ODonnell v. Harris County

MEMORANDUM AND OPINION SETTING OUT FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Lee H. Rosenthal, Chief United States District Judge

Introduction... 1057

I.Findings of Fact... 1060

A. Procedural Background... 1060

B. The Evidence in the Record... 1061

1. The Parties... 1062

2. The Fact Witnesses... 1064

3. The Expert Witnesses... 1066

4. Overview of the Factual and Legal Issues,..1067

C. The Historical Development of Bail in the United States and in Hams County. ..1068

1. The Constitutionalization of Bail. ..1068

2. Statutory and Judicial Bail Reform: Pretrial Services, Probable Cause Hearings, and “Meaningful” Alternatives to Secured Money Bail... 1070

3. Bail at the Federal Level... 1073

4. Bail under Texas Law... 1076

5. Recent Distinctions Drawn Between Bail and Preventive Detention.. .1078

a. Washington, D.C.... 1078

b. New Mexico... 1079

c. New Jersey., .1079

d. New Orleans.,. 1080

e. Maryland... 1080

f. Alabama.. .1081

g. Calhoun, Georgia.. .1082

h. Conclusion... 1084

D. The Use of Bail in Hands County Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention.. .1084

1. The Statutory Framework... 1084

2. Arrest and Booking... 1087

3. The Probable Cause and Bail-Setting Hearing.. .1092.

4. The First Appearance Before a County Judge... 1101

5. Disposition of Misdemeanor Cases... 1104

6. The Use of Bail to Detain... 1107

E. The Population Statistics of Misdemeanor Detainees at Each Stage in the Post-arrest Process... 1111

*1057 1. Arrestees Detained More than 24 Hours Before the Probable Cause Hearing... 1111

2. Arrestees Detained More than 48 Hours Before a Bail Review... 1112

3. Arrestees Detained Until Case Disposition. ..1114

4. Arrestees Detained “Because of’ Indigence.. .1114

5. Bond Forfeitures and Re-Arrests for New Criminal Activity... 1117

F. The Effects of Pretrial Detention on Misdemeanor Defendants Who Cannot Pay Secured Money Bail... 1121

G. Comparisons to Other Jurisdictions... 1122

H. Proposed Bail Reforms... 1124

I. Changes to Risk Assessment... 1124

2. Changes to the System’s Efficiency. ..1125

3. Changes to the Probable Cause Hearings... 1126

4. Texas House Bill 3011 / Senate Bill 1338...1127

I.Conclusions . on Findings of Fact... 1129 .

II.Conclusions of Law.. .1132

A. The Legal Standards... 1132

B. Likelihood of Success on the Merits... 1138-

1. The Standard of Review... 1133

a. Equal Protection... 1134

b. Due Process... 1139

2. The Constitutional Requirements .".. 1140

a. Equal Protection... 1140

b. Due Process... 1140

c. Excessive Bail.., 1147

3. Harris County Policies that Violate Constitutional Requirements... 1148

a. Municipal Liability under § 1983...1148

b. The County Judges’ Policies and Customs: Equal Protection.. .1149

c. The County Judges’ Policies and Customs: Due Process... 1153

d. The Sheriffs Policies under Equal Protection and Due Process ... 1154

4. Judicial Conduct that Violates Constitutional Requirements.. .1155

5. Conclusion' on Likelihood of Success on the Merits... 1156

C. Irreparable Injury .. .1157

D. Balancing the Harms. .■. 1158

E. The Public Interest... 1159

F. Bond...1159

III. Remedy.. .1160

IV. Conclusion.. .1166

A. Summary Judgment... 1166

B. Preliminary Injunction... 1167

Introduction

“Twenty years ago, not quite one-third of [Texas’s] jail population was awaiting trial. Now the number is three-fourths. Liberty is precious to Americans, and any deprivation'must be scrutinized. To protect public safety and ensure that those accused of a crime will appear at trial, persons charged with breaking the law may be detained before their guilt or innocence can be adjudicated, but that detention must not extend beyond its justifications. Many who are arrested cannot afford a bail bond and remain in jail awaiting a hearing. Though presumed innocent, they lose their jobs and families, and- are more likely to re-offend. And if all this weren’t bad enough, taxpayers must shoulder the cost—a staggering $1 billion per year.” The Honorable Nathan L, Hecht, Chief Justice of the Texas Supreme Court, Remarks Delivered to the 85th Texas Legislature, Feb. 1, 2017.

This case requires the court to decide the constitutionality of a bail system that *1058 detains 40 percent of all those arrested only on misdemeanor charges, many of whom are indigent and cannot pay the amount needed for release on secured money bail. These indigent arrestees are otherwise eligible for pretrial release* yet they are detained for days or weeks until their cases are resolved, creating the problems that Chief Justice Hecht identified. The question addressed in this Memorandum and Opinion is narrow: whether the plaintiffs'have met their burden of showing a likelihood of success on the merits of their claims and the other factors necessary for a preliminary injunction against Harris County’s policies and practices of imposing secured money bail on indigent misdemeanor defendants. Maranda- Lynn ODonnell, Robert Ryan Ford, and Loetha McGruder sued while detained in the Harris County Jail on misdemeanor charges. They allege that they were detained because they were too poor to pay the amount needed for release on the secured money bail imposed by the County’s policies and practices. (Docket Entry Nos, 3, 41, 54). They ask this court to certify a Rule 23(b)(2) class and preliminarily enjoin Harris County, the Harris County Sheriff, and—to the extent they are State enforcement officers or County policymakers—the Harris County Criminal Court at Law Judges, from maintaining a “wealth-based post-arrest , detention scheme.” (Docket Entry No. 143 at 2). .

This case is difficult and complex. The Harris County Jail is the third largest jail in the United States. Pls. Ex. 12(aa) at 1. Although misdemeanor arrestees awaiting trial make up' about 5.5 percent of the Harris County Jail population on any given day, see id. at 13, about 50,000 people are arrested in Harris County, on Class A and Class B misdemeanor charges each year. Pis. Ex. 10(c), SOW Pretrial Services Annual Reportat 8. 1 The arrests are made by a number of law-enforcement agencies, including the Houston Police Department and the police forces of smaller municipalities, the Texas Department of Public Safety, and the Harris County Sheriffs Office. Id. Harris County’s bail system is regulated by State law, local municipal- codes, informal, rules, unwritten customary practices, and the actions of judges in particular cases. The legal issues implicate intertwined Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit precedents on the level of judicial scrutiny in equal protection and due process cases and on the tailoring of sufficient means to legitimate ends.

Bail has a longstanding presence in the Anglo-American common law tradition. Despite this pedigree, the modern bail-bond industry and the mass incarceration on which it thrives present important questions that must be examined against current law and recent developments. Extrajudicial reforms ' have caused a sea change in American bail practices within the last few years. Harris County is also in the midst of commendable and. important efforts to reform its bail- system for misdemeanor arrests. The reform effort follows similar work in other cities and counties around the country. This work is informed *1059 by recent empirical data about the effects of secured money bail on a misdemeanor defendant’s likely appearance at hearings and other law-abiding conduct before trial, as well as the harmful effects on the defendant’s life.

The plaintiffs contend that certainly before, and even with, the implemented reforms, Harris County’s bail system for misdemeanor arrests will continue to violate the Constitution, This case is one of many similar cases recently filed around the country challenging long-established bail practices. Most have settled because the parties have agreed to significant reform. This case is one of the first, although not the only one, that requires a court to examine in detail the constitutionality of a specific bail system for misdemeanor ar-restees. This case is also one of the most thoroughly and skillfully presented by able counsel on all sides, giving the court the best information available to decide these difficult issues.

One other complication is worth noting at the outset. Since this case was filed, the 2016 election replaced , the Harris County Sheriff and the presiding County Judge of Criminal Court at Law No. 16. (Docket Entry Nos. 158, 168). The new Sheriff and County Judge have taken positions adverse to their codefendants, although each continues to oppose certain aspects of the plaintiffs’ request for preliminary injunc-tive relief. 2 Nonparty County officials, including the newly elected Harris County District Attorney and one of the Harris County Commissioners, have filed amicus briefs supporting the plaintiffs. (Docket Entry Nos. 206, 272). Harris County’s Chief Public Defender has filed a declaration supporting the defendants. Def. Ex. 23. The lines of affinity and adversity between'the defendants and their nonparty County colleagues are not always clear.

Even with the factual and legal complexities, at the heart of this ease are two straightforward questions: Can a jurisdiction impose secured money bail on misdemeanor arrestees who cannot pay it, who would otherwise be released, effectively ordering their pretrial detention? If so, what do due process and equal protection require for that to be lawful? Based on the extensive record and briefing, the fact and expert witness testimony, the arguments of able counsel, and the applicable legal standards, the answers are that, under federal and state law, secured money bail may serve to detain indigent misdemeanor arrestees only in the narrowest' of cases, and only when, in those c’ases, due process safeguards the rights of the indigent accused.

Because Harris County does not currently supply those safeguards or protect those rights, the court will grant the- plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunctive relief. The reasons and the precise, limited relief granted are set out in detail below.

More specifically, the court finds that;

• Harris County has a consistent and systematic policy and practice of imposing secured money bail as de facto orders of pretrial detention in misdemeanor cases.

*1060 • These de facto detention orders effectively operate only against the indigent, who would be released if they could pay at least a bondsman’s premium, but who cannot. Those who can pay are released, even if they present similar risks of nonappearance or of new arrests.

• These de facto detention orders are not accompanied by the protections federal due process requires for pretrial detention orders.

• Harris County has an inadequate basis to conclude that releasing misdemeanor defendants on secured financial conditions is more effective to assure a defendant’s appearance or law-abiding behavior before trial than release on unsecured or nonfinancial conditions, or that secured financial conditions of release are reasonably necessary to assure a defendant’s appearance or to deter new criminal activity before trial.

• Harris County’s policy and practice violates the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the United States Constitution.

The court accordingly orders that:

• Harris County and its policymakers— the County Judges in their legislative and rulemaking capacity and the Harris County Sheriff in his law-enforcement capacity—are enjoined from detaining misdemeanor defendants who are otherwise eligible for release but cannot pay a secured financial condition of release.

• Harris County Pretrial Services must verify a misdemeanor arrestee’s inability to pay bail on a secured basis by affidavit.

• The Harris County Sheriff must release on unsecured bail those misdemeanor defendants whose inability to pay is shown by affidavit, who would be released on secured bail if they could pay, and who have not been released after a probable cause hearing held within 24 hours after arrest.

The court does not order: relief in cases involving felony charges or a mix of misdemeanor and felony charges; the elimination of secured money bail; changes to Texas State law; changes to the written Harris County Criminal Courts at Law Rules of Court; modification of prior federal court orders, including the consent decree in Roberson v. Richardson; or a right to “affordable bail” under the Eighth Amendment. Instead, the relief ordered is consistent with Texas state and Harris County law as written, is required by the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, and is justified by the plaintiffs’ evidence. The relief is narrow so as not to interfere with the improvements the County is working to implement by July 1, 2017.

The reasons for these rulings are set out in the detailed findings and conclusions below.

I. Findings of Fact

A. Procedural Background

Ms. ODonnell filed suit while she was in custody in the Harris County Jail on May 19, 2016. (Docket Entry No. 3). Ms. McGruder and Mr. Ford filed suit while they were in custody on May 21, 2016. Civil No. 16-1436. The court consolidated the actions in August 2016. (Docket Entry No. 41). The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on September 1, 2016. (Docket Entry No. 54). After extensive briefing and two lengthy hearings on August 18 and November 28, 2016, the court issued a Memorandum and Opinion on the defendants’ motions to dismiss. (Docket Entry No. 125); ODonnell v. Harris Cty., Tex., 227 F.Supp.3d 706 , 2016 WL 7337549 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 16, 2016). The court dismissed *1061 the claims against the Harris County Sheriff and the sixteen Harris County Criminal Court at Law Judges in their personal capacities. The court denied the motions to dismiss the claims against the County, the personal-capacity claims against five Harris County Hearing Officers, and the official-capacity claims against the Sheriff and the County Judges. (Id.). The court reset the preliminary injunction hearing scheduled for December 15, 2016 at the parties’ request, to facilitate settlement negotiations between the parties and newly elected Harris County officials. (Docket Entry No. 109). The parties did not settle. The court held an eight-day hearing in March 2017, and the parties filed voluminous records, lengthy video recordings, and numerous briefs.

The pending motions are the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification, (Docket Entry No. 146), the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, (Docket Entry Nos. 101, 104, 108), the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, (Docket Entry No. 143), and the defendants’ contingent motion for a stay pending appeal should the court grant preliminary injunctive relief, (Docket Entry No. 252). The defendants argue, principally, that there is no constitutional right to “affordable bad,” that Harris County’s post-arrest policies are subject to rational basis review, and that Harris County’s policies are constitutional under any level of judicial scrutiny. (See Docket Entry Nos. 101, 161, 162, 166, 193, 256, 286). The plaintiffs argue that Harris County’s system of pretrial bail and detention in misdemeanor cases violates the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the United States Constitution. (See Docket Entry Nos. 143, 145, 188, 189). They do not believe their claims raise an Eighth Amendment challenge, but they argue in the alternative that the County’s bail system for misdemeanor arrestees fails under the Eighth Amendment as well. (Docket Entry No. 92 at 18 n.19; No. 188 at 14 n.13).

This Memorandum and Opinion addresses the parties’ disputes on summary judgment and the plaintiffs’ entitlement to preliminary injunctive relief. Separate orders address class certification and the defendants’ motion to stay.

B. The Evidence in the Record

The motion for a preliminary injunction requires balancing the- expediency demanded by the request for emergency relief with a full and fair consideration of the voluminous record. The parties submitted nearly 300 written exhibits, in addition to 2,300 video recordings of bail-setting hearings conducted within the last year in Harris County, all admitted without objection. (Docket Entry Nos. 244, 267). Thirteen witnesses testified at the eight-day hearing, including four expert witnesses. The court admitted depositions and declarations from many other witnesses as well.

The parties largely agree on the facts of the procedures Harris County follows after the arrest of. misdemeanor defendants. Both parties’ statistical experts used the same data from the County’s administrative sources and largely agreed on the raw numbers produced by, and the gaps found in, the Harris County data. The parties’ experts disagree about how to interpret the data. The parties disagree about the constitutional significance of the evidence about the County’s bail procedures in misdemeanor cases and their effects.

The court reviews the factual record under the applicable legal framework to resolve these disagreements and to enter the findings of fact and conclusions of law. 3

*1062 1. The Parties

Maranda Lynn ODonnell, a 22-year-old single mother, was arrested on May 18, 2016 at 5:00 p.m. and charged with driving with'an invalid license. Pis. Ex. 7(a). After she was booked into- the Harris County Jail, she was informed that she would be released promptly if she paid a secured money bail of $2,500 set according to the County’s bail schedule, but that she would remain in jail if she did not pay either the full bail amount to the County or a premium to a bail bondsman up front. Id. Ms, ODonnell and her child struggled to meet the basic. necessities of life. She received benefits from the federal government’s Women, Infants, and Children program to feed her daughter. She could not afford housing, so she stayed with a friend. Id. At the time of her arrest, Ms. ODonnell was working, but it was at a new job she had held for only seven days. Id. She had no money to buy her release from detention. Id. She was otherwise eligible for release.

Harris County Pretrial Services interviewed Ms. ODonnell at 11:52 p.m. on May 18. Pls. Ex. 8(c)(1), ODonnell Pretrial Services Report. At 3:00 a.m., on May 19, Pretrial Services completed a risk-assessment report recommending her release on a personal bond—that is, an unsecured appearance bond requiring no up-front payment for release. Id. Ms. ODonnell appeared before a Hearing Officer at 7:00 a.m., by videolink from the Harris County Jail, Pls. Ex. 4(c)(1), ODonnell Docket Sheet. The Sheriffs deputies present ordered her not to speak. Pis. Ex. 7(a). Without explanation,' the Hearing Officer told her that she did not “qualify” for release on personal bond and imposed the $2,500 scheduled amount as secured bail, meaning that she had to pay the full bail amount or a bondman’s premium to be released. Pls. Ex. 8(c), ODonnell Hearing Video. When asked if she would hire her own lawyer or would be seeking help from a court-appointed lawyer, Ms. ODonnell responded, “Seeking help.” These were her only words during her 50-second hearing. Id.

On the morning of May 20, Ms. ODonnell appeared before a County Criminal Court at Law Judge. (Docket Entry No. 31, Ex. 1). She completed an .affidavit declaring her lack of assets and was found indigent for the. purpose of appointing counsel- (Id.). Her bail amount was not changed or set on an unsecured basis, even though she declared on her affidavit that she remained in jail. (Id.). That, same day, but after Ms. ODonnell filed this suit, an insurance underwriter for a commercial bondsman posted her bail amount. Pls. Ex. 11 at *5. This third-party payment looks like an attempt to moot her claim. See id. Ms. ODonnell was released from jail after three days in pretrial detention- on the charge of driving with an invalid license. Pls. Ex. 8(c), ODonnell Docket Sheet.

Robert Ryan Ford.was arrested on May 18, 2016 at 8:00 p.m. He was charged with shoplifting from a Wal-Mart. Pls. Ex. 7(c). Mr. Ford could not pay the $5,000 secured money bail imposed as the condition for his release from pretrial detention. Id. This was the amount specified in the bail schedule. Mr. Ford was interviewed by Pretrial Services at 10:00 a.m. the morning after his arrest, but Pretrial Services did not complete Mr. Ford’s risk assessment until the next day, May 20, at 2:00 a.m. Pls. Ex. 8(c)(iii), Ford Pretrial Services Report. The risk-assessment report recommended “Detain,” stating that Mr. Ford had “[sjafety issues that conditions can’t mitigate.” Id. at *16. The form did not explain these issues nor why some combination of conditions of release could not address them. Notwithstanding the recommenda *1063 tion to detain, had Mr. Ford paid the $5,000 bail—or paid a bondsman a $500 premium 4 —he would have been promptly released, regardless of “safety issues.” He could not pay the $5,000 secured money bail or the bondsman’s premium, so he remained in jail. Pls. Ex. 7(c). As intended by Pretrial Services, the secured money bail served as a pretrial detention order because Mr, Ford was too poor to pay.

Mr. Ford did not see a Hearing Officer until May 20, 2016 at 4:00 a.m., 32 hours after his arrest. Pis. Ex. 8(c)(iii), Ford Docket Sheet. His hearing lasted less than 50 seconds. Pls. Ex. 8(c), Ford Hearing Video. He did not speak except to ask for a court-appointed lawyer. Id. His bail was confirmed at $5,000 on a secured basis. Id.

On May 23, 2016,- Mr. Ford appeared before a County Criminal Court at Law Judge, pleaded guilty, and was sentenced to time served. Pls. Ex. 8(c)(iii), Ford Docket Sheet. He was released at 12:30 a.m. on May 24, 2016. Id. Mr. Ford was continuously detained on his misdemeanor charge for over five days, until the final disposition of his case.

Loetha Shanta McGruder, a pregnant 22-year-old mother of two, was arrested on May 19, 2016 at 5:20 p.m. She was charged with failing to identify herself to a police officer, Pls. Ex. 7(b). Ms. McGruder was indigent. Id. She depended on federal benefits to care for her older son, who has Down’s Syndrome and other medical needs, and she depended on child-support payments for her other children. Id. Ms. McGruder was not working when she was arrested. She avoided homelessness by living with her boyfriend. Id. She could not pay the $5,000 secured money bail imposed as the condition for her release from pretrial detention. Id.

Ms. McGruder was interviewed by Pretrial Services the morning after her arrest, at 8:40 a.m. Pls. Ex. 8(c)(ii), McGruder Pretrial Services Report. Pretrial Services completed its risk-assessment report around 1:00 p.m. With no recommendation for either release or detention. Id. Ms. McGruder appeared-before a Hearing Officer at 1:00 p.m. on May 20. Pls. Ex. 8(c)(ii), McGruder Docket Sheet - She did not speak at her hearing except to discuss her need for a court-appointed lawyer. Pls. Ex. 8(c)(ii), McGruder Hearing Video. Her bail was confirmed at $5,000 on a secured basis. Id .

After about 87 hours in jail, Ms. McGru-der appeared before a County Criminal Court at Law Judge. Pls. Ex. 8(e)(ii), McGruder Docket Sheet. She was ready to enter a guilty plea because she bélieved it was the fastest way to be released. Hearing Tr. 2-1:80-81, 108. Her lawyer convinced her to seek’a personal bond instead. Id. At her first counseled hearing before a County Judge, Ms. McGruder was granted a personal bond—an unsecured $5,000 bond with no up-front payment required. She was released at 7:30 p.m. the same day. Pls. Ex. 8(c)(ii), McGruder Docket Sheet. Ms. McGruder spent four full days in pretrial detention on her misdemeanor charge of failing to identify herself to a police officer.

The plaintiffs sued Harris County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , alleging that the County’s policies have deprived them and others similarly situated of due process and equal protection by detaining them 'before trial on misdemeanor charges because of their *1064 inability to pay a secured money bail, and without a meaningful or timely inquiry into their inability to pay. (Docket Entry No. 54). The motions to dismiss resulted in earlier rulings on the claims against the various defendants.

• The court denied Harris County’s motion to dismiss. The County may face municipal liability under § 1983 for the law-enforcement policies of its Sheriff, to the extent the Sheriff knowingly enforces invalid detention orders, and for the legislative and administrative policies of the County Judges to the extent those policies are not directly mandated by Texas law. ODonnell, 227 F.Supp.3d at 738-50 , 2016 WL 7337549 at *22-31.

• The court dismissed the plaintiffs’ personal-capacity claim against the Harris County Sheriff but denied the motion to dismiss the official-capacity claim. Id. at 751-52, 2016 WL 7337549 at *32. To the extent the Sheriff enforces facially valid but unconstitutional detention orders, the Sheriff may be liable for prospective relief under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 , 28 S.Ct. 441 , 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908). Id.

• The court dismissed personal-capacity claims against the sixteen Harris County Criminal Court at Law Judges, but denied the motion to dismiss the official-capacity claims against them. ODonnell, 227 F.Supp.3d at 745-47 , 2016 WL 7337549 at *27-28. To the extent the County Judges administratively enforce facially constitutional Texas laws, such as the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, in an unconstitutional manner, the County Judges may be liable for prospective relief. Id. at 746—47, 756-58, 2016 WL 7337549 at *28, 36-37.

• The court granted the motion to dismiss the official-capacity claims against five Harris County Hearing Officers. Id. at 753-55, 2016 WL 7337549 at *34-35. They remain in the suit in their personal capacities for declaratory relief only. Id.

2. The Fact Witnesses

The fact witnesses testified about the post-arrest process for misdemeanor defendants in Harris County, as well as the reforms to the bail system the County expects to implement by July 1, 2017. The fact witnesses and their testimony are summarized below.

• Assistant District Attorney JoAnne Musick. Ms. Musick was appointed the Sex Crime Unit Chief at the Harris County District Attorney’s Office in January 2017. She has practiced criminal defense privately for over thirteen years and has served as the vice-chair of the Criminal Law & Procedure Committee of the Houston Bar Association and as a board member of the Texas Criminal Defense Lawyers Association. Ms. Musick testified about her extensive experience with Harris County pretrial processes, both as a criminal defense lawyer and as an Assistant District Attorney. Ms. Musick filed a declaration stating her observation that Harris County consistently detains misdemeanor arrestees, who are otherwise eligible to be released, because they cannot pay a secured financial condition of release. As a consequence, many indigent misdemeanor arrestees plead guilty at their first appearance as the only way to be released from pretrial detention without waiting days or weeks for another hearing. Pls. Ex. 7(g) at 4-5.

• Sheriff Ed Gonzalez. Sheriff Gonzalez was elected Harris County Sheriff in November 2016 and assumed office in January 2017. He served eighteen *1065 years with the Houston Police Department and was a Houston City Council member for three terms before his election as Sheriff. Sheriff Gonzalez testified about his experience with the post-arrest process in Harris County. Sheriff Gonzalez also filed a declaration stating his observation that Harris County consistently detains misdemeanor arrestees, who are otherwise eligible to be released, because they are too poor to pay a secured financial condition of release. Pls.' Ex. 7(r) at 1-2.

• Major Patrick Dougherty. Major Dougherty was appointed as a major with the Harris County Sheriffs Office in January 2017 after serving thirty-five years with the Houston Police Department. Major Dougherty testified about his experiences with the post-arrest processes in the City of Houston and in Harris County. Major Dougherty reviewed the technology limits and overcrowded conditions in the Harris County Jail that complicate the timely transfer and presentment of misdemeanor arrestees.

• Director of Pretrial Services Kelvin Banks. Mr. Banks began work as the Director of Pretrial Services for Harris County in October 2016. He served previously as the Director of Pretrial Services for the Third Circuit Court in Wayne County, Michigan, primarily overseeing pretrial services for the City of Detroit. Mr. Banks testified about the County’s current Pretrial Services program, the planned changes to Pretrial Services’s risk-assessment tool, and other changes impacting the use of secured money bail in misdemeanor cases. These changes are expected to be implemented by July 1, 2017.

• Chief Hearing Officer Blanca Villago-mez. Judge Villagomez has been a Harris County Hearing Officer since the position was created in 1993. She testified about her own and others’ practices as Hearing Officers.

• Hearing Officer Eric Hagstette. Judge Hagstette has been a Harris County Hearing Officer for over eleven years. He was a Harris County Assistant District Attorney for ten years and a criminal defense attorney for ten years. Judge Hagstette testified about his practices as a Hearing Officer and his impressions of the pretrial process from his time as a practicing criminal lawyer.

• County Judge Darrell Jordan. Judge Jordan was elected to be the presiding judge of County Criminal Court at Law No. 16 in November 2016. He assumed office in January 2017. Judge Jordan previously practiced as a criminal defense attorney for eight years. Judge Jordan testified about his practices as a County Judge and about his past experiences as a lawyer defending misdemeanor arrestees in Harris County.

• County Judge Paula Goodhart. Judge Goodhart was appointed to be the presiding judge of County Criminal Court at Law No. 1 in 2010. She was an Assistant District Attorney for Harris County for fourteen years and a criminal defense attorney for three years. Judge Goodhart testified about her practices as a County Judge and about her past experiences practicing in the Harris County Criminal Courts at Law.

• County Judge Margaret Harris. The defendants offered the testimony of Judge Harris, the presiding judge of County Criminal Court at Law No. 5 since 2003. The parties stipulated that Judge Harris’s testimony would be consistent in material respects with *1066 Judge Goodhart’s testimony. Hearing Tr. 5:152.

• Dr. Marie VanNostrand. Dr. VanNost-rand is a project manager for Luminosity, a consulting firm that advises pretrial services programs. Dr. Van-Nostrand is a former probation and parole officer and pretrial services provider, She began working as a consultant for pretrial services agencies in 2003 and through Luminosity has been consulting with Harris County to reform its pretrial processes and services since February 2015. Hearing Tr. 6-1:131. Dr. VanNostrand testified about her statistical studies on pretrial detention and about the reforms to the Harris County pretrial process planned for implementation by July 1, 2017.

3. The Expert Witnesses

The plaintiffs presented Dr. Stephen Demuth to testify under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence on sociology and criminal pretrial procedure. Dr. De-muth has a doctorate in sociology with a concentration in chronology and quantitative methods of research. He is a professor of Sociology at Bowling Green State University in Ohio. He has published extensively in peer-reviewed journals on pretrial criminal processes and on the appropriate use of large data sets. Dr. Demuth testified that he received no compensation for his consultation and testimony in this case. He has invested at least 150 hours of work analyzing the data Harris County has produced since the plaintiffs retained him on February 9, 2017.

The plaintiffs also presented Judge Truman Morrison to testify under Rule 702. Judge Morrison is a Senior Judge of 'the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. He has served on that court for over thirty-seven years. After taking senior status in 2000, Judge Mbrrison has focused on misdemeanor cases. Since the late 1980s, he has led reform efforts in his court to eliminate the use of secured money bail in the D.O. criminal justice system. He has also worked to educate judicial officers and others around the country on the benefits of eliminating money bail and the harms of continuing to use it in misdemeanor cases.

The defendants offered the testimony of Dr. Robert Morris as a Rule 702 witness in criminology. Dr. Morris holds a doctorate in criminal justice and was a professor of criminology at the University of Texas in Dallas for nine years. Since August 2016, he has been the cofounder and chief executive officer of Predicto, a company that uses machine learning to predict failures in industrial equipment. Dr. Morris testified that he has worked 45 to 50 hours analyzing data produced by Harris County since his retention and has invoiced the County $325 per hour. Hearing Tr. 4-2:156.

The defendants-also offered the testimony- of Mr. Bob Wessels as a Rule 702 witness with specialized knowledge in court administration and pretrial procedures, particularly in Harris County..Mr. Wessels was the court manager of the Harris County Criminal Courts at Law for thirty-five years, until he retired in 2011. He has received numerous awards and national recognition for his' work on court administration and is a former president of the National Association of Court Administrators.

The court finds that'Drs. Demuth and Morris meet the Rule 702 requirements to testify about Harris County’s pretrial arrest data and system and that Judge Morrison and Mr. Wessels are qualified to testify about court administration. Specific findings about the reliability, helpfulness, and credibility of their opinions are set out in detail below.

*1067 4. Overview of the Factual . and Legal Issues

The parties dispute three broad issues: (1) whether Harris County impermissibly sets secured money bail to serve as de facto orders of pretrial detention in misdemeanor cases; (2) whether Harris County provides misdemeanor defendants due process and equal protection in their bail settings; and (3) whether planned reforms will sufficiently address the plaintiffs’ allegations of' constitutional violations. Each issue raises complex questions of fact‘and law.

The defendants argue that Harris County judicial officers do not intentionally use secured money bail to detain and are not recklessly indifferent to that effect of secured money bail. Instead, the defendants argue, Hearing Officers and County Judges apply the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure’s requirement to consider five factors—only one of which relates to a defendant's ability to pay—in setting bail. See Tex. Code Crim. Pro. art. 17.15. The plaintiffs respond that the evidence shows Harris County judicial officers do not in fact give individualized consideration of the five factors in setting bail in each misdemeanor case, but instead routinely set secured money bail to conform to a predetermined schedule, even when it is clear that the effect will be pretrial detention.

The parties’ disputes • extend beyond whether the facts show rare, occasional, or frequent individual consideration of bail in particular cases. The parties also dispute whether imposing secured money bail on an indigent or impecunious misdemeanor arrestee is a but-for cause or a proximate cause of pretrial detention if an arrestee with financial means could pay and secure prompt release. The defendants argue that virtually no misdemeanor defendant is detained before trial “solely by” or “because of’ an inability to pay secured money bail. Instead, the defendant’s past criminal history, prior failures to appear, or other risk factors all contribute to a judicial officer’s decision to impose secured money bail at a particular amount. Under this view, the arrestee’s criminal history, prior failures to appear, or other risk factors—not just the bail amount—are among the reasons for pretrial detention. (See, e.g., Docket Entry No. 162 at 15-16; No. 164 at 8-9); Hearing Tr. 1:99-100.

The plaintiffs counter with a but-for argument. A judicial officer’s decision to set secured money -bail means that the misdemeanor defendant has.been found eligible for release and would be released but for their inability to make the up-front payment of the secured money bail bond. The plaintiffs argue that detaining misdemean- or defendants before trial solely because of their inability to pay violates the Equal Protection Clause, because defendants with similar histories and risks but with access to money are able to purchase pretrial release. The plaintiffs contend that all rigorous studies of pretrial release in misdemeanor cases show that release on secured money bail does no more to mitigate the risk of nonappearance or of new criminal activity during pretrial release than release on, unsecured or nonfinancial conditions. (See, e.g., Docket Entry No. 143 at 15-17; No. 188 at 4-7); Hearing Tr. 4-2:15-16.

For' the reasons set out below, the court finds and concludes that the plaintiffs have the better understanding of the case. A misdemeanor defendant’s criminal background or risk factors may give the County a persuasive reason to detain that defendant. But an order imposing secured money bail is effectively a pretrial preventive detention order only against those who cannot afford to pay. It is not a detention order as to defendants who can pay, even* if they present a similar risk of fail *1068 ing to appear or of committing new offenses before trial as those who cannot pay. And the reliable record evidence shows that release on secured money bail does not mitigate those risks for misdemeanor defendants better than release on unsecured or nonfinancial conditions, in Harris County or elsewhere. The issue is not a right to “affordable bail,” as the defendants insist, but a violation of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses.

The plaintiffs allege that Harris County’s pretrial misdemeanor bail system violates procedural due process because: (1) misdemeanor arrestees who cannot pay the up-front amount for release on secured money bail are frequently held longer than 24 hours before any meaningful bail review, contrary to Texas law and to federal court orders; (2) misdemeanor arrestees are not able even to ask for a review of their bail in a counseled, adversarial proceeding, with an opportunity to present evidence and a right to findings on the record, until at least two or three days and often up to two weeks after their arrests; (3) misdemeanor arrestees who cannot afford their secured money bail are jailed for more than 48 hours if they do not plead guilty at their first court appearances; and (4) the County imposes secured money bail to serve as de facto detention orders, without affording misdemeanor defendants the due process protections the Constitution requires for detention orders. (See, e.g., Docket Entry No. 144 at 13-14; No. 145 at 7-9; No. 188 at 13-15).

The defendants argue that Harris County’s pretrial process is among the fastest in the nation and that its bail practices are not out of step with the majority of other United States jurisdictions. (See, e.g., Docket Entry No. 286). While insisting that the County’s current system is legal, the defendants acknowledge that it needs improvement. They argue that the planned reforms will make the County’s pretrial system more efficient, more rational, and more equal across classifications of wealth and risk factors. (Docket Entry No. 162 at 23); Hearing Tr. 1:100-01, 8-2:30-32. The plaintiffs respond that until the expected reforms are implemented, serious constitutional violations will continue to occur, affecting hundreds of individuals every day. Even under the reforms, the plaintiffs contend, Harris County will continue its policy of imposing secured money bail as de facto pretrial detention orders in violation of federal due process requirements. (Docket Entry No. 188 at 26-27).

The court finds and concludes that, based on the credible, reliable evidence in the present record, the plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of at least some of their claims that the present system violates due process and equal protection, and that the plaintiffs are likely to succeed in part in their challenges to the new pretrial system as currently proposed by Harris County. The plaintiffs are entitled to a preliminary injunction, as set out in detail below.

C. The Historical Development of Bail in the United States and in Harris County

1. The Constitutionalization of Bail

Bail originated in medieval England “as a device to free untried prisoners.” Daniel J. Freed & Patricia M. Wald, Bail in the United States: 1964 1 (1964); see 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (Rees Welsh & Co. [1769] 1902) (“By the ancient common law, before and since the [Norman] conquest, all felonies were bailable, till murder was excepted by statute; so that persons might be admitted to bail before conviction almost in every case.” (footnotes omitted)); see generally William F. Duker, The Right to Bail: A *1069 Historical Inquiry, 42 Alb. L. Rev. 33 , 34-66 (1977); Elsa de Haas, Antiquities of Bail 128 (1940). In 1276, the English Parliament enacted the Statute of Westminster, which defined bailable offenses and provided criteria for determining, whether a particular person should be released, including the strength of the evidence against the accused and. the accused’s criminal history. See Note, Bail: An Ancient Practice Reexamined, 70 Yale L.J. 966 , 966 (1961); June Carbone, Seeing Through the Emperor’s New Clothes: Rediscovery of Basic Principles in the Administration of Bail, 34 Syracuse L. Rev. 617 , 523-26 (1983). In 1679, Parliament adopted the Habeas Corpus Act to ensure that an accused could obtain a timely bail hearing. In 1689, Parliament enacted an English Bill of Rights that prohibited excessive bail. See Carbone, supra, at 528.

Early American constitutions codified a right to bail as a presumption that defendants should be released pending trial. See Note, Bail, supra, at 967. One commentator who surveyed the bail laws in each state found that forty-eight states have protected, by constitution or statute, a right to bail, “by sufficient sureties, except for capital offenses when the proof is evident or the presumption great.” Matthew J. Hegreness, America’s Fundamental and Vanishing Right to Bail, 55 Ariz. L. Rev. 909 , 916 (2013). States modeled these provisions on the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1682. See Carbone, supra, at 531-32. Texas substantially incorporated that language into its Constitution in 1845, and it remains. 5 Tex. Const. art. 1 § 11.

Texas law interprets Article I, § 11 to prohibit preventive pretrial detention except in specific and narrow circumstances set out in constitutional amendments. Id. § 11a et seq. “The exceptions contained in Article I, § 11a, supra, to the constitutional right to bail proclaimed by Article I, § 11, supra, include the seeds of preventive detention urged by many to be abhorrent to the American system of justice. It is obvious that for these reasons the provisions of said § 11a contain strict limitations and other safeguards.” Ex parte Davis, 574 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Tex. Cr. App. 1978). The exceptions are narrow. All but one are limited to felonies. The one exception is under §§ lib and 11c, which permit a denial of bail and pretrial preventive detention for those accused of a crime of family violence, including misdemeanors, if: (1) the accused has violated a condition of pretrial release or a protective order; and (2) a magistrate determines at an adversary hearing by a preponderance of the evidence that the accused violated the condition of release or protective order in a manner “related to the safety of a victim of the alleged offense or the safety of the community.” Tex. Const. art. 1, §§ 11b-11c.

Historians and jurists confirm that from the medieval period until the early American republic, a bail bond was typically based on an individualized assessment of what the arrestee or his surety could pay to assure appearance and secure release. In medieval England, an arrestee was forbidden to pay his sureties for obtaining his release. If an accused failed to appear, the sureties were' “amerced” with a fine, but there were “maximum amercements depending on the wrong-doer’s rank; the baron [did] not have to pay more than a hundred pounds, nor the routier more than five shillings.” 2 Frederick William Polluck & Frederic William Maitland, The History of English Law Before the Time of Edward I 514 (2d ed. 1984 [1898]). Joseph Chitty, an eminent proceduralist, summa *1070 rized the English practice when the United States Constitution was-- ratified: “The rule is, where the offence is - prima facie great, to require good bail; moderation nevertheless is to be observed, and such bail only is to be required as the party is able to procure; for otherwise the allowance of bail would be a mere colour for imprisoning the party on the charge.” 1 J. Chitty, A Practical Treatise on the Criminal Law 88-89 (Philadelphia ed. 1819); see also Bates v. Pilling, 149 Eng. Rep. 805, 805 (K.B. 1834) (“a defendant might be subjected to as much inconvenience by being.compelled to put in bail to an excessive amount, as if he had been actually arrested”); Rex v. Bowes, 99 Eng. Rep. 1327, 1329 (K.B. 1787) (per curiam) (“[ejxcessive bail is a relative term; it depends on the nature of the charge for which bail is required, Upon the- situation in life of the parties, and on various other circumstances”) & (Archbald, J.) (permitting a “lessening” of bail if there were “difficulty” procuring the decreed sum); Neal v. Spencer, 88 Eng. Rep. 1305, 1305-06 (K.B. 1698) (collecting cases showing a diversity of bail amounts given for the same .offense). The pre-Texas history of bail confirms the modern holdings of Texas courts, that bail is a mechanism for pretrial release and not. for continued pretrial.preventive detention.

2. Statutory and Judicial Bail Reform: Pretrial Services, Probable Cause Hearings, and “Meaningful” Alternatives to Secured Money Bail

In the mid-nineteenth century, bail reform was crucial to abolishing imprisonment for. debt. In Massachusetts, the 1831 survey of the Prison Discipline Society noted that the availability of bail in debtors’ prison's created class distinctions between- “poor seamen, poor laborers, and poor mechanics” who could not find sureties and remained -in jail, “while there is scarcely an instance on record of a poor minister, a poor physician, or a poor lawyer in Prison for debt.” Sixth Annual Rep. of the Prison Discipline Society 22 (1831). After Massachusetts abolished imprisonment for debt in 1855, the State permitted those jailed on mesne 6 process in contract cases to swear an oath of indigence and to be released on personal recognizance as an alternative to secured money bail. 1857 Mass. L. 489-97. From 1831 to 1833; Congress passed legislation abolishing imprisonment for debt at the federal level. 4 Stat. 467 , 594, 676. Ultimately, forty-one States, including Texas, constitutionally banned imprisonment for debt. 7 See Tex. Const. art. 1 § 18.

Another wave of bail reform began with the 1960s Manhattan Bail Project, conducted by -the Vera Foundation in New York City. See Wayne H. Thomas, Jr., Bail Reform in America 3, 20-27 (1976); Ronald Goldfarb, Ransom 150-72 (1965). The Project interviewed- defendants before their first court appearance to evaluate whether they were good candidates for pretrial release -on recognizance; that is, release “on one’s honor pending trial.” Goldfarb, supra, at 153-54. The standard interview questions asked about a defendant’s personal background, community ties, and criminal history. Id. The’ interviewer scored a defendant’s answers using a *1071 point-weighting system and verified the answers, usually by telephone, with references the defendant provided. Id. at 154-55, 174-75. The interviewers gave the information to the court and recommended which defendants should be released on nonfinancial conditions. Id. at 155. During the first three years of the Project, defendants released on nonfinancial conditions at the recommendation of the Vera Foundation were about three times more likely to appear for trial than were defendants in control groups who were found eligible for release on nonfinancial conditions but who were instead released on secured money bail. Id. at 155, 157. The success of the Manhattan Bail Project inspired the creation of pretrial services programs across the country. See Timothy R. Schnacke et al, Pretrial Justice Inst., The History of Bail and Pretrial Release 10 (2010).

In the 1970s, a major prisoners’ class action challenged the facial and as-applied constitutionality of Florida’s pretrial detention system. The litigation led to two foundational opinions, one by the United States Supreme Court and one by the former Fifth Circuit. In Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 , 95 S.Ct. 854 , 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975), the Supreme Court, ruled that criminal defendants arrested without a warrant and then detained before trial had to be taken “promptly” before a judicial officer to determine probable cause for the arrest. 420 U.S. at 127 , 95 S.Ct. 854 . The Court did not specify what would meet the promptness standard, instead noting that “the nature of the probable cause determination usually will be shaped to accord with a State’s pretrial procedure viewed as a whole.... It may be found desirable, for example, to make the probable cause determination at the suspect’s first appear-anee before a judicial officer, or the determination may be incorporated into the procedure for setting bail or fixing other conditions of pretrial release.” Id. at 124 , 95 S.Ct. 854 (internal citations omitted).

In Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053 (1978) (en banc), the Fifth Circuit considered the same class’s challenge to Florida’s pretrial bail system. The en banc court vacated as moot the panel decision finding the system unconstitutional, because Florida had aménded its rules, while the appeal was pending. Id. at 1058-59 . The en banc court ruled that the Constitution did not require the statute to include a presumption that indigent arrestees would be released without financial conditions to be facially valid. Id. at 1057-58 . But the court noted that while “[ujtilization of a master bond schedule provides speedy and convenient release for those who have no difficulty in meeting its requirements!;, t]he incarceration of those who cannot, without meaningful consideration of other possible alternatives, infringes on both due process and equal protection requirements.” Id. at 1057 .

In the decade following Gerstein and Rainwater , the City of Houston and Harris County were sued in two lawsuits disputing how to apply those precedents locally. In Sanders v. City of Houston, 543 F.Supp. 694 (S.D. Tex. 1982), the court ruled after a bench trial that Gerstein’s promptness standard required a probable cause hearing for those arrested without a warrant by the City of Houston within 24 hours of arrest. Id. at 702 . The court also ruled that bail had to be set within 24 hours of arrest to avoid an unconstitutional denial of bail under the Texas Constitution. 8 Id. at 704 .

*1072 In Roberson v. Richardson, Agreed Final Judgment, Civil No. 84-2974 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 25, 1987), the court entered a final agreed judgment that applied the 24-hour time limit to misdemeanor cases throughout the County. 9 The Roberson order’s stated purpose was to ensure that misdemeanor arrestees in Harris County had “the right to a prompt, fair and reliable determination of Probable Cause as set out in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 [ 95 S.Ct. 854 , 43 L.Ed.2d 54 ] (1978 [1975]), a meaningful review of alternatives to pre-scheduled bail amounts as set out in Rainwater v. Pugh [Pugh v. Rainwater ], 572 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc), and the right to the prompt appointment of counsel.” Id. at 1. The Roberson order required the County Criminal Courts at Law Judges to provide probable cause hearings within 24 hours of misdemeanor arrests, allowing the hearings to be by videolink father than in person. Id. at 2 (videolink), 3 (24 hours).

The Roberson order required judicial officers at the probable cause hearing to “set the amount of bail required of the accused for release and determine the accused’s eligibility for release on personal bond or alternatives to prescheduled bail amounts.” Id. at 3. Substantially repeating Article 17.15 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Section D of the Roberson order stated:

Such bail determinations shall be according to the following criteria:

1. The bail shall be sufficiently high to give reasonable assurance that the undertaking will be complied with;

2. The nature of the offense for which Probable Cause has been found and the circumstances under which the offense was allegedly committed are to be considered, including both aggravating and mitigating factors for which there is reasonable ground to believe shown, if any;

3. The ability to make bail is to be regarded, and proof may be taken upon this point;

4. The future safety of the victim may be considered, and if this be a factor, release to a third person should also be considered; and

5. The Judicial Officer shall also consider the accused’s employment history, residency, family affiliations, prior criminal record, previous court appearance performance and any outstanding bonds.

Id. at 3.

The Roberson order required the County Judges to “implement and maintain a bond schedule for all misdemeanor offenses within their jurisdiction.” Id. at 4. The schedule had to “establish the initial amounts of bail required in each type or category of offense.” Id. The Roberson order required that:

At the Probable Cause hearing' the [Hearing] Officer shall use the Bail Schedule, in addition to the criteria in Section D, in determining the appropriate bail in a given case. The [Hearing] Officer shall have the authority to order the accused released on personal bond or released on other alternatives to pre-scheduled bail amounts. The [County] Judges shall direct the Pretrial Services Agency to make every effort to insure that sufficient information is available at the time of the hearings required herein for the [Hearing] Officer to determine an accused’s eligibility for a personal *1073 bond or alternatives to prescheduled bail amounts.

Id.

Nothing in the Roberson order contemplated detention based on a misdemeanor arrestee’s inability to pay the scheduled bail amount set on a secured basis. Rather, the order required Hearing Officers to make individualized adjustments to the bail schedule in each case to provide a mechanism for release, either by lowering the scheduled amount when setting a secured bond; setting nonfínancial conditions of release; or granting release on unsecured “personal bonds” without additional conditions. See id. at 4, 1 (the purpose of the order is to provide “a meaningful review of alternatives to pre-scheduled bail amounts” (emphasis added)).

Finally, the Roberson order required the County Judges to appoint counsel “prior to any adversarial judicial proceedings” or “where the Judge concludes that the interests of justice require representation, for all accused indigents who do not refuse the appointment of counsel.” Id. at 4. In determining indigency for the purpose of appointing counsel, the Roberson order required the County Judges to consider the accused’s income and expenses, assets and debts, dependents, and “whether the accused -has posted or is capable of posting bail.” Id. In no case could a County Judge “deny appointed counsel to an accused solely because the accused has posted, or is capable of posting bail.” Id.

Efforts to comply with the Roberson order have produced the system Harris County has in place today, examined in greater detail below. 10 (Docket Entry No. 101 at 11); Hearing Tr. 4-2:222-29; 5:6-20. Harris County operates a Pretrial Services Agency that interviews misdemeanor ar-restees to provide criminal risk and financial background information to the Hearing Officers. The Hearing Officers hold videolink hearings for those arrested, charged, and booked into the Harris County Jail on misdemeanor charges. 11 These hearings usually, but far from always, are held within 24 hours of arrest. The Hearing Officers usually jointly determine probable cause and set bail.

3. Bail at the Federal Level

At the federal level, the Judiciary Act of 1789 provided an absolute right to bail in noncapital cases and bail at the judge’s discretion in capital cases. See 1 Stat. 73 , 91. The first Congress also proposed the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which, like the Texas Constitution and the English Bill of Rights, prohibits excessive bail. See U.S. Const. amend. VIII; Tex. Const. art. 1, § 13. But, unlike the Texas Constitution, the United States Constitution does not explicitly state a right to bail. The Eighth Amendment guarantees only that “[ejxcessive bail shall not be required.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII; see Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 545-46 , 72 S.Ct. 525 , 96 L.Ed. 547 , (1952) (the Eighth Amendment does not provide a “right to bail”). But the United States Supreme Court has made clear that “[b]ail set at a figure higher than an amount reasonably calculated to fulfill [the] purpose [of assuring the defendant’s appearance at trial] is ‘excessive’ under the Eighth Amendment.” Stack v. Boyle, 342 *1074 U.S. 1, 5 , 72 S.Ct. 1 , 96 L.Ed. 3 (1951). As the Court explained,

From the passage of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73 , 91, to the present Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 46(a)(1), 18 U.S.C.A., federal law has unequivocally provided that a person arrested for a noncapital offense shall be admitted to bail.1 This traditional right to freedom before conviction permits the unhampered preparation of a defense, and serves to prevent the infliction of punishment prior to conviction. See Hudson v. Parker, 1895, 156 U.S. 277, 285 , 15 S.Ct. 450 , 39 L.Ed. 424 . Unless this right to bail before trial is preserved, the presumption of innocence,secured only after centuries of struggle, would lose its meaning.

Id. at 4, 72 S.Ct. 1 ; see also Bandy v. United States, 81 S.Ct. 197 , 198, 5 L.Ed.2d 218 (1960) (Douglas, J., in chambers) (“It would be unconstitutional to fix excessive bail to assure that a defendant will not’ gain his freedom. Yet in the case of an indigent defendant, the fixing of bail in even a modest amount may have the practical effect of denying him release." (citing Stack, 342 U.S. at 1 , 72 S.Ct. 1 )); United States v. Leathers, 412 F.2d 169, 171 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (“the setting of bond unreachable because of its amount would be tantamount to setting no conditions at all”).

The Bail Reform Act of 1966 became' “the first major reform of the federal bail system since the Judiciary Act of 1789.” State v. Brown, 338 P.3d 1276 , 1286 (N.M. 2014); see Bail Reform Act of 1966, 80 Stat. 214 (repealed 1984). The stated purpose of the Bail Reform Act of 1966 was “to assure that all persons, regardless of their' financial status, shall not needlessly be detained pending their appearance to answer charges .,, when detention serves neither the ends of justice nor the public interest.” Id. § 2. The Act required: (1) a presumption of release on -personal recognizance unless the court determined that release would not reasonably assure the defendant’s- appearance in court;. (2) the option of conditional pretrial release under supervision. or other terms designed to decrease the flight risk; and (3) a prohibition on using money bail when nonfinancial release options such as supervisory custody or restrictions on “travel ... or place of abode” .could reasonably, assure the defendant’s appearance. See id. § 3, § 3146(a).

Congress again revised federal bail procedures with the Bail Reform Act of 1984, enacted as part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984. See Bail Reform Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 1837 , 1976 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3150 (2012)). The legislative history of the 1984 Act states that Congress -wanted to “address the alarming- problem of crimes committed by persons on release”-and to “give the courts adequate authority to- make release decisions that give appropriate recognition to the danger a person may pose to others if released.” S. Rep. 98-225, at 3 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3185. The 1984 Act, as amended, retains most of the 1966 Act but “allows a federal court to detain an arrestee pending trial if the Government demonstrates by clear and ‘ convincihg evidence after an adversary hearing that -no release conditions' ‘will reasonably assure ... the safety of any other- person and the community.’ ” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 741 , 107 S.Ct. 2095 , 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987) (omission in original) (quoting the Bail Reform Act of 1984) (upholding the preventive detention provisions in the 1984 Act).

The federal history of bail reform confirms that bail is a mechanism of pretrial release, riot of preventive detention. Pretrial preventive detention in federal cases requires counseled, adversarial hearings with findings stated on the record that, by *1075 clear and convincing evidence, no less restrictive alternative can reasonably assure the defendant’s presence at trial. See id. In United States v. McConnell, 842 F.2d 105 (5th Cir. 1988), the Fifth Circuit held that “a bail setting is not constitutionally excessive merely because a defendant is financially unable to satisfy the requirement.” Id. at. 107. The magistrate judge in McConnell had initially ordered the felony defendant detained before trial with no release condition under the provision of the Bail Reform Act recently upheld in Salerno. See id. at 106 . The district court replaced the detention order with a set of conditions for release, including weekly check-ins with pretrial services, travel restrictions, and secured money bail of $750,000. Id. The defendant moved for reconsideration, alleging that he did not have the assets to pay the secured money bail. The defendant appealed the district'court’s denial of his motion for reconsideration, and the Fifth Circuit remanded to the district court for a written opinion with findings on the record. Id. The court issued written findings, and a second appeal followed. Id.

The Fifth Circuit recognized that under the Bail Reform Act, Congress “pro-scrib[ed] the setting of a high bail as a de facto automatic detention practice.” Id. at 109 . The Fifth Circuit relied on the Senate Report of the Bail Reform Act, which explained that:

section'3142(c) provides' that a judicial officer may not impose a financial condition of release that results in the pretrial detention of the defendant. The purpose of this provision is to preclude the sub rosa use of money bond to detain dangerous defendants. However, its application does not necessarily require the release of a person who says he is-unable to meet a financial condition of release which the judge has determined is the only form of conditional release that will assure the person’s future appearance. Thus, for example, if a judicial officer determines that a $50,000 bond is the only means, short of detention, of assuring the appearance of a defendant who poses a serious risk of flight, and the defendant asserts that, despite the judicial officer’s finding to the contrary, he cannot meet the bond, the judicial officer may reconsider the amount of the bond. If he still concludes that the initial amount is reasonable and nece'ssary then it would appear that there is no available condition of release that will assure the defendant’s appearance. This is the very finding which, under section 3142(e), is the basis for an order of detention, and therefore the judge may proceed with a detention hearing pursuant to section 3142(f) and order the defendant detained, if appropriate. The reasons for the judicial officer’s conclusion that the bond was the only condition that could reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant, the judicial officer’s finding that the amount of the bond was reasonable, and the fact that the defendant stated that he was unable to meet this condition, would be set out in the detention order as provided in section 3142(i)(l). The defendant, eould then appeal the resulting detention pursuant to section 3145.

Id. at 108-09 (quoting S.Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong.2d Sess. 16, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3199), The Fifth Circuit concluded that the district court could set a secured money bail amount beyond the defendant’s ability to pay, but' “[i]n such an instance, the court must explain its reasons for concluding that the particular financial requirement is a necessary part of the conditions for release. It is sufficient for the court to find by a preponderance of evidence that the defendant poses a serious risk of flight.” Id. at 110 , When federal *1076 bail functions as an order of detention because of the defendant’s inability to pay, the court must treat the bail as an order of detention under § 3142(e) and must provide the procedural protections that section requires, with a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. See also United States v. Mantecon-Zayas, 949 F.2d 548, 550 (1st Cir. 1991) (“once a court finds itself in this situation—insisting on terms in a ‘release’ order that will cause the defendant to be detained pending trial—it must satisfy the procedural requirements for a valid detention order”).

4. Bail under Texas Law

The Texas state appellate court practice is similar to federal court practice. Texas courts have imposed or confirmed high money bail after a judicial officer holds an adversarial hearing, with defense counsel present, and issues a reasoned opinion with written findings permitting secured money bail despite inability to pay in felony cases in which pretrial preventive detention without bail is available under Article I, § 11 of the Texas Constitution. See, e.g., Jobe v. State, 482 S.W.3d 300 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2016) (charge of capital murder); Ex parte Ragston, 422 S.W.3d 904 (Tex. App-Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (capital murder, first-degree murder, and aggravated robbery); Ex parte Vasquez, 558 S.W.2d 477 (Tex. Cr. App. 1977) (capital murder). In cases in which preventive detention is not available, Texas appellate courts have confirmed high money bail in felony cases when the evidence did not show the defendant’s inability to pay. See, e.g., Ex parte Dupuy, 498 S.W.3d 220, 233 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (“Appellant offered no evidence, and we see none in the record, suggesting the trial court set his bail at $200,000 for each case in order to keep him incarcerated.”); Cooley v. State, 232 S.W.3d 228, 235 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007) (“Cooley owns half of a multi-million dollar air freight business and did not introduce evidence that revenues from it were unavailable to him.”); Ex parte Charlesworth, 600 S.W.2d 316, 317 (Tex. Cr. App. 1980) (evidence showed the defendants “live in a style inconsistent with poverty”); Ex parte Welch, 729 S.W.2d 306, 310 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, no pet.) (incomplete and conflicting evidence on ability to pay in a case charging solicitation of capital murder committed while the defendant was already on pretrial release on a secured money bail).

In a narrow set of felony cases, Texas courts have imposed or confirmed high money bail despite evidence of inability to pay the amount needed for pretrial release. “When the offense is serious, and involves aggravating factors that may result in a lengthy prison sentence,” a higher money bail than the defendant can pay is permissible, but only after satisfying the same due process requirements as an actual detention order. Dupuy, 498 S.W.3d at 230 ; see, e.g., Maldonado v. State, 999 S.W.2d 91 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. ref'd) (charges of possessing cocaine with a street value of $11-72 million with a possible sentence of 99 years); Ex parte Miller, 631 S.W.2d 825 (Tex. App.—Ft. Worth 1982) (charges of murder and rape carrying life sentence); Ex parte Runo, 535 S.W.2d 188 (Tex. Cr. App. 1976) (bail set at $125,000 on a charge carrying a life sentence was not excessive, but bail set at $75,000 on a charge carrying a minimum two-year sentence was excessive and had to be reduced to $5,000). Even so, Texas courts are careful to distinguish between transparent pretrial preventive detention orders and de facto pretrial detention orders imposed by setting bail higher than the defendant can pay. See, e.g., Dupuy, 498 S.W.3d at 230 ; Ex parte Harris, 733 S.W.2d 712, 714 (Tex. *1077 App.—Austin 1987, no pet.) (setting bail “on the obvious assumption that appellant could not afford bail in that amount and for the express purpose of forcing [the defendant] to remain incarcerated” was overturned for abuse of discretion); Ex parte Nimnicht, 467 S.W.3d 64, 70 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2015) (“There is no evidence the trial court set bail with the intent to prolong Nimnicht’s incarceration, especially in light of the fact the trial court reduced the bail amount.”). 12

The defendants argue that, while Texas law forbids setting bail higher than a defendant can pay in order to impose a de facto pretrial detention order, if a judicial officer weighs all five factors of Article 17.15 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure and then imposes a bail amount that an indigent arrestee cannot pay, the bailas not a de facto detention order. (See, e.g., Docket Entry No. 164 at 8-10, 18; No. 263 at 3-4; No. 266 at 7-8). The defendants overstate the Article 17.15 factors and their role. The Texas cases make clear that a judge may arrive at a bail amount that a defendant cannot pay when the defendant is facing a felony charge carrying an extended prison sentence. Even then, the bail setting requires an adversarial, counseled hearing at which the defendant can put on evidence of indigence and likelihood of compliance with nonfinancial conditions of release, and reviewable findings, stated on the record, that the secured financial condition is reasonably necessary to assure the defendant’s appearance at trial or law-abiding conduct. 13 In misdemeanor cases, *1078 pretrial preventive detention is permitted only when a defendant is facing a family violence charge after previously violating a release condition in an earlier family violence case. In those cases, it is not necessary to use secured money bail to effect the detention of those who cannot pay. The Texas Constitution permits a transparent order of pretrial preventive detention.

5. Recent Distinctions Drawn Between Bail and Preventive Detention

a. Washington, D.C.

In 1994, Washington, D.C. amended its Code using language substantially similar to the federal Bail Reform Act. The amended Code permits a judicial officer to set “a financial condition to reasonably assure the defendant’s presence at all court proceedings that does not result in the preventive detention of the person, except as provided in” the Code’s regulations of preventive pretrial detention orders. D.C. Cope § 23-1321(c)(3). The Code permits preventive detention only in cases involving a charge of violent or dangerous crime, as Well as in cases presenting a “serious risk that the person will flee.” Id. § 23—1322(b)(1). To order preventive detention, a judge must: hold a hearing at the first appearance of the defendant' before a judicial officer; appoint counsel for. the defendant; permit the defendant to put on evidence, testify, and call witnesses; and make written findings “by clear and convincing evidence that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required,.and the safety of any other person and the community.” Id. § 23—1322(b) (2)—(d)(7)."

Judge Truman Morrison of the D.C. Superior Court credibly testified at the motion hearing that until the 1994 amendment, the D.C. courts did not order preventive detention outright. The statutory prohibition on using secured money bail to assure community safety was also “a dead letter)’ Hearing Tr. 2-2:137. “So in cases of any seriousness, judges made an effort nontransparently, never saying what they were doing out loud, to immobilize high-risk people—who they thought were high-risk people—with money bonds that they hoped would be beyond their reach.” Id. Judge Morrison testified that after the 1994 rule change, “[f]or' the high-risk people that we used to immobilize nontransparently, we turned to this preventive detention statute that was moldering on the bookshelf, and prosecutors and judges began using that for high-risk people.” Id. at 2-2:139. For- “somewhat serious misdemeanors who we had been keeping in the jail on lower levels of money bond,” judges began to order alternative nonfinancial conditions of release with supervision provided by D.C.’s pretrial services agency. Id. at 2-2:139-40. Based on a recent report by that agency, Judge Morrison testified that although secured money bail is still available under the D.C. Code, such bail is almost never imposed in misdemeanor cases. Transparent preventive detention orders are issued in only about 1.5 percent of misdemeanor cases, and then only after counseled, adversary hearings with findings on the record that there are no less restrictive conditions that will assure the defendant’s presence at trial or the safety of the community. 14 Id. at 2-2:149, 154; D.C. Code § 23—1322(b)(2)—(d) (7).

*1079

b. New Mexico

In 2014, the New Mexico Supreme Court ruled that “[n]either the New'Mexico Constitution nor our rules''of criminal procedure permit a judge to set high bail for the purpose of’ preventing a defendant’s pretrial release.” Brown, 338 P.3d at 1292 (citing N.M. Const. art. II, § 13—substantially the same language as Tex. Const, art. I, § 11). The court explained that “[ijntentionally setting bail so high as to be unattainable is simply a less honest method of unlawfully denying bail altogether.” Id. The supreme court-held that the trial court had abused its discretion by requiring secured money bail “solely on the basis of an accusation of a sierious crime” and had failed to apply the New Mexico Code of Criminal Procedure requirement that trial -courts impose the least restrictive bail and release conditions to reasonably assure a defendant’s appearance and the public’s safety. Id. at 1291—92.

In 2016, New Mexico voters codified the holding of State v. Brown in a constitutional amendment that passed with 87.2 percent of the vote, 15 The amendment provided that “[b]ail may be denied by a court of record pending trial for a defendant charged with a felony if the prosecuting authority requests a hearing and proves by clear and convincing evidence that no release conditions will reasonably protect the safety of any other person or the community. An appeal from an order denying bail shall be given preference over all other matters.” Constitutional Amendment 1, New Mexico Senate Joint Resolution 1, March 1, 2016. 16 The amendment also required that “[a] person who is not detaina-ble on grounds of dangerousness nor a flight risk in the absence of bond and is otherwise eligible for bail shall not be detained solely because of financial inability to post a money or property bond.” Id. Under the amendment, courts cannot- order preventive detention for misdemeanor arrestees or accomplish the same effect by setting a secured -money bail that an indigent defendant cannot pay.

c. New Jersey

New Jersey recently amended its constitution and statutes to enact statewide bail reforms. The- changes went into effect on January 1, 2017. The New Jersey Constitution now provides that “[pjretrial release may be denied to a person if the court finds that .no amount of monetary bail, non-monetary conditions of pretrial release, or combination of monetary bail and non-monetary conditions would reasonably assure the person’s appearance in court when required, or protect-the safety of.any other person, or the community, or prevent the person from obstructing or attempting to obstruct the criminal justice process.” N.J. Const. art. 1, § 11.

In a detailed law-enforcement directive, the New Jersey Attorney General concluded that under New Jersey’s prior practice, “in most cases the critical determination whether a defendant [was] released pending trial or instead incarcerated in a county jail [was] not made by a judge issuing a well-reasoned court order. Rather, for all practical purposes, defendants [were] re *1080 leased or detained based on whether they happened] to have the financial means to post bail.” N.J. Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2016-6 at 9. New Jersey changed. Its current system creates a presumption against the use of secured money bail unless the prosecutor can show that “no non-monetary release condition or combination of conditions would be sufficient to reasonably assure the defendant’s appearance in court when required”; “the defendant is reasonably believed to have financial assets that will allow him or her to post monetary bail in the amount requested by the prosecutor without having to purchase a bond from a surety company or to obtain a loan”; and “imposition of monetary bail set at the amount requested would ... -make it unnecessary for the prosecutor to seek pretrial detention.” Id. at 56. Secured money bail cannot be used to achieve'or to have the effect of a pretrial detention order. Out of 3,382 cases filed in the first month under the new law, judges imposed transparent orders of pretrial detention in 283 cases and denied pretrial detention when requested to do so in 223 cases. Secured money bail was set in only 3 cases. Pls. Ex. 7(k) at 1.

'.New Jersey does not distinguish between felony and misdemeanor cases but between numbered “categories” of offenses, making comparisons to the Texas misdemeanor bail system difficult. The New Jersey numbers are for all ease categories. Id. Because this approach clearly applies to more serious felony-level cases, the basis for applying it to misdemeanor eases is even stronger.

d. New Orleans

On January 12, 2017, the Council of the City of New Orleans, where the municipal courts have jurisdiction only over misdemeanor cases, passed a measure reforming its bail ordinance. Pls. Ex. 12(tt). The preamble states that “incarcerating people solely due to their inability to pay for their release through the payment of cash bond violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 1 (citing Barnett v. Hopper, 548 F.2d 550, 554 (5th Cir. 1977). The new ordinance requires that except for four enumerated offenses— battery, possession of weapons, impersonating a peace officer, and domestic violence—all misdemeanor arrestees are to be released on personal recognizance. Id. at 2-3. For those charged with one of the enumerated offenses, the municipal courts must “impose the least restrictive non-financial release conditions.” Id. at 3. “For any person who qualifies for indigent defense, or does not have the .present ability to pay, the Court may not set” any financial condition of release or a nonfinaneial condition of release “that requires fees or costs to be paid by the defendant.” Id. Other than the four specific exceptions for offenses that involve violence or other public safety threats, all defendants must be released with no financial conditions. If a financial condition is imposed, the defendant must have “the present ability to pay the amount set.” Id.

e. Maryland

On February 17, 2017, the Maryland Court of Appeals adopted detailed changes to its court rules, the main source of criminal procedural law in Maryland. The rule changes will take effect on July 1, 2017. Pls. Ex. 12(p)(i), Court of Appeals of Maryland, Rules Order, Feb. 17, 2017 at 3. The rule ’changes are “designed to promote the release of defendants on their own recognizance or, when necessary, unsecured bond” by establishing a “[p]reference” for “additional conditions [of release] without financial terms.” Id. at 33. All defendants—both felony and misdemean- or—must be released on personal recognizance or unsecured bond unless a judicial *1081 officer makes written- findings on the record “that no permissible non-financial condition attached to a release will reasonably ensure (A) the appearance of the defendant, and (B) the. safety of each alleged victim, other persons, or the community.” Id. at 35. Even in those circumstances, the new rules require that “[a] judicial officer may not impose a special condition of release with financial terms in form or amount that results in the pretrial detention of the defendant solely because the defendant is financially incapable of meeting that condition.” Id. at 39. Pretrial detention must not be the intended use or the incidental effect of secured money bail.

Before the rule.change, the Maryland Attorney General wrote to the rules committee chairman that “[although Maryland law permits unconditional pretrial detention only where no conditions of release will reasonably protect the public or ensure the defendant’s appearance at trial, nearly every evaluation of Maryland’s pretrial system has found no relationship between a pretrial detainee’s perceived risk and the bond amount set,... Lower risk defendants are detained because they cannot afford the bail, while higher risk defendants who have access to financial resources are able to make bail and are often permitted to do so without imposition of other conditions to protect the public.” Pls. Ex. 12(p) at 3 (citing reports). An advisory memo from the then United States Attorney General stated that “[a]s a general proposition, Maryland’s judicial officials ... do not properly and consistently consider defendants’ individual circumstances, and particularly their financial resources, in making bail determinations. As a result, arrestees in Maryland habitually face extended periods of pretrial detention not as a result of their dangerousness to the community or because they pose a substantial risk of flight, but solely because they are unable to pay bail.” Pls. Ex. 12(p)(ii) at 7. The memo concluded that this system, and those like it, violated both state law and the federal Constitution. Id. at 4-11.

f. Alabama

Some of the same lawyers representing the plaintiffs in this case have brought similar actions challenging bail systems around the country. Several actions were resolved with an agreed final judgment.. These judgments typically state that “[i]f the government offers release from custody after arrest upon the deposit of money pursuant to a bail schedule, it cannot deny release from custody to a person, without a hearing regarding the person’s indigence and the sufficiency of the bail setting, because the person is unable to deposit the amount specified by the schedule.” Jones v. City of Clanton, Alabama, Civil No. 15-34, 2015 WL-5387219 at *4 (M.D. Ala. Sep. 14, 2015) (citing Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1978); Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 , 103 S.Ct. 2064 , 76 L.Ed.2d 221 (1983); State v. Blake, 642 So.2d 959 (Ala. 1994)); see also Jenkins v. City of Jennings, Civil No. 15-252 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 14, 2016); Bell v. City of Jackson, Civil No. 15-252 (E.D. Mo. June 20, 2016); Thompson v. Moss Point, Civil No. 15-182, 2015 WL 10322003 (S.D. Miss. Nov. 6, 2015); Snow v. Lambert, Civil No, 15-567, 2015 WL 5071981 (M.D. La. Aug. 27, 2015); Cooper v. City of Dothan, Civil No. 15-425, 2015 WL 10013003 (M.D. Ala. June 18, 2015); Pierce v. City of Velda, Civil No. 15-570, 2015 WL 10013006 (E.D. Mo. June 3, 2015). In Jones, the court independently confirmed the need for relief, reasoning that “[b]ail schemes.such as the one formerly enforced in the municipal court result in the unnecessary pretrial detention of people whom our system of justice presumes to be innocent,” and that “[cjriminal-defendants, presumed innocent, must not be confined in jail merely because they are poor.” Jones, 2015 WL 5387219 at *3.

*1082 The U.S. Department of Justice filed a statement of interest in Jones , stating that “[i]ncarcerating -individuals solely because of them inability to pay for their release, whether through the payment of fines, fees, or a cash bond,. violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” 17 See Varden v. City of Clanton, Alabama, Civil No. 15-34, Docket Entry No. 26 at 1 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 13, 2015). The Justice Department reasoned that because rigidly adhering to a secured money bail schedule “do[es] not account for individual circumstances of the accused, [it] essentially mandate[s] pretrial detention for anyone who is too poor to pay the predetermined fee. This amounts to mandating pretrial detention only for the indigent.” Id. at 9, After Jones , fifty of Alabama’s largest cities, accounting for 40 percent of the population, voluntarily reformed their bail systems to either release misdemeanor defendants on personal recognizance or, at a minimum, to set an early hearing to consider alternative methods’ of release to secured money bail. Pls. Ex. 12(l).

g. Calhoun, Georgia

Some of the plaintiffs’ counsel also represented the plaintiffs in Walker v. City of Calhoun, Georgia, Civil No. 15-170, 2016 WL 361612 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 28, 2016). A putative class of misdemeanor arrestees alleged that Calhoun detained them on prescheduled amounts of secured money bail that were not reviewed except at'court sessions held each Monday. Id. at *1. The trial court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that “keeping individuals in jail solely because they cannot pay for them release, whether via fines, fees, or a cash bond, is impermissible.” Id. at *10 (citations omitted). The court ordered Calhoun to- “implement post-arrest proceddres that comply with the Constitution,” and directed that “until Defendant implements lawful postarrest procedures, Defendant must release any other misdemeanor arrestees' in its custody, or who comé into its custody, on their own recognizance or on unsecured bond in a manner otherwise consistent with state and federal law and with standard booking procedures.” Id. at *14. The Eleventh Circuit vacated the injunction because requiring the defendant to implement constitutional procedures was “the archetypical and unenforceable ‘obey the law’ injunction” forbidden by Federal' Rule of Civil Procedure 65. Walker v. City of Calhoun, Georgia, 682 Fed.Appx. 721, 724 , 2017 WL 929750 at *2 (11th Cir. Mar. 9, 2017). The panel did not consider the merits, instead remanding for the district court to enter a specific order consistent with Rule 65. See id.

Walker attracted significant attention. Ten amicus briefs were filed, including by the American Bar Association; the U.S. Department of Justice, the Pretrial Justice Institute and National Association of Pretrial Services Agencies, the Cato Institute, and various representatives of bail bonds associations, Georgia law-enforcement personnel, and other municipalities and their insurers. The relevant amicus briefs are includéd in the record here.

The American Bar Association’s amicus brief in Walker argued that “[m]onetary conditions of release should never be drawn from an inflexible schedule, should be imposed only after consideration of the *1083 defendant’s individual circumstances, and should never prevent the defendant’s release solely because the defendant is unable to pay.” Pls. Ex. 12(ff) at 12: The Third Edition of the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Pretrial Release (3d ed. 2007), recommend-“procedures designed to promote the release of defendants on their own recognizance or, when necessary, unsecured bond.” Standard 10-1.4(a). Jurisdictions should impose financial conditions only “when no other conditions will ensure appearance,” and financial conditions “should not be employed to respond to concerns for public safety.” Standard 10-1.(4c)-(d). The Standards also emphasize that “[t]he judicial officer should not impose a financial condition, of release that results in the pretrial detention of a defendant solely due to the defendant’s inability to pay.” Standard 10-1.4(e).

The American Bar Association’s brief emphasizes that “[Unwarranted pretrial detention infringes on defendants’ constitutional rights, ‘making it difficult for the defendant to consult with counsel, locate witnesses, and gather evidence’and placing a particularly heavy burden on ‘poor defendants and on racial and cultural minorities.’” Pls. Ex. 12(ff) at 14 (quoting Standards at 32—33). The commentary to the Standards states that “[i]f the court finds that unsecured bond is not sufficient, it may require the defendant to post bail; however, the bail amount must be within the reach of the defendant and should not be at an amount greater than necessary to assure the defendant’s appearance in court.” Id. (quoting with emphasis Standards at 43-44). The brief concludes that detaining a defendant solely for failure to pay a secured financial condition of release is unwarranted and unconstitutional. Id.

The Justice Department’s brief expanded the statement of interest it submitted in the Jones Alabama bail case. The brief reasoned that, based on Supreme Court precedent, “[i]f a court finds that no other conditions may reasonably assure an individual’s appearance at trial, financial conditions may be constitutionally imposed—but ‘bail must .be set by, a court at a sum designed to ensure that goal, and no morel ” Pls. Ex. 12(dd) at 18 (quoting with emphasis Salerno, 481 U.S. at 764 , 107 S.Ct. 2095 ). “Although the imposition of bail in such circumstances may result in a person’s incarceration,” the Department explained, “the deprivation of liberty in such circumstances is not based solely on inability to pay.” Id. But adhering to “fixed bail schedules that allow for the pretrial release of only those, who can pay, without accounting for ability to pay and alternative methods of.assuring future appearance, do not provide for such individualized determinations, and therefore unlawfully discriminate based on indigence.” Id.

The Justice Department’s argument is stated less strongly than the American Bar Association’s. While the American Bar Association argues that defendants must not be detained solely because of their inability to pay secured money, .bail, the Justice Department interprets “solely” to exclude those who cannot pay a, secured money bail because it has been set beyond then? reach due to their risk of flight. See id. Both arguments are consistent with the reforms surveyed above. Some jurisdictions, such as Washington, D.C., New Mexico, New Jersey, and New Orleans, do not permit secured- money bail settings to result in pretrial detention or operate as de facto pretrial preventive detention orders in misdemeanor cases, in line with the American Bar Association’s recommendations. Others, such as Maryland and Alabama, permit secured money bail to have the effect of detention 'only if the court follows the procedures required for pretrial preventive detention, in line with the Justice Department’s argument. In those cases, a judicial officer must make written findings *1084 after an adversarial, counseled hearing that secured money bail in the amount set is the only, or the least restrictive, condition that can reasonably assure the defendant’s appearance at trial.

The Pretrial Justice Institute and the National Association of Pretrial Services Agencies submitted a brief in Walker using empirical data to argue that secured money bail, as opposed to an unsecured appearance bond; is never the only reasonable condition that will assure an individual’s appearance at trial or community safety. Pls. Ex. 12(hh). The brief presented data showing that those released on secured money bail do not appear at greater rates or commit new crimes at lower rates than those released on unsecured bonds. Id. Secured money bail schedules can effectively increase rates of appearance when they operate as detention orders, but “the use of such schedules inevitably leads to the detention of some, persons who pose little threat to public safety, but are too poor to afford release, while releasing others that pose a higher safety risk (but can afford to post bond).” Id. at 25.

In addition to the policy changes that a number of jurisdictions have already implemented or are in the process of implementing, even more jurisdictions have announced that they are examining or are about to reform their bail systems. 18 A common theme among these reformed and reforming jurisdictions is that; before recent rule changes, each jurisdiction as a matter of routine practice either intentionally used or indifferently permitted the use of secured money bail as de facto detention orders against those financially unable to pay. See, e.g., Brown, 338 P.3d at 1292 (“We understand that this case may not be an isolated instance and that other judges, may be imposing bonds based solely on the nature of the charged offense without regard to individual determinations of flight risk or continued danger to the community.”); Pls. Ex. 12(p); Hearing Tr. 2-2:137. The other theme is that this practice did not hold up to historical, empirical, political, or legal scrutiny.

h. Conclusion

Whether by legislative enactment, judicial rulemaking, or court order, there is a clear and growing movement against using secured money bail to achieve a misdemeanor arrestee’s continued detention. Of course, it is not a federal court’s role in any way to make policy judgments. See, e.g., Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 at 537-38 , 131 S.Ct. 1910 , 179 L.Ed.2d 969 (2011). The question this case presents is not what is the best or even a good bail policy. The question is what bail system the Constitution requires and what system it prohibits. The Constitution sets minimum standards of due process and protects basic rights such as the presumption of innocence and the ability to prepare for trial. State and local governments may add to, but may not detract from, these basic protections. See, e.g., Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 124 , 95 S.Ct. 854 . The question is whether Harris County meets the constitutionally minimum standards and procedures.

D. The Use of Bail in Harris County Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention

1. The Statutory Framework

The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure defines “bail” as “the security given by the *1085 accused that he will appear and answer before the proper court the accusation brought against him, and includes a bail bond or a personal bond.” Tex. Code Crim. Pro. art. 17.01. Except for certain types of felonies, “a magistrate may, in the magistrate’s discretion, release the defendant on his personal bond without sureties or other security.” 19 Id. art. 17.03(a). A personal bond requires the defendant to swear an oath that if he or she fails to appear, the principal sum the court sets becomes due. Id. art. 17.04. The magistrate granting a personal bond may assess a nonrefundable bond fee “of $20 or three percent of the amount of the bail fixed for the accused, whichever is greater.” Id. art. 17.42, § 4(a). Magistrates may postpone, reduce, or waive the fee. Id. art. 17.03(g).

Texas law does not facially provide for release on no financial conditions. The “personal bond” defined in Texas law differs from what other jurisdictions call a personal bond or a personal recognizance bond by requiring a principal sum that becomes due if the defendant fails to appear. See, e.g., Goldfarb, supra, at 153-54 (personal recognizance in New York is release solely “on one’s honor pending trial”); Brown, 338 P.3d at 1289 (distinguishing release on “personal recognizance” from release “upon the execution of an unsecured bond,” which makes a sum due if the defendant fails to appear). 20

The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure states that “[t]he amount of bail to be required in any case is to be regulated by the court, judges, magistrate or officer taking the bail; they are to be governed in the exercise of this discretion” by five rules:

1. The bail shall be sufficiently high to give reasonable assurance that the undertaking will be complied with.

2. The power to require bail is not to be so used as to make it an instrument of oppression.

3. The nature of the offense and the circumstances under which it vías committed are to be considered.

4. The ability to make bail is to be regarded, and proof may be taken upon this point.

5. The future safety of a victim of the alleged offense and the community shall be considered.

Tex. Code Crim. Pro. art. 17.15.

In Harris County, “magistrates” include Hearing Officers and County Judges. See id. art. 2.09. In addition to a magistrate’s discretion to issue a personal bond, the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure permits the arresting officer to release defendants *1086 accused, of certain misdemeanors by citation only. Id. art. 14.06. The Code permits the arresting officer to cite-and-release those arrested for Class A or B misdemeanors for possessing small amounts of marijuana or certain other controlled substances, criminal mischief causing damage up to $2,500, graffiti, theft of property or service up to the value of $2,500, supplying contraband to prisoners, or driving without a license. Id. Major Patrick Dougherty testified that the Houston Police Department and Harris County follow the cite- and-release practice only for traffic-related Class C misdemeanor arrestees. Hearing Tr. 3-2:47-48 (“All Houston police officers basically book all their prisoners in the City Jail, regardless of whether it is a felony, misdemeanor or a Class C offense.”), 52. The Harris .County District Attorney has recently implemented a cite- and-release policy, as well as a diversionary program, for misdemeanor arrests for possessing small amounts of controlled substances. Hearing Tr. 3-2:178. Under the County’s diversionary program, the District Attorney’s office postpones charges for misdemeanor arrestees who agree to complete educational courses. These arrestees are not subjected to the booking and bail setting processes described below because the District Attorney declines charges at that time. Hearing Tr. 4-1:21-22.

The Texas Government Code permits the County Judges to “adopt rules consistent with the Code of Criminal Procedure ... for practice and procedure in the courts. A rule may be adopted by a two-thirds vote of the judges.” Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 75.403(f). At least three times since the beginning of 2016, the Harris County Criminal Courts at Law Judges, sitting en banc and voting by two-thirds majority, adopted or amended the Harris County Criminal Courts at Law Rules of Court. 21 The current version is the Rules of Court as amended on February 9, 2017. The Rules of Court contain a misdemeanor bail schedule, id. Rule 9, and provide that “[t]he: initial bail amount may be changed on motion of the court, the hearing officer, or any party subject to the following criteria”:

4.2.3.1.1. the bail shall be sufficiently high to give reasonable assurance that the defendant will comply with the undertaking;

4.2.3.1.2. the nature of the offense for which probable cause has been found and the circumstances under which the offense was allegedly committed are to be considered, including both aggravating and mitigating factors for which there is reasonable ground to believe shown, if any;

4.2.3.1.3. the. ability to make bail is to be regarded, and proof may be taken upon this point;

4.2.3.1.4. the future safety of the victim and the community may be considered, and if this is a factor, release to a third person should also be considered; and . .

4.2.3.1.5. the criminal law hearing officer shall also consider the employment history, residency, family affiliations, prior criminal record, previous court appearance performance, and any outstanding bonds of the accused.

Id. Rule 4.2.3. The County Rules of Court state that “all law enforcement officials in Harris County shall cause the pretrial detainees in their respective custody, who have been charged with a class A or class B misdemeanor, to be delivered to the criminal law hearing officer not later than *1087 24 hours after arrest.” Id. Rule 4.2.1.1. Misdemeanor defendants arrested without a warrant who are not given a probable cause hearing within 24 hours after arrest must be released on a personal bond of no more than $5,000 when the 24 hours have expired. 22 See Tex. Code Crim. Pro. art. 17.033; Sanders v. City of Houston, 543 F.Supp. 694, 705-06 (S.D. Tex. 1982); Roberson v. Richardson, Agreed Final Judgment, Civil No. 84-2974 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 25, 1987). 23

At the 24-hour hearing, commonly referred to as the probable cause hearing, in addition to finding probable cause for the arrest, Hearing Officers are to “set the amount of bail required of the accused for release and shall determine the eligibility of the accused for release on personal bond, cash bond, surety bond, or other alternative to scheduled bail amounts, and shall issue a signed order remanding the defendant to the custody of the sheriff.” Rules of Court 4.2.2.1.11. On August 12, 2016, the County Judges amended the County Rules of Court to provide that “personal bonds”—unsecured appearance bonds—“are favored” in twélve specific misdemeanor categories. 24 Id. Rule 12. Rule 12 lists five circumstances in which personal bonds “are disfavored,” including when “the defendant has demonstrated a risk to reoffend or harm society” or “has previously failed to appear in court as instructed.” Id.

The next step in «the process is scheduling cases for arraignment, referred to as the “first appearance settings.” Arrestees released on secured money bail., before booking are scheduled for arraignment one week from the day of their arrests (or on a Friday if the arrest was over a weekend). Id. Rule 4.1.2. Those released on a personal bond are scheduled for arraignment the same day, or the next business day if released , after 9:00 a.m. Id.. Rule 4.1.4. Those booked into the County Jail who request counsel are scheduled for arraignment the next business day, when counsel may be appointed. Id. Rule 24.9.1.

On February 9, 2017, the County Judges amended the County Rules of. Court to provide first appearance settings for all misdemeanor arrestees booked into the County Jail- the next business day after booking, “regardless of whether the defendant has been released from custody.” Id. Rule 4.1.2. At this first appearance, the County Judge must “review conditions of release, bail amount set, and personal bond decision and modify if good cause 'exists to do so.” Id.

2. Arrest and Booking

According to the 2015 annual report of Harris County Pretrial Services, 50,947 people were arrested in Harris County on only Class A or Class B misdemeanor charges in 2015. Pls. 10(c), 2015 Pretrial Services Annual Report at 8. In that year, 27.9 percent were arrested by the Harris County Sheriffs Office. The rest were ar *1088 rested by other law-enforcement agencies, principally the Houston Police Department. 25 Id.

Major Dougherty testified based on his thirty-five years of service with the Houston Police Department that those arrested without a warrant by the City of Houston are taken to the City Jail, tested for drugs or alcohol if applicable, and fingerprinted. Hearing Tr. 3-2:48-49. Either at the site of the arrest or at the City Jail, the arresting office calls a District Attorney hotline that is staffed 24 hours a day by an Assistant District Attorney, who decides whether to accept the charge. Id. at 3-2:50-51. If the Assistant District Attorney declines the charge, the arrestee is promptly released. Id. at 3-2:50. If the charge is accepted, an officer prepares a District Attorney Intake Management System (DIMS) report and electronically forwards it to the District Attorney’s office, where the formal charge is prepared. Id. at 3-2:48-49. Major Dougherty testified that by this point in the process, 1 to 3 hours have elapsed, depending on the time spent transporting arrestees from outlying areas of Houston to the City Jail. Id. at 3-2:49.

The District Attorney’s office prepares a formal charging document and applies a secured money bail using the County Judges’ bail schedule to set the amount. Id. at 3-2:51; see Rules of Court 2.3. The scheduled bail amount is set based on the charge and the defendant’s criminal history. See Rules of Court 9.1. The document is forwarded to the District Clerk’s office, which assigns the case to a County Judge’s court and sets a first-appearance date. Major Dougherty testified that the Clerk’s assignment makes the case “paper-ready” and is completed about 12 to 16 hours after arrest. Hearing Tr. 3-2:52. Once the case is paper-ready, a misdemeanor defendant with access to enough money may pay the amount necessary for release and be promptly released from custody. 26 Id. at 3-2:54. A defendant may pay the entire bond amount into the registry of the court, to be refunded at case disposition if the defendant makes all scheduled appearances—a “cash bond.” Or, and most often, the defendant pays a nonrefundable premium to a commercial bondsman, who posts the principal with the court—a “surety bond.” 27 See Pls. 10(c), 2015 Pretrial Services Annual Report at 9; 2-1:55-58.

Harris County Pretrial Services personnel have offices at the City Jail. Hearing Tr. 3-2:57, 59. Arrestees who have not bonded out at the earliest opportunity and *1089 who have not already been taken from the City to the County Jail have their interview with a Pretrial Services officer while at the City Jail. Id. at 3-2:56-58. Harris County Director of Pretrial Services Kelvin Banks testified that interviews typically take 15 to 20 minutes. Id. at 3-2:170. In the interview, Pretrial Services asks for the defendant’s background information, including residence, employment, education level, and past criminal history. See, e.g., Pis. Ex. 8(d). After the interview,. Pretrial--Services tries to verify the information by calling references and running internet searches. Hearing Tr. 3-2:171.

Before this suit was filed, an unwritten policy required Pretrial Services to obtain two verified references before a defendant could be released on a personal bond. (See Docket Entry No. 162 at 5; No. 166 at 10 n.13); see also Def. Ex. 52. In August 2016, the County Judges sent a Tetter to the Hearing Officers changing the policy to permit release on personal bond with only one verified reference. Def. Ex. 52. The verification requirement is not codified in the County Rules of Court or in State law. Until the August 2016 letter, the requirement appears to have been an unwritten policy promulgated by County Judges and enforced as a practice or custom by Hearing Officers and by Pretrial Services personnel. 28

Pretrial Services officers complete a validated risk-assessment form, which uses a point-weighting system to itemize and evaluate the defendant’s risk of flight or risk of new criminal activity during pretrial release. Hearing Tr. 3-2:172; Pls. Ex. 8(d). A risk-assessment tool is “validated” when its risk indicators have- been empirically shown to reliably predict outcomes such as nonappearance or new criminal activity. Hearing Tr. 3-2:172.

The current risk-assessment tool that Harris County Pretrial Services uses assigns points to seventeen different risk indicators. See, e.g., Pls. Ex. 8(d). Under “Criminal Risk Items,” arrestees are given a point if the current charge involves a crime of violence, a point if the defendant is on probation, a point if the defendant is on parole, a point for a prior misdemeanor conviction and another point for multiple prior convictions, a point for a prior felony conviction and another point for multiple prior convictions, a point for a past failure to appear, and a point if the .defendant has a formal “hold,” .such as an outstanding warrant from another jurisdiction. See id.; Hearing Tr. 2-1:134-37.

Under “Background Risk Items,” a defendant receives a point for being male, a point for lacking a high school diploma or GED, a point for not having a land line phone, a point for living with someone other than a spouse or family, a point for not'owning an automobile, a point for lacking full-time employment, ’and a point for being under 30 years of age. 29 Hearing Tr. 2-1:134-37; see generally Pls. Ex. 8(d).

The point totals from both the Criminal Risk Items and Background Risk Items *1090 are added to reach a single score which is set on a risk scale. Id. Defendants with three points or fewer are scored as low risk, four to five points are scored as “low moderate risk,” six to seven points are scored as moderate risk, and eight points or above are scored as high risk. Id. Criminal risk points are weighted the same way as background risk points. A 29-year-old man who works part-time and rents and apartment with a roommate, who does not own' a car or a land line phone, but who has no criminal history would receive the same risk score as an older woman on probation who has multiple felony convictions, a past failure to appear, am outstanding warrant and a current charge involving a crime of violence. Both cases would be assigned at least six points and be categorized' as “moderate” risk. See id. Mr. Banks testified that for defendants whose risk scores are increased because of the background factors that correlate with poverty rather than criminal activity, the standard Pretrial Services procedure is to recommend release on personal bond, notwithstanding the .higher risk score. Hearing Tr. 4-1:55.

The collected information, verified references, risk-assessment score sheet, and the Pretrial Services recommendation, for release are all gathered into a report and transmitted to a Hearing Officer,for the defendant’s probable cause hearing. See generally Pls. Ex. 8(d). Mr. Banks testified that currently, if Pretrial Services makes a recommendation, it recommends either that a Hearing Officer grant a personal (unsecured) bond with standard conditions (such as supervision by Pretrial Services), grant a personal (unsecured) bond with additional conditions (such as geographic restrictions), or “detain.” Id. at 3—2:173. Mr. Banks explained that Pretrial Services makes a recommendation to “detain” misdemeanor arrestees with immigration or other warrant holds on their record. Id. at 3-2:173-75; 4-1:41-44. A recommended high bail setting is intended to keep arres-tees detained to address the hold. Id. at 3-2:175; 4-1:41-42.-But, as explained below, secured money bail, if unpaid, prevents the defendant from addressing the hold or from being transferred to the agency imposing the hold, extending the overall time spent in custody. 30 Mr. Banks testified that Pretrial Services also recommends “detain” for “high risk” arrestees. Id. at 3-2:173-75; 4-1:41-44. Because Texas law prohibits pretrial preventive detention inmost misdemeanor cases, a recommendation to “detain” is a recommendation to set a high secured bail in order to detain until a judicial officer considers the case or the case is terminated. Id. at 3-2:175; 4-1:41-42, A defendant who pays the bail is released, despite the “high- risk” .category and the recommendation to detain.

Pretrial Services does hot directly ask defendants whether they can pay the bail amount set or what amourit they could pay. Hearing Tr. 4-1:47. Mr. Banks testified that instead, Pretrial Services asks a “litany” of questions about a defendant’s assets, income, and expenses. Id. at 4-1:48. Defendants sometimes refuse to be interviewed, and the record indicates that they may do so because they do not understand that the interview is non-adversarial and that providing responsive answers is the only way they can be released on nonfinancial conditions. Hearing Tr. 2-2:29-30; 3-2:125. Other defendants are confused by the questions. For instance, “Do you have a place to stay?” may be taken to mean “Can you afford rent or housing?” But it could also mean “Are you likely to leave the jurisdiction because you do not have a place to live here?” Answering the first *1091 question in the negative when the second question is the one asked can—and in Harris County does 31 —become the basis for detention rather than release on unsecured financial conditions. Hearing Tr. 2-2:12-13.

If Pretrial Services officers at the City Jail determines that an arrestee is a good candidate for release on personal bond, they may forward the interview papers to their counterparts at the County Jail for “early presentment” to a Hearing Officer. Hearing Tr. 3-2:182-83. The Hearing Officer may approve or deny release on personal bond using only the charging papers (the DIMS report) and interview papers prepared for the early presentment. Id. If the Hearing Officer approves release on personal bond, the arrestee can be released from the City Jail without being transported to or booked in the County Jail. Id. 3-2:57-58. Early presentment depends on the availability of Pretrial Services personnel. The record evidence clearly shows that early presentments are rare. In 2015, only 90 out of 21,748 Houston Police Department arrestees were released on personal bonds after early presentment. 32 Pis. Ex. 4(d), Second Rebuttal Report at 15; Pis. Ex. 10(c), 2015 Pretrial Services Annual Report at 8.

Arrestees who do not pay for release or obtain release on personal bond by early presentment at the City Jail are taken to and booked in the Harris County Jail. Hearing Tr. 3-2:65. Transport buses run every two hours, but Major Dougherty testified that capacity limits at the County Jail Inmate Processing Center create significant delays. These limits prevent paper-ready misdemeanor arrestees from being transported to the County Jail on the next available bus. Id. at 3-2:67-68. Because the Inmate Processing Center is the only holding facility for County arrestees, they are given priority over arrestees waiting for transport from the City Jail, which adds to the delays. Id. at 3-2:69-70.

Major Dougherty testified that those arrested without a warrant by the County are taken either directly to the County Jail or to one of four outlying County detention centers, with transport to the County Jail within 4 hours. Id. at 3-2:54-55. Once at the County Jail, County arrestees go through the same process as City arres-tees—they are charged, fingerprinted, drug and alcohol tested, and interviewed by Pretrial Services in the . Inmate Processing Center next to the Jail. Id. at 3-2:84-85. The Inmate Processing Center runs 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. The booking process takes between 8 and 12 hours, Id. at 2-1:38. Booking at the County Jail relies on a paper, rather than an electronic, system. Id. at 3-2:85. Arrestees with the financial means .to .do so may pay their money bonds or a bondsman’s premium while still in the Inmate Processing Center and be released, usually within 12 to 15 hours of arrest. Id. While in the Processing Center, arrestees do not have access to counsel or family members. Id. at *1092 2-1:43. Those who do not pay their secured money bonds while in.the Processing Center are assigned and transferred to a housing unit in the County Jail. Id.

About 7 percent of misdemeanor arrests annually are arrested after a warrant has issued. Pls. Ex. 10(c), 2015 Pretrial Services Annual Report at 8; (see also Docket Entry No. 290, Ex. 1 at 8). When Harris County magistrates—Hearing Officers or County Judges—issue warrants, they affix the prescheduled secured money bail amount to the warrant. Hearing Tr. 2-1:216-17; 3-2:55; 8-2:108. Misdemeanor defendants with access to money can pay the secured amount or a bondsman’s premium and be processed without being arrested. Id. Misdemeanor defendants who áre arrested on a warrant but cannot pay are subject to the same procedures as warrantless arrests. Id. Although a magistrate has already found probable cause to issue the warrant, the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure requires each arrestee to appear before a magistrate to be informed of his or her rights and to request counsel. Tex. Code Crim. Pro. art. 15.17. What Harris County calls “probable cause hearings” fulfill the function of informing arrestees of their rights, finding probable cause for warrantless arrests, and setting bail or, more often, confirming the pre-scheduled amount of bail on a secured basis.

3. The Probable Cause and Bail-Setting Hearing

The Hearing Officers hold probable cause hearings every 2 hours, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Hearing Tr. 4-1:160. Defendants arrested without a warrant who have completed processing at the Inmate Processing Center are put on the next available docket for a probable cause hearing. Id. at 2-1:93. Probable cause hearings are conducted by videolink connecting a Hearing Officer’s courtroom, an Assistant District Attorney’s office, and a large room in the County Jail. See generally Pl s. Ex. 2. Up to forty-five arrestees may be adjudicated at a single probable cause hearing. Hearing Tr. 4-1:161. When an arrestee’s case is called, the arrestee stands on a marked square in the center of the room and faces, a screen showing the Hearing Officer and Assistant District Attorney. See Pls. Ex. 2. The hearings are recorded. Id.

Hearings typically last about one to two minutes per arrestee. 33 See generally Pls. Ex. 2. During this brief period, the Assistant District Attorney reads the charge, and the Hearing Officer determines probable cause and sets bail. Id. Hearing Officers have discretion to release arrestees on personal bond, to impose additional conditions of release (such as geographical restrictions), or to raise or lower the bail amount from the scheduled amount. See Tex. Code Crim. Pro. art. 17.03, 17.15, 17.40-44. For those misdemeanor arres-tees who have not had their Pretrial Services papers given to a Hearing Officer for early presentment—the vast majority—the first setting is their earliest opportunity to be considered for release on a personal bond. Hearing Tr. 2-1:45-46.

As noted, under Texas law, misdemean- or defendants arrested without a warrant must be released on an unsecured personal *1093 bond if a magistrate does not find probable cause within 24 hours of arrest. Tex. Code Crim. Pro. art. 17.033. The Houston City-Jail is not equipped to provide videolink hearings and does not provide opportunities for live presentment to the Hearing Officers. Hearing Tr. 3-2:61-63. When the Inmate Processing Center at the County Jail is at capacity and arrestees cannot be transported promptly from the City Jail, those who have not paid and been released may wait at the City Jail more than 24 hours before they are transported to the County Jail and can have their probable cause and bail-setting hearing before a Hearing Officer. Id. at 4-1:9,136. To avoid releasing these arrestees on unsecured personal bonds at the. 24-hour time limit, the customary unwritten practice is to hold in absentia “paper hearings.” Id. at 2-1:92-93. At a paper hearing, the Hearing Officer finds probable cause based on the DIMS report that the arresting officer prepared and that the Assistant District Attorney used to draw up the charge. Id. Pretrial Services forms are not made available at paper hearings. The DIMS report does not provide any of the defendant’s financial information. Hearing Officers do not set bail or consider eligibility for unsecured personal bonds at paper hearings. Id. at 4-1:133-35.

Defendants almost never have counsel at the probable cause and bail-setting hearing. See Def. Ex. 23. Those who are indigent have not yet had counsel appointed. Those who can afford counsel have either paid their bonds and been released or have not been able to arrange their counsel’s presence. See id. Both the Sheriffs deputies and the Hearing Officers instruct the defendants not to speak except to answer specific questions, lest they incriminate themselves. Hearing Tr. 4-1:178. Because the Hearing Officers are not judges of courts of record, they do not make written findings or issue reasoned opinions explaining why they set bail on a secured or unsecured basis, or why they select the bail amount imposed. (Docket Entry No. 138 ¶ 72); Hearing Tr. 4-1:145.- The video recordings show that Hearing Officers occasionally state that bail is set at a certain level or that a personal bond is denied “based on your .priors” (see below). Hearing Officers occasionally make notes on the Pretrial Services forms, such as “Criminal History”; “Safety of Community”; or “Safety.” See Pls. Ex. 9, e.g., (M. W.), (A. G.), (H. P.). These cryptic, one-to-three word notations are just that. They do not show that Hearing Officers weighed the statutory factors in setting bail, much less how they did so.

Chief Hearing Officer Blanca Villagomez testified that before granting an unsecured personal bond, she “look[s] at the five factors obviously that are set out in Article 17.15. I listen to the prosecutor and whatever allegations that led to their charge, secondly. I will look at all of the information that is available to me that is provided by Pretrial Services and reach a conclusion on that.” Hearing Tr. 4-1:117.-She testified that on occasion, based on the circumstances and the evidence presented, she has denied release on an unsecured personal bond to defendants who score low on the risk scale because she • perceived a threat to public safety. On other occasions, she disregards a high risk score based on background resource factors, such as not owning a land line phone or a car. Id. at 4-1:126. Judge Villagomez testified that she does not reach a conclusion on whether secured money bail will operate as a condition of detention, but that she does realize that detention, ,-rather than release, will be the outcome of setting secured money bail for indigent defendants more than “rarefiy].” Id. at 4-1:140-42. She nevertheless sets bail on a secured -basis at the scheduled amounts in those-cases. Id. She *1094 testified that she believes it is lawful under Texas law to require a secured money bail she knows a defendant cannot pay “if I have taken in all of the factors in 17.15 into consideration because [ability to pay] is not the only one.” Id. at 4-1:144-45.

Hearing Officer Eric Hagstette testified that' he discounts high risk scores when they are based on background factors showing poverty rather than a history of nonappearance or criminal activity. Id. at 4-1:163-65. He did not disagree with Judge Villagomez’s approach. He testified that the Hearing Officers “all go about -our job pretty much the same way, do what we are statutorily required to do during these hearings and then make the decision with the information that is available and is presented at the hearing.” Id. at 4-1:168-69. He explained that he does not impose secured money bail with' an intent to detain but that “[t]he intent is'to set a bond that is sufficiently high based on the factors I’m obligated to consider.” Id. at 4-1:171. When asked how he would approach a defendant with no job, no income, no assets, and a history of failing to appear, for whom the scheduled bond' amount would be $4,000, he testified that he would not release that defendant on an unsecured $4,000 bond because “[i]t depends again on the other factors being balanced.” Id. at 4-1:172.

Judge Villagomez testified that she does not and cannot keep track of how many times she raises or lowers a bond, how often she rejects a Pretrial Services recommendation, or whether, and how often, defendants she releases on unsecured personal bonds fail to appear at hearings. Id. 4-1:126-27, 132, 150. Judge Hagstette testified that he raises and lowers bail amounts in roughly equal numbers—“I knock them down and I raise, them up”— but he does not know how often those he releases on unsecured personal bonds fail to appear. Id. at 4—1:163, 167-68,173.

' The Pretrial Services Annual Report provides system-wide statistics on how often Hearing Officers implement or' reject Pretrial Services recommendations. Pis. Ex. 10(c), 2015 Pretrial Services Annual Report at 14. In 2015, for the 9,388 defendants for whom Pretrial Services recommended release on unsecured personal bond with standard conditions of supervision, Hearing Officers denied a personal bond 56.3 percent of the time. 34 Id. In 1,831 cases, Hearing Officers granted release on unsecured personal bonds on the condition that Pretrial Services could verify the references. Id. The data do not show in how many cases that did or did not happen. 35 For the 4,816 defendants for *1095 whom Pretrial Services recommended release on personal bond with enhanced supervisory conditions, Hearing Officers denied a personal bond 84.8 percent of the time. 36 Id. For the 11,935 defendants for whom Pretrial Services made no recommendation, Hearing Officers denied a personal bond 96.9 percent of the time. 37 Id. For the 4,716 defendants for whom Pretrial Services recommended “detain” (15.3 percent of all defendants interviewed by Pretrial Services), Hearing Officers denied a personal bond 97.1 percent of the time. 38 Id. Overall, Hearing Officers reject Pretrial Services recommendations for release on a personal bond 66,3 percent of the time. Id. Pretrial Services acknowledges the wide discrepancy between what they recommend based on the County’s validated risk-assessment tool and what the Hearing Officers order based on the preset bail schedule. The Frequently Asked Questions page on the Pretrial Services public website asks, “Why aren’t there more Personal Bonds approved?” The answer: “Good question!” 39 Hearing Tr. 4-1:57.

Among all cases in which Pretrial Services interviewed the misdemeanor defendant, whether Hearing Officers granted release on secured or on unsecured financial conditions, the Hearing Officers lowered the bail amount from what was-stated on the charging document in 7.2 percent of cases and raised the- bail amount in 10.7 percent of cases. 40 Pls. Ex. 10(c), 2015 Pretrial Services Annual Report at 14. In 2015, Hearing Officers lowered the-amount below $500—the' minimum amount on the bail schedule—in 4 cases, out of nearly 51,000 arrests with bail set. 41 Id. at 8. The plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Stephen Demuth, credibly testified that from the beginning of 2015 to the end of January 2017, Hearing Officers adhered -to the prescheduled bail amount stated on the charging documents in 88.9 percent of all misdemeanor cases. 42 Pls. Ex. 4(d), Second Rebuttal Re *1096 port at 10; Hearing Tr. 6-2:119-21. When they do change the amount, they raise it about 67 percent of the time. Id.

Dr. Demuth presented credible evidence based on Harris County’s administrative data that from January 2015 through January 2017, only 9.7 percent of all misdemeanor arrestees were granted release on an unsecured personal bond, with or without additional nonfinancial conditions. Pis. Ex. 8(d), Second Rebuttal Report at 9. That figure is consistent with the Pretrial Services annual reports, which show that 8.5 percent of misdemeanor arrestees were granted an unsecured personal bond in 2015, and 10.8 percent in 2016. 43 Pis. Ex. 10(c) at 9; (Docket Entry No. 290, Ex. 1 at 9). In 2015, 46.1 percent of arrestees were released on a surety bond, 5.1 percent on a cash bond, and the remaining 40.3 percent were detained until case disposition. In 2016, the figures were nearly identical: 43.4 percent released on a surety bond, 5.6 percent on a cash bond, and 40.1 percent detained until case disposition. Id. Virtually all misdemeanor arrestees detained until disposition have a secured bail amount set that, if paid, would result in the prompt release of the arrestee. See Pls. Ex. 10(c) at 8; (Docket Entry No. 290, Ex. 1 at 8).

The court credits the Hearing Officers’ testimony that they consider the Article *1097 17.15 factors in some way. But their impressions about how frequently certain case outcomes occur is not reliable and not worthy of greater weight than the data presented in the Pretrial Services Annual Report. The Hearing Officers’ testimony that they do not “know” whether imposing secured money bail will have the effect of detention in any given case, e.g., Hearing Tr. 4-1:141, 4-2:16, and their testimony that they do not intend that secured money bail have that effect, is not credible. Other record evidence, including the Pretrial Services public reports; the high number and percentage of misdemeanor defendants detained rather than released because they are subject to secured money bail at the scheduled amount; the high number and percentage whose bail is set by the schedule rather than by an individualized inquiry; the infrequency of deviations from imposing the scheduled bail amount on a secured basis; and the video recordings of probable cause hearings, which consistently show an indifference as to whether pretrial detention will result from setting secured bail, all weigh heavily in favor of finding little to no credibility in the Hearing Officers’ claims of careful case-by-case consideration under the Roberson order and the Article 17.15 factors.

This is not a personal criticism of any one or all of the Hearing Officers. To say that their job is difficult is a dramatic understatement. The sheer numbers of defendants the Hearing .Officers confront on a daily basis makes individual consideration extraordinarily difficult. The absence of counsel adds to the difficulty. The Hearing Officers clearly work steadily and hard. They see a difficult population—including both misdemeanor and felony defendants—every day and all day. It is unsurprising that a. system of virtually automatic adherence to a bail schedule has developed, given the large number of defendants, the small number of Hearing Officers, and the. limited time for hearings.

The record contains 2,300 recordings of misdemeanor probable cause hearings before the Hearing Officers. The recordings begin in March 2016—before the lawsuit was filed—and continue through early November 2016. Pis. Ex. 2. The court has reviewed many hours of foQtage. The results are consistent and support this court’s findings and conclusions. Two hearings are illustrative. The court chooses them not because they are extreme examples of any particular feature, but because they appear pretty ordinary. Neither hearing is procedurally unusual. The parties did not cite or play either one at the motion hearing. 44

*1098 D. M. was arrested early in the morning of August 24, 2016 and charged with possessing less than two ounces of marijuana. See Pis. Ex. 4(b), Working Database, His probable cause hearing was at 4:00 p.m. the same day. Id. The recording shows the following:

• The Hearing Officer finds probable cause and tells the defendant* ‘Tour bond is incorrect based on” his five prior felony and nine misdemeanor convictions. Pis. Ex. 3, August 24, 2016, 15.22 at 37:25.

• The defendant responds that he has only one prior felony conviction. The Hearing Officer spends the bulk of the unusually long four-and-a-half minute hearing thumbing through the défendant’s record arid counting convictions. The Hearing Officer counts as prior felony convictions two felony charges that were reduced to misdemeanor convictions but still does not arrive at five felony convictions. He tells the defendant, “Either way your bond was incorrectly set, so it’s now set at $5,000, which is what it should have been set at. [I’m] going to deny your personal bond based on all your priors.” Id.

• The defendant requests a personal bond because his fiancée is pregnant and he is the only income earner in the household. The Hearing Officer responds, “I take all that into consideration” but again points to the defendant’s prior convictions. The defendant points out that he .has never missed a court appearance for any of those prior arrests and convictions. The Hearing Officer cuts him off, stating, “That is one factor, the other factor is everything else.... Based on the nature of the offenses for which you were charged, I’m not going to consider you” for a personal bond. Id.

• The defendant confirms he will need a court-appointed lawyer. The Hearing Officer concludes that if the defendant would like a personal bond he can ask the County Judge for one in the morning at his first appearance. Id.

If the defendant had been able to pay a bondsmanV premium, he would have been released notwithstanding his criminal history. D.M. appeared before a County Judge the next day and pleaded guilty. He was released later that day. See Pls. Ex. 4(b), Working Database.

A. G. was arrested on October 1, 2016 at 9:30 p.m. for unlawfully wielding a five-inch knife. See id. His probable cause hearing was held the next afternoon. It is one of the more recent recordings in evidence. Id. The recording shows the following:

• The Hearing Officer finds probable cause and confirms the scheduled secured money bail amount of $2,500. Pls. Ex. 3, October 2, 2016, 12.16 at 27:39.

• The defendant confirms that he will need a court-appointed lawyer and tries to ask a question. The Hearing Officer cuts him off, stating, “Nobody who’s got the criminal history you have out of Flqrida is'going 'to get a pretrial [bond] from me, for fear of what would happen to the safety of the community.” The defendant again tries to speak. The Hearing Officer again cuts him off: “I have more people to consider than you in this, and the safety of the public is one of them.” The defendant tries a third time to speak, and again the Hearing Officer shouts over him, saying “You’re not going to be able to talk to me because I’m not letting you talk, because I’m. going by what I feel is best for the community,” Id.

• After a pause, the defendant quietly asks if he may speak. The Hearing *1099 Officer shouts “No!” The defendant pauses again and then states that his only criminal history is a 25-year-old matter in Florida and that he is nearly finished with his exams to become a medical professional. The Hearing Officer responds that “your 25 year ago tendencies seem to be revisiting me, and I am afeared for the people in the State of Texas.” Id.

• The Hearing Officer again confirms that the defendant will need a court-appointed attorney, then dismisses him. As the defendant leaves the room, the Hearing Officer quips to the Assistant District Attorney that it “makes me feel better” that the defendant is returning to detention. The Assistant District Attorney laughs. Id.

The defendant’s first appearance before a County Judge was held the next day but then reset for October 7, 2016. Pls.’ Ex. 4(b), Working Database. At the rescheduled hearing, after seven continuous days in detention, A.G. was released on an-unsecured personal bond. See id. His case remained pending at the time of the most recent data production from the County. There is no indication’that he has failed to appear or has been re-arrested since October 2016. See id.

The two recordings illustrate what many other recordings confirm. Hearing Officers treat the bail schedule, if not as binding, then as a nearly irrebuttable presumption in favor of applying secured money bail at the prescheduled amount. 45 Amounts that deviate from the schedule are.treated as “incorrect,” 46 and requests for a personal bond, if not denied outright, are deferred until the County Judge holds a later hearing. 47 Hearing Officers routinely adjust initial bail settings to conform to, not to deviate from, the bail schedule. Defendants who try to speak are commanded not to, shouted down, or ignored. 48

The Hearing Officers testified that they cannot let one factor—the inability to *1100 pay—control their bail determination. Healing Tr. 4-1:124, 171. But they frequently cite only one factor—criminal history—as controlling them decision to set secured money bail that the defendant clearly cannot pay. 49 And although the Hearing Officers testified that they do not “know” in any given case whether a defendant can pay secured money bail, they routinely set secured scheduled money bail amounts despite: (1) being informed of a defendant’s indigence on the Pretrial Services report; (2) being told of a defendant’s indigence by the defendant; (3) being aware that a defendant’s charge clearly relates to poverty (such as begging or sleeping at a bus stop); and (4) recording that a defendant needs court-appointed counsel because of indigence. 50 The evidence that this occurs is overwhelming. The Hearing Officer’s wisecrack that setting a $2,500 bond for reasons of community safety “makes me feel better” clearly shows intent to use secure money bail to detain that defendant indefinitely. 51

The court finds and concludes that in the typical case, Hearing Officers set se *1101 cured money bail as a condition, of detention operating only against those who are indigent and cannot pay the bail, rather than as a mechanism for pretrial release. In the vast majority of cases, the Hearing Officers use their discretion to consider the five Article 17.15 factors to almost automatically impose the prescheduled secured bail amounts, notwithstanding Pretrial Services recommendations to release defendants on unsecured personal bonds and notwithstanding clear evidence of indigence. Hearing Officers make these decisions in brief, uncounseled hearings at which the defendants are actively discouraged from speaking, and no reviewable findings are made on the record.

4. The First Appearance Before a County Judge

Before the most recent change to the County Rules of Court in February 2017, any “incarcerated person” who remained in detention after the probable cause hearing would be scheduled to appear before a County Judge “the next business day” after the probable cause hearing. At this first appearance before a County Judge, counsel was appointed if requested. Rules of Court, Rule 24.9. The plaintiffs offered unrebutted testimony that, although misdemeanor defendants were taken to the County Courthouse on the scheduled day, they usually did not appear in the courtroom before the County Judge unless they offered to plead guilty at that time. Hearing Tr. 2-1:59-61, 63; 3-1:8-9. Bail review was at the County Judge’s initiative, and done only in a minority of the eases. In some cases, the review was prompted by a Pretrial Services recommendation or by defense counsel. See Pls Ex. 10(c), 2015 Pretrial Services Annual Report at 15; Hearing Tr. 5:108; 7-2:56-61. One County Judge testified that in his experience as a former criminal defense attorney, seeking a bail reduction before a County Judge was formally available, but practically futile. Hearing Tr. 2-1:10. Defendants who did not plead guilty but wanted to contest their bail settings depended on court-appointed counsel filing a formal motion for bail review. That motion would not be considered until a later hearing, usually held one or two weeks later. Id. at 3-1:10-11. The only way to gain release earlier was to pay the bail or to plead guilty.

'The February 9, 2017 amendment took effect oh March 9, 2017. The amended County Rules of Court require “any arres-tee that is booked into the Harris County Jail” to be presented at a “Next Business Day Setting,” even if that arrestee is released from custody between booking and the next business day. Rules of Court, Rule 4.3.1. If the probable cause hearing has not been held by the Next Business Day Setting, the County Judge rather than the Hearing Officer will determine probable cause and set bail. Id. The amended Rules state that “[ajbsent a waiver by the defendant and defense counsel, the court will review conditions of release; bail amount set, and personal bond decision and modify if good cause exists to do so.” Id.

Judge Darrell Jordan, the presiding judge of County Criminal Court at Law No. 16, testified that in e-mail exchanges, some County Judges have objected that *1102 because the new Rule 4.3.1 is not based on the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, County Judges do not have to review bail at the Next-Business Day Setting. Hearing Tr, 3-1:98, 117. Whether County Judges do or do not review the bail that the Hearing Officers set, Judge Jordan testified that in his experience as a criminal defense attorney on many misdemeanor cases, seeking a bail review at the first appearance was futile because .County Judges “stick to. the bond schedule. That would be the answer. What does the bond schedule say?” Id. at 3-1:10.

Judge Jordan testified that he takes’ a different approach to bail from his fifteen County Judge colleagues. Id. at 3-1:16-17. The Hearing Officers and other County Judges who. testified agreed. Id. at 3-2:176-77; 4-1:113-16, 180-81; 5:62, 120. Judge Jordan testified that in his interpretation of the Roberson order and Article 17.15 factors, the first factor—that “the bail shall be sufficiently high to give reasonable assurance that the undertaking will be complied with”—means that a person who has the funds available for a secured money bail should post, security within his or, her financial means to assure appearance at trial. Id. at 3-1:62-63. The fourth factor—requiring consideration of ability to pay—means that bail should be set ’at an amount and on terms the defendant can meet to be released. That may mean a $2,000 secured bail if the defendant can afford the $200 commercial surety premium, and an unsecured personal bond if the defendant cannot pay the premium. Id. at 3-1:65-66. “Otherwise, I[ would be] keeping them in jail because they can’t afford the bond.” Id. at 3-1:66.

As for the nature of the offense and consideration of community safety, Judge Jordan testified that he reviews charging documents with the assigned Assistant District Attorney before the first appearance hearings. Id. at 3-1:66-67; For- cases that present troubling charges or circumstances, Judge Jordan has the defendants appear in his courtroom and engages them in a colloquy. Id. “I want to talk -to them and fully understand what is going on so then I can make a decision on what we should do with their bond.” Id. at 3-1:66. “But at-no time in my analysis do I say setting a money bond is going to make them a better person or make the victim safer because the person had $500.... Money does not make somebody safe.” Id. at 3-1:71. Instead, Judge Jordan testified that he orders additional, nonfinancial conditions of release on personal bond, such as GPS monitoring for those at risk of violating a protective order. Id. at 3-1:73-74.

Judge Jordan has experienced the Harris County misdemeanor pretrial justice system both as a lawyer representing defendants and as a County Judge ruling on defendants’ cases. He does not believe that the Texas Code or County Rules of Court are unconstitutional as written. He testified that judges can apply the rules in a constitutional manner, and that the way he applies them is constitutional. Id. at 3-1:87-88. But he also believes that outside of his jurisdiction over those assigned to County Court No. 16, the County engages in a widespread practice of detaining misdemeanor defendants before trial on secured bail amounts County personnel know the defendants cannot pay because they are indigent. Id. at 3-1:61. Judge Jordan testified that without an injunction from this 'court, that practice will continue. Id.

Testifying on behalf of- herself and County Judge Margaret Harris, Judge Paula Goodhart, the presiding judge of County Criminal Court at Law No. 1, testified that she believes. Judge Jordan “consider[s] one factor and one factor only, *1103 which is the ability to pay.” Id at 5:115, 120. She interprets the Roberson order and Article 17.15 to require her to “look at a person’s individual liberty and'weigh that with the risk to the community and the risk that they are not going to appear and consider it altogether with all of those factors and set a reasonable' and rational bond that we believe is going to secure their reappearance and it is going to minimize their risk to reoffend,” Id. at 5:116. She testified that “[a]fter going through the whole process, I have set a bond that I did not think it was likely that the person could make, not as an .instrument of oppression or with the intent to-detain, but because after considering all of the factors, that was the reasonable and rational non-excessive thing to do.” Id. at 3-1:121.

Judge Goodhart disagreed with Judge Jordan’s conclusions about the incentives resulting from the secured money bail system. She testified to her understanding that under Texas law, having a bond revoked for new criminal activity creates a financial incentive for those who post secured money bail to comply with the conditions of their release. Id. at 3-1:123. Judge Goodhart apparently did not know that Texas does not permit a financial forfeiture when a defendant released on bond commits a new offense. See Tex. Code Crim. Pro. art. 22.01-02 (permitting forfeiture with a right to collect the financial security only in cases of failure to appear). In fact, the re-arrest of a defendant during pretrial release guarantees that the bond will not be forfeited. Id. art. 22.13(5).

Judge Goodhart testified that no Harris County policymaker, so far as she is aware, has examined Harris County data to compare pretrial failure-to-appear rates or bond forfeiture rates between those released on secured or unsecured financial conditions. Hearing Tr. at 5:137-38. Her impression was confirmed by Director of Pretrial Services Kelvin Banks and the Hearing Officers. See id. at 3-2:146; 4-1:149-50, 162-63. Dr. Marie VanNostrand, the County’s consultant on pretrial reform, testified that Harris County may collect the data that would allow this study but has never undertaken such a study or compiled the data to do so. Id. at 6-1:111. Judge Goodhart testified on behalf of herself and another County Judge that even if she learned from such a study that secured money bail provides no financial incentive to comply with the conditions’ of release, it would not change her subjective belief that secured money bail is better for community safety than unsecured bail. Id. at 5:131.

The court finds and. concludes that the Harris County policymakers with final authority over the County’s bail system have no adequate or reasonable basis for their belief that for misdemeanor defendants, release on secured- money bail provides incentives for, or produces, better pretrial behavior than release on unsecured or nonfinancial conditions; The policymakers are apparently unaware of important facts about the bail-bond system in- Harris County, yet they have devised and implemented bail practices and customs, having the force of policy, with no inquiry into whether the bail policy is a reasonable way to achieve the goals of assuring appearance at trial' or law-abiding behavior before trial. In addition to the absence of any information about the relative performance of secured and unsecured conditions of release to achieve thesé goals, the policymakers have testified under oath that their policy would not change despite evidence showing that release on unsecured personal bonds or with no financial conditions is no less effective .than release on- secured money bail at achieving the goals of appearance at trial or avoidance of new criminal activity during pretrial release.

*1104 Dr. Demuth presented uneontroverted and reliable evidence that in 2015 and 2016, the County Judges changed the bond amount and type from that set by the Hearing Officers in fewer than 1 percent of misdemeanor cases. Pls. Ex. 4(d), Second Rebuttal Report at 10; see also Pls. Ex. 10(c), 2015 Pretrial Services Annual Report at 15. That is compelling evidence that, like the Hearing Officers, County Judges presiding over Court Nos. 1 through 15 are not making individualized bail assessments under either the Roberson Order or the Article 17.15 factors.

. The County’s rule change to require a bail review at a defendant’s first appearance within one business day of booking, rather than within one business day of the probable cause and bail-setting hearing, has been in effect only since March 9, 2017. See Rules of Court 4.3.1. The record evidence does not show whether this earlier bail review has had any effect. Mr. Bob Wessels, who served as court administrator for the County Criminal Courts at Law for decades, testified that the bail review is not a new change to the rules but a codification of prior consistent practice. Hearing Tr. 5:29. Judge Jordan credibly testified that some of his colleagues have refused to conduct bail reviews, even under the new rule. Id. at 3-1:98. Judge Jordan also testified that bail reviews are usually futile because the County Judges adhere to the bail schedule on a secured basis. Id. at 3-1:10. Assistant District Attorney JoAnne Musick testified that, before the rule change, County Judges typically presumed that a misdemeanor defendant was indigent and appointed counsel if the defendant was still detained at the first appearance. Id. at 2-1:60-61.. Only those who had posted bond to be released were made to submit an affidavit of indigence before counsel could be appointed. Id. That means that for years, under a consistent practice now codified in the County Rules of Court, the County Judges have presumed misdemeanor defendants to be indigent because they remained detained by their inability to pay a secured financial condition of release, yet in about 99 percent of the cases, the County Judges have neither adjusted the bail nor granted release on unsecured or nonfmancial conditions. There is no basis in the record to find or conclude that the rule change requiring bail review at the Next Business Day Setting has altered or will alter these practices.

5. Disposition of Misdemeanor Cases

Unless a district attorney declines a charge or a Hearing Officer finds no probable cause, the earliest opportunity to dispose of a misdemeanor case is at the defendant’s first appearance before a County Judge, if the defendant pleads guilty and is sentenced. 52 Ms. Musick testified based on her lengthy experience as a criminal defense attorney that many misdemeanor defendants “don’t really want to plead guilty, but sometimes they want to get out of jail, return to family, return to work, what have you. So they will inquire about a plea so that they can get out.” Hearing Tr. 2-1:65. Judge Jordan testified that in his experience, Assistant District Attorneys would make a plea offer in 85 or 90 percent of the misdemeanor cases at a defen *1105 dant’s first appearance. Id. at 3-1:14. Both testified that the typical sentence for those pleading guilty at a first appearance is either the time already served in pretrial detention, or some number of days that with a two-for-one or three-for-one credit for the time served would allow release within a day of the first appearance. Id. at 2-1:67; 3-1:12. Judge Goodhart testified that prosecutors sometimes threaten to seek sentencing enhancements for certain offenses to convince misdemeanor defendants to plead and receive a time-served sentence at their first appearances. Id. at. 6:114.

Another indication that misdemeanor defendants abandon valid defenses and plead guilty to obtain faster release than if they contested their charges is a report from the National Registry of Exonera-tions showing that Harris County has led the United States in the total number of criminal exonerations each of the last two years. Def. Ex. 110. Most of Harris County’s exonerations come from misdemeanor drug offenses that evidence samples conclusively prove the defendant did not commit. See id. But rather than wait for lab tests that may exonerate them, misdemeanor arrestees who cannot pay for release before their first appearances plead guilty in order to end their pretrial detention and be released. See id.; Pls. Ex. 13(a); 7(h) at 2.

Defendants who do not plead guilty at the first appearance have a hearing set, generally two or three weeks, later. Id. at 2-1:10. Defendants who cannot pay their bail during this time remain in pretrial detention. Id. at 2-1:10-11. Defendants released on bond typically have their hearings set much later. Dr. Demuth presented uncontroverted and reliable testimony that from 2015 to early 2017, for misdemeanor arrestees who did not bond out—40 percent of all misdemeanor arrestees—the median time between arrest and case disposition was 3.2 days. Of those, 72 percent resolved their cases within 7 days; 90 percent resolved their cases within 30 days. Pls. Ex. 4(d), Second Rebuttal Report at 4. Over the same period, for misdemeanor arrestees released on bond (either secured or unsecured)—60 percent of misdemeanor arrestees—the median time to disposition was 120 days. Of those, 5 percent resolved their cases within 7 days; 13 percent resolved their cases within 30 days. Id.

Dr. Demuth presented uncontroverted and reliable testimony, based on the County’s own data, that the likelihood of a conviction differs dramatically depending on whether a defendant is detained before trial. In 2016 and 2016, 84 percent of misdemeanor arrestees detained at case disposition pleaded guilty, while 49 percent of those released before disposition pleaded guilty. Id. at 4. Only 13 percent of those still detained at case disposition had their cases dismissed, and 2 percent received deferred adjudications. Id. For those released before case disposition, 32 percent had their cases dismissed and 12 percent received deferred adjudications. Id.; Pls. Ex. 4(b), First Rebuttal Report at 16-18. These figures are consistent with, and support, the plaintiffs’ theory that for misdemeanor defendants unable to pay secured money bail, Harris County maintains a “sentence first, conviction after” system that pressures misdemeanor defendants to plead guilty at or near their first appearances because that is the only way to secure timely release from detention. Hearing Tr. 6-2:172-73.

In one of the most sophisticated and rigorous studies of bail and pretrial detention in misdemeanor cases to date, 53 re *1106 searchers at the University of Pennsylvania examined hundreds of thousands of Harris County misdemeanor arrest cases. The results are presented in a peer-reviewed study forthcoming in the Stanford Law Review. Pls. Ex. 12(d), Paul Heaton et al, The Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention 69 Stan. L. Rev, (forthcoming) (July 2016) (“Heaton-Study”); Pls. Ex. 12(d)(i) (peer-review policy for empirical research). The Heaton Study analyzed the differences in case outcomes between misdemeanor defendants, who did not post bond within the seven days following the probable cause hearing, and those who did post bond within that period and were released. The researchers found that the still-detained defendants were 25 percent (14 percentage points) more likely to be convicted, and 43 percent (17 percentage points) more likely to be sentenced to jail than those who bonded out earlier. Id. at 4. Detained defendant? received sentences nine days longer on average, more than double the average sentence of similar, released defendants. Id. The researchers concluded that the fact of detention itself, rather than the. defendant’s charge, criminal - history, or other variables, causally affects these outcomes. Id . at 3-4.

The" findings of Dr. Demuth and of the Heaton Study are'supported by the record, casé law, and commentary. The case law and commentary recognizes that those released from pretrial detention are better able to consult with counsel and prepare a defense without hazarding- their' employment, housing, or family obligations. See, e.g., Brown, 338 P.3d at 1287 (“Congress attempted to remediate' the array of negative impacts experienced by defendants who were unable to pay for their pretrial release,. including the adverse effect on defendants’ ability to consult.with counsel and prepare a defense, the financial impacts on their families, a statistically less-favorable outcome at trial and sentencing, and the fiscal burden .that pretrial incarceration imposes on society at large.”) (citing 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2293, 2299); (see also Docket Entry No. 182 at 7; No. 272 at 9). Above all, they are free from the pressure to plead guilty as the only way to be released from detention in a reasonably short period, Ms. Musick credibly testified *1107 that many of her misdemeanor clients chose to abandon valid defenses by pleading guilty at the first appearance so they could get out of jail instead of remaining detained for the two or three weeks it would take even to raise those defenses— or their inability to pay secured bail—in court. Hearing Tr. 2-1:68-69. Judge Jordan credibly testified that it was common to have misdemeanor clients who professed their innocence and had valid defenses to nevertheless plead guilty in order to be released much earlier than if they sought an unsecured bond based on indigence or challenged the prosecution’s ease. Id. at 3-1:11-12.

The defendants note that every misdemeanor defendant who pleads guilty affirms under oath that he or she does so voluntarily. That is true. It is also true that the County Judges engage the misdemeanor defendant in a counseled colloquy to affirm that the.plea is made voluntarily. Id. at 2-1:83-84; 3-1:98-99; 5:112-13. But these arguments miss the point. The credible, reliable, and well-supported testimony of the witnesses and the statistical studies in the record overwhelmingly prove that thousands 'of misdemeanor defendants each year are voluntarily pleading guilty knowing that they are choosing a conviction with fast release over exercising their right to trial at the cost of prolonged detention. This Hobson’s choice is, the evidence shows, the predictable effect of imposing secured money bail on indigent misdemeanor defendants.

6.. The Use of Bail to Detain

The consistent testimony of the plaintiffs’ witnesses, including Assistant District Attorney Musick, Sheriff Gonzalez, and Judge Jordan, is that Harris County routinely detains misdemeanor defendants, who would be released if they could pay secured money bail, because they are unable to pay the amount needed for release. Hearing Tr. 2-1:68-69; 3-1:51-52, 61; 3-2:9; see also Pls. Ex. 7(h) ¶ 5; (Docket Entry No. 206). The consistent testimony of the Hearing Officers and other County Judges is that they do not detain misdemeanor defendants solely because they cannot pay but because the balance of state-law factors,' including the need to ensure future appearances and to protect community safety, require money bail that is secured and generally (in 90 percent or more of the cases) set at the scheduled bail amount, calculated básed on the charge and the defendant’s criminal history and no other factors. These requirements, the defendants testified, can and frequently do outweigh the misdemeanor defendant’s inability to pay the bail on a secured basis. Id. at 4-1:117-18, 123-25, 144-45, 168-69; 5:34, 58, 71-72; Def. Ex. 23. At the motion hearing, the parties agreed with the court’s characterization of this conflict as one between a but-for cause and' a proximate cause view of detention. Id. at 1:99— 100; 4-2:15-16. In the plaintiffs’ theory, thousands of defendants are detained but for their ability to pay secured money bail, (See, e.g., Docket Entry No. 143 at 15-17; No. 188 at 4-7). In the defendants’ view, secured money bail for many defendants is out of reach because of the defendants’ problematic criminal history, the serious nature of the charges, the need for mental health evaluations, or other fact

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