The opinion
United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
No. 95-8107.
Robert D. MASTROIANNI, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Michael J. BOWERS, Patrick D. Deering, Joe B. Jackson, Jr.,
Weyland Yeomans, Defendants-Appellants.
Jan. 5, 1996.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Georgia.
Before HATCHETT and BIRCH, Circuit Judges, and GODBOLD, Senior
Circuit Judge. (No. CV293-88), Anthony A. Alaimo, Judge.
HATCHETT, Circuit Judge:
We dismiss this appeal based on the teachings of Johnson v.
Jones, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 2151, 132 L.Ed.2d 238 (1995).
BACKGROUND
Appellants Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General of Georgia,
Patrick D. Deering, Assistant Attorney General of Georgia, and
Georgia Bureau of Investigation (GBI) Agents Joe B. Jackson Jr.,
Weyland Yeomans, and Lee J. Sweat, Jr. conducted an investigation
into alleged misconduct of Camden County Sheriff William E. Smith
and Deputy Sheriff Robert Mastroianni. Bowers supervised the
investigation that lasted from the spring of 1991 to the summer of
1992. The investigation of Mastroianni stemmed from allegations
that he planted drugs on criminal suspects and then falsely
arrested them. Mastroianni believed, however, that the goal of the
investigation was to damage the reputation of Sheriff Smith's
department.
On July 1, 1992, Deering filed a notice of indictment against
Mastroianni, and grand jury proceedings occurred on July 16 and 17.
The grand jury indicted Mastroianni on one count for planting drugs
on and falsely arresting a suspect. Law enforcement officials
arrested Mastroianni on July 17 and took him to the Glenn County
Jail where he was booked and subsequently released on a $5,000 bond
the same day. Mastroianni was on bond with restricted freedom of
movement until April 9, 1993, when Deering and Bowers formally
declared that they would not seek to prosecute Mastroianni.
On June 29, 1993, Mastroianni filed a complaint in the
Southern District of Georgia against Bowers, Deering, Yeomans,
Jackson, and Sweat for allegedly violating the Civil Rights Act of
1
1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Mastroianni sought compensatory and
punitive damages. In his complaint, Mastroianni alleged that
appellants conspired to violate his constitutional rights to be
free from malicious prosecution, bad-faith prosecution, abuse of
process, knowing use of false and perjured testimony, deprivation
of a fair trial and false arrest. Mastroianni claimed that the
appellants violated his civil rights because he refused to assist
them with an ongoing investigation of Sheriff Smith.
Appellants filed a motion to dismiss on August 2, 1993, and on
September 20, 1993. The district court granted appellants' motion
to dismiss with respect to Mastroianni's claims for deprivation of
fair trial, use of false and improperly obtained evidence, and use
of perjured testimony. The district court reasoned that
Mastroianni could not maintain a fair trial claim in the absence of
1
Mastroianni subsequently moved to have Sweat dismissed from
this action. The district court granted Mastroianni's motion on
July 20, 1994.
a trial.
The district court dismissed the claims for use of false and
improperly obtained evidence and perjured testimony because it
determined that those claims were indistinguishable from claims of
malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and false arrests. The
district court, however, denied the appellants' motion to dismiss
with respect to Mastroianni's constitutional claims in the nature
of malicious prosecution, abuse of process, false arrest, false
imprisonment and conspiracy to commit the same. The district court
found that Mastroianni had pleaded sufficient facts to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted.
In September 1994, appellants filed a motion for summary
judgment claiming that they were entitled to both qualified and
absolute immunity. The district court denied appellants' motion
for summary judgment on the claims for false arrest and conspiracy
to commit false arrest, but granted their motion on the claims for
false imprisonment, abuse of process, malicious prosecution, and
conspiracy to commit the foregoing. The district court held that
Mastroianni's claims of false imprisonment and malicious
prosecution were part of his broader claim of false arrest. The
district court also found that the tort of "abuse of process" was
not clearly established law in this circuit at the time of the
arrest. The district court found that the appellants violated
clearly established law when they arrested Mastroianni without
probable cause. This appeal is from the denial of the summary
judgment motion based on qualified immunity.
DISCUSSION
When a lower court denies a motion for summary judgment based
on qualified immunity, this court has interlocutory appellate
jurisdiction. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530, 105 S.Ct.
2806, 2817-18, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985). According to Mitchell, this
court may properly entertain an interlocutory appeal from a
district court's denial of a defendant's motion for summary
judgment when (1) the defendant is a public official claiming
qualified immunity as a defense, and (2) the issue on appeal is
whether the undisputed facts show a violation of clearly
established law. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 528, 105 S.Ct. at 2816-17.
Insofar as appeals from denials of summary judgment relate to
"factual disputes" or "sufficiency of evidence" regarding the
plaintiff's claim, this court lacks appellate jurisdiction.
Johnson v. Jones, --- U.S. ----, ----, 115 S.Ct. 2151, 2156, 132
L.Ed.2d 238 (1995); Babb v. Lake City Community College, 66 F.3d
270, 272 (11th Cir.1995). Therefore, in light of the recent
Supreme Court decision in Johnson and this court's decision in
Babb, interlocutory appellate review of denial of summary judgment
motions on the grounds of qualified immunity is confined to
determining whether the law supposedly violated was clearly
established. Johnson, --- U.S. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 2156; Babb,
66 F.3d at 272. When a district court finds that genuine issues of
material fact exist regarding the "conduct" alleged to have
violated clearly established law, this court is without appellate
jurisdiction. Babb, 66 F.3d at 272. The district court in this
case found that genuine issues of material fact exist surrounding
appellants' alleged illegal conduct leading to Mastroianni's
arrest. Moreover, the appellants did not challenge the district
court's determination of the clearly established law allegedly
violated. Therefore, this court may not properly exercise
jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
This appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
DISMISSED.