusion of presumed prejudice in a similar

case. See Barnett, 2005 WL 357015, at *10-12. The Sixth Circuit adopted the presumed-

prejudice approach because it found that “it would be exceedingly difficult for a defendant, such

as Barnett, to show that his sentence would have been different if the district court had sentenced

him under the advisory, rather than the mandatory, Guidelines framework.” Id. at *10. As

discussed at length in Rodriguez, clear precedent of the Supreme Court and this Court

establishes that a defendant has the burden to show actual prejudice in plain-error review.

Rodriguez, 2005 WL 272952, at *7-10. While we agree with the Sixth Circuit’s observation that

it will be difficult for a defendant to establish the third prong in Booker-error cases, that is no

reason to dispense with it as that Court has done. See Barnett, 2005 WL 357015, at *18 (Boggs,

C.J., dissenting) (“It is well settled that the defendant must show prejudice before a reviewing

court may reverse. . . . Indeed, if the Supreme Court believes that we should presume prejudice

when it would be difficult for the defendant to establish it, it is hard to explain why the Court has

passed up so many opportunities to articulate such a doctrine.” (citation omitted)). Besides,

some defendants, including Shelton, can satisfy the third prong.

14

factor in sentencing.9 But Shelton has carried that heavy burden in the instant case.

Here, the district court during sentencing expressed several times its view

that the sentence required by the Guidelines was too severe, and noted that

“unfortunately” Shelton’s criminal history category under the Guidelines was

based on his past charges rather than on the actual nature of the crimes as reflected

in the sentences imposed in those cases. The district court not only sentenced

Shelton to the lowest possible sentence it could under the Guidelines, 130 months,

but also stated that sentence was “more than appropriate” in this case. All of these

comments taken together convince us that there is a reasonable probability the

district court would have imposed a lesser sentence in Shelton’s case if it had not

felt bound by the Guidelines.10 In addition, and importantly too, Shelton has

established a reasonable probability that some sentence below the Guidelines range

9

After Booker, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines remain an essential consideration in the

imposition of federal sentences, albeit along with the factors in § 3553(a). A sentencing court

under Booker still must consider the Guidelines, and, such consideration necessarily requires the

sentencing court to calculate the Guidelines sentencing range in the same manner as before

Booker. Indeed, the factors the Sentencing Commission was required to use in developing the

Guidelines are a virtual mirror image of the factors sentencing courts are required to consider

under Booker and § 3553(a). The change wrought by Booker is the excising of the mandatory

nature of the Guidelines.

10

We emphasize that the district court was, and still is, bound by the statutory minimums.

For example, Shelton’s sentence can be no less than 120 months’ (10 years’) imprisonment for

the drug charge in count 4. The district court sentenced Shelton to 130 months’ imprisonment,

which is 10 months higher than the statutory minimum on count 4. The firearms sentence is not

in issue in this case because it carries a mandatory, five-year minimum, consecutive sentence to

follow the drug sentence.

15

would be permissible and reasonable in light of Booker and the § 3553(a) factors.11

Thus, we proceed to the fourth prong.

4. Fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings

Finally, under the fourth prong of plain-error review, we consider whether

the “plain error” at sentencing “seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public

reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Simpson, 228 F.3d 1294,

1300-01 (11th Cir. 2000) (quotation marks and citations omitted); United States v.

Chisholm, 73 F.3d 304, 307 (11th Cir. 1996). A plain error affecting substantial

rights does not, without more, satisfy the plain-error test, for otherwise the fourth

prong and the discretion afforded by the fourth prong would be illusory. We

conclude that the fourth prong is established here and that an exercise of our

discretion is warranted in this particular case.12

11

Although the district court’s comments convince us that on remand the district court

will sentence below the range indicated by the Guidelines, we do not know exactly what

sentence it will impose after consulting the § 3553(a) factors. Until we find out, we will not

attempt to decide whether a particular sentence below the Guidelines range might be reasonable

in this case. If there is an appeal of the actual post-remand sentence which raises that issue, we

can decide it then.

12

We also must mention the plain-error analysis in United States v. Curtis, 380 F.3d 1308

(11th Cir. 2004). The Curtis case was before the Court on the defendant’s motion to file a

supplemental brief on appeal. After briefing and oral argument, Curtis’s motion sought to raise,

for the first time on appeal, a claim that his sentencing enhancements were unconstitutional

under Blakely. The Curtis Court’s published opinion denied the defendant’s motion as untimely.

In a footnote, the Curtis Court made the alternative ruling that even if the Blakely issue

had been raised adequately on appeal, we would have been limited to plain-error review and that

the Blakely error in any event was not at all plain under the second prong of plain error review.

The Curtis Court did not address the third prong at all, but moved on to the fourth prong, stating:

16

The district court in this case indicated an express desire to impose a

sentence lesser than the low end of the Guidelines range of 130 months’

imprisonment, and the Supreme Court in Booker plainly indicated that the district

court now has the discretion to do so, provided the resulting sentence is reasonable

in light of the § 3553(a) factors. Under these circumstances, the defendant Shelton

has carried his burden to establish the fourth prong and has shown that the plain

error that affected his substantial rights also seriously affected the fairness,

integrity or public reputation of the judicial proceedings in his particular case.

Accordingly, we vacate Shelton’s sentence and remand for resentencing consistent

with Booker.

VACATED AND REMANDED.

With respect to the fourth prong, we discern no miscarriage of justice in the case, nor

do we believe this case presents a situation that seriously affects the fairness,

integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Accordingly, as an alternative

basis for our decision, we conclude that Curtis has failed to demonstrate plain error.

Id. at 1311 n.2.

Shelton’s case is distinguishable from Curtis because (1) Shelton has established the third

prong of the plain-error test, that his sentence actually would have been different and shorter but

for the district court’s error, (2) our failure to notice the forfeited error would leave Shelton with

a sentence that the district court would not have given, and (3) in any event, the Blakely error in

the Sentencing Guidelines context contemplated by the Curtis panel was judicial versus jury

fact-finding of sentencing enhancements and is entirely different from the error we now know to

exist under Booker as to the Sentencing Guidelines. See Rodriguez, 2005 WL 272952, at *9

(“The constitutional error is the use of extra-verdict enhancements to reach a guidelines result

that is binding on the sentencing judge; the error is the mandatory nature of the guidelines once

the guideline range has been determined.”)

17