Opinion

Donald Robin BARREN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Tom HARRINGTON, Defendant-Appellee

  • 152 F.3d 1193
  • 98 Daily Journal DAR 9173
  • 98 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6618
  • 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 20808
  • 1998 WL 537934
Court
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Filed
Aug 26, 1998
Status
Published
On the bench
O'Scannlain, Rymer, Hawkins
Cited by
1,921 cases
Authority
More cited than 99.9%

holding that wheelchair-bound arrestee has valid claim under ADA where local police "denied him the benefit of post-arrest transportation appropriate in light of his disability"

How later courts described this case

  • holding that wheelchair-bound arrestee has valid claim under ADA where local police "denied him the benefit of post-arrest transportation appropriate in light of his disability"
  • emphasizing that “[a] plaintiff must allege facts, not simply conclusions, that 10 show that an individual was personally involved in the deprivation of his civil rights.”
  • emphasizing that “[a] plaintiff must allege facts, not simply conclusions, that 21 show that an individual was personally involved in the deprivation of his civil rights.”
  • noting that “[a] plaintiff must allege facts, not simply conclusions, that 18 show that the individual was personally involved in the deprivation of his civil rights”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

ORDER

Barren appeals the district court’s order sua sponte dismissing the third amended complaint of his § 1983 action filed in forma pauperis against various members of the Nevada state law enforcement community. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 .

The district court dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e), holding that Barren had failed to present claims cognizable under § 1983. The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-10, 110 Stat. 1321 , amended § 1915 to require the district court to dismiss in forma pauperis prisoner civil rights suits if the court determines that the action does not state a claim upon which relief may be granted. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). The language of § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). We join our sister circuits and employ the same de novo standard to review such dismissals as we use to review dismissals pursuant to 12(b)(6).

See Black v. Warren,

134 F.3d 732, 733 (5th Cir.1998);

Mitchell v. Farcass,

112 F.3d 1483, 1489-90 (11th Cir.1997);

McGore v. Wrigglesworth,

114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir.1997);

Atkinson v. Bohn,

91 F.3d 1127, 1128 (8th Cir.1996).

The statutory authority is clear: “the court shall dismiss the case

at any time

if the court determines that ... the action or appeal ... fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(ii) (emphasis added).

Barren’s complaint comprised four separate allegations. Count I alleged that the defendants had conspired to deny him his Fourth Amendment rights by bringing charges against him without probable cause, thus causing him to be incarcerated for 156 days before the charges were dismissed. Count II alleged that his due process rights were violated when he was held from May 1995 to October 1995 without a hearing. Count III alleged that he was denied the equal protection of the laws and was denied his First Amendment right of access to the courts when the defendants caused his brass slip requesting payment of a court ordered $5 filing fee to be denied. Count IV alleged that the appellant was denied access to the courts when his brass slip was denied, resulting in the dismissal of his lawsuit,

Barren v. Harrington,

CV-N-96-254-DWH.

A plaintiff must allege facts, not simply conclusions, that show that an individual was personally involved in the deprivation of his civil rights. Liability under § 1983 must be based on the personal involvement of the defendant.

May v. Enomoto,

633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir.1980). Barren has failed to meet this standard by failing to allege any facts which would support his allegations that the defendants had conspired to violate his Fourth Amendment rights, and by failing to allege any specific proceedings in which his due process rights were violated.

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment a plaintiff must show that the defendants acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against the plaintiff based upon membership in a protected class.

Washington v. Davis,

426 U.S. 229, 239-40 , 96 S.Ct. 2040 , 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976);

Sischo-Nownejad v. Merced Community College Dist.,

934 F.2d

*1195

1104, 1112 (9th Cir.1991);

Gutierrez v. Municipal Court of the Southeast Judicial District,

838 F.2d 1031, 1047 (9th Cir.1988) (purposeful discrimination is an essential element of an equal protection claim). Barren has not demonstrated that he is a member of a protected class.

To state a valid claim for denial of access to the courts, a plaintiff must allege an actual injury.

Linda R.S. v. Richard D.,

410 U.S. 614, 617 , 93 S.Ct. 1146 , 35 L.Ed.2d 536 (1973). Barren has not alleged that he has suffered an actual injury.

Barren has offered no more than concluso-ry allegations that the defendants were involved in a conspiracy to deprive him of his constitutional rights. Consequently, the district court did not err in dismissing this third amended complaint.

AFFIRMED.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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