holding that agency’s surveilling a street view of defendant’s home with pole camera and observing delivery of what others had informed the agency was marijuana established probable cause to search the property
How later courts described this case
- holding that agency’s surveilling a street view of defendant’s home with pole camera and observing delivery of what others had informed the agency was marijuana established probable cause to search the property
- explaining that the use of a pole camera was not a search because “one can see through [the defendant’s] fence and [thus] the cameras captured what was open to public view from the street”
- holding, in the context of extended pole camera surveillance, that recording areas “open to view of the public” does not implicate the Fourth Amendment
- finding no Fourth Amendment violation in the installation of cameras directed at front and back of defendant’s house
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Case: 19-50855 Document: 00516409077 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/27/2022
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
July 27, 2022
No. 19-50855
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
United States of America,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Michael Dewayne Dennis,
Defendant—Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. 2:18-CR-1199-1
Before Higginbotham, Haynes, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
Patrick E. Higginbotham, Circuit Judge:
A jury found Michael Dennis guilty of conspiracy to possess with
intent to distribute more than 100 kilograms of marijuana. Dennis now
appeals his conviction and sentence.
I.
The Department of Homeland Security began investigating Michael
Dennis after a number of accomplices described delivering marijuana to him.
On April 30, 2018, DHS agents installed pole cameras directed at the front
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No. 19-50855
and back of Dennis’s properties in Houston, Texas. Until July 9, 2018, the
cameras captured video of incidents similar to the deliveries described by
cooperating defendants Ray Trevino and Ausencio Garcia-Herrera. On June
24 and July 9, the video showed boxes being unloaded from pickup trucks
into the garage, Dennis going from the garage to his house and returning with
a bag, trucks departing, and Dennis moving the boxes from the garage to his
house. The video also showed Jonathan Ray Alaniz delivering boxes to the
garage twice; Houston police stopped Alaniz after he left the property,
seizing approximately $5,000 and thirty pounds of marijuana.
On June 20, 2018, Dennis was indicted for conspiracy to possess with
intent to distribute more than 100 kilograms of marijuana in violation of 21
U.S.C. §§ 841(a), (b)(1)(B), and 846. The indictment included notice of a
demand of forfeiture. On July 11, 2018, law enforcement executed an arrest
warrant for Dennis and a search warrant for his property. During a forced
entry into his home, an agent shot Dennis on seeing him with a firearm. After
his arrest, agents found an AR-15 rifle and an AK-47-type pistol with a drum
magazine, 111.85 kilos of marijuana, nineteen firearms, $197,313 cash, money
counters, scales, and ledgers showing prices, weights, and names for
hydroponic marijuana sales for $800 to $1,000 per pound on his property.
Dennis’s first retained counsel entered an appearance on August 3,
2018. Pretrial motions were due by September 16, 2018. Prior to trial, seven
different lawyers represented Dennis; other than motions to substitute
counsel or for continuances, counsel filed no pretrial motions. The district
court granted nine continuances and set three plea hearings, then denied a
motion to suppress as untimely.
Dennis was convicted in a two-day jury trial. After accepting the
verdict, the district court held a hearing on forfeiture and sentenced Dennis
to 216 months in prison and five years’ supervised release. The district court
2
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No. 19-50855
also ordered Dennis to forfeit his weapons, boat, Houston properties, and
$7,200,000 as proceeds of the offense. Dennis timely appeals.
II.
Dennis challenges the denial of three pre-trial motions: leave to file
untimely motions to suppress, its merits, and a motion for a continuance. We
address each in turn.
A.
Trial counsel filed their notice of appearance on August 9, 2019. At an
August 13 docket call the district court told counsel that the trial would
proceed on September 11. On August 29, 2019, Dennis moved to suppress
the video surveillance and evidence from the search of his property. On
September 5, 2019, Dennis moved for leave to file the motions to suppress,
nearly a year after the due date of September 16, 2018 for pretrial motions.
At the pretrial conference, the district court addressed the lateness of the
motions, heard counsel’s argument, denied the motions, and declined to
suppress any evidence. Dennis contends that the district court abused its
discretion by denying him leave to file an untimely motion to suppress.
We review the district court’s denial of a motion to suppress as
untimely for abuse of discretion. 1 A motion to suppress that is filed after the
deadline for pretrial motions while untimely, may be considered if the party
shows good cause. 2 Although we have “not ruled on the standard of review
of a district court’s finding of lack of good cause under Rule 12(c)(3),” 3 in
1
United States v. Oliver, 630 F.3d 397, 410 (5th Cir. 2011).
2
Fed. R. Crim. P. 12 (c)(3); United States v. Williams, 774 F. App’x 871, 876
(5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam).
3
Williams, 774 F. App’x at 876.
3
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Williams this Court stated that a showing of good cause requires a showing of
cause and prejudice. 4
Dennis has shown neither cause nor prejudice. For the year prior to
his trial, Dennis had at least seven different lawyers. Here, counsels’
appearance a month before trial cannot justify the late filings. 5 Prior counsel
could have moved to suppress as they were aware of the surveillance. 6
Similarly, the ongoing plea negotiations did not prevent and do not justify
prior counsels’ failure to file motions to suppress. 7 Dennis has not shown that
he was prejudiced by the denial of leave to file his untimely motions. The
district court was familiar with the facts and legal issues, heard counsels’
argument, and gave oral rulings on them before trial.8 The district court did
not abuse its discretion in denying Dennis leave to file his untimely motion to
suppress.
4
Id. at 876-77; see Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233, 243–44 (1973); United States
v. Fry, 792 F.3d 884, 888 (8th Cir. 2015) (“Under Rule 12(c)(3), as amended December 1,
2014, a court may consider an issue not timely raised under Rule 12(b)(3) only upon a
showing of ‘good cause,’ which requires a showing of cause and prejudice.”); 1A
Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 194 (5th ed. 2019).
5
See United States v. Gulley, 780 F. App’x 275, 283 (6th Cir. 2019) (change in
counsel alone not sufficient to constitute good cause for late filing); United States v. Turner,
602 F.3d 778, 787 (6th Cir. 2010).
6
Williams, 774 F. App’x at 877; see United States v. Knezek, 964 F.2d 394, 398–99
(5th Cir. 1992); 1A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 194 (5th ed. 2019).
7
See United States v. Walden, 625 F.3d 961, 965 (6th Cir. 2010) (belief that motion
to suppress would not be necessary due to planned plea did not excuse late filing).
8
Williams, 774 F. App’x at 874, 877.
4
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B.
Dennis contends that the district court erred in denying his motion to
suppress. When a pretrial motion is denied as untimely, we review the denial
of the motion for plain error. 9 To show plain error, Dennis must show a
forfeited error that is clear or obvious, which affects his substantial rights. 10
With that showing, we have the discretion to correct the error, but only if it
seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings. 11
1.
Dennis argues that the pole cameras were an unreasonable intrusion
into his privacy under the Fourth Amendment. “[O]fficial intrusion into that
private sphere generally qualifies as a search and requires a warrant
supported by probable cause.” 12 However, a defendant cannot assert a
privacy interest in information which he “voluntarily conveyed to anyone
who wanted to look.” 13 Dennis relies on United States v. Cuevas-Sanchez to
argue that the fencing around his property established his privacy interest,
but given that one can see through his fence and that the cameras captured
what was open to public view from the street, this is not a clear or obvious
application of our precedent. 14 Dennis argues the prolonged and continuous
9
United States v. Vasquez, 899 F.3d 363, 373 (5th Cir. 2018), as revised (Aug. 24,
2018).
10
Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009).
11
Id.
12
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 (2018).
13
Id. at 2215 (citation omitted).
14
See United States v. Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d 248, 250–51 (5th Cir. 1987); Evans
v. Lindley, No. 21-20118, 2021 WL 5751451, at *5 (5th Cir. Dec. 2, 2021) (per curiam);
United States v. Beene, 818 F.3d 157, 162 (5th Cir. 2016) (noting there was no expectation
5
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No. 19-50855
nature of the surveillance violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Although
the Supreme Court addressed a form of continuous surveillance in Carpenter,
unlike cell-site location information, there is nothing inherent in the use of
security cameras to cast doubt on their validity. 15 It is rather whether the
surveillance invades protected privacy interests. Surveillance of areas open
to view of the public without any invasion of the property itself is not alone a
violation. 16 All that was surveilled here was from the view from the street,
continuously visible to individuals.17 We do not say that the length of time
surveilled is irrelevant, but we find no privacy interest was here invaded—
information subject to the daily view of strollers and the community. The
legal issues here are not so clear that any error would be plain or obvious.
of privacy and that defendant had not posted “no trespassing” signs); United States v.
Moffitt, 233 F. App’x 409, 411 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (defendant did not have
legitimate expectation of privacy with respect to his driveway and yard). Other circuits have
held that similar surveillance does not violate the Fourth Amendment. See also United
States v. Moore-Bush, 36 F.4th 320 (1st Cir. 2022) (en banc) (eight months of video
surveillance with a pole camera trained on a side door, attached garage, drive-way, and
portions of the lawn and public street in front of an un-fenced house was not suppressed,
court divided on whether this was because it did not violate the Fourth Amendment or
because agents had acted in good faith reliance on existing authority); United States v.
Tuggle, 4 F.4th 505, 513 (7th Cir. 2021) (18 months of video surveillance with three cameras
viewing the front of un-fenced Tuggle’s home, an adjoining parking area, and another
portion of the outside of his house did not invade a reasonable expectation of privacy);
United States v. Houston, 813 F.3d 282, 287–88 (6th Cir. 2016) (defendant “had no
reasonable expectation of privacy in video footage recorded by a camera that was located
on top of a public utility pole and that captured the same views enjoyed by passersby on
public roads”); United States v. Vankesteren, 553 F.3d 286, 290 (4th Cir. 2009) (surveillance
cameras on farmer’s land did not violate Fourth Amendment).
15
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220.
16
See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986) (“[T]he mere fact that an
individual has taken measures to restrict some views of his activities [does not] preclude an
officer’s observations from a public vantage point where he has a right to be and which
renders the activities clearly visible.”).
17
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213.
6
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Dennis fails to show that the district court clearly erred in not suppressing
the video evidence. 18
2.
Dennis also sought to suppress the fruit of the search of his property
as relying on stale information, urging that the affidavit did not contain the
dates of the cooperating defendants’ deliveries of marijuana.
A search warrant may be invalidated upon a showing that the
supporting affidavit includes assertions that were deliberate falsehoods or
made with reckless disregard for the truth and the remaining portion of the
affidavit is insufficient to support a finding of probable cause. 19 It must be
shown that the affiant made specific statements that were deliberately false
or made in reckless disregard of the truth. 20 It is the defendant’s burden to
“make[] a strong preliminary showing that the affiant excluded critical
information from the affidavit with the intent to mislead the magistrate.” 21
Dennis has offered no proof that the affiant deliberately or recklessly falsified
statements about the information from cooperating defendants to mislead the
court. Although the dates were omitted, the defendants collectively
described nineteen deliveries of hundreds of pounds of marijuana taking
place over months. And the more recent video evidence showed that Dennis
was engaging in the same conduct described, which freshened the
18
United States v. Prieto, 801 F.3d 547, 555 (5th Cir. 2015); United States v. Miller,
665 F.3d 114, 136 (5th Cir. 2011).
19
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978); United States v. Brown, 298 F.3d
392, 395–96 (5th Cir. 2002).
20
Franks, 438 U.S. at 171–72.
21
United States v. Tomblin, 46 F.3d 1369, 1377 (5th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).
7
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No. 19-50855
information. 22 Dennis cannot show that the district court plainly erred when
it declined to suppress evidence from the search of his property.
C.
Dennis argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying
his final motion for a continuance. We review the denial of a continuance for
abuse of discretion. 23 We look to the totality of the circumstances, including:
(a) the amount of time available; (b) the defendant’s role in
shortening the time needed; (c) the likelihood of prejudice
from denial; (d) the availability of discovery from the
prosecution; (e) the complexity of the case; (f) the adequacy of
the defense actually provided at trial; and (g) the experience of
the attorney with the accused. 24
From August 2018 to September 2019, the district court granted nine
continuances, providing Dennis adequate time to prepare for trial. 25 The
shortened amount of time trial counsel had to prepare was of Dennis’s
making. 26 The district court set the September trial date on June 26, 2019.
Dennis retained new counsel in August and counsel undertook the
representation knowing the trial date. The evidence was straight-forward and
discovery was timely. 27 Dennis concedes that “[t]rial [c]ounsel performed
well at trial,” and cites no deficiencies in their representation. None of the
grounds on appeal address errors attributable to counsel’s want of
22
United States v. Webster, 734 F.2d 1048, 1056 (5th Cir. 1984).
23
United States v. Walters, 351 F.3d 159, 170 (5th Cir. 2003).
24
Id.
25
United States v. Diaz, 941 F.3d 729, 740 (5th Cir. 2019) (two continuances);
United States v. Kelly, 973 F.2d 1145, 1148 (5th Cir. 1992) (two continuances).
26
Walters, 351 F.3d at 170.
27
Diaz, 941 F.3d at 740.
8
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preparation and Dennis has not identified any prejudice from the denial of
the continuance.
III.
A.
Dennis also moved for limited discovery of the drug quantity
information in the presentence reports (PSRs) of cooperating defendants
Alex Perez-Orozco, Garcia-Herrera, Trevino, Ibarra-Gonzalez, and Hermilio
Garcia-Nunez. The district court denied the motion.
We review the district court’s decision to disclose PSR information to
a third party for abuse of discretion. 28 “There is a general presumption that
courts will not grant third parties access to the presentence reports of other
individuals.” 29 This presumption is supported by “powerful policy
considerations,” including the defendant’s privacy interest; maintaining
confidential information about informants, investigations, and grand jury
proceedings; and not chilling the “transmission of information by the
defendants.” 30 “[O]nly where a ‘compelling, particularized need for
disclosure is shown should the district court disclose the report.’” 31
Dennis argues that the need to avoid an unwarranted disparity
between his and the other defendants’ sentences justifies disclosure. The rub
is that a defendant’s drug quantity extends only to criminal activity “he was
directly involved [in] or that was reasonably foreseeable to him.” 32 Dennis
28
United States v. Huckaby, 43 F.3d 135, 138 (5th Cir. 1995).
29
Id. (internal quotation omitted).
30
Id.
31
Id. (quoting United States v. Corbitt, 879 F.2d 224, 239 (7th Cir.1989)).
32
United States v. McClaren, 13 F.4th 386, 411 (5th Cir. 2021), cert. denied sub nom.
Fortia v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 1244 (2022).
9
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worked with all of the other defendants to distribute marijuana, while they
were responsible only for what they distributed. And unlike the others,
Dennis did not cooperate with the investigation. The cooperating defendants
were not similarly situated to Dennis. 33 The district court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Dennis’s request for sentencing information.
B.
Dennis next challenges the length of his sentence, arguing that the
district court miscalculated the drug quantity finding, misapplied the
enhancement for possession of a firearm, and erroneously refused to consider
the changing laws regarding marijuana. These arguments are without merit.
“Using a bifurcated review process, we first examine whether the
district court committed any significant procedural error.” 34 “A district
court’s interpretation or application of the Sentencing Guidelines is reviewed
de novo, and its factual findings . . . are reviewed for clear error. There is no
clear error if the district court’s finding is plausible in light of the record as a
whole.” 35 “If the district court’s decision is procedurally sound, we then
consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence.” 36 In reviewing the
substantive reasonableness of the sentence, we apply “an abuse-of-discretion
standard of review, and within-Guidelines sentences enjoy a presumption of
reasonableness.” 37
33
United States v. Gaspar-Felipe, 4 F.4th 330, 344 (5th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142
S. Ct. 903 (2022).
34
United States v. Nguyen, 854 F.3d 276, 280 (5th Cir. 2017).
35
United States v. Juarez Duarte, 513 F.3d 204, 208 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam)
(citation omitted).
36
Nguyen, 854 F.3d at 280.
37
United States v. Scott, 654 F.3d 552, 555 (5th Cir. 2011).
10
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No. 19-50855
1.
Dennis first raises a procedural challenge to the calculation of the drug
quantity finding of 11,194.37 kilograms. “The defendant bears the burden of
showing that the information in the PSR relied on by the district court is
materially untrue.” 38 This finding was supported by 9,000 kilograms based
on Trevino’s testimony, 1,896.07 kilograms based on Ibarra-Gonzalez’s
statement and Garcia-Herrera’s testimony, 118.85 kilograms seized from
Dennis, and $197,313 seized from Dennis, converted to 186.45 kilograms.
Dennis argues that the calculation is not supported by the record
because Trevino, Garcia-Herrera, and Ibarra-Gutierrez are not reliable and
have motives to falsify testimony. Information provided by codefendants and
confidential sources may support a drug quantity finding; 39 such statements
are sufficiently reliable where other information corroborates details about
the drug scheme. 40 Here, in addition to the testimony, there was video
surveillance, a recorded call with Trevino, and the marijuana, money, scales,
and money counters found on Dennis’s property, all corroborating the
district court’s finding. Moreover, Dennis argued to the jury that Trevino
and Garcia-Herrara were unreliable because they cooperated with the
government. “[T]o find [the testimony] categorically unreliable for
sentencing purposes, where the government’s burden of proof is by a
preponderance of the evidence, would automatically call into question the
jury’s verdict, which was based on the higher beyond a reasonable doubt
38
United States v. Valencia, 44 F.3d 269, 274 (5th Cir. 1995).
39
United States v. Zuniga, 720 F.3d 587, 591–92 (5th Cir. 2013); United States v.
Cantu-Ramirez, 669 F.3d 619, 629 (5th Cir. 2012).
40
United States v. Rogers, 1 F.3d 341, 344 (5th Cir. 1993).
11
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standard.” 41 Dennis’s argument that Trevino, Garcia-Herrera, and Ibarra-
Gutierrez provided unreliable testimony fails.
Dennis also challenges the conversion of the $197,313 cash to 186.45
kilograms of marijuana. “Converting the money seized from a drug
defendant into its equivalent amount of drugs is not clear error.” 42 The
record supports the $480 per pound value used to convert the $197,313 43
because Dennis told Trevino he was buying marijuana for $380 to $400 a
pound and hydroponic marijuana for $800 per pound.
2.
Dennis challenges the two-level enhancement for the use of violence.
Section 2D1.1(b)(2) directs an increase of two levels to the base offense level
“if the defendant used violence, made a credible threat to use violence, or
directed the use of violence.” 44 Application of the provision is a factual
finding reviewable for clear error. 45 An agent entering Dennis’s home saw
the barrel of an assault rifle protrude around a corner, withdraw, and emerge
again. Near the entry, the agents found an AR-15 rifle and an AK-47-type
pistol with a drum of magazine boxes. The district court’s finding that Dennis
used or threatened the use of force was not clearly erroneous.
41
Cantu-Ramirez, 669 F.3d at 629.
42
United States v. Haines, 803 F.3d 713, 743 (5th Cir. 2015); U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 cmt.
n. 5).
43
Even without the converted marijuana quantity, the total quantity of marijuana
exceeds the 10,000 kilogram marijuana threshold for base offense level 34, rendering
harmless any error. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 Drug Quantity Table.
44
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(2).
45
United States v. Lira-Salinas, 852 F. App’x 860, 861 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam).
12
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3.
Dennis also challenges the substantive reasonableness of his sentence
because the district court did not consider the changing legal status of
marijuana. Even in states with more lenient marijuana laws, other federal
courts have declined to consider the status of marijuana as a sentencing
factor. 46 Even so, the district court sentenced Dennis to 216 months—144
months below the guidelines range. 47 Dennis has already received what he
now requests: a downward variance of his sentence to account for the
difference between marijuana and other drugs. The sentence imposed by the
district court was without error.
IV.
Finally, Dennis challenges the forfeiture of his property.
A.
Dennis argues that he ought to have a new trial on forfeiture because
he did not personally waive his right to a jury. Dennis did not object to the
judge hearing the forfeiture until months after the hearing. As Dennis’s
objection was not properly preserved, we review for plain error. Dennis
“bears the burden of proving (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects
his substantial rights.” 48
When the indictment states the government is seeking forfeiture “the
court must determine before the jury begins deliberating whether either party
46
United States v. Zachariah, No. SA-16-CR-694-XR, 2018 WL 3017362, at *1
(W.D. Tex. June 15, 2018) (collecting cases).
47
The district court said it imposed a non-guidelines sentence because it “was
marijuana and not meth, and not some other heavy type of drug.”
48
United States v. Valdez, 726 F.3d 684, 699 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Johnson v.
United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466–67 (1997)).
13
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requests that the jury be retained to determine the forfeitability of specific
property if it returns a guilty verdict.” 49 Forfeiture, “as an aspect of
sentencing, does not fall within the Sixth Amendment right to a jury
determination of guilt or innocence.” 50 We have not recognized a
constitutional right to a jury for criminal forfeiture. 51 The district court
determined before trial that the forfeiture hearing would proceed without a
jury. After trial, the district court confirmed, and counsel twice replied, that
Dennis did not wish for a jury. “[B]ecause counsel is the defendant’s agent,
the defendant ‘must accept the consequences of the lawyer’s decision[s].’” 52
Accepting counsel’s waiver of a jury is not plain error.
B.
Dennis argues that there is insufficient evidence to support the $7.2
million forfeiture ordered by the district court and that it thus violates the
Excessive Fines Clause. 53 We review the district court’s legal conclusions as
to the propriety of a forfeiture order de novo, the district court’s findings of
facts under the clearly erroneous standard, and “the question of whether
those facts constitute legally proper forfeiture de novo.” 54
The Comprehensive Forfeiture Act (“CFA”) “was intended to reach
every last dollar that flowed through the criminal’s hands in connection with
49
Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(5)(A).
50
Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 30 (1995).
51
United States v. Simpson, 741 F.3d 539, 560 (5th Cir. 2014).
52
United States v. Cabello, 33 F.4th 281, 295 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting Taylor v.
Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 418 (1988)).
53
Dennis also challenges the district court’s calculations on the basis that Trevino
was not a credible witness, but, as above, the district court found Trevino to be credible.
54
United States v. Olguin, 643 F.3d 384, 395 (5th Cir. 2011).
14
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the illicit activity.” 55 This Court has “upheld reasonable estimates for
calculating criminal forfeiture,” 56 bound by the stricture that “a punitive
forfeiture violates the Excessive Fines Clause if it is grossly disproportional
to the gravity of a defendant’s offense.” 57 When making the proportionality
determination, we consider
(a) the essence of the defendant’s crime and its relationship to
other criminal activity; (b) whether the defendant was within
the class of people for whom the statute of conviction was
principally designed; (c) the maximum sentence, including the
fine that could have been imposed; and (d) the nature of the
harm resulting from the defendant’s conduct. 58
Dennis’s activity was on going; he falls within the class of people for whom
the statute of conviction was principally designed, dealing with sources for
drugs in Mexico; the forfeiture amount, approximately one-and-a-half times
the maximum guidelines and statutory range of $5 million, was not “grossly
disproportional;” 59 and the scale of his distribution inflicted the harm
addressed by the statute of conviction. Dennis is only being held accountable
for sums he received from his own involvement in this criminal conspiracy. 60
Finally, contrary to Dennis’s assertions, the district court accounted for the
forfeiture of Dennis’s real property in setting the forfeiture amount; the
55
21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(2); Olguin, 643 F.3d at 400.
56
United States v. Mazkouri, 945 F.3d 293, 307 (5th Cir. 2019) (collecting cases).
57
United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998).
58
United States v. Suarez, 966 F.3d 376, 385 (5th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted).
59
Suarez, 966 F.3d at 387; see United States v. Haro, 753 F. App’x 250, 259 (5th Cir.
2018).
60
Olguin, 643 F.3d at 400.
15
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forfeiture of these assets was not duplicative. The $7.2 million forfeiture
order was without error.
****
We AFFIRM Dennis’s conviction and sentence, including its order
of forfeiture.
16