Salley v. St. Tammany Parish School Board

United States Court of Appeals,

Fifth Circuit.

No. 94-30357.

Jack R. SALLEY, individually and on behalf of his minor daughter,

Margaret Danielle Salley, Margaret R. Salley, individually and on

behalf of their minor daughter, and Margaret Danielle Salley,

Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross-Appellees,

v.

The ST. TAMMANY PARISH SCHOOL BOARD and Carole Smith, Defendants-

Appellees-Cross-Appellants.

Charles N. Branton, Movant-Appellant.

July 10, 1995.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Louisiana.

Before WOOD, JR.,* JOLLY and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.

HARLINGTON WOOD, JR., Circuit Judge:

Jack R. Salley, individually and on behalf of his minor

daughter, Margaret Danielle Salley ("Danielle"); Margaret R.

Salley;1 and Danielle ("the Salleys") appeal the decision of the

district court. The district court rejected the Salleys' claims

for residential placement for Danielle, compensatory damages,

punitive damages, and attorneys' fees, but found that the

defendants, St. Tammany Parish School Board and Carole Smith ("St.

Tammany"), had committed certain procedural violations of the

Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA," or "the Act"),

*

Circuit Judge of the Seventh Circuit, sitting by

designation.

1

Mrs. Salley died in May 1993. Mr. Salley was subsequently

named the succession's representative in this suit.

1

20 U.S.C. § 1400, et seq. The district court further found,

however, that the violations committed by St. Tammany did not

negatively affect the actions taken by the Salleys regarding

Danielle's education. Accordingly, the district court awarded only

nominal damages to the Salleys. St. Tammany appeals the decision

of the district court to the extent that it found St. Tammany

liable for committing procedural violations of the Act.

I. BACKGROUND

We need not re-state the factual background and procedural

history of this case in detail here as it was well-documented by

the district court in its two opinions. See Salley v. St. Tammany

Parish Sch. Bd., No. 92-1937, 1993 WL 386299 (E.D.La. Sept. 20,

1993); Salley v. St. Tammany Parish Sch. Bd., No. 92-1937, 1994 WL

148721 (E.D.La. Apr. 18, 1994). In summary, the Salleys moved to

Louisiana from Pennsylvania in April or May of 1985, when Danielle

was in the fourth grade. The Salleys enrolled Danielle in Carolyn

Park Elementary School ("Carolyn Park"), a public school located in

St. Tammany Parish, on May 8, 1985. Danielle had been receiving

special educational services in Pennsylvania pursuant to an

individualized education program ("IEP") during the three years

immediately prior to moving to Louisiana. Upon enrolling Danielle

in Carolyn Park, Mrs. Salley provided copies of Danielle's records,

including her IEP's; Mrs. Salley also orally informed school

officials that Danielle had been diagnosed as learning disabled.

Pending an evaluation, Danielle was placed in a regular classroom

setting for the remaining fourteen days of the 1984-85 school year.

2

St. Tammany later returned Danielle's Pennsylvania school records

to the Salleys without examining them.

The Salleys were not provided with notice of their rights

under IDEA or Louisiana law, and no further action was taken

regarding Danielle's educational status during the summer of 1985.

The Salleys then removed Danielle and her siblings from St. Tammany

and enrolled them in Our Lady of Lourdes Catholic School

("Lourdes"), a private school. Danielle completed the fifth grade

and a portion of the sixth grade at Lourdes, but she showed no real

progress and her conduct deteriorated.

In the fall of 1986, the Salleys re-enrolled Danielle in the

St. Tammany public school system. At this time, the Salleys

informed the school counselor that Danielle had been experiencing

difficulty in a regular school environment. The Salleys again

provided St. Tammany with copies of Danielle's educational records,

but the Salleys were still not provided with written notification

of their rights under federal and state law. In lieu of formally

evaluating Danielle or preparing an IEP for her, St. Tammany

instead developed an informal educational plan to accommodate

Danielle. Danielle's teachers were aware of Danielle's

difficulties and the Salleys fully consented in the formulation of

the informal plan. Under this arrangement, Danielle fulfilled the

requirements of the sixth and seventh grades, and she began the

eighth grade. She scored well on standardized tests during this

period, but Danielle's overall classroom work suffered due to her

behavioral problems and poor study habits.

3

Danielle's problems continued and she was eventually admitted

to the psychiatric unit at DePaul Northshore Hospital in September

1988. Danielle was evaluated at this time and it was determined

that she qualified for Louisiana's hospital/homebound program2 as

she had been admitted to DePaul Hospital. It was also determined,

however, that Danielle was not suffering from a learning disorder.

Although Danielle demonstrated little academic progress while at

DePaul Hospital, she was able to satisfy the requirements of the

eighth grade. Danielle was discharged from DePaul Hospital in the

summer of 1989, after the Salleys were fully informed of their

right under state and federal law to have Danielle formally

evaluated to determine her eligibility for special educational

services.3

The Salleys enrolled Danielle in another private school, St.

Scholastic Academy, in the fall of 1989, but she was re-admitted to

DePaul Hospital in January 1990, after she developed a substance

abuse problem and failed several courses. Danielle completed the

ninth grade in DePaul Hospital as a hospital/homebound patient.

After Danielle was discharged from DePaul Hospital in the summer of

1990, the Salleys sought to re-enroll Danielle in the St. Tammany

2

Louisiana's hospital/homebound program allows children to

receive special educational services while they are hospitalized

or confined to their homes because of health or emotional

problems. See La. Bulletin 1706 § 449.

3

From this point on, the Salleys do not deny that they were

informed of their rights under state and federal law at every

appropriate juncture in Danielle's educational history—the

district court documented at least seven occasions when the

Salleys were presented with formal, written notification of their

rights.

4

public school system.

St. Tammany school officials screened Danielle prior to the

school year and determined that she did not qualify for special

educational services. The Salleys were then informed of their

right to request a formal evaluation. Instead of requesting a

formal evaluation, the Salleys instead approached a school

psychologist and expressed their concern regarding Danielle's

ability to handle a regular curriculum. Danielle attended

approximately three days of classes at St. Tammany before an

interim IEP conference was held on August 28, 1990. The Salleys

disagreed with the interim IEP proposed by St. Tammany because

Danielle was to receive instruction in a common resource room with

other children. The Salleys instead demanded residential placement

for Danielle pending a full evaluation. St. Tammany rejected this

proposal and the Salleys withheld their consent for a full

evaluation of Danielle.

Due to her continuing difficulties, Danielle was again

admitted to DePaul Hospital in September 1990. On October 6, 1990,

the Salleys exercised their right to request a due process hearing

to review Danielle's educational placement. In January 1991, while

the due process hearing was pending, the Salleys sent Danielle to

the Darrow School, a residential facility in New York. Before

Danielle was able to complete her first semester at the Darrow

School, she was again admitted to DePaul Hospital on May 17, 1991.

The Salleys re-enrolled Danielle in the Darrow School in the fall

of 1991, but then transferred her to the Meeting High School in New

5

Hampshire, another private residential facility, that same fall.

Danielle eventually graduated from Meeting High School in December,

1993.

This matter was initially heard before a due process hearing

officer pursuant to the Salleys' request of October 6, 1990. After

two days of testimony, the hearing officer recessed the hearing so

that a formal evaluation of Danielle could be conducted. Prior to

the evaluation ordered by the hearing officer, Danielle had not

been formally evaluated since she had moved to Louisiana. Those

informal evaluations and screenings which had been conducted by

doctors at DePaul Hospital and by school officials at St. Tammany

prior to this time had not resulted in Danielle being diagnosed as

learning disabled because she consistently tested at or above her

grade level.

After the evaluation, a formal IEP conference was held and St.

Tammany drafted a proposed IEP. The Salleys rejected the proposed

IEP as it did not provide residential placement for Danielle. The

hearing officer eventually denied the Salleys' request for

residential placement for Danielle after concluding that St.

Tammany's proposed IEP met IDEA's requirements and that the

proposed IEP was less restrictive than the requested residential

placement. The Salleys appealed the hearing officer's decision to

a state level review panel. The review panel upheld the hearing

officer's conclusion that St. Tammany's proposed IEP was

appropriate and less restrictive than the residential placement

sought by the Salleys. The Salleys then filed suit in district

6

court pursuant to IDEA's provision for judicial review. 20 U.S.C.

§ 1415(e)(2). The district court rejected most of the Salleys'

claims, but found that St. Tammany had committed certain procedural

violations of the Act. This appeal followed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The district court's decision that an IEP fulfills the

requirements of IDEA is a mixed question of fact and law and, as

such, we subject this determination to a de novo review.

Christopher M. v. Corpus Christi Indep. Sch. Dist., 933 F.2d 1285,

1289 (5th Cir.1991) (citations omitted). In this regard, we must

remain mindful of our proper role in this area:

Congress left the choice of educational policies and methods

where it properly belongs—in the hands of state and local

school officials. Our task is not to second-guess state and

local policy decisions; rather, it is the narrow one of

determining whether state and local school officials have

complied with the Act.

Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1048 (5th

Cir.1989). The district court's underlying factual findings are

subject to the clearly erroneous standard. Christopher M., 933

F.2d at 1289 (citation omitted).

For the reasons given below, we reverse in part and affirm in

part the district court's finding that St. Tammany committed

certain procedural violations of IDEA; we affirm the finding that

Danielle was not harmed as a result of the violation that did

occur. We affirm the district court's determination that the IEP

proposed by St. Tammany was sufficient under IDEA. We also affirm

the district court's finding that the Salleys are not entitled to

an award of attorneys' fees.

7

III. PROCEDURAL VIOLATIONS

A. Whether Procedural Violations Occurred

The district court found that St. Tammany had committed the

following procedural violations: (1) Danielle was not evaluated or

placed on an IEP when she moved from Pennsylvania and first

enrolled at Carolyn Park Elementary School in May 1985; (2)

Danielle was not evaluated by St. Tammany when she returned to the

public school system during the 1986-1987 school year; and (3) the

Salleys were not provided with written notice of their rights under

IDEA by St. Tammany at a sufficiently early date. See Salley, 1993

WL 386299 at *7-*10. We find that the district court clearly erred

with respect to the first two findings, and we affirm the last

finding.

1. May 1985

Turning first to the issue of Danielle's initial enrollment

in May 1985, we take note of the district court's findings

regarding the time constraints facing St. Tammany: At the time of

Danielle's initial enrollment at Carolyn Park, only fourteen school

days remained of the 1984-85 school year. Federal and state

regulations, however, allow schools thirty days to hold a meeting

to develop an IEP once it is determined that a child needs special

education services. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.343(c); La. Bulletin

1508. The time constraints involved in this case were further

exacerbated by the fact that Pennsylvania school officials did not

forward Danielle's official records until after the end of the

1984-85 school year—although Mrs. Salley did provide St. Tammany

8

with an unofficial copy of Danielle's records upon Danielle's

enrollment.

Then, before Danielle could be evaluated in the fall of 1985,

the Salleys unilaterally removed Danielle from the public school

system, severed all lines of communication with public school

officials, and enrolled Danielle in a private school for the 1985-

86 school year.4 Under these circumstances, we cannot uphold the

finding that St. Tammany violated IDEA by failing to evaluate

Danielle or place her on an IEP before the conclusion of the 1984-

85 school year.5

2. Fall 1986

Second, we find that the district court clearly erred when it

found that St. Tammany had procedurally violated IDEA by failing to

4

In light of the fact that the private school wherein the

Salleys enrolled Danielle, Lourdes, offered no special education

services, the district court concluded that the Salleys may have

withdrawn Danielle from St. Tammany for the specific purpose of

avoiding a formal evaluation:

Considering Mrs. Salley's concerns regarding the

development of an IEP program for Danielle who was a

bright child, the decision to withdraw her from the

public school system during the summer of 1985, was

more likely motivated by her concern that upon

evaluation, Danielle might indeed be placed in [a

learning disabilities] classroom at Carolyn Park

Elementary with slow learners.

1994 WL 148721, at *5.

5

The district court cited Jackson v. Franklin County Sch.

Bd., 806 F.2d 623, 628 (5th Cir.1986), in support of its holding

that the school district was obligated to either enroll Danielle

in a special educational curriculum or convene an IEP conference

before the end of the 1985-86 school year. 1993 WL 386299, at *9

n. 71. Jackson is distinguishable, however, as in that case

"over a month of school still remained in the spring term." 806

F.2d at 628.

9

evaluate Danielle when she returned to the public school system in

the fall of 1986. Where, as here, a child is not currently

enrolled in special education,6 Louisiana law does not require the

initiation of an individual evaluation unless a parent, the school

system, or a hearing officer has requested such an evaluation. La.

Bulletin 1706 § 431(A). None of these parties requested an

evaluation in this case.

The district court found, moreover, that St. Tammany could not

be faulted for failing to request that Danielle be evaluated in the

fall of 1986: At this time, the bulk of credible evidence

indicated that Danielle was not learning disabled under Louisiana

law. As the district court found, "[t]he resounding opinion of the

educational professionals rendering evaluation and/or diagnostic

services to Danielle up until this time i.e., May 1990, was that

she was not learning disabled within the meaning of Louisiana law

and thus did not qualify for special education or related

services." 1994 WL 148721, at *15.

The district court further found that an educational strategy,

instead of a formal IEP, was prepared for Danielle upon her

re-enrollment in the fall of 1986 at the direction of the Salleys

because the Salleys were loath to stigmatize Danielle.7 Although

6

As discussed above, the district court found that Lourdes,

the private school where Danielle was enrolled prior to her

return to St. Tammany, did not offer any special educational

services. 1994 WL 148721, at *5.

7

The district court found:

Mrs. Salley's close cooperation with [St. Tammany]

to the end of accommodating Danielle in a regular

10

Danielle's school performance slipped during the period that this

informal arrangement was in place, the district court nonetheless

concluded that Danielle received adequate educational benefits

during this time.8

classroom in conjunction with her later statements

regarding placing a bright student such as Danielle in

[a learning disabilities] classroom with slow learners,

have convinced the Court that from the outset Mrs.

Salley was "anti-IEP," and thus, did not request a

formal educational evaluation of Danielle or an interim

IEP. It is this Court's opinion that even if

Danielle's teachers at Slidell Junior High had

recommended early on that she be fully evaluated and/or

suggested an interim IEP for Danielle, considering Mrs.

Salley's mind-set she would not have consented to such

an evaluation or an interim IEP.

1994 WL 148721, at *10.

8

As the district court found:

[T]he uncontested fact that Danielle progressed from

the sixth to the eighth grade at Slidell Junior High

with passing marks in combination with the

psychoeducational evaluation/assessment conducted by

Dr. Margaret Hagan in April of 1988 ... noting that

Danielle was functioning at or above grade level in

every subject, demonstrate that Danielle derived

educational benefits from the modified regular

educational program implemented by the teachers and

school officials at Slidell Junior High in cooperation

with Mrs. Salley....

....

... Danielle's below average but passing final

performance marks during the seventh grade at Slidell

Junior High appeared to be due to a combination of her

lack of effort, refusal to turn in the required

assignments, an "oppositional" component to her

personality quite possibly stemming from personal

problems at home with her parents, and not the result

of the allegedly inadequate educational program devised

by Slidell Junior High school officials/teachers in

cooperation with Mrs. Salley.

1994 WL 148721, at *8, *14.

11

3. Failure to Notify

We affirm the district court's finding that St. Tammany

violated the procedures of IDEA by failing to provide the Salleys

with formal notice of their rights under the Act in May 1985. We

reverse, however, the district court's finding that St. Tammany

violated IDEA by failing to notify the Salleys of their rights when

Danielle re-enrolled in the fall of 1986.

Turning first to Danielle's initial enrollment in May 1985,

we find that St. Tammany was required to notify the Salleys of the

Act's protections under the facts of this case, even though there

was insufficient time in which to prepare an IEP in May 1985.

"Surely parents should, and are expected to, vigilantly oversee

their handicapped child's educational progress. However, under the

Act the burden rests squarely on the school or agency to safeguard

handicapped children's rights by informing their parents of those

rights." Jackson v. Franklin County Sch. Bd., 806 F.2d 623, 629

(5th Cir.1986). Section 1415 states, in pertinent part, that a

state is required to provide

(C) written prior notice to the parents or guardian of

the child whenever such agency or unit—

(i) proposes to initiate or change, or

(ii) refuses to initiate or change, the identification,

evaluation, or educational placement of the child or the

provision of a free appropriate public education to the child;

(D) procedures designed to assure that the notice

required by clause (C) fully informs the parents or guardian

..., unless it clearly is not feasible to do so, of all the

procedures available pursuant to this section.

20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(C)-(D).

12

In this case, Danielle had been diagnosed as learning

disabled and was receiving educational services in Pennsylvania

pursuant to an IEP immediately prior to her enrollment at Carolyn

Park in May 1985. While this fact did not necessarily obligate St.

Tammany to continue those services, St. Tammany's discontinuance of

those services did, at least, obligate St. Tammany to inform the

Salleys of their rights under IDEA.9 In short, we agree with the

district court's holding that a state is obligated under IDEA to

follow the Act's procedural requirements when a child has been

determined to be handicapped under another state's laws, even

though that child has not been identified as learning disabled

under the state's own laws. Our holding is, however, limited to

situations such as this one, where a child has recently moved from

a state where he or she was receiving special educational services

pursuant to an IEP. In this situation, the second state must

inform the parents or guardian of the child if that second state

proposes to change "the identification, evaluation, or educational

placement of the child." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(C). Notice of

such change is required even in situations where the child would

never have qualified for special educational services under the

9

That there was insufficient time in which to evaluate or

prepare a new IEP for Danielle does not excuse St. Tammany. St.

Tammany could have continued to provide special educational

services to Danielle in conformity with her last Pennsylvania IEP

for the remainder of the 1985-86 school year. Furthermore,

notice is required here as students in Louisiana may receive

special educational services on an interim basis where time does

not permit an in-depth evaluation—but parental approval, and

hence notice, is required for the interim placement. See La.

Bulletin 1706 § 416.

13

second state's laws.

We find, however, that Danielle's re-enrollment in the fall

of 1986 did not obligate St. Tammany to inform the Salleys of the

Act's protections. The procedural safeguards of § 1415 are

designed to protect "children with disabilities and their parents

or guardians." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a). The preliminary evaluations

and screenings of Danielle that had been conducted in Louisiana as

of the fall of 1986 did not reveal any evidence of a learning

disability. Although Danielle later required hospitalization, in

part because of emotional difficulties, and although Danielle was

later diagnosed as suffering from dyslexia, the record indicates

that she was not suffering from these problems in the fall of 1986.

Furthermore, when Danielle re-enrolled in the fall of 1986, she had

most recently attended Lourdes, where there was no IEP in place and

where she did not receive special educational services. For these

reasons, the procedural protections provided by the Act did not

apply to her at this time and St. Tammany can not be faulted for

failing to follow those procedures.

As the issue is not properly before us, we express no opinion

regarding whether St. Tammany may have violated its responsibility

to search for children suspected of being in need of special

educational services in this case. See La. Bulletin 1706 §§ 411-

12.

We agree with the district court's conclusion that, under the

facts of this case, St. Tammany is liable for failing to provide

the Salleys with notice of IDEA's procedural safeguards when

14

Danielle was initially enrolled in May 1985; we reverse the

district court's finding that St. Tammany is liable for failing to

notify the Salleys of their rights when Danielle was re-enrolled in

the fall of 1986.

B. Appropriate Remedy

Despite its findings regarding these procedural violations,

the district court awarded only nominal damages to the Salleys

after concluding that the violations did not affect the Salleys'

decisions regarding the education of Danielle. The district court

reached this conclusion after first finding that the Salleys were

very familiar with the IEP process, as they had been exposed to it

on three previous occasions in Pennsylvania. The district court

further found that, despite their familiarity with the IEP process,

the Salleys did not request that Danielle be evaluated to determine

her eligibility for special educational services, nor did the

Salleys request that an IEP or an interim IEP be prepared, once

they had moved to Louisiana and enrolled Danielle in Carolyn Park

Elementary School. Evidently, the Salleys did not want an IEP

prepared for Danielle because they were afraid of the impact that

an IEP would have on Danielle's education. In Mrs. Salley's own

words: " "I knew IEPs could be done, but to me an IEP just means

going in a classroom for learning disabled kids. Usually those

classrooms are usually and honestly for slow kids.' " 1994 WL

148721, at *5 (quoting the testimony of Mrs. Salley).

Based upon these findings, which we do not find to be clearly

erroneous, we must affirm the conclusion of the district court that

15

the procedural violation committed by St. Tammany did not affect

the Salley's decisions regarding Danielle's education.10 Although

St. Tammany did not advise the Salleys of their right to have

Danielle formally evaluated at the time of her initial enrollment

at Carolyn Park, the Salleys were already well aware of this right,

given their past experiences in Pennsylvania. St. Tammany's

procedural violations therefore can not be said to have harmed

Danielle. The district court acted correctly when it awarded only

nominal damages to the Salleys.

IV. SUFFICIENCY OF THE PROPOSED IEP

In brief, IDEA provides federal money to states in order to

assist them in providing "a free appropriate public education" to

children with disabilities. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c). The federal

funding is conditioned upon a state's compliance with the Act's

provisions. 20 U.S.C. § 1416. In Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458

U.S. 176, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982), the Supreme Court

provided the following two-part test to determine whether a state

has met the requirements of IDEA: "First, has the State complied

with the procedures set forth in the Act? And second, is the

individualized educational program developed through the Act's

procedures reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive

10

This conclusion is bolstered by the district court's

finding that the Salleys were later provided with written

notification of their rights, on at least seven occasions, but

that the Salleys nonetheless never requested that Danielle be

evaluated or that an IEP be prepared for her. 1994 WL 148721, at

*21. "[E]ven after having been thoroughly notified of their

rights, the Salleys chose to skirt the system, and chart the

course of Danielle's educational history without taking advantage

of their rights." Id. at *19.

16

educational benefits?" Id. at 206-07, 102 S.Ct. at 3051 (footnotes

omitted).

The Act seeks to ensure that each disabled child receives a

free appropriate public education by requiring the preparation of

an IEP. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(18). The Act defines an IEP as

follows:

The term "individualized education program" means a

written statement for each child with a disability developed

in any meeting by a representative of the local educational

agency ..., the teacher, the parents or guardian of such

child, and, whenever appropriate, such child, which statement

shall include—

(A) a statement of the present levels of educational

performance of such child,

(B) a statement of annual goals, including short-term

instructional objectives,

(C) a statement of the specific educational services to

be provided to such child, and the extent to which such child

will be able to participate in regular educational programs,

(D) a statement of the needed transition services for

students beginning no later than age 16 ... before the student

leaves the school setting,

(E) the projected date for initiation and anticipated

duration of such services, and

(F) appropriate objective criteria and evaluation

procedures and schedules for determining, on at least an

annual basis, whether instructional objectives are being

achieved....

20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(20). The Supreme Court has held, however, that

the Act does not require a state to maximize each disabled child's

educational potential. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 200, 102 S.Ct. at 3047-

48. Rather, the IEP need only be "reasonably calculated to enable

the child to receive educational benefits." Id. at 207, 102 S.Ct.

at 305 (footnote omitted).

17

Turning to the IEP proposed by St. Tammany, we agree with the

district court's finding that it satisfies the Act's requirements.

The proposed IEP sought, in part, to provide: (1) individualized

instruction in problem areas, particularly writing; (2) oral,

untimed testing; (3) academic subjects one subject at a time, at

a pace set by Danielle; (4) an hour of individualized counseling

twice a week, as needed; and (5) enrollment in a certain number of

regular classes with non-exceptional children. We have previously

held that the Act creates a presumption in favor of the educational

plan established by the IEP and that the party attacking the IEP

bears the burden of demonstrating its inappropriateness. See

Christopher M., 933 F.2d at 1290-91 (citations omitted). It is

evident that the Salleys have not carried their burden

here—especially in light of the Salleys' primary challenge to the

IEP.

The Salleys attempt to argue that only an IEP which provided

for the residential placement of Danielle could be viewed as

reasonably calculated to enable Danielle to receive educational

benefits. The district court found, however, that "many of

Danielle's difficulties stem from her relationship with her family

and that such matters are more properly resolved through counseling

rather than the removal of the child from the household." 1993 WL

386299, at *11. Even if we were to assume arguendo that a

residential placement could provide the best possible education for

18

Danielle,11 we would not necessarily be required to reject St.

Tammany's proposed IEP. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 200, 102 S.Ct. at

3047-48. Moreover, our conclusion finds additional support in the

Act's requirement that an IEP must seek to educate a child in the

least restrictive environment. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5);12 see also La.

Bulletin 1706 § 448. The IEP proposed by St. Tammany, which would

have allowed Danielle to live at home and attend some regular

classes, is obviously less restrictive than the residential

placement in New York and New Hampshire sought by the Salleys.

We accordingly affirm the district court's finding that the

IEP proposed by St. Tammany passes muster under IDEA.

V. PREVAILING PARTIES

The Salleys also contest the district court's decision to

deny them attorneys' fees. The Act provides that "the court, in

its discretion, may award reasonable attorneys' fees as part of the

costs to the parents or guardian of a child or youth with a

11

This is an assumption which is not supported by the

record—Danielle required readmittance to DePaul Northshore

Hospital, for example, before she could complete even one

semester at the Darrow School.

12

Section 1412(5) requires participating states, in

pertinent part, to establish

procedures to assure that, to the maximum extent

appropriate, children with disabilities ... are

educated with children who are not disabled, and that

special classes, separate schooling, or other removal

of children with disabilities from the regular

educational environment occurs only when the nature or

severity of the disability is such that education in

regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and

services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.

20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B).

19

disability who is the prevailing party." 20 U.S.C. §

1415(e)(4)(B). The district court's decision regarding the award

of attorneys' fees under IDEA will be overturned only for an abuse

of discretion. Fontenot v. Louisiana Bd. of Elementary & Secondary

Ed., 835 F.2d 117, 120 (5th Cir.1988).

In the context of determining "prevailing party" status under

42 U.S.C. § 1988,13 the Supreme Court has stated that "a plaintiff

"prevails' when actual relief on the merits of his claim materially

alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the

defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefits the

plaintiff." Farrar v. Hobby, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 566,

573, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992). In this case, the Salleys did not

obtain residential placement for Danielle, which was their primary

objective. The Salleys' sole victory in the district court—a

finding that St. Tammany had procedurally violated the Act—did not

materially alter the legal relationship between parties, as

evidenced by the Salleys' receipt of only nominal damages.

Danielle was given a full evaluation as a result of the due process

hearing initiated by the Salleys, but this result could have been

obtained at any time and the Salleys were well aware of this fact.

Accordingly, we find that the district court did not abuse its

discretion when it denied the Salleys' request for an award of

attorney's fees.

13

We have previously held that we may look to other fee

shifting statutes, such as 42 U.S.C. § 1988, for guidance in

interpreting the meaning of "prevailing party." See, e.g.,

Angela L. v. Pasadena Indep. Sch. Dist., 918 F.2d 1188, 1193 (5th

Cir.1990).

20

VI. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, we REVERSE in part, and

AFFIRM in part, the decision of the district court.

21