McDaniel v. Camp (In Re Camp)

United States Court of Appeals,

Fifth Circuit.

No. 94-50247.

In the Matter of Hope G. CAMP, Debtor.

Wilburn C. McDANIEL, Independent Personal Representative of the

Estate of Betty J. McDaniel, deceased, Appellant,

v.

Hope G. CAMP, et al., Appellees.

Aug. 2, 1995.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western

District of Texas.

Before WISDOM, JONES and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.

EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judge:

The district court affirmed a bankruptcy court order voiding,

under the Texas Constitution's provisions governing homestead

rights, a pre-petition transfer of debtor Hope G. Camp's property.

Betty McDaniel, claiming title to the property, appeals the

district court's judgment. We reverse and remand.

I

Hope Camp was married to Betty McDaniel's father, who is now

deceased. In his will, McDaniel's father bequeathed to Camp title

to a house located on La Manda Street in San Antonio, Texas (the

"La Manda property"). Thereafter, Camp evicted McDaniel from the

La Manda property and sold it to David L. Gutierrez. At the time

Camp evicted her, McDaniel had lived in the house for approximately

six years.

McDaniel believed that she held superior title to the La Manda

1

property by virtue of a bequest from her grandmother, and sued

Gutierrez in a trespass to try title action. McDaniel successfully

obtained both possession of the house and a money judgment for back

rent against Gutierrez, and Gutierrez filed a breach of warranty of

title suit against Camp in state court.

Camp failed to file an answer in the breach of warranty suit,

and the state court entered a default money judgment in Gutierrez'

favor. In order to determine what properties Camp owned that could

be used to satisfy his money judgment against her, Gutierrez sent

post-judgment interrogatories and requests for admissions to Camp.

Gutierrez asked Camp to admit that she had "abandoned any homestead

claim [she] may have in and to" a house located on Linda Drive in

San Antonio, Texas ("the Linda property"). At that time, Camp was

living in the Linda property and had lived there for approximately

twenty-three years.

When Camp failed to answer the discovery requests, the state

court issued an order compelling her to answer. When Camp failed

to comply with the order, Gutierrez filed a motion for sanctions

against Camp. When Camp did not reply to the motion, the court

issued a sanctions order (1) deeming her to have admitted that she

had "abandoned any and all homestead claim she may have had" to the

Linda property, (2) declaring that the Linda property was not her

homestead, and (3) "prohibiting [Camp] from introducing into

evidence documents or testimony to support the exempt status of

2

[the Linda] property."1 The court also issued a writ of execution,

and the Bexar County Sheriff levied on the Linda property and

noticed it for sale. Gutierrez bought the property, and later

transferred title to McDaniel to satisfy the money judgment

McDaniel had earlier obtained against him.

After the sale of the Linda property, Camp filed a bankruptcy

petition and claimed the Linda property as her homestead. The

bankruptcy court refused to give res judicata effect to the

sanctions order that had declared that Camp had abandoned her

homestead claim to the Linda property. Instead, the court issued

an order declaring that the Linda property was in fact and law

Camp's homestead. The court also voided the sheriff's sale.

McDaniel filed an interlocutory appeal from the bankruptcy court's

order, and the district court affirmed. McDaniel appeals,

contending that both the sanctions order and subsequent judicial

sale of the Linda property were valid, and that the bankruptcy

1

In pertinent part, the sanctions order stated that the

Linda property and another house owned by Camp:

are not the respondent HOPE CAMP, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS

EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF HENRY H. CAMP's homestead;

and are not exempt from execution, for all of which let

execution issue; and

2. The matters contained in the Plaintiff's Request for

Admissions directed to Respondent HOPE CAMP,

INDIVIDUALLY AND AS EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF HENRY H.

CAMP are deemed admitted;

3. The Respondent HOPE CAMP, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS

EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF HENRY H. CAMP is shall [sic]

be prevented from supporting any claim she may have or

may ever have that the parcels of real property

described above are or ever were exempt from execution

as her homestead.

3

court should have given the sanctions order res judicata effect.

II

McDaniel contends that the bankruptcy court improperly reached

the question of the homestead character of the Linda property.2

The district court held that "the bankruptcy court's determination

that Camp satisfied her burden of establishing the initial

homestead character of the [property] was not clearly erroneous"

because "it was undisputed that Camp occupied the [property]

continuously as her homestead for approximately 23 years."

McDaniel argues that under the state court's sanctions order, Camp

was prohibited from claiming the Linda property as her homestead in

the bankruptcy court.

McDaniel contends that the sanctions order was a valid final

judgment, and that the bankruptcy court should have given res

judicata effect to the state court's decrees that the Linda

property was not Camp's homestead and that Camp be prevented from

"supporting" a homestead claim to the property. The district court

held that "the Sanctions Order did not establish that Camp had

"abandoned' her homestead claim to the [Linda property] as a matter

of law,"3 and that "post-judgment discovery is simply not capable

2

We review a bankruptcy court's findings of fact for clear

error; and when the district court has affirmed the findings,

our review for clear error is strict. In re Kemp, 52 F.3d 546,

550 (5th Cir.1995). We review the bankruptcy court's conclusions

of law de novo. Id.

3

" "The right to a homestead in a particular tract of land,

having once vested by ownership and use, is presumed to continue

until there is affirmative proof of abandonment.' " Truman v.

Deason (In re Niland), 825 F.2d 801, 808 (5th Cir.1987) (quoting

McFarland v. Rousseau, 667 S.W.2d 929, 931 (Tex.App.—Corpus

4

of overriding the protection afforded to homestead claimants under

the Texas Constitution."

A court may invoke the doctrine of res judicata to bar

consideration of a claim already presented to a Texas court upon

finding: "(1) that the prior judgment was rendered by a court of

competent jurisdiction; (2) that there was a final judgment on the

merits; (3) that the parties, or those in privity with them, are

identical in both suits; and (4) that the same cause of action is

involved in both suits." Sutherland v. Cobern, 843 S.W.2d 127, 130

(Tex.App.—Texarkana 1992, writ denied). If, however, the court

that rendered the prior judgment lacked jurisdiction, the judgment

is void and has no res judicata effect.4 A party may collaterally

attack a void judgment. See Holloway v. Starnes, 840 S.W.2d 14, 18

(Tex.App.—Dallas 1992, writ denied) ("A collateral attack is proper

only if the judgment is "void in law.' "), cert. denied, --- U.S.

----, 114 S.Ct. 93, 126 L.Ed.2d 60 (1993); Dews, 413 S.W.2d at 805

Christi 1984, no writ)). Under Texas law, "[a]bandonment of a

homestead requires both the cessation or discontinuance of use of

the property as a homestead, coupled with the intent to

permanently abandon the homestead." Womack v. Redden, 846 S.W.2d

5, 7 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1992, writ denied).

4

See Sanders v. Brady (In re Brady, Tex., Mun. Gas Corp.),

936 F.2d 212, 218 (5th Cir.) ("Under Texas law, before the

doctrine of res judicata will apply, the court rendering the

prior judgment must have had jurisdiction over the dispute."),

cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1013, 112 S.Ct. 657, 116 L.Ed.2d 748

(1991); see also Poynor v. Bowie Indep. Sch. Dist., 627 S.W.2d

517, 519 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1982, writ dism'd) ("A void

judgment is not res judicata in a subsequent suit involving the

same parties and subject matter."); Dews v. Floyd, 413 S.W.2d

800, 805 (Tex.Civ.App.—Tyler 1967, no writ) ("Where a court

rendering judgment does not have jurisdiction, the judgment is

void and cannot operate as res adjudicata; it neither binds,

bars, nor estops anyone." (emphasis omitted)).

5

("When the judgment is not merely erroneous, but an absolute

nullity, it can have no binding force or effect, either in the

tribunal in which it is rendered, or in any other in which it may

be brought in question." (emphasis omitted)).5 Under Texas law,

courts have no jurisdiction where they lack 1) jurisdiction over

the person of a party or the party's property, 2) jurisdiction over

the subject matter, 3) jurisdiction to enter the particular

judgment rendered, or 4) capacity to act as a court. Steph v.

Scott, 840 F.2d 267, 270 (5th Cir.1988); accord Austin Indep. Sch.

Dist. v. Sierra Club, 495 S.W.2d 878, 881 (Tex.1973); Holloway,

840 S.W.2d at 18 (citing Cook v. Cameron, 733 S.W.2d 137, 140

(Tex.1987)).

As a court of general jurisdiction, the trial court had

subject-matter jurisdiction over Gutierrez's breach of warranty

suit. See Tex. Const. art. 5, § 8 ("District court jurisdiction

consists of exclusive, appellate and original jurisdiction of all

5

Thus, the treatment of a void judgment differs from that of

a voidable judgment: "Absent one of those rare circumstances

that makes the judgment "void,' the mere fact that action by a

court ... is contrary to statute, constitutional provision or

rule of civil or appellate procedure makes it "voidable' or

erroneous." Mapco, Inc. v. Forrest, 795 S.W.2d 700, 703

(Tex.1990). When a judgment is merely voidable, "[t]hat the

judgment may have been wrong or premised on a legal principle

subsequently overruled does not affect application of res

judicata." Segrest v. Segrest, 649 S.W.2d 610, 612-13 (Tex.),

cert. denied, 464 U.S. 894, 104 S.Ct. 242, 78 L.Ed.2d 232 (1983);

see also Schein v. American Restaurant Group, Inc., 852 S.W.2d

496, 497 n. 1 (Tex.1993) (noting that "the fact that "a judgment

may have been wrong or premised on a legal principle subsequently

overruled does not affect the application of res judicata.' "

(quoting Victoria County Cooperative Co. v. National Steel Prods.

Co., 704 S.W.2d 80, 82 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1985, writ ref'd

n.r.e.)).

6

actions, proceedings, and remedies...."). From this jurisdictional

base, the trial court properly entered a default judgment after

Camp's failure to answer. See Tex.R.Civ.P. 239 (governing entry of

default judgments). The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure further

allow a "successful party" at any time after rendition of judgment

to "initiate and maintain in the trial court in the same suit in

which said judgment was rendered any discovery proceeding

authorized by these rules for pre-trial matters." Tex.R.Civ.P.

621a. Camp's refusal to answer post-trial discovery requests and

the motion for sanctions led to the sanctions order entered by the

trial court. See Tex.R.Civ.P. 215 (governing sanctions for abuse

of discovery).

Accordingly, the trial court had general jurisdiction to

sanction Camp, but that does not end our inquiry. "[W]hen the

Legislature creates a right, it can also restrict the remedies

available and the means of determining their enforcement." Testoni

v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 861 S.W.2d 387, 390 (Tex.App.—Austin

1992, no writ) (noting, in benefits context, that trial court

lacked jurisdiction to render judgment on remedy when proceedings

were not in compliance with statutory restrictions). Concerning

homestead rights, the courts operate under limited jurisdiction.

Thus, even if a court has general jurisdiction to act, a judgment

is void if the actual action taken orders a remedy not within the

court's jurisdiction.6

6

See Crawford v. Kelly Field Nat'l Bank, 724 S.W.2d 899, 901

(Tex.App.—San Antonio 1987, no writ) (holding that although

jurisdiction to enter sanctions order existed, jurisdiction to

7

In this case, therefore, the issues require us to determine

whether the state trial court sanctions order declaring the Linda

property not Camp's homestead and the trial court's order of sale

contravened such a jurisdictional restriction. At first blush,

Rule 215 would seem to allow trial courts to enter "such orders in

regard to the failure [to respond to discovery] as are just,"

including "an order that the matters regarding which the order was

made or any other designated facts shall be taken to be

established" and "an order refusing to allow the disobedient party

to support or oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting

him from introducing designated matters in evidence." Tex.R.Civ.P.

215(2)(b). However, the character of the sanctions imposed by the

trial court—the declaration that the Linda property is not

homestead property, not exempt from execution, and order of

execution—requires us to examine the jurisdiction of the trial

court over the "subject matter"—namely the homestead—given the

language of the Texas Constitution. See Tex. Const. art. XVI, § 50

("The homestead ... shall be, and hereby is protected from forced

sale, for the payment of all debts [except those provided for in

this section]."); accord Curtis Sharp Custom Homes, Inc. v.

Glover, 701 S.W.2d 24, 25 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.)

("Since the purported equitable lien was imposed by judicial

order remedy that modified judgment no longer existed because

modification remedy no longer available if more than thirty days

had elapsed since judgment); cf. Downs v. City of Fort Worth,

692 S.W.2d 209, 212 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.)

(stating, in discussion of appeal time limits, that "[i]f a

judgment were granted in contravention of a mandatory statutory

provision it would be a void judgment.").

8

decree, we must examine the jurisdiction of the trial court in that

case over the subject matter, to-wit: the homestead, in view of

the language of the constitution.").

The Texas Supreme Court has defined "jurisdictional power" in

this sense to mean "jurisdiction over the subject matter, the power

to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the

particular matter belongs." Middleton v. Murff, 689 S.W.2d 212,

213 (Tex.1985). "[T]he constitutional provision against forced

sales of homesteads is of a mandatory character and it has been

held with considerable unanimity that forced sales of property

constituting a homestead are void and subject to collateral attack,

even when the homestead character of the property is not

affirmatively disclosed by the record." Curtis Sharp Custom Homes,

701 S.W.2d at 27. "[I]n dealing with the subject of the sale of a

homestead," a court is not acting under general powers, but "is

acting within a specially limited field of jurisdiction declared by

the Constitution and statutes." Cline v. Niblo, 117 Tex. 474, 8

S.W.2d 633, 638 (1928). Consequently, if the sanctions order and

order of sale constitute a "forced sale of homestead," the trial

court's judgment is void. See Niblo, 8 S.W.2d at 638 ("A decision

[under general jurisdiction] ... would be entitled to no force and

effect in so far as the court in rendering it overstepped its

acquired jurisdiction or its powers under the law.").

It is plausible to suggest that because the sanctions order

declaring that the Linda property was not Camp's homestead does not

in and of itself "force" the sale of the property, the declaration

9

cannot contravene the constitutional restriction. The sanctions

order, however, operated in the nature of an equitable lien,

thereby creating a cloud on Camp's title. See Henderson v. Belknap

(In re Henderson), 18 F.3d 1305, 1310 (5th Cir.) (holding that

judicial order was equitable lien and impaired exemption under

federal law because created cloud on title to homestead property

even though unenforceable), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct.

573, 130 L.Ed.2d 490 (1994). Moreover, because the validity of the

order of sale depends on the validity of the declaration,7 we

cannot view each action in isolation. Thus, if the declaration

improperly impaired a homestead right, we will not ignore "the

practical real life effects of an unenforceable judicial lien on a

Texas homestead." In re Henderson, 18 F.3d at 1310; see also In

re Niland, 825 F.2d at 814 (denying equitable lien against

homestead because otherwise would render constitutional protections

"almost meaningless" (citation omitted)).

McDaniel argues that the sanctions order is valid as a proper

determination of homestead. Courts of general jurisdiction do have

jurisdiction to determine whether a property is a homestead,8 and

7

"[A] properly abstracted judgment never attaches to a

homestead so long as it remains homestead property." In re

Henderson, 18 F.3d at 1308. Thus, if the Linda property is

Camp's homestead, the order of sale cannot attach. If the

declaration is valid, however, the Linda property is no longer

Camp's homestead. Consequently, the order of sale would not be

acting upon a homestead and would not contravene the

constitutional prohibition. However, the overall effect, if the

property is indeed Camp's homestead, would be a sale of homestead

property.

8

See Pace v. McEwen, 617 S.W.2d 816, 819

(Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ) (holding that

10

once such a determination is made, res judicata can apply. See

Mosley v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 875 S.W.2d 10, 11

(Tex.App.—Eastland 1994, writ denied) (noting that res judicata

applies to homestead dispute only if prior court had subject matter

jurisdiction through a proper adjudication and upholding prior

judgment because it was in compliance with constitutional

protections).9 There exists a distinction, however, between the

determination of whether an existing, proper lien was correctly

applied and the imposition of a new lien without a prior

determination of its propriety. See Mosley, 875 S.W.2d at 11

(noting distinction between "the adjudication of an existing lien

and the imposition by the court of a previously non-existing

lien"). In the former situation, the prior court exercises its

jurisdiction to determine whether a property was a homestead, and

then if, and only if, the property is not a homestead, the court

imposes the lien. In the latter situation, the court imposes the

lien without conducting the required homestead determination; it

is this lien that the constitutional provision prohibits.

Accordingly, res judicata can apply only if the trial court

actually and properly determined the homestead question prior to

trial court had jurisdiction "to determine that the property in

question was not [claimant's] homestead").

9

Cf. Johnson v. Whatley, 45 S.W.2d 766, 768

(Tex.Civ.App.—Galveston 1932, writ ref'd) (refusing to allow

party to retry homestead issue because prior court had conducted

full trial of that issue); Tuerpe v. George W. Saunders Live

Stock Commission Co., 259 S.W. 649, 650-51 (Tex.Civ.App.—San

Antonio 1924, writ dism'd w.o.j.) (same).

11

issuing the order of sale.10

McDaniel argues that by failing to answer, Camp waived her

right to contest the propriety of the trial court's homestead

determination at a later date and to prove that jurisdiction was

lacking. Although parties must plead jurisdiction, waiver can

apply. See Tex.R.Civ.P. 90. (governing waiver of pleading

jurisdiction). This waiver, however, applies only to the pleading

of jurisdictional facts, not to their existence. See Trevino v.

Allstate Ins. Co., 651 S.W.2d 8, 12 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1983, writ

ref'd n.r.e.) ("[W]aiver of pleading of a fact does not constitute

waiver of proof of that fact."); Northrup v. O'Brien, 474 S.W.2d

614, 617 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1971, no writ) (stating that waiver

"does not dispense with proof of essential jurisdictional facts").

"An omission of, or defect in, the jurisdictional allegations will

be waived if the defendant fails to call it to the court's

attention before judgment, provided that the proof upon the trial

establishes the court's jurisdiction." Mercer v. Phillips Natural

10

See Curtis Sharp Custom Homes, 701 S.W.2d at 27 ("[T]he

former judgment [ordering sale] can stand only when the record

discloses that the issue of whether homestead exists has been

determined adversely to the one claiming the homestead

exemption...."); Tucker v. Cole, 215 S.W.2d 252, 255

(Tex.Civ.App.—Texarkana 1948, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (requiring "an

affirmative showing in the decree that the question was

adjudicated in the judgment leading up to the sale"); Johnson v.

Echols, 21 S.W.2d 382, 383 (Tex.Civ.App.—Eastland 1929, writ

ref'd) ("[A] judgment foreclosing an attachment lien on land is

not conclusive of the defendant's homestead rights in the

attached lands where no issue regarding such homestead rights has

been made by the pleadings of either party."); Tobar v. Losano,

25 S.W. 973, 974 (Tex.Civ.App.1894, no writ) ("It is well settled

that the foreclosure of an attachment does not adjudicate the

homestead right, unless that issue is raised in the suit in

connection with which the attachment is foreclosed.").

12

Gas Co., 746 S.W.2d 933, 939 (Tex.App.—Austin 1988, writ denied).

Accordingly, a party's waiver is not effective if the underlying

facts of jurisdiction are absent. See Mercer, 746 S.W.2d at 939

(looking to whether jurisdictional facts existed, not merely

whether they were pled); Poynor, 627 S.W.2d at 519 (noting that

parties cannot waive subject matter jurisdictional defects). If,

therefore, the proceedings resulting in the sanctions order did not

raise the issue of whether the property was Camp's homestead, the

sanctions order was not a determination of homestead and the trial

court would have had no jurisdiction to issue the order of sale.

In the request for admissions, Gutierrez asked Camp to admit

whether she had abandoned any homestead claim in the Linda

property. "When homestead rights are once shown to exist in

property, they are presumed to continue, and anyone asserting an

abandonment has the burden of pleading and proving it by competent

evidence." Norman v. First Bank & Trust, 557 S.W.2d 797, 801

(Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

Abandonment is a question of fact. See Coleman v. Banks, 349

S.W.2d 737, 741 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.)

("[A]bandonment of a homestead is a question of fact to be

determined in each case from the entire evidence before the court

or jury....").

A party may attempt to satisfy its burden to prove factual

issues by requesting an admission from the opposing party. See

Tex.R.Civ.P. 169(2) ("Any matter admitted under this rule is

conclusively established as to the party making the

13

admission...."). If the opponent fails to answer the request, the

factual issue is deemed admitted. See Marshall v. Vise, 767 S.W.2d

699, 700 (Tex.1989) ("An admission once admitted, deemed or

otherwise, is a judicial admission, and a party may not then

introduce testimony to controvert it.").11 Should the deemed

admissions supply the necessary elements of the requesting party's

proof, a court may enter judgment on the requesting party's cause

of action.12 Consequently, resolution of a question solely on

11

See also Ramsey v. Criswell, 850 S.W.2d 258, 259

(Tex.App.—Texarkana 1993, no writ) ("[W]hen timely response is

not made to a request for admissions, the matter is admitted

without the necessity of a court order."); Texas Employers' Ins.

Ass'n v. Bragg, 670 S.W.2d 712, 715-16 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi

1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (noting that questions were deemed

admitted with or without a court order if no answer to request

for admissions); Frierson v. Modern Mut. Health & Acc. Ins. Co.,

172 S.W.2d 389, 393 (Tex.Civ.App.—Waco 1943, ref'd w.o.m.)

("[T]he effect of a party's failure to answer inquiries in

adverse party's written request for admission ... is comparable

to a "legal admission' made in the applicable pleadings of a

party, so as to preclude his denial of such facts on the trial of

the case.").

12

See Ramsey, 850 S.W.2d at 260 (holding that when party's

deemed admissions supplied all elements necessary to support

judgment, judgment was proper); Agristor Credit Corp. v.

Donahoe, 568 S.W.2d 422, 427 (Tex.Civ.App.—Waco 1978, writ ref'd

n.r.e.) (holding that when deemed admissions established all

elements of claim, claim had been established as a matter of

law); Frierson, 172 S.W.2d at 393 (holding that because admitted

facts "established in favor of [requesting party] every fact

tendered by its pleadings, ... it was the duty of the trial judge

to apply the law to the facts so established and render judgment

accordingly"); see also Parras v. McLelland, 846 S.W.2d 44, 46

(Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1992, writ denied) ("[T]he legal effect

of a party's failure to answer inquiries in its written request

for admissions ... is to present the case to the trial court on

the agreed statement of facts ... [and] it is the trial judge's

duty to apply the law to the facts so established and render

judgment accordingly.").

14

deemed admissions constitutes adjudication of that question.13

Allowing Camp to challenge that adjudication in the bankruptcy

court would eviscerate the protections Texas law provides to a

party who properly obtains and relies on judicial admissions.14

Camp essentially contends that because the Texas courts

liberally construe the constitutional restriction against forced

homestead sales,15 we should make an exception and disregard the

ordinary legal effect of her admissions. We decline. The Texas

13

We have held in other circumstances that under Texas law,

a discovery sanction operates as a determination on the merits.

See Besing v. Hawthorne (In re Besing), 981 F.2d 1488, 1493-94

(5th Cir.1993) (stating that discovery sanction—dismissal with

prejudice—operated as a determination on the merits under Texas

law (citing Mossler v. Shields, 818 S.W.2d 752, 754 (Tex.1991);

Logan, 736 S.W.2d at 931); Dillard v. Security Pacific Brokers,

Inc., 835 F.2d 607, 608 (5th Cir.1988) (holding that dismissal as

sanction for discovery abuse qualified as judgment on merits).

The Texas courts have acted similarly. See, e.g.,

Greater Houston Transp. Co. v. Wilson, 725 S.W.2d 427, 430

(Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.)

(giving res judicata effect to default judgment entered as

sanction for discovery abuse); Tucker v. Cole, 215 S.W.2d

at 254-56 (holding that settlement decrees constituted full

adjudication of homestead question).

14

See Logan v. First Bank, 736 S.W.2d 927, 930

(Tex.App.—Beaumont 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ("[S]anctions ...

serve to deter violations of the discovery rules."); id. at 931

("We believe that the sanctions imposed by the trial court would

be meaningless if the [sanctioned party] were allowed to raise

the same matters again in this case.").

15

See Simank v. Alford, 441 S.W.2d 234, 237

(Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (stating "generally

accepted rule that homestead laws are to be liberally construed

to effectuate their beneficent purpose"); Gann v. Montgomery,

210 S.W.2d 255, 258 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1948, writ ref'd

n.r.e.) ("The courts have always given a liberal construction to

the Constitution and Statutes to protect the homestead rights.

However, the courts cannot protect that which is not

homestead.").

15

courts explicitly have given admissions their ordinary legal effect

in the homestead context, both to award and to deny a finding of

homestead.16 Camp's admission that she had abandoned her homestead

interest in the Linda property thus established the factual basis

for the trial court's determination that the Linda property was not

her homestead. Consequently, the constitutional homestead

provisions no longer applied, and the trial court had jurisdiction

to impose execution on the Linda property.

Because the sanctions order and order of sale complied with

the first Sutherland requirement of jurisdiction, we turn to the

remaining elements—finality, identity of parties, and identity of

cause of action. The parties17 and the issues are identical;

therefore, the remaining question is whether the sanctions order

and order of sale constituted a final judgment. "A post-judgment

order disposing of all matters placed before the trial court in the

16

See, e.g., Steenland v. Texas Commerce Bank Nat'l Ass'n,

648 S.W.2d 387, 390 (Tex.App.—Tyler 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.)

(allowing additional proof of homestead only because admissions

did not preclude facts necessary to determine homestead issue);

Cox v. Messer, 469 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex.Civ.App.—Tyler 1971, no

writ) (using admissions to establish homestead facts); Alexander

v. Alexander, 373 S.W.2d 800, 805 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi

1963, no writ) (finding conclusive judicial admission that

conceded homestead right to another party); Summers v. Butler,

284 S.W.2d 954, 956 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1955, writ ref'd n.r.e.)

(holding that once admissions established that property was

homestead, "the fact issue as to whether the [property] was

homestead went out of the case").

17

After Gutierrez prevailed in the breach of warranty action

against Camp, he assigned his interest in the property to

McDaniel to satisfy a judgment McDaniel had against him.

Accordingly, both the state court action and the bankruptcy

proceeding share the same parties in interest. Indeed, Camp does

not challenge this point.

16

post-judgment motion is a final and appealable order." Wolma v.

Gonzalez, 822 S.W.2d 302, 304 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1991, no writ)

(citing Allen v. Allen, 717 S.W.2d 311 (Tex.1986)); see also

Collier Servs. Corp. v. Salinas, 812 S.W.2d 372, 374

(Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1991, no writ) (stating that postjudgment

discovery order was final and appealable if it "finally disposed of

the newly asserted claims"); Transceiver v. Ring Around Prods.,

581 S.W.2d 712, 712 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1979, no writ) (holding

that postjudgment order was final and appealable because disposed

of all issues); cf. Arndt v. Farris, 633 S.W.2d 497, 500 n. 5

(Tex.1982) ("Trial court orders granting or denying particular

postjudgment discovery requests are not appealable until a final

judgment is rendered disposing of all issues between the

parties."). The sanctions order and order of sale disposed of all

questions raised by Gutierrez, that is, whether he could levy on

the Linda property to satisfy the judgment on his breach of

warranty claim. Accordingly, the orders are final.18

We therefore hold that the sanctions order and order of sale

constituted a valid judgment under Texas law that complied with all

the requirements for application of res judicata. A Texas court

would therefore have barred Camp from raising the homestead claim

in subsequent actions. Accordingly, the bankruptcy court should

have acted likewise and have given the sanctions order and order of

18

The orders are also final for the purposes of collateral

attack because Camp did not appeal them. See Curtis Sharp Custom

Homes, Inc., 701 S.W.2d at 24 (stating that prior judgment was

final because no appeal was taken from it).

17

sale res judicata effect. See In re Besing, 981 F.2d at 1494

("[F]ederal courts must give the Texas judgment the same preclusive

effect it would have had in a Texas court.").

III

For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the judgment of the

district court, and we REMAND to the district court with

instructions to remand to the bankruptcy court for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

18