Tyree v. Boston Scientific Corp.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

(Daubert Motions)

JOSEPH R. GOODWIN, District Judge.

The following motions have been brought by the defendant, Boston Scientific Corporation (“BSC”): (1) Defendant’s Motion to Exclude Plaintiffs’ Experts’ Opinion that Polypropylene Mid-Urethral Slings Are Defective [Docket 227]; (2) Defendant’s Motion to Exclude the Opinions and Testimony of Michael Thomas Margol-is, M.D. [Docket 237](3) Defendant’s Motion to Exclude the Opinions and Testimony of Richard W. Trepeta, M.D. [Docket 235]; (4) Defendant’s Motion to Exclude the Opinions and Testimony of Jimmy W. Mays, Ph.D. and Samuel P. Gido, Ph.D. [Docket 221]; (5) Defendant’s Motion to Exclude the Opinions and Testimony of Peggy Pence, Ph.D., RAC, FRAPS [Docket 219]; (6) Defendant’s Motion to Exclude the Opinions and Testimony of Thomas H. Barker, Ph.D. [Docket 223]; (7) Defendant’s Motion to Exclude the Opinions and Testimony of Donald R. Ostergard, M.D. [Docket 217]; (8) Defendant’s Motion to Exclude the Opinions and Testimony of Vladimir Iakovlev, M.D. [Docket 225]; (9) Defendant’s Motion to Exclude the Opinions and Testimony of Jerry Blaivas, M.D. [Docket 239]; (10) Defendant’s Motion to Exclude the Opinions and Testimony of Alison Vredenburgh, Ph.D., CPE [Docket 241]; (11) Defendant’s Motion to Exclude the Opinions and Testimony of Bruce Allen Rosenzweig, M.D. [Docket 251]; (12) Defendant’s Motion to Exclude the Opinions of Christopher Walker, M.D. [Docket 247]; and (13) Defendant’s Motion to Strike Rebuttal Report of Dr. Abbas Shobeiri [Docket 400].

The following motions have been brought by the plaintiffs: (1) Plaintiffs’ Motion to Exclude the Testimony of Stephen H. Spiegelberg, Ph.D. [Docket 215]; (2) Plaintiffs Motion to Exclude the Testimony of Stephen F. Badylak, D.V.M., Ph. D., M.D. [Docket 213]; (3) Plaintiffs’ Motion to Exclude the Testimony of Gary L. Winn, Ph.D. [Docket 229]; (4) Plaintiffs’ Motion to Exclude or Limit Testimony of Christine Brauer, Ph.D. [Docket 231]; (5) Plaintiffs’ Motion to Limit the Testimony of Patrick Culligan, M.D. [Docket 233]; and (6) Plaintiffs’ Motion to Limit the Testimony of Lonny Green, M.D. [Docket 354],

For the reasons explained below, the defendant’s motion with respect to Plaintiffs’ Experts’ Opinion that Polypropylene Mid-Urethral Slings Are Defective [Docket 227] is DENIED. The defendant’s motion with respect to Dr. Margolis [Docket 237] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART and RESERVED IN PART. The defendant’s motion with respect to Dr. Trepeta [Docket 235] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The defendant’s motion with respect to Drs. Mays and Gido [Docket 221] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The defendant’s motion with respect to Dr. Pence [219] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The defendant’s motion with respect to Dr. Barker [Docket 223] is GRANTED. The defendant’s motion with respect to Dr. Ostergard [Docket 217] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The defendant’s motion with respect to Dr. Ia-kovlev [Docket 225] is GRANTED. The defendant’s motion with respect to Dr. *515 Blaivas [Docket 239] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The defendant’s motion with respect to Dr. Vredenburgh [Docket 241] is GRANTED. The defendant’s motion with respect to Dr. Rosenzweig [Docket 251] is DENIED. The defendant’s motion with respect to Dr. Walker [Docket 247] is DENIED. The defendant’s motion to strike the rebuttal report of Dr. Shobeiri [Docket 400] is GRANTED.

The plaintiffs’ motion with respect to Dr. Spiegelberg [Docket 215] is RESERVED IN PART and GRANTED IN PART. The plaintiffs’ motion with respect to Dr. Bady-lak [Docket 213] is RESERVED IN PART and GRANTED IN PART. The plaintiffs’ motion with respect to Dr. Winn [Docket 229] is GRANTED. The plaintiffs’ motion with respect to Dr. Brauer [Docket 231] is GRANTED. The plaintiffs’ motion with respect to Dr. Culligan [Docket 233] is GRANTED. The plaintiffs’ motion with respect to Dr. Green [Docket 354] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

I. Background

This consolidated case resides in one of seven MDLs assigned to me by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation concerning the use of transvaginal surgical mesh to treat pelvic organ prolapse and stress urinary incontinence. In the seven MDLs, there are over 60,000 cases currently pending, over 13,000 of which are in the Boston Scientific Corporation MDL, MDL 2326. In this particular case, the four consolidated plaintiffs were surgically implanted with the Obtryx Transobturator Mid-Urethral Sling System (“the Ob-tryx”), a mesh product manufactured by BSC. (See Pretrial Order # 78 [Docket 9], at 1-2). 1 All of the plaintiffs received their surgeries in West Virginia. They claim that as a result of implantation of the Obtryx, they have experienced “erosion, mesh contraction, infection, fistula, inflammation, scar tissue, organ perforation, dys-pareunia (pain during sexual intercourse), blood loss, neuropathic and other acute and chronic nerve damage and pain, pu-dendal nerve damage, pelvic floor damage, and chronic pelvic pain.” (Id. at 4 (quoting the master complaint)). The plaintiffs allege negligence; strict liability for design defect; strict liability for manufacturing defect; strict liability for failure to warn; breach of express warranty; breach of implied warranty; and punitive damages. (Id. at 2). The spouse of one plaintiff (Ms. Tyree) has also alleged loss of consortium. (Id.). The parties have retained experts to render opinions regarding the elements of these causes of action, and the instant motions involve the parties’ efforts to exclude or limit the experts’ opinions and testimony pursuant to Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993).

II. Legal Standard

Under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, expert testimony is admissible if the ex *516 pert is “qualified ... by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,” and if his testimony is (1) helpful to the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or determining a fact in issue; (2) “based upon sufficient facts or data”; and (3) “the product of reliable principles and methods” that (4) have been reliably applied “to the facts of the case.” Fed.R.Evid. 702. The U.S. Supreme Court established a two-part test to govern the admissibility of expert testimony under Rule 702 — the evidence is admitted if it “rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 . The proponent of expert testimony does not have the burden to “prove” anything to the court. Md. Cas. Co. v. Therm-O-Disc, Inc., 137 F.3d 780 , 783 (4th Cir.1998). He or she must, however, “come forward with evidence from which the court can determine that the proffered testimony is properly admissible.” Id.

The district court is the gatekeeper. 2 It is an important role: “[Ejxpert witnesses have the potential to be both powerful and quite misleading[;]” the court must “ensure that any and all scientific testimony ... is not only relevant, but reliable.” Cooper v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 259 F.3d 194, 199 (4th Cir.2001) (citing Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d 257, 261 (4th Cir.1999) and Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588, 595 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 ). In carrying out this role, I “need not determine that the proffered expert testimony is irrefutable or certainly correct” — “[a]s with all other admissible evidence, expert testimony is subject to testing by ‘vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof.’ ” United States v. Moreland, 437 F.3d 424, 431 (4th Cir.2006) (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 ); see also Md. Cas. Co., 137 F.3d at 783 (noting that “[a]ll Daubert demands is that the trial judge make a ‘preliminary assessment’ of whether the proffered testimony is both reliable ... and helpful”).

Daubert mentions specific factors to guide the court in making the overall reliability determinations that apply to expert evidence. These factors include (1) whether the particular scientific theory “can be (and has been) tested”; (2) whether the theory “has been subjected to peer review and publication”; (3) the “known or potential rate of error”; (4) the “existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique’s operation”; and (5) whether the technique has achieved “general acceptance” in the relevant scientific or expert community. United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 266 (4th Cir.2003) (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 ).

Despite these factors, “[t]he inquiry to be undertaken by the district court is ‘a flexible one’ focusing on the ‘principles and methodology’ employed by the expert, not on the conclusions reached.” Westberry, 178 F.3d at 261 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594-95 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 ); see also Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 150 , 119 S.Ct. 1167 , 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999) (“We agree with the Solicitor General that ‘[t]he factors identified in Daubert may or may not be pertinent in assessing reliability, depending on the nature of the issue, the expert’s particular expertise, and the subject of his testimony.’ ”) (citation omitted); see also Crisp, 324 F.3d at 266 (not *517 ing “that testing of reliability should be flexible and that Daubert’s five factors neither necessarily nor exclusively apply to every expert”).

With respect to relevancy, Daubert further explains:

Expert testimony which does not relate to any issue in the case is not relevant and, ergo, non-helpful. The consideration has been aptly described by Judge Becker as one of fit. Fit is not always obvious, and scientific validity for one purpose is not necessarily scientific validity for other, unrelated purposes.... Rule 702’s helpfulness standard requires a valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry as a precondition to admissibility.

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591-92 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Finally, in several of the instant Daubert motions, a specific scientific methodology comes into play, dealing with differential diagnoses or etiologies. “Differential diagnosis, or differential etiology, is a standard scientific technique of identifying the cause of a medical problem by eliminating the likely causes until the most probable one is isolated.” Westberry, 178 F.3d at 262 . The Fourth Circuit has stated that:

A reliable differential diagnosis typically, though not invariably, is performed after “physical examinations, the taking of medical histories, and the review of clinical tests, including laboratory tests,” and generally is accomplished by determining the possible causes for the patient’s symptoms and then eliminating each of these potential causes until reaching one that cannot be ruled out or determining which of those that cannot be excluded is the most likely.

Id. A reliable differential diagnosis passes scrutiny under Daubert . An unreliable differential diagnosis is another matter:

A differential diagnosis that fails to take serious account of other potential causes may be so lacking that it cannot provide a reliable basis for an opinion on causation. However, “[a] medical expert’s causation conclusion should not be excluded because he or she has failed to rule out every possible alternative cause of a plaintiff’s illness.” The alternative causes suggested by a defendant “affect the weight that the jury should give the expert’s testimony and not the admissibility of that testimony,” unless the expert can offer “no explanation for why she has concluded [an alternative cause offered by the opposing party] was not the sole cause.”

Id. at 265-66 (internal citations omitted).

Ultimately, the district court has broad discretion in determining whether to admit or exclude expert testimony, and the “the trial judge must have considerable leeway in deciding in a particular case how to go about determining whether particular expert testimony is reliable.” Cooper, 259 F.3d at 200 (quoting Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152 , 119 S.Ct. 1167 ).

Before I review these motions, I begin by addressing three arguments that apply to many of the parties’ Daubert objections. First, as I have maintained throughout these MDLs, I will not permit the parties to use experts to usurp the jury’s fact-finding function by allowing an expert to testify as to a party’s state of mind or on whether a party acted reasonably. See, e.g., Huskey v. Ethicon, Inc., 29 F.Supp.3d 691, 702-03 , 2:12-cv-05201, 2014 WL 3362264, at *3 (S.D.W.Va. July 8, 2014); Lewis, et al. v. Ethicon, Inc., 2:12-cv-4301, 2014 WL 186872 , at *6, *21 (S.D.W.Va. Jan. 15, 2014); In re C.R. Bard, Inc., 948 F.Supp.2d 589, 611, 629 (S.D.W.Va.2013). Although an expert may testify about his or her review of internal *518 corporate documents solely for the purpose of explaining the basis for his or her opinions — assuming the opinions are otherwise admissible — a party’s knowledge, state of mind, or other matters related to corporate conduct and ethics are not appropriate subjects of expert testimony because opinions on these matters will not assist the jury.

Second, “opinion testimony that states a legal standard or draws a legal conclusion by applying law to the facts is generally inadmissible.” United States v. McIver, 470 F.3d 550, 562 (4th Cir.2006). I have diligently applied this rule to previous expert testimony, and I continue to adhere to it in this case. I will not parse the expert reports and depositions of each expert in relation to these same objections. I trust that able counsel in this matter will tailor expert testimony at trial accordingly.

Last, with respect to the arguments that certain experts’ testimony is litigation driven, I note that an expert’s formulation of his or her opinion for the purposes of litigation does not, by itself, justify that expert’s exclusion. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. (“Daubert II ”), 43 F.3d 1311 , 1317 (9th Cir.1995) (“That an expert testifies for money does not necessarily cast doubt on the reliability of his testimony, as few experts appear in court merely as an eleemosynary gesture.”). This concern, however, does have a role in applying Daubert. See Hoffman v. Monsanto Co., No. 2:05-CV-00418, 2007 WL 2984692 , at *3 (S.D.W.Va. Oct. 11, 2007) (considering in the Daubert analysis “[w]hether experts are proposing to testify about matters growing naturally and directly out of research they have conducted independent of the litigation, or whether they have developed their opinions expressly for purposes of testifying” (quoting Fed.R.Evid. 702 advisory committee’s note)). In sum, I will not exclude an expert on the sole basis that the opinion arose during litigation, so long as it is otherwise reliable. But I will consider the independence of an expert’s testimony as evidence that his “research comports with the dictates of good science.” Daubert II, 43 F.3d at 1317. Having addressed these universal objections, I now turn to BSC’s Daubert motions.

III. BSC’s Daubert Motions

In this case, BSC seeks to limit or exclude certain opinion testimony of Dr. Michael Thomas Margolis; Dr. Richard W. Trepeta; Drs. Jimmy W. Mays and Samuel P. Gido; Dr. Peggy Pence; Dr. Thomas H. Barker; Dr. Donald R. Ostergard; Dr. Vladimir Iakovlev; Dr. Jerry Blaivas; Dr. Alison Vredenburgh; Dr. Bruce Allen Rosenzweig; Dr. Christopher Walker; and Dr. Abbas Shobeiri. BSC also seeks to preclude the plaintiffs’ experts from opining on the alleged defects of polypropylene mid-urethral slings.

A. Motion to Exclude Plaintiffs’ Experts’ Opinion that Polypropylene Mid-Urethral Slings are Defective

BSC moves to preclude any of plaintiffs’ experts from opining that polypropylene mid-urethral slings are defective. BSC argues that this opinion should be excluded because it “has not been tested, is not based on published-peer-reviewed literature, and is not generally accepted in the relevant medical and scientific communities.” (BSC’s Mem. of Law in Support of its Mot. to Exclude Pls.’ Experts’ Op. That Polypropylene Mid-Urethral Slings Are Defective [Docket 228], at 2-3). The plaintiffs in Sanchez presented the same arguments. See Sanchez, et al. v. Boston Scientific Corp., No. 2:12-cv-05762, 2014 WL 4851989 , at *4-5 (S.D.W.Va. September 29, 2014). I ADOPT my reasoning in Sanchez:

*519 Rule 702, by its plain terms, contemplates Daubert challenges directed at the opinions of specific experts, not the opinions of a collection of experts. While these experts may have come to similar conclusions, it is not the conclusions that the court must assess, but the reliability of the methods and procedures underpinning those conclusions. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595 [ 113 S.Ct. 2786 ] (“The focus, of course, must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.”). Two experts may come to a similar conclusion, but one or both experts’ methodology in reaching that conclusion may be unreliable. Rule 702 directs the court to determine whether an expert is qualified, whether his or her opinions are the product of reliable methodology, and whether the opinions will be helpful to the jury. See Fed.R.Evid. 702. I can only conduct the required Daubert analysis on an individualized basis.

Id. at *5. Therefore, I DENY BSC’s motion on the grounds explained in Sanchez.

B. Motion to Exclude the Opinions and Testimony of Michael Thomas Margolis, M.D. 3 , 4

BSC moves to exclude the opinions and testimony of Michael Thomas Margolis, M.D. Dr. Margolis is a pelvic floor surgeon and urogynecologist. He seeks to offer several opinions regarding polypropylene mesh slings, alternative procedures, and complications associated with mesh products. BSC argues that Dr. Margolis’s opinions are unreliable because he failed to consider scientific literature contrary to his opinions and failed to provide any scientific basis for other opinions. (See Def. BSC’s Mem. of Law in Supp. of Its Mot. to Exclude the Ops. and Test, of Michael Thomas Margolis, M.D. (“BSC’s Mem. re: Margolis”) [Docket 238], at 2). BSC also contends that Dr. Margolis’s specific causation opinions as to Ms. Tyree, Ms. Moore, and Ms. Campbell should be excluded because “he has not reliably applied his methodology to the facts of the cases” and did not perform a proper differential diagnosis. (Id.). In addition, BSC contends that Dr. Margolis’s opinions “either (1) constitute legal opinions, (2) fall outside the scope of his expertise, or (3) consist of speculation regarding Boston Scientific’s knowledge, intent and/or state of mind.” (Id.). Finally, BSC argues that Dr. Mar-golis seeks to offer opinions that were not disclosed in his expert report. (Id.).

I have previously reviewed the opinion testimony of Dr. Margolis under Daubert. See Sanchez, et al. v. Boston Scientific Corp., No. 2:12-cv-05762, 2014 WL 4851989 , at *10-19 (S.D.W.Va. Sept. 29, 2014). The parties in this case assert arguments on the admissibility of Dr. Margolis’s expert opinion that I addressed in Sanchez. To the extent that there are *520 differences in fact or exhibits, the court does not find them sufficiently material to this case. Thus, I ADOPT my prior ruling on Dr. Margolis as follows and thereby GRANT IN PART, DENY IN PART, and RESERVE IN PART BSC’s motion. I will address additional arguments raised by the parties in this case below.

1. BSC Argues That Dr. Margolis Failed to Consider Contrary Scientific Studies in Forming His Opinions

BSC argues that Dr. Margolis failed to consider scientific studies that were contrary to his opinions without a scientific basis for doing so.

An expert’s opinion may be unreliable if he fails to account for contrary scientific literature and instead “selectively [chooses] his support from the scientific landscape.” In re Rezulin Products Liab. Litig., 369 F.Supp.2d 398, 425 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (quotations omitted). “[I]f the relevant scientific literature contains evidence tending to refute the expert’s theory and the expert does not acknowledge or account for that evidence, the expert’s opinion is unreliable.” Id.; see also Abarca v. Franklin Cnty. Water Dist., 761 F.Supp.2d 1007 , 1066 n. 60 (E.D.Cal.2011) (“A scientist might well pick data from many different sources to serve as circumstantial evidence for a particular hypothesis, but a reliable expert would not ignore contrary data, misstate the findings of others, make sweeping statements without support, and cite papers that do not provide the support asserted.” (quotations omitted)); Rimbert v. Eli Lilly & Co., CIV 06-0874 JCH/LFG, 2009 WL 2208570 , at *14 n. 19 (D.N.M. July 21, 2009) aff'd, 647 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir.2011) (“[A]n expert who chooses to completely ignore significant contrary epidemiological evidence in favor of focusing solely on non-epidemiological studies that support her conclusion engages in a methodology that courts find unreliable.”).

a. Opinion that Polypropylene Mid-Urethral Slings Are Not Safe and Effective for SUI

First, BSC contends that Dr. Mar-golis’s opinion that polypropylene mid-urethral slings are not safe and effective for the treatment of SUI is unreliable because he ignored peer-reviewed literature indicating otherwise. I addressed this argument in Sanchez:

BSC’s argument focuses on Dr. Margol-is’s testimony regarding the Nilsson seventeen-year follow-up study, which supports the conclusion that polypropylene slings are safe and effective. (See Margolis Dep. [Docket 132-2], at 193:5— 20). Dr. Margolis rejected the Nilsson study without explaining a scientific basis for doing so. Instead, he merely indicated that he had “serious questions about the bias, the potential for bias and also the — the data in this article” but would not elaborate further:

Q: You believe that this particular study is — is not reliable; is that your opinion?

A: I question the reliability.

Q: And you won’t tell me why?

A: I question it, and that’s all I can say.

Q: So what you’re telling the judge is I am dismissing this paper and not considering it rehable, but I’m not going to tell you why?

A: Sure. I don’t have to tell you why I don’t consider something to be authoritative. I mean, I don’t consider that to be a valid study. I have concerns about it. I have a right to hold that opinion. And I do hold that opinion.

*521 Q: All right. Are there and—

A: I don’t consider it authoritative and I consider it potentially flawed and potentially biased. That’s my opinion. Right or' wrong, that’s my opinion.

(Id. at 196:1-3, 16-20; 199:10-22).

Sanchez, 2014 WL 4851989 , at *12. I ADOPT this reasoning here and find his method to be unreliable. Therefore, this opinion is EXCLUDED.

b. Opinion Regarding the Complication Rates of Pain in Women with Polgpropglene Mesh and Slings

BSC also argues that Dr. Margolis did not consider contrary studies showing lower complication rates of pain in women with polypropylene slings. In Sanchez, I cited to Dr. Margolis’s deposition testimony, which reveals that he gives no scientific basis for disagreeing with these studies:

Q: Would you agree that there are studies that show that the rates of pain with polypropylene slings are in the low single digits?

A: I — there áre studies.

Q: And do you discount those studies?

A: I disagree with those studies.

Q: And why?

A: Because that’s not what I have seen, read, studied, observed, and that’s not biologically plausible.

([Margolis Dep. [Docket 132-2],] at 239:2-13). Without further explanation for his disagreement with these studies, Dr. Margolis’s method is unreliable.

Sanchez, 2014 WL 4851989 , at *13. I ADOPT this reasoning here. His opinion is EXCLUDED.

c. Opinions Regarding General Complication Rates in Women with Polypropylene Mesh

BSC also challenges Dr. Mar-golis’s general opinions regarding high complication rates in women with polypropylene mesh products. In Sanchez , I cited to Dr. Margolis’s deposition testimony, where he explains his belief that studies indicating low single digit complication rates are not accurate because complications are underreported and data is possibly fabricated. See Sanchez, 2014 WL 4851989 , at *13. I also find that Dr. Margolis’s method of “[g]iv[ing] the benefit of the doubt to the patient” is unreliable:

Dr. Margolis explains that, when forming his opinion about the complication rates of a medical procedure, he “give[s] the benefit of the doubt to the patient.” ([Margolis Dep. [Docket 132-2],] at 259:7-9). In other words, he “assume[s] the worst-case scenario” and errs on the side of opining as to a higher complication rate to better protect a patient. (Id. at 259:11-259:23). Dr. Margolis eventually admits that he has been evaluating the literature and forming his opinions for this case according to that principle as well. (See id. at 259:20-260:14). “[G]iv[ing] the benefit of the doubt to the patient” is not a scientific basis for determining the complication rates associated with a mesh device. (Id. at 259:8-9).

Sanchez, 2014 WL 4851989 , at *14. I ADOPT this reasoning here. Dr. Margol-is’s opinions as to this matter are EXCLUDED.

2. BSC Argues that Dr. Margolis Failed to Provide Any Scientific Basis For His Other Opinions

BSC next argues that Dr. Margolis failed to offer any scientific basis for his *522 other opinions and based them solely on his experience.

a. Opinion Concerning the Lack of Sound Scientific Evidence Supporting the Clinical Benefits of Polypro-pglene Mesh in SUI

BSC challenges the reliability of Dr. Margolis’s opinions concerning a lack of sound scientific evidence supporting the use of polypropylene mesh in treating SUI. (See BSC’s Mem. re: Margolis [Docket 238], at 10-11). BSC points to Dr. Margolis’s deposition testimony where he admits that there, in fact, are studies supporting the use of polypropylene in SUI. I addressed this argument in Sanchez :

Inconsistent statements of a witness may be addressed on cross-examination. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596 [ 113 S.Ct. 2786 ] (“Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.”); In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 749 (3d Cir.1994) (“[Evaluating the reliability of scientific methodologies and data does not generally involve assessing the truthfulness of the expert witnesses ... ”). However, here, Dr. Margolis’s inconsistencies seem to directly shed light on the unreliability of his method. Even if Dr. Mar-golis is stating that there is a lack of credible evidence, as the plaintiffs argue, it is still unclear why Dr. Margolis believes these studies lack credibility. As a result, Dr. Margolis’s opinions are rendered untrustworthy and unreliable.

Sanchez, 2014 WL 4851989 , at *14. I ADOPT this reasoning here. Therefore, his opinions as to this matter are EXCLUDED.

b. Opinion that the Burch Procedure is More Effective than Polypropylene Mesh Slings

BSC challenges Dr. Margolis’s opinion that the Burch procedure is more effective than polypropylene slings. BSC argues that this opinion is unreliable because Dr. Margolis could not identify direct comparison studies of the Burch procedure and the use of slings in his deposition. (See BSC’s Mem. re: Margolis [Docket 238], at 11). In Sanchez , I nevertheless found his opinion to be reliable because his opinion was founded in scientific literature:

Dr. Margolis cited in his report several scientific, peer-reviewed sources showing that the Burch procedure has high success rates. (See Margolis Report [Docket 58-1], at 9 n. 6 (citing J.W. Ross, Post Hysterectomy Total Vaginal Vault Prolapse Repaired Laparoscopi-cally.)) Presented at 2nd World Symposium on Laparoscopic Hysterectomy, American Association of Gynecologic La-paroscopists, New Orleans, LA (Apr. 7-9, 1995) (reporting 93% success rate for laparoscopic Burch and 90% for open Burch in the treatment of SUI); Romano S. Bustan et al., Burch Laparoscopic Procedure for Repairing Proven Stress Incontinence&emdash;Report of 32 Cases, Ha-refuah 139 (9-10), 350-2, 407 (2000) (reporting 97% cure rate); E.G. Jacome et al., Laparoscopic Burch Urethropexy in a Private Clinical Practice, J. Am. Assoc. Gynecol. Laparosc. 6(1): 39^14 (1999) (reporting cure rate of 94% for laparoscopic Burch); R.D. Moore et ah, Laparoscopic Burch Colposuspension for Recurrent Stress Urinary Incontinence, Jourdan of the Am. Assoc, of Gyneco. Laparasc. 8, no. 8:389-92 (2001) (reporting 90% objective cure rate in patients having repeat Burch procedure laparoscopically); Todd R. Jenkins and C.Y. Liu, Laparoscopic Burch Colposus- *523 pension, 4 Current Opinion in Obstetrics & Gynee. 314, 314-18 (2007) (literature review noting a finding of cure rates between 76% to 96% for laparoscopic Burch procedures). In addition, Dr. Margolis testified that the Burch procedure success rates reported in the data are higher than the rates for the polypropylene sling. (See Margolis Dep. [Docket 132-1], at 136:12-16).

Sanchez, 2014 WL 4851989 , at *15. I ADOPT this reasoning here and find his opinion reliable.

Also, unlike my ruling in Sanchez , I find Dr. Margolis’s opinion relevant in this case. Sanchez dealt with the Pinnacle device for the treatment of POP, and, since Dr. Margolis opined about the Burch procedure and polypropylene mesh slings in the treatment of SUI, I found that his opinion was irrelevant to Ms. Sanchez’s claims. (See id.). However, the product at issue in this case is the Obtryx, which is a sling that treats SUI. As a result, Dr. Margolis’s opinion that the Burch procedure is more effective than polypropylene mesh slings is relevant here. Therefore, I DENY BSC’s motion with respect to this matter.

c. Opinion that Xenform Slings are More Effective than Polypropylene Slings

BSC challenges Dr. Margolis’s opinion that Xenform slings are more effective than polypropylene slings in the treatment of SUI. BSC’s argument focuses on Dr. Margolis’s comparison of the different complication rates associated with Xenform slings versus polypropylene slings and his failure to identify studies involving Xenform slings. (See BSC’s Mem. re: Margolis [Docket 238], at 12). I addressed these arguments in Sanchez :

Although Dr. Margolis has experience in this area, his method of comparing the complication rates of Xenform and polypropylene slings is problematic. In his deposition, Dr. Margolis explained that the 4% complication rate for Xenform slings is, in fact, “the complication rate that I understand all surgeons have when they take any patient into an operating room, whether it’s vaginal surgery, abdominal surgery, bladder surgery, brain surgery, or toe surgery.” (Mar-golis Dep., [Docket 132-1], at 122:18-24). His reasoning as to why Xenform has a lower complication rate than polypropylene slings is simply because Xenform uses no polypropylene mesh and, thus, has no mesh-related complications. (See id. at 123:22-124:11). This logic is not scientific. Dr. Margolis’s conclusion that Xenform does not have mesh-related complications because it is not made from mesh could be reached by a jury without expert testimony.

Moreover, Dr. Margolis cannot cite a single study involving use of Xenform slings to treat SUI. When asked if he could point to a study, Dr. Margolis responded “I am not prepared to present any studies to you today. I don’t know any off the top of my head.” (Id. at 133:14-19). When asked if he had seen any studies, Dr. Margolis testified “I’m sure I have. I don’t have any names for you today.” (Id. at 133:20-24). Without a scientific basis, Dr. Mar-golis’s method is unreliable.

Sanchez, 2014 WL 4851989 , at *16. I ADOPT this reasoning here. Therefore, his opinion regarding Xenform slings is EXCLUDED.

d. Opinion that the Infection Rate of Polypropylene Mesh is Up to 100%

BSC next challenges Dr. Margol-is’s opinion that the infection rate of polypropylene mesh is up to 100%. (See BSC’s *524 Mem. re: Margolis [Docket 238], at 12). As in Sanchez , BSC points to a slide presentation that Dr. Margolis has given which cites a study finding infection rates of 0% to 8%. (See id.). I addressed this issue in Sanchez :

Dr. Margolis’s inconsistent presentation does not automatically render his method unreliable. In his report, Dr. Mar-golis does cite to scientific studies to support his opinion. (See Margolis Report [Docket 58-1], at 16) (describing the Vollebregt study finding 83.6% of implants contained bacteria during surgical implantation, the Boulanger study finding 100% of mesh explants removed in the study due to complications contain bacteria, the Shah and Badlani study finding infection in mesh patients).

However, as BSC points out, the study which Dr. Margolis cites to support his 100% figure is not directly applicable. The Boulanger study did not find that 100% of the mesh systems explanted for the study were infected; the study found that 100% of the mesh systems were contaminated with bacteria. (See Margolis Report [Docket 58-1], at 16; Boulanger et al., Bacteriological Analysis of Meshes Removed for Complications After Surgical Management of Urinary Incontinence or Pelvic Organ Prolapse, 19 Int’l Urogynecol J. 827, 827 (2008) [Docket 58-5]). The authors of the Boulanger study are not certain that bacteria contamination leads to infection. (See Boulanger, supra, at 827, 830) (stating that the “exact role” of bacterial contamination “is not yet clear” and “must be explored by other experimental studies”). They even write that “infection is a rare complication of retropu-bic mid-urethral slings (0.7% of cases)” and that their “findings concur with previously published data” on this subject. (Boulanger, supra, at 830). The Boulanger study does not support the opinion that there is a 100% infection rate in women who undergo mesh implantation surgery. Therefore, Dr. Margolis’s methodology of basing his opinion on this study is unreliable.

Sanchez, 2014 WL 4851989 , at *17. I ADOPT this reasoning here. Therefore, his opinion as to this matter is EXCLUDED.

e. Opinion that the Complication Rate of Urethral Obstruction is Greater than Ten Percent with Polyproylene Mid-Urethral Slings

BSC challenges Dr. Margolis’s opinion that the complication rate of urethral obstruction is greater than ten percent. (See BSC’s Mem. re: Margolis [Docket 238], at 13). As in Sanchez , BSC supports its argument by quoting Dr. Margolis’s deposition testimony:

Q: ... [A]re you offering an opinion as to how frequently shrinkage of a polypropylene midurethral sling chokes off the vagina as a result of shrinkage?

A: Yes.

Q: How often?

A: Greater than ten percent.

Q: And is there a study that you’re relying upon for that?

A: I’m looking. And I’m not finding it right now. So I don’t have a study for you at this time.

(Margolis Dep. [Docket 237-3], at 262:6-16). The plaintiffs in Sanchez did not respond to this argument, and I found this opinion to be unreliable. See Sanchez, 2014 WL 4851989 , at *17. In this case, the plaintiffs in response cite to Dr. Margolis’s deposition testimony regarding mesh shrinkage and studies concerning mesh shrinkage to demonstrate that Dr. Margol-is’s opinion is, in fact, reliable. (See Pis.’ *525 Resp. in Opp’n to BSC’s Mot. to Exclude the Opinions & Testimony of Michael Thomas Margolis, M.D. (“Pis. Resp. re: Margolis”) [Docket 283], at 13-15).

However, the deposition testimony cited by the plaintiffs does not provide scientific support for Dr. Margolis’s opinion. It only references studies that report a variety of mesh shrinkage rates, without any support for his opinion that slings cause urethral obstruction in 10% of the cases. (See id.). For the reasons stated above and in Sanchez , I find Dr. Margolis’s opinion on this matter to be unreliable and, therefore, EXCLUDED.

f. Opinion on the Percentage or Number of BSC Products Dr.

Margolis Has Removed

BSC challenges Dr. Margolis’s opinion on the percentage or number of BSC products that he has removed. (See BSC’s Mem. re: Margolis [Docket 238], at 13). I agreed with BSC in Sanchez on this point:

Dr. Margolis testified that he has removed approximately 300 polypropylene mesh and sling products “throughout the last 15 or so years” and gives his “best guess” that 10% to 15% of those were Boston Scientific. (Margolis Dep. [Docket 132-1], at 74:23-76:1). Dr. Margolis explained that “[t]he exact numbers of each [product] I don’t keep track of.” (Id. at 74:11-19). When asked how he arrived at that 10% to 15% figure for Boston Scientific products, Dr. Margolis testified that these percentages are just to his “best recollection”:

Q: Have you tried to do a system— did you go back and try to do some kind of systematic count, or are you just doing that from recollection in terms of the percentage of Boston Scientific products?

A: Best recollection.

(Id. at 76:13-18). Dr. Margolis testified that he cannot identify the mesh brand by sight after explantation, and he “tr[ies] to get the operative records from the implant” with the product manufacturing information but does not know how often he receives these records for his patients. (Id. at 76:2-9, 77:14-78:2). As a result, BSC argues that Dr. Mar-golis’s opinion as to the number or percentage of BSC products he has removed is unreliable ...

Without a reliable basis, Dr. Margolis’s opinions may be erroneous. See Lewis, et al. v. Ethicon, Inc., 2:12-cv-4301, 2014 WL 186872 , at *8 (S.D.W.Va. Jan. 15, 2014) (excluding expert’s “analyses of the mesh implants” because they were not “controlled for error or bias”). Therefore, his opinions are EXCLUDED.

Sanchez, 2014 WL 4851989 , at *18. I ADOPT this reasoning here. His opinions as to this matter are EXCLUDED.

g. Plaintiffs’ Argument Regarding the Daubert Analysis of Dr. Margolis in Lewis

The plaintiffs in this case make an additional argument regarding Dr. Margolis’s expert opinions. The plaintiffs contend that “this Court has already decided that Dr. Margolis’ methodology and qualifications are sufficient to defeat challenges under Daubert and Rule 702” in Lewis and that, therefore, his testimony should be admitted in this case. (See Pls. Resp. re: Margolis [Docket 283], at 6 (citing Lewis v. Ethicon, Inc., No. 2:12-cv-04301, 2014 WL 186872 , at *15-17) (S.D.W.Va. Jan. 15, 2014)).

However, Lewis was a different case involving a different plaintiff, a different defendant, and a different product. Also, in Lewis , Dr. Margolis submitted a different expert report which included expert *526 opinions specific to the plaintiff in Lewis . As a result, I reject this argument.

h. Plaintiffs’ Argument Regarding Dr. Margolis’s Experience and Kumho Tire

Next, the plaintiffs in this case make an additional argument in response to BSC’s contention that Dr. Margolis failed to provide any scientific basis for some of his opinions. (BSC’s Mem. re: Margolis [Docket 288], at 2). The plaintiffs argue that Dr. Margolis’s experience alone is enough basis for his opinions. Several times, the plaintiffs quote the Supreme Court in Kumho Tire stating “an expert might draw a conclusion from ... extensive and specialized experience.” (Pis. Resp. re: Margolis [Docket 288], at 2, 9, 12, 14, 16 (citing Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 156 , 119 S.Ct. 1167 , 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999))).

However, “[proposed testimony must be supported by appropriate validation — i.e., ‘good grounds’ based on what is known.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 . Dr. Margolis writes that he “considered the scientific literature” in forming his opinions, (see Margolis Report [Docket 237-1], at 5), yet, as I discuss in Sanchez , he is unable to provide scientific support for some of his opinions. See Sanchez, 2014 WL 4851989 , at *14-18. Even though Dr. Margolis has experience, he must still base his opinions on a reliable, scientific method. (See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 (“[I]n order to qualify as ‘scientific knowledge,’ an inference or assertion must be derived by the scientific method.”)). The plaintiffs’ argument is unavailing.

3.Specific Causation Opinions as to Ms. Campbell, Ms. Moore, and Ms. Tyree

BSC argues that Dr. Margolis’s specific causation opinions as to Ms. Campbell, Ms. Moore, and Ms. Tyree should be excluded as unreliable. In particular, BSC makes the following arguments: (1) Dr. Margol-is’s specific causation opinions should be excluded because his general causation opinions are unreliable; (2) Dr. Margolis did not perform a proper differential diagnosis in regards to Ms. Campbell, Ms. Moore, and Ms. Tyree; (3) Dr. Margolis inconsistently applied his methodology in evaluating the plaintiffs; and (4) Dr. Mar-golis’s opinions regarding the plaintiffs’ complications are unreliable. (BSC’s Mem. re: Margolis [Docket 238], at 14-18).

Ms. Moore is no longer a plaintiff in this case. Therefore, BSC’s motion as to Dr. Margolis’s opinions related to Ms. Moore is DENIED AS MOOT. As in Sanchez , I RESERVE my ruling on Dr. Margolis’s remaining specific causation opinions until trial.

4. BSC Argues that Dr. Margolis Offers Opinions Outside of His Area of Expertise

BSC argues that several of Dr. Margol-is’s opinions should be excluded because they are outside his area of expertise. (See BSC Mem. re: Margolis [Docket 238], at 19). In particular, BSC challenges Dr. Margolis’s opinions as to: “biomaterials, adequate pore size, adequate weight of polypropylene, polypropylene degradation, biocompatibility of polypropylene, medical device design and development, and marketing.” (Id. (internal citations omitted)). As in Sanchez , the plaintiffs conceded that Dr. Margolis will not be offering these opinions at trial. (See Pls.’ Resp. re: Margolis [Docket 283], at 19). Therefore, this aspect of BSC’s motion is DENIED AS MOOT.

5. Impermissible Expert Opinions As To BSC’s State of Mind

BSC also argues that Dr. Margolis seeks to offer testimony as to BSC’s state of mind, knowledge, and intent during prod *527 uct development. As I explained in Sanchez , expert testimony about a defendant company’s state of mind is impermissible. In Lewis , I excluded state of mind testimony of Dr. Margolis because “he is not qualified ... to opine on Ethicon’s state of mind or knowledge.” Lewis, 2014 WL 186872 , at *15. The plaintiffs concede that Dr. Margolis will not be offering these opinions at trial. (See Pls.’ Resp. re: Margolis [Docket 283], at 19). Therefore, this aspect of BSC’s motion is DENIED AS MOOT.

6. Opinions Offered by Dr. Margolis That Were Not Disclosed in His Expert Report

BSC argues that “Dr. Margolis testified to numerous opinions during his most recent depositions that he did not disclose in his Rule 26 expert report.” (BSC’s Mem. re: Margolis [Docket 238], at 20). However, BSC only points to his opinion on banding and his opinion that Ms. Campbell has chronic pelvic pain. (See id.) “Under Rule 26, expert reports must contain ‘a complete statement of all opinions the witness will express and the basis and reasons for them.’ ” Lewis, No. 2:12-cv-4301, 2014 WL 186872 , at *17 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(2)(B)(i)).

In regards to banding, Dr. Margolis does mention banding in his case-specific report for Ms. Tyree. (See History and Physical re: Jacquelyn Tyree in Margolis Report [Docket 237-1], at App. D). Therefore, although I reserve my ruling on Dr. Margolis’s remaining specific causation opinions until trial, I FIND that his banding opinions as to Ms. Tyree should not be excluded under BSC’s Rule 26 reasoning here.

However, Dr. Margolis admits that he did not include in his report his opinion that Ms. Campbell has chronic pelvic pain:

Q: In Ms. Tyree’s case, you stated in your impression/plan that she had chronic pelvic pain. You make no such reference here. Does that mean that you — your opinion is that in Ms. Campbell’s case, she does not have chronic pelvic pain related to her sling?

A: No.

Q: Why did you not include it?

A: Error on my part. Failure to include that in there. It was a typo. My mistake.

(Margolis Dep. II [Docket 237-5], at 255:4-16) (objections omitted). However, according to Dr. Margolis’s report on Ms. Campbell, her vaginal exam revealed that, “Palpation of the obturator foramen bilaterally through the vaginal wall does reproduce her pain.” (See History and Physical re: Carol Campbell in Margolis Report [Docket 237-1], at App. D). Although I reserve my ruling on Dr. Margolis’s remaining specific causation opinions until trial, I FIND that his opinion that Ms. Campbell has chronic pelvic pain should not be excluded under BSC’s Rule 26 argument.

Therefore, for the reasons stated above and in Sanchez , I GRANT IN PART and DENY IN PART and RESERVE IN PART BSC’s Motion to Exclude the Opinions and Testimony of Michael Thomas Margolis, M.D. See Sanchez, 2014 WL 4851989 , at *10-19.

C. Motion to Exclude the Opinions and Testimony of Richard W. Trepeta, M.D.

In this case, the plaintiffs offer Dr. Trepeta to testify as an expert witness on the general pathology of vaginal mesh implantation (see generally Trepeta General Report [Docket 235-1]) and on the specific pathology of Plaintiff Jeanie Blankenship (see generally Trepeta Specific Report [Docket 235-2]). Among other things, Dr. *528 Trepeta is a board-certified pathologist and a Fellow with the College of American Pathologists and the International Society for the Study of Vulvovaginal Disease. As part of his fellowship, he “establishes criteria and terminology for the diagnosis of vulvar and vaginal diseases.” (Trepeta General Report [Docket 235-1], at 2). Dr. Trepeta also examines vulvar-vaginal pathology samples through his private practice. (See id.). BSC moves to exclude Dr. Trepeta as an expert witness, raising two primary objections: (1) Dr. Trepeta is not qualified to opine on the properties of polypropylene mesh or the clinical responses to mesh implants; and (2) Dr. Trepeta’s opinions are unreliable, irrelevant, and not helpful to the jury. (See generally BSC’s Mem. in Supp. of its Mot. to Exclude Richard W. Trepeta (“BSC’s Mem. re: Trepeta”) [Docket 236]). As further explained below, I GRANT In PART and DENY IN PART BSC’s Motion to Exclude Dr. Trepeta [Docket 235].

1. Dr. Trepeta’s Qualifications

BSC begins by contending that Dr. Trepeta’s background in pathology does not qualify him under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 to render the opinions he sets forth in his expert reports on the properties of polypropylene and the human clinical response to polypropylene implants.

a. Properties of Polypropylene Mesh

In his general report, Dr. Trepeta opines about mesh degradation, mesh contraction, and mesh migration. He states that “[degradation occurs as either fragmentation of the mesh or oxidation [of the mesh] release[s] chemical components from the mesh into surrounding tissues,” and “[m]esh contraction and shrinkage cause the mesh to be significantly decreased in its physical size.” (Trepeta General Report [Docket 235-1], at 5). BSC asserts that Dr. Trepeta is not qualified to put forth these opinions because he is not a material scientist, biochemist, or biomedical engineer. (See Trepeta Dep. [Docket 235-3], at 100:20-101:1). Furthermore, he has no training in polymer science or biomedical engineering and has not performed mechanical or chemical testing of mesh products. (See id. at 100:2-11).

In Sanchez, et al. v. Boston Scientific Corp., I assessed this argument and disagreed with BSC:

In making [its] argument, however, BSC downplays Dr. Trepeta’s knowledge, training, and experience as a clinical pathologist. In general, a clinical pathologist “will be knowledgeable in the areas of chemistry, hematology, microbiology, ... serology, immunology, and other special laboratory studies.” 33 Am.Jur. Trials § 17 (1986); see also Coll, of Am. Pathologists, CAP Fact Sheet, http://www.cap.org (last visited Sept. 22, 2014) (“[Clinical pathologists] are involved in a broad range of disciplines, including surgical pathology, cytopathology, ... clinical chemistry, microbiology, immunopathology, and hematology.”). Dr. Trepeta’s thirty years’ experience as a clinical pathologist therefore demonstrates sufficient knowledge to provide expert testimony about the chemistry and surgical pathology of materials like transvaginal mesh. Moreover, Dr. Trepeta has knowledge of and experience with pelvic mesh explants in particular, having examined fifty explant samples over the past five years. (See Trepeta General Report [Docket 86-1], at 2). According to Dr. Trepeta, by examining the mesh explants under a microscope, he has witnessed the polypropylene’s chemical changes. (See Trepeta Dep. [Docket 110-3], at 217:14-19). Given Dr. Trepeta’s knowledge and experi *529 ence as an anatomical and clinical pathologist, I FIND that he is qualified to testify about mesh degradation, mesh shrinkage, and mesh migration, and I therefore DENY BSC’s motion in this respect.

No. 2:12-cv-05762, 2014 WL 4851989 , at *20 (S.D.W.Va. Sept. 29, 2014). I ADOPT this holding here.

b. The Human Clinical Response to Polypropylene Mesh

Dr. Trepeta also opines that the “human body’s pathological response to implantation of polypropylene mesh as well as the inherent physical properties of the mesh cause permanent injuries resulting in distortion of the pelvic architecture, sexual dysfunction, persistent pain, scarring, and alteration of bowel and bladder function.” (Trepeta General Report [Docket 235-1], at 6). BSC contends that Dr. Trepeta is not qualified to present this opinion because Dr. Trepeta does not treat patients for these conditions and has limited familiarity with the symptoms of stress urinary incontinence and pelvic organ prolapse. (See Trepeta Dep. [Docket 235-3], at 109:21-23). In short, BSC argues that Dr. Trepeta is not a gynecologist, obstetrician, urogyneeologist, or a surgeon, and as a result, Dr. Trepeta’s opinions about the clinical response to mesh should be excluded.

In Sanchez , I addressed this argument and held:

Dr. Trepeta’s extensive experience and knowledge in the field of pathology qualify him to submit these opinions. Part of pathology involves reaching a diagnosis through “clinical and pathologic correlation.” [ (See Trepeta Dep. [Docket 86-3], at 11:10-14) ]. Dr. Trepe-ta frequently engages in this process by providing clinical consultations to physicians, which require him to examine clinical information (through specimens, reports, or physician findings) and reach a pathologic diagnosis about a patient. (See id.). Dr. Trepeta applied this pa-thologic process in reaching his conclusions about the human clinical responses to polypropylene vaginal mesh. He examined fifty pathology samples from mesh removals and opines that he observed injuries “consistent with the pathological process of tissue response and/or injury due to polypropylene.” (Trepeta General Report [Docket 86-1], at 2). He also compared medical literature to these observations and concluded that his pathological findings “are well described in the published literature.” (Id.). Dr. Trepeta’s understanding and application of the pathologic process qualify him to opine on the causal relationship between transvaginal mesh implantation and tissue response. Therefore, I DENY BSC’s motion on this point.

2014 WL 4851989 , at *20 (footnote omitted). I ADOPT this holding here.

2. The Reliability and Relevance of Dr. Trepeta’s Opinions

Next, BSC raises several objections to the reliability and relevancy of Dr. Trepe-ta’s opinion testimony. I addressed each of these objections in Sanchez and consequently rely on Sanchez to explicate my conclusions here.

a. Reliability of Dr. Trepeta’s Methodoloyy in Formulatiny His Opinions

BSC contends that Dr. Trepeta’s method of using pathology reports to formulate his opinions is unreliable. Dr. Trepeta used various resources to reach his expert opinion. First, Dr. Trepeta has studied over fifty mesh explant samples in his private practice. Dr. Trepeta received these samples from physicians about once *530 a month over the past five years. (Trepe-ta Dep. [Docket 235-3], at 61:10-12). He examined these samples under a microscope, identified any abnormalities, and concluded that the samples presented injuries “consistent with the pathological process of tissue response and/or injury due to polypropylene.” (Trepeta General Report [Docket 235-1], at 2). Second, Dr. Trepeta studied the medical literature on mesh implantation and determined that his pathological findings correspond with the published research on mesh erosion and exposure in the vaginal wall. (Id. at 2-3). Third, Dr. Trepeta reviewed twenty-four pathology reports that he received from the plaintiffs’ counsel and ascertained that “the pathology reports of excised Boston Scientific Products ... are consistent” with the acute, sub-acute, and chronic categories of the disease process. (Id. at 4).

As I held in Sanchez :

BSC’s strongest objection to Dr. Trepeta’s methodology focuses on this third source of information. BSC argues that the twenty-four pathology reports were unreliable because: they were “hand-selected by Plaintiffs’ counsel”; Dr. Trepeta only relied on seventeen of the twenty-four reports; and Dr. Trepeta did not review the medical records of any of the probed patients. (BSC’s Mem. re: Trepeta [Docket 235], at 11-12). The plaintiffs respond that these pathology reports only supplemented Dr. Trepeta’s opinion and that the main thrust of Dr. Trepeta’s opinion comes from his review of fifty mesh explants over the past five years and from his study of medical literature. Moreover, the plaintiffs argue that BSC’s chosen expert, Dr. Badylak, agreed that review of pathology reports of vaginal tissue taken from polypropylene explants is an accepted method for reaching a pathologic conclusion on tissue response to polypropylene. (See Pis.’ Resp. in Opp. to Def.’s Mot. to Exclude Dr. Trepeta [Docket 110], at 13).

The fact that each side’s pathologist accepts this practice suggests that it is accepted by the general community of pathologists. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594 [ 113 S.Ct. 2786 ] (“Widespread acceptance can be an important factor in ruling particular evidence admissible.... ”). But Dr. Trepeta’s review of the pathology reports still has a fatal deficiency in that it lacked standards to govern the process of selecting the sample of pathology reports to be evaluated. See id. (listing as a factor in evaluating an expert’s opinion the “existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique’s operation”). The plaintiffs do not explain how or why they chose these twenty-four reports for Dr. Trepeta’s review, and without such an explanation, I have no way of assessing the potential rate of error or the presence of bias. See id. (stating that the “court ordinarily should consider the potential rate of error”). I confronted a similar situation in Lewis, et al. v. Ethicon, Inc. and excluded the expert opinion on hand-selected ex plant samples because “[t]here are no assurances that [plaintiffs’ counsel] did not opportunistically choose samples while ignoring others that might have weakened or disproved [the expert’s] theories.” No. 2:12-cv-4301, 2014 WL 186872 , at *8 (S.D.W.Va. Jan. 15, 2014). Here, I similarly have no way to ensure that the plaintiffs’ counsel did not provide Dr. Trepeta with only those pathology reports that tended to strengthen, rather than refute, Dr. Trepeta’s opinions. Accordingly, Dr. Trepeta’s opinions derived from his review of the twenty-four pathology reports are EXCLUDED.

2014 WL 4851989 , at *22. I ADOPT this holding, accepting Dr. Trepeta’s opinions *531 as reliable apart from those opinions based on his review of the twenty-four pathology reports.

b. Litigation Driven Opinions

BSC also argues Dr. Trepeta’s opinions are unreliable because they are litigation-driven. Specifically, BSC asserts that Dr. Trepeta’s “familiarity with the literature on polypropylene mesh comes only from his research and reading in connection with this litigation.” (BSC’s Mem. re: Trepeta [Docket 236], at 10). As in Sanchez , I disagree. Dr. Trepeta has largely based his opinions on his professional experience with mesh pathology samples examined during his practice. (Trepeta Report [Docket 235-1], at 2). In addition, he testified that he has “looked at mesh removed from the bodies of female vaginal walls under the microscope” and has seen degradation. (Trepeta Dep. [Docket 280-3], at 216:14-19). These activities occurred outside of this litigation. Thus, I FIND that Dr. Trepeta’s opinions are not litigation-driven and DENY BSC’s motion on this point.

c. Dr. Trepeta’s Specifíc Causation Opinion

Dr. Trepeta also offers a specific causation opinion concerning Ms. Blankenship. Dr. Trepeta opines that Ms. Blankenship’s

symptoms of pain, infection, dyspareu-nia, voiding dysfunction and resulting diagnoses, and her medical treatment for urinary complications and pelvic pain complications are all directly attributable to the implantation of polypropylene surgical mesh in the Obtryx Trans-Obturator Tape surgical kit implanted April 8, 2009.... My personal experience as a pathologist with special training and focus on pathology of the vagina, as well as my knowledge and training, also evidences the known complications directly attributable to the pathological tissue response to a polypropylene implant such as [that] implanted in Ms. Blankenship.

(Trepeta Specific Report [Docket 235-2], at 4). Dr. Trepeta adds that the complications associated with the human body’s pathologic response to the implantation of polypropylene mesh were present in Ms. Blankenship’s medical records. {Id. at 5). BSC argues that Dr. Trepeta’s specific causation opinion is unreliable because: (1) his general causation opinion is unreliable; (2) he is not qualified to determine medical causation; and (3) he failed to conduct a reliable differential diagnosis.

Apart from Dr. Trepeta’s review of the twenty-four pathology reports, I concluded that Dr. Trepeta’s general causation opinion was reliable. Therefore, BSC’s first argument fails. BSC’s second argument also lacks merit because, as I have explained previously, a pathologist’s job is to determine medical causation. See In re C.R. Bard, Inc., 948 F.Supp.2d 589, 621 (S.D.W.Va.2013) (“Dr. Klosterhalfen’s very job as a pathologist qualifies him to opine on [medical causation].”); see also Coll, of Am. Pathologists, CAP Fact Sheet, http:// www.cap.org (last visited Oct. 17, 2014) (“[Clinical pathologists] are physicians who use laboratory medicine and technology to identify and diagnose disease.”). While Dr. Trepeta admits that examining women to diagnose pelvic pain and dyspareunia would go beyond his expertise as a pathologist, (see Trepeta Dep. [Docket 235-4], at 17:7-13, 20:6-9), Dr. Trepeta’s opinion in this case is not based on his examination of women. Rather, he reaches his opinion by “reviewing] pathology slides and [correlating] that with the patient’s symptoms.” (Id. at 16:18-20). (See also Trepeta Dep. [Docket 280-5], at 46:18-21 (“Pathology is all about explaining clinical findings through tissue examination.”)). Indeed, *532 Dr. Trepeta applied this procedure in diagnosing Ms. Blankenship-he “personally reviewed three slides” belonging to Ms. Blankenship and observed reactions “typical of the reaction observed to polypropylene mesh.” (Trepeta Report [Docket 235-2], at 4). In sum, as a pathologist, Dr. Trepeta is qualified to opine on medical causation based on his review of pathology slides.

BSC’s final argument that Dr. Trepeta did not engage in a proper differential diagnosis presents a closer question. Dr. Trepeta admits that he did not “try to make a clinical diagnosis as to why Miss Blankenship was having pelvic pain and pain on intercourse prior to receiving her Obtryx sling.” (Trepeta Dep. [Docket 235-4], at 45:17-20). On the other hand, he explains that the foreign material present in Ms. Blankenship’s pathology slides is “consistent with the Obtryx sling” because “by process of elimination, the patient has not had any other synthetic material implanted in that site.” (Trepeta Dep. [Docket 280-5], at 85:18-20). Reviewing Dr. Trepeta’s report and deposition testimony as a whole, I find that Dr. Trepeta has based his opinion in large part on reliable pathology methods — he reviewed pathology slides, considered the possible causes for the inflammation, and came to a diagnostic conclusion. (See Trepeta Rep. [Docket 235-2], at 4 (concluding that Ms. Blankenship’s tissue inflammation appeared consistent with typical polypropylene mesh reactions)). Challenges to the accuracy of the diagnostic conclusion are better suited for cross-examination. Thus, I DENY BSC’s motion to exclude Dr. Trepeta’s specific causation opinions. 5

In conclusion, Dr. Trepeta’s general causation opinions satisfy Daubert, apart from his opinions based on the pathologic reports selected by the plaintiffs’ counsel for his review, which are EXCLUDED. Dr. Trepeta’s specific causation opinions likewise meet the standards of Daubert. Accordingly, BSC’s Motion to Exclude the Opinions and Testimony of Dr. Trepeta [Docket 235] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

D. Motion to Exclude the Opinions and Testimony of Jimmy W. Mays, Ph.D. and Samuel P. Gido, Ph.D.

BSC seeks to exclude the opinions of Dr. Jimmy W. Mays and Dr. Samuel P. Gido. Dr. Mays is a Distinguished Professor of Chemistry at the University of Tennessee, and Dr. Gido is an Associate Professor of Polymer Science and Engineering at the University of Massachusetts Amherst. (Mays & Gido Report [Docket 221-1], at 2, 4). Both have worked extensively in the area of polymer materials. Drs. Mays and Gido issued a joint expert report examining and assessing the polypropylene material mesh BSC used in the Obtryx product. (Id. at 5). In their report, Drs. Mays and Gido conclude that (1) polypropylene is susceptible to oxidation and degrades by *533 an oxidative mechanism in the body; (2) analysis of explanted BSC Obtryx mesh shows clear sign of oxidative degradation; and (3) the Obtryx is thus defective and not suitable to serve as a permanent implant. (Id.). The report states that Drs. Mays and Gido relied upon their training and experience, provided materials, and underlying data from the testing in forming their opinions. (Id.). However, as discussed below, the deposition testimony proves otherwise. The reasoning in Sanchez substantially reflects the court’s view of these issues as presented in this case. To the extent that there are differences in fact and exhibits, the court does not find them sufficiently material. The Sanchez excerpts quoted throughout are to explicate the conclusions the court reaches below.

BSC argues that Drs. Mays and Gido’s testing and the clinical conclusions drawn from that testing must be excluded because their testing is unreliable and their opinions are irrelevant. (BSC’s Mem. of Law in Supp. of its Mot. to Exclude the Ops. & Test, of Jimmy W. Mays, Ph.D. & Samuel P. Gido, Ph.D. (“BSC’s Mem. re: Mays & Gido”) [Docket 222], at 2). Additionally, BSC argues that Drs. Mays and Gido’s opinions are unreliable because they are litigation driven, as well as a poor fit that would not be helpful to the jury. (Id.). Finally, the defendant argues that some of the opinions offered by Drs. Mays and Gido should be excluded because they opine about BSC’s state of mind and make inadmissible legal conclusions. (Id.).

1. Chemical & Microscopic Testing

a. Background

As BSC takes particular issue with Drs. Mays and Gido’s testing of the Obtryx explants, I will briefly discuss their testing procedures and results. Drs. Mays and Gido received exemplars of Obtryx products on September 24, 2013. (Mays & Gido Report [Docket 221-1], at 24). These exemplars were used as a control. (Id. at 18). The plaintiffs’ counsel, Ms. Jennifer Black, arranged for Drs. Mays and Gido to also receive Obtryx mesh explants from Steelgate, a repository for explanted tran-svaginal mesh. (Aff. of Jennifer Black [Docket 272-7], ¶¶5-6, 12). Ms. Black identified the available BSC Obtryx ex-plants by cross-referencing the firm’s client list with the patient list retained by Steelgate. (Id. ¶¶ 9-11). Ms. Black determined that there were a total of fourteen such explants at Steelgate. (Id. ¶ 8). After identifying these explants, Ms. Black requested that the explants be sent to Dr. Gido with the appropriate chain of custody. (Id. ¶ 12).

On October 1, 2013, Dr. Gido received the fourteen explants. (Mays & Gido Report [Docket 221-1], at 24). The explants were sealed in plastic containers and came with chain of custody documentation. (Id.). Only eleven of the fourteen explants contained mesh suitable for testing. (Id.). Dr. Gido proceeded to conduct three microscopic analyses of the eleven explants: (1) Scanning Electron Microscopy (“SEM”) to take pictures of the mesh fibers at high magnification and compare those images to the images published in the literature; (2) Energy Dispersive Spectroscopy (“EDS”) to determine if there was oxygen in the mesh fibers; and (3) Transmission Electron Microscopy (“TEM”) to identify amorphous regions in the mesh fibers that are more susceptible to oxidation. (Id. at 18).

Utilizing Steelgate’s chain of custody, Dr. Gido sent the samples to Dr. Mays on October 22, 2013. (Id.). Only four of the samples sent by Dr. Gido had sufficient amounts of polypropylene mesh adequate for testing by Dr. Mays. Dr. Mays conducted three chemical analyses of the four samples: (1) Fourier Transform Infrared *534 Spectroscopy (“FTIR”), a testing instrument that uses infrared to identify chemical groups containing oxygen; (2) Gel Permeation Chromotography (“GPC”), a test that separates molecules by size and quantifies the molecular weight of the polymer, which allowed Dr. Mays to estimate the reduction in molecular weight of the polypropylene explants; and (3) Thermogravi-metric Analysis (“TGA”) to determine if there were other additives or inorganic materials in the mesh. (Mays Dep. [Docket 221-2], at 49-50).

Drs. Mays and Gido included the following summary of results in their expert report:

*535 [[Image here]]

(Mays & Gido Report [Docket 221-1], at 19). However, Dr. Mays did not include the protocol or results of the TGA or TEM in the expert report. Instead, for the TGA, he produced that information to BSC in the form of his handwritten notes, which were taken from his lab notebook. (Mays Dep. [Docket 221-1], at 49-50).

b. Reliability

With respect to the reliability of Drs. Mays and Gido’s testing, BSC makes several specific arguments. However, I have previously reviewed the reliability of Drs. Mays and Gido’s testing under Dau-bert and found their opinions unreliable because they (1) failed to control for error or bias and (2) did not establish or adhere to testing protocols. See Sanchez, 2014 WL 4851989 , at *26. In Sanchez , I made the following findings:

i Lack of Control for Error or Bias

Although plaintiffs’ counsel selected the samples, counsel explained that these were the only Pinnacle and Obtryx samples available in the Steel gate repository. Therefore, unlike Lewis , where Dr. Klinge did not indicate whether the meshes examined constituted a large sample size of the repository’s collection, here, these were the only samples available for testing. Furthermore, certain samples were not tested because they did not have enough mesh, not because of bias. Despite the differences in these two cases, the fact that Drs. Mays and Gido’s sample was not very large or randomly selected affects the reliability of their testing. See Edwards v. Ethicon, No. 2:12-cv-09972, 2014 WL 3861923 , at *39 (S.D.W.Va. July 8, 2014) (excluding plaintiffs’ expert’s analysis of pelvic mesh explants generally). Drs. Mays and Gido “[have] given no explanation as to whether [theirs] is a representative sample size.... Therefore I have no information as to the potential rate of error inherent in [their] observations.” Lewis, 2014 WL 186872 , at *8. Additionally, Drs. Mays and Gido have no knowledge of how the material they examined was explanted or how it was preserved and handled before reaching their lab. (Mays Dep. [Docket 99-1], at 304-05). Dr. Gido conducted EDS testing to differentiate between polypropylene fibers and biological material. In their report, Drs. Mays and Gido state that “the presence or absence (or near absence) of nitrogen as detected by EDS is the key discriminator between clean polypropylene fibers from which valid conclusions can be drawn or biomaterial covered fiber from which conclusions are less straightforward.” (Mays & Gido Report [Docket 98-1], at 31). At his deposition, Dr. Gido acknowledged that on a relatively clean sample “there might be a little blip of nitrogen [in the EDS] and *536 the question is, you know, is that nitrogen statistically significant.” (Gido Dep. [Docket 99-2], at 154). However, Dr. Gido never determined the significance of potential “blips,” although the data was available. (Id. (“I did not do that analysis, although the data is all there, and if that analysis needs to be done, I would contend it is not a new opinion.”)). Similarly, in their report, Drs. Mays and Gido state that “[w]e need to base our conclusions related to fiber degradation on clean polypropylene fibers and make sure we are not looking at biological films coating the fibers.” (Mays & Gido Report [Docket 98-1], at 31). However, both Dr. Mays and Dr. Gido admit in their depositions that their inconsistent bleach treating techniques may have failed to remove all biologic material from the test samples. (See Mays Dep. [Docket 99-1], at 208; see also Gido Dep. [Docket 99-2], at 165). When asked explicitly whether they completed a statistical analysis or calculated a rate of error based on their tests, Dr. Gido admitted they did not. (Gido Dep. [Docket 99-2], at 154-55).

The key Daubert inquiry is “whether the analysis undergirding the experts’ testimony falls within the range of accepted standards governing how scientists conduct their research and reach their conclusions.” Daubert II, 43 F.3d at 1317. The small sample size and Drs. Mays and Gido’s failure to determine the statistical significance of their results call into the question the reliability of their methods. Although Daubert is a flexible inquiry, these facts weigh heavily against the reliability of their opinions.

ii Failure to Establish or Adhere to Testing Protocol

First and most simply, Dr. Mays states that “SEM is a very common tool,” but when asked if he prepared any written methodology before completing the SEM testing, he admits that he did not. (Mays Dep. [Docket 99-1], at 162). In addition, Dr. Mays and Dr. Gido both reference Dr. Gido’s completely subjective cracking standard he came up with for purposes of their testing. Dr. Mays admits that the standard cannot be found in any published material, and Dr. Gido admits that he has never created or used a cracking standard before. (See id. at 18; see also Gido Dep. [Docket 99-2], at 161).

Expanding on the brief discussion above, while the samples were with Dr. Gido for testing, Dr. Mays asked Dr. Gido to try bleach cleaning one of the explants to see if it was effective. (Gido Dep. [Docket 99-2], at 167). Dr. Gido used a 6% bleach concentration on explanted sample 11. (See id. at 193; Mays & Gido Addendum Report [Docket 111-5], at 2). In comparison, Dr. Mays used a 7.8% concentration to clean the explants and controls before testing. (See Mays & Gido Report [Docket 98-1], at 33). The bleach treatments were clearly inconsistent. Additionally, Drs. Mays and Gido have no explanation as to why a discussion of this testing was “mistakenly” omitted from their original report. (Mays Dep. [Docket 99-1], at 202).

Another mistake occurred after Dr. Gido returned the samples, and he discovered that he failed to conduct an EDS test on one of them, which he attributed to a mere oversight. (Gido Dep. [99-2], at 214-15). Finally, Dr. Mays conducted TGA testing on the explants to determine what additives were in the mesh, but for some reason did not include the results in their expert report. (Compare Mays Dep. [Docket 99-1], at 50, with Mays & Gido Report [Docket 98-1]).

*537 Although Drs. Mays and Gido performed tests that are supported by the literature, the haphazard application of these tests, errors, and changes to their report lead to the conclusion that their methodology is unreliable. Vigorous adherence to protocols and controls are the hallmarks of “good science.” See Black v. Rhone-Poulenc, Inc., 19 F.Supp.2d 592, 608 (S.D.W.Va.1998). Accordingly, I FIND that the testing performed by Drs. Mays and Gido is unreliable, and therefore, EXCLUDED.

Sanchez, et al. v. Boston Scientific Corp., No. 2:12-cv-05762, 2014 WL 4851989 , at *26-28 (S.D.W.Va. Sept. 29, 2014). The parties in this case assert the same arguments regarding . the reliability of Drs. Mays and Gido’s testing that I addressed in Sanchez . Therefore, I ADOPT my pri- or ruling on the reliability of Drs. Mays and Gido’s testing.

2. Expert Opinions Not Based on Testing 6

a. Background

While BSC argues that Drs. Mays and Gido’s unreliable testing should be excluded entirely, the plaintiffs respond by explaining that the testing “merely confirmed what [Drs. Mays and Gido] have long known because of their training, experience, and peer-reviewed published scien-tifie literature.” (Pls.’ Mem. in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Exclude Test, of Pis.’ Expert (“Pis.’ Mem. re: Mays & Gido”) [Docket 272], at 4). 7 The plaintiffs contend that both the expert report and depositions support this explanation; however, they conveniently choose to cite only Dr. Mays’s deposition in support of their proposition. (See id. at 4-5; see also Mays Dep. [Docket 272-5], at 65 (“I believe all of my conclusions are ones that one could reach simply by looking at published literature on polypropylene that’s been implanted into the human body combined with the knowledge of chemistry and polymer science and the behavior of polymeric materials.”); id. at 140 (“So my opinion is based on my experience as a scientist, as a chemist. It’s based on all the literature we looked at. It’s based also on the testing that we did in this report.”); id. at 260 (“My opinion in this case, and it was my opinion before I got involved in this case, is that polypropylene is so fundamentally susceptible to oxi-dative degradation that it’s a poor choice for permanent implant where there’s going to be tissue ingrowth.”)).

The plaintiffs fail to point out or cite Dr. Gido’s deposition testimony, which takes the opposite position. Dr. Gido explicitly states that “we’re making this statement based on our own study and our own results. We’re not getting it from the litera *538 ture.” (Gido Dep. [Docket 221-3], at 233). While Dr. Mays describes the testing as “confirmatory,” Dr. Gido highlights the fact that he completed the testing first and then “got into the literature.” (Mays Dep. [Docket 272-5], at 65; Gido Dep. [Docket 221-3], at 50). Dr. Gido admits that he had not reached his opinions before testing and emphasizes how important the data was in drafting his portions of the report. (See Gido Dep. [Docket 221-3], at 51 (“I would suspect the same — you know, I would probably conclude that there would likely be a problem with polypropylene, but I would not be as sure of it as I am having seen data that I took with my own hands and seen Dr. Mays’s data.”)). Based on the depositions, Drs. Mays and Gido clearly have different opinions regarding the nature and influence of the testing they performed.

I have determined that Drs. Mays and Gido’s testing was unreliable, and Dr. Gido states that his opinions are based solely on the testing. Accordingly, I FIND that Dr. Gido’s opinions are EXCLUDED. However, as discussed more fully below, because Dr. Mays indicates that he relied primarily on other scientific sources, I FIND that Dr. Mays is permitted to testify generally about polypropylene degradation based on his experience and review of the literature.

b. Reliability

BSC argues that Dr. Mays’s opinions are not reliable because they are litigation driven, not scientific, and not fair and balanced. With respect to the argument that Dr. Mays’s expert testimony is litigation driven, I refer back to my above ruling that an expert’s formulation of his opinion for the purposes of litigation does not, by itself, justify that expert’s exclusion. As I FIND Dr. Mays’s opinions otherwise reliable, I need not address this argument further.

Next, BSC contends that Dr. Mays “selectively eite[s] several articles” and “fail[s] to include contrary statements or literature in [his] report.” (BSC’s Mem. re: Mays & Gido [Docket 222], at 14). I have previously reviewed the reliability of Dr. Mays’s opinions under Daubert. See Sanchez, 2014 WL 4851989 , at *29. The parties in this case assert the same arguments regarding the reliability of Dr. Mays’s expert opinions that I addressed in Sanchez . In Sanchez , I ruled as follows:

Dr. Mays cites eight different studies supporting his proposition that polypropylene is not suitable as a permanent implant, many of which are the same peer-reviewed, published literature relied upon by other experts in previous MDL trials. See Lewis, 2014 WL 186872 , at *11 (discussing plaintiffs’ expert Dr. Uwe Klinge). Clearly these are studies reasonably relied upon in the field of polymer science. Additionally, Appendix C of the report lists 68 scholarly articles Dr. Mays considered in making his opinions, as well as hundreds of other documents. (Mays & Gido Expert Report App. C [Docket 111-3], at 1-22). If [BSC] take[s] issue with Dr. Mays’s failure to review or cite particular documents, this goes to the weight of his opinion, not its admissibility, and can be addressed on cross-examination.

Sanchez, 2014 WL 4851989 , at *51.

Finally, BSC argues that Dr. Mays’s opinions are a poor fit and would not be helpful to a jury because Dr. Mays was not able to correlate degradation to any clinical symptoms in an individual patient. However, as I stated in Sanchez ,

I have repeatedly held that general causation testimony, including degradation opinions, is admissible under Rule 702, even if the plaintiffs might fail to carry *539 their burden as to specific causation. See, e.g., Huskey, [ 29 F.Supp.3d at 712 ] 2014 WL 3362264, at *13 . Additionally, in his deposition, Dr. Mays references complications that can arise in patients as a result of degradation. (Mays Dep. [Docket 99-1], at 131 (“I’m saying that degradation is the root cause of these devices failing to function the way they are designed in some cases and then the device not functioning properly is part of the problem.”)). To the extent that BSC believes degradation is nqt clinically significant, it may cross examine Dr. Mays on that issue.

Dr. Mays explicitly states that he relied not only on his knowledge and experience, but also on scientific literature, which are sufficiently reliable methods of forming his particular opinion. Accordingly, I FIND that Dr. Mays is permitted to testify generally that polypropylene is susceptible to oxidation and degrades, without specifically referencing the unreliable testing he conducted with Dr. Gido.

Sanchez, 2014 WL 4851989 , at *51-52. Therefore, I ADOPT my prior ruling on Dr. Mays, as stated in Sanchez , and FIND that his opinions based on his experience and review of scientific literature should not be excluded.

3. State of Mind

Dr. Mays offers two opinions regarding BSC’s state of mind and its knowledge of risks associated with polypropylene. (See Mays & Gido Report [Docket 221-1], at 5 (“BSC did not take into account polypropylene’s propensity for oxidation during design of its Pinnacle and Obtryx mesh.”); id. at 17 (“If the developers of Pinnacle and Obtryx were ignorant of this information on implantation of PP materials then they were incompetent to be in their line of business. If they were aware of these facts and chose to proceed anyway, they were taking an unconscionable, calculated gamble with the lives and wellbeing of others for the sake of their own profits.”)). As I previously discussed, expert opinions on BSC’s knowledge or state of mind are not helpful to the jury. See Fed.R.Evid. 702. Therefore, these opinions are EXCLUDED.

4. Legal Opinions

Dr. Mays offers two opinions that draw legal conclusions from the facts. (See Mays & Gido Report [Docket 221-1], at 17; id. at 19 (“The results of our own testing completely support and greatly strengthen this opinion that choice of PP as the material for the explants we tested rendered them unacceptably susceptible to degradation and was thus incompetent and or negligent.”) (emphasis added)). In the Fourth Circuit, “opinion testimony that states a legal standard or draws a legal conclusion by applying law to the facts is generally inadmissible.” United States v. McIver, 470 F.3d 550, 562 (4th Cir.2006). Whether BSC failed to act as a reasonable and prudent medical device manufacturer is a question for the jury. To be clear, Dr. Mays may offer opinions that, as a polymer scientist, he does not believe the Ob-tryx is suitable to serve as a permanent implant, but his opinions cannot be phrased as legal conclusions. Therefore, these statements are EXCLUDED.

E. Motion to Exclude the Opinions and Testimony of Dr. Peggy Pence

Dr. Pence works as a clinical and regulatory consultant, providing “advice, guidance, and product development services to pharmaceutical/biopharmaceutical and medical device companies in the areas of strategic planning, preclinical testing, clinical trials, design and conduct, and regulatory matters 'involving the [FDA].” (Pence *540 Report [Docket 219-1], at 1). During her career, she has accumulated knowledge about and experience with the testing requirements for medical devices; the development and content of product labeling; and the procedures necessary to comply with regulatory and industry standards, including those set forth by the FDA. (See id. at 1-4). In this matter, Dr. Pence offers four opinions: (1) BSC did not conduct adequate testing of the Obtryx product prior to placing them on the market; (2) the Obtryx product was inadequately labeled; (3) patients could not adequately consent to the surgical implantation of the Obtryx due to the misbranding of these products; and (4) BSC failed to meet the postmarket vigilance standard of care for their products, leading to further mis-branding. BSC seeks to exclude Dr. Pence’s testimony in its entirety.

I have previously reviewed the opinion testimony of Dr. Pence under Daubert. See Sanchez, et al. v. Boston Scientific Corp., No. 2:12-cv-05762, 2014 WL 4851989 , at *32-36 (S.D.W.Va. Sept. 29, 2014). The reasoning in Sanchez substantially reflects the court’s view of this issue as presented here. To the extent that there are differences in fact and exhibits, the court does not find them sufficiently material as to the ruling on Dr. Pence. Therefore, I ADOPT my prior ruling on Dr. Pence as follows and thereby GRANT IN PART and DENY IN PART her expert opinion.

1. Dr. Pence’s Qualifications

I first address BSC’s argument that this court should exclude Dr. Pence’s opinions because she lacks the qualifications necessary to make them. BSC maintains that Dr. Pence’s work as a researcher and consultant does not qualify her to opine about the safety and efficacy of mesh products, as she attempts to do in her expert report. In BSC’s vi'ew, without a medical degree and without experience in the development of polypropylene mesh, Dr. Pence’s opinions on BSC’s medical devices cannot withstand Daubert.

In Sanchez , I ruled as follows, and I ADOPT that ruling here:

The absence of a medical degree on Dr. Pence’s curriculum vitae does not call into doubt Dr. Pence’s demonstrated knowledge about and experience with medical devices like the [Obtryx]. Dr. Pence has over forty years of experience in the research and development of medical devices. (Pence Report [Docket 118-1], at 1). Over that time, she has accumulated knowledge that is relevant to this case, such as the design of clinical trials for diseases of the female genital system, the clinical testing of novel medical devices, and the content of product labeling. Accordingly, ... I FIND that Dr. Pence is qualified to render the opinions set forth in her expert report, including her opinions about the safety and efficacy of mesh products and the sufficiency of BSC’s product branding.

Sanchez, 2014 WL 4851989 , at *33.

2. Dr. Pence’s Opinions on Appropriate Pre-Market Testing

Having found that Dr. Pence is qualified to offer these opinions, I next address whether her opinions are relevant and reliable.

In her report, Dr. Pence opines:

BSC should have performed adequate preclinical and clinical testing of the Ob-tryx Sling and Pinnacle PFR Kits prior to marketing to ensure the devices were reasonably safe for permanent implantation. By its failure to do so, BSC fell below the standard of care required of a reasonably prudent medical device manufacturer.

*541 (Pence Report [Docket 219-1], at 44). In reaching this conclusion, Dr. Pence considered the risks associated with polypropylene mesh (id. at 31-36); the statements in Material Safety Data Sheets provided by the polypropylene supplier in 2004 indicating that polypropylene should not be used for permanent implantation in the human body (id. at 36-40); and the developmental history of BSC products (id. at 41-43).

In Lewis, et al. v. Ethicon, Dr. Pence gave a similar opinion. No. 2:12-cv-4301, 2014 WL 186872 , at *18-19 (S.D.W.Va. Jan. 15, 2014). She opined that the defendant did not conduct the required investigative tests on the specific risks of a tran-svaginal mesh product, but she failed to support this opinion with any authority suggesting that the performance of such tests was needed. Id. at *18. Without a reliable foundation, I excluded Dr. Pence’s opinion as unreliable. Id. at *19. Here, BSC argues that Dr. Pence’s expert report should again be excluded as unreliable because it fails to point to any authority requiring BSC to perform the tests that Dr. Pence believes should have been conducted. The plaintiffs counter that Dr. Pence has revised her report to fix the deficiencies identified in Lewis . This time around, the plaintiffs argue, Dr. Pence has “clearly demonstrated that her methodology and opinions were not based upon her ‘professional opinion’ alone” and instead arose from her review of a “voluminous amount of peer-reviewed scientific articles, data, government codes and regulation, deposition testimony provided in this litigation, and internal documents received from BSC.” (Pls.’ Resp. in Opp. To Def.’s Mot. to Exclude Dr. Peggy Pence [Docket 274], at 5).

In Sanchez , I agreed with the plaintiffs and concluded that

Dr. Pence’s bolstered expert report [Docket 118-1] has tempered my previous concerns about the reliability of her opinion on this issue. Dr. Pence has cited to multiple sources that stress the importance of running clinical trials before incorporating mesh materials into a surgical product. For instance, she describes a 2006 study conducted by the French National Authority for Health (“HAS”), in which it evaluated the safety and efficacy of vaginally implanted mesh for the treatment of genital prolapse. (Pence Report [Docket 118-1], at 9). HAS concluded that “the use of mesh implants for transvaginal correction of genital prolapse remained a matter of clinical research” and recommended prospective studies on the anatomical and functional outcomes of mesh implantation, the mid- to long-term effects, possible adverse events like erosion, and the management of erosions and retractions. (Id. at 10). Dr. Pence also discusses the recommendations of the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence, which include the warning that transva-ginal mesh repair “should be used with special arrangements for clinical governance, consent and audit or research.” (Id. at 43).

In contrast with Lewis , Dr. Pence’s opinion in this case is backed by authoritative studies that recommend the performance of clinical trials and long-term follow-ups before using polypropylene mesh. Thus, her opinion on the inadequacy of BSC’s pre-market testing is more than a bare declaration of her professional opinion. Accordingly, I FIND that Dr. Pence’s methodology is reliable under Daubert and DENY BSC’s motion with respect to this opinion.

Sanchez, 2014 WL 4851989 , at *34. I ADOPT this ruling here.

*542 3. Dr. Pence’s Opinions on the Adequacy of BSC’s Product Labels

Dr. Pence proffers two opinions regarding the labeling of the Obtryx. First, she states that “BSC marketed [these products] without adequate instructions for use throughout the life of these products ..., in particular, without adequate warnings, precautions, and information about the likelihood and extent of potential risks.” (Pence Report [Docket 219-1], at 62). Second, she states that “patients implanted with the Obtryx Sling or Pinnacle mesh were prevented from ... giving true informed consent as a result of BSC’s inadequate professional and patient labeling.” (Id. at 63). She then offers a list of warnings and risks that she believes should have been included in the products’ instructions for use (“IFU”) and patient brochures.

BSC asserts that these opinions should be excluded because they relate to BSC’s deviation from the branding requirements of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”), which is irrelevant in this case and consequently unhelpful to the jury. The plaintiffs agree that whether BSC violated the FDCA is not relevant and that Dr. Pence will not offer an opinion on that issue. The plaintiffs stress, however, that Dr. Pence’s testimony about labeling is relevant to the plaintiffs’ failure to warn claim. To assess the validity of this claim, the jury will need to understand what information should be included in IFUs and patient brochures but was not included by BSC — the plaintiffs argue that Dr. Pence can provide such understanding to the jury. I agree that such testimony might help guide the jury in reaching a verdict on these state law claims, which consider the appropriateness of product labeling, and as such, her opinions are relevant. 8 See, e.g., Church v. Wesson, 182 W.Va. 37 , 385 S.E.2d 393, 396 (1989) (explaining that in failure to warn cases, “the focus is not so much on a flawed or physical condition of the product, as on its unsafeness arising out of failure to adequately label, instruct or warn” (quoting Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 162 W.Va. 857 , 253 S.E.2d 666, 682 (1979))).

BSC adds that even if Dr. Pence’s opinions on BSC’s labeling practices are relevant, they lack a reliable basis. In BSC’s view, Dr. Pence does not provide any authority supporting her assertion that BSC’s labeling fell short of the standard of care, and instead, she simply insists that BSC “should have gone further.” (Def.’s Mem. in Supp. of its Mot. to Exclude the Ops. and Test, of Peggy Pence (“BSC’s Mem. re: Pence”) [Docket 220], at 8 (quoting Pence Dep. [Docket 219-3], at 328:3)). In response, the plaintiffs point to Dr. Pence’s reliance on medical publications and the FDA’s Manufacturer and User Facility Device Experience (“MAUDE”) database as evidence that Dr. Pence supported her opinions with authority. (See Pence Report [Docket 219-1], at 49-50).

Again, the reasoning in Sanchez reflects the court’s view of this issue as presented here, and I ADOPT the Sanchez ruling as quoted below:

Indeed, Dr. Pence cites to various publications and data throughout her report. However, the information she references — literature and data on the re *543 ported complications associated with Pinnacle mesh — does not go to the heart of her opinion — that BSC failed to meet the “standard of care required of a medical device manufacturer” in its deficient labeling of its product. (Id. at 63). In other words, although this authority demonstrates that complications occurred, it does not provide any guidance as to whether these complications should have been included as warnings in the Pinnacle’s IFU. Eliminating this peripheral information, Dr. Pence is left with ipse dixit sources like “the standard of care” (id.) and “a matter of ethics” (id. at 61), both of which fall short of Daubert’s reliability prong. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594 [ 113 S.Ct. 2786 ] (explaining the importance of ascertainable “standards” to govern the expert’s methodology in reaching his opinion).

Dr. Pence also utilizes FDCA provisions and FDA regulations to craft criteria for the information that should be included in medical device labeling. (See Pence Report [Docket 118-1], at 62 n. 257-59, 63 n. 260-61). As explained above, this may very well be relevant to the state law claim of failure to warn. Daubert, however, advises courts to keep in mind the other rules of evidence when evaluating expert testimony. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595 [ 113 S.Ct. 2786 ] (“Throughout, a judge assessing a proffer of expert scientific testimony under Rule 702 should also be mindful of other applicable rules.... ”). Rule 403, which permits exclusion of relevant evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury,” Fed.R.Evid. 403, carries particular significance in Daubert decisions because “[ejxpert evidence can be both powerful and quite misleading.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595 [ 113 S.Ct. 2786 ] (internal quotations omitted). Here, expert testimony about the requirements of the FDCA, which are not at issue in this case, could lead to more confusion about the failure-to-warn claim than enlightenment. The jury might think that the FDA regulations govern warning requirements in [West Virginia], whereas Dr. Pence is actually using the FDA regulations as a model for the contents of labeling materials. Given that the probative value of expert testimony on FDA requirements is substantially outweighed by the risk of jury confusion, I cannot admit Dr. Pence’s testimony as it relates to the FDCA or FDA regulations. See Lewis v. Johnson & Johnson, 991 F.Supp.2d 748, 755 (S.D.W.Va.2014) (agreeing that “alleged shortcomings in FDA procedures are not probative to a state law products liability claim”) (internal quotations omitted).

In sum, the only basis for Dr. Pence’s opinions on the adequacy of BSC’s product labeling is violation of the FDCA and FDA regulations. Such a violation, however, is not probative to the claims at issue. Moreover, asserting a violation of the FDCA is a legal conclusion, not an expert opinion. Accordingly, Dr. Pence’s opinion testimony on BSC’s labeling practices, both in the IFU and the patient brochure, is EXCLUDED.

Sanchez, 2014 WL 4851989 , at *35-36.

4. Opinion on Postmarket Vigilance

In her last opinion, Dr. Pence proffers that BSC “deviated from the standard of care by its failure to report to [the] FDA a number of adverse events that met the criteria for Medical Device Reporting, rendering the Obtryx and Pinnacle devices misbranded as a result of failure to furnish information requested under Section 519 of the FDCA.” (See Pence Report [Docket 219-1], at 91). BSC argues that whether BSC “reported certain adverse events to *544 the FDA is not helpful to the jury” in determining whether BSC provided adequate warnings or whether its products were defective. (See BSC’s Mem. re: Pence [Docket 220], at 9).

For the reasons explained in Sanchez , I agree with BSC.

Dr. Pence cites to FDA public health notifications, the FDA’s corporate warning letter to BSC, and the FDCA’s Medical Device Reporting regulations. Contrary to the plaintiffs’ assertions, however, the FDCA’s reporting requirements and BSC’s alleged violation of them have minimal relevance. First, the plaintiffs have not brought any claims concerning the FDCA. Second, even if an explanation of BSC-FDA communications could shed light on the state law claims at issue, testimony on whether or not BSC complied with the FDCA would constitute an impermissible legal conclusion rather than an expert opinion. And finally, ... opinion testimony on the labyrinth of reporting regulations within the FDCA has little probative value compared to the substantial risk of jury confusion, particularly when both parties agree that “whether, how, and when BSC communicated safety information to the FDA is irrelevant.” (See Pis.’ Resp. re: Pence [Docket 122], at 17). Accordingly, ... I EXCLUDE Dr. Pence’s opinions on postmarket vigilance.

Sanchez, 2014 WL 4851989 , at *36.

In conclusion, Dr. Pence can testify on pre-market testing, but her other opinions on the adequacy of product labels and the reporting of adverse events to the FDA are EXCLUDED. As such, BSC’s Motion to Exclude Peggy Pence [Docket 219] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

F. Motion to Exclude the Opinions and Testimony of Thomas H. Barker, Ph.D.

BSC moves to exclude the opinions and testimony of Thomas H. Barker, Ph.D. Dr. Barker is a biomedical engineer who seeks to opine as to the behavior of polypropylene mesh inside of the human body. (See Barker Report [Docket 223-1], at 1, 4-5). He bases his opinions on mechanical stress tests that he conducted on the Obtryx and Pinnacle products, his experience, scientific literature, and internal documents. (See id. at 3). BSC argues that Dr. Barker’s opinions are unreliable and irrelevant. In particular, BSC argues that Dr. Barker’s testing methodology was flawed, that his opinions are litigation driven, that he is unqualified to opine as to polypropylene and product design, and that Dr. Barker seeks to offer impermissible state of mind testimony.

I have previously reviewed the opinion testimony of Dr. Barker under Daubert. See Sanchez, et al. v. Boston Scientific Corp., No. 2:12-cv-05762, 2014 WL 4851989 , at *5-10 (S.D.W.Ya. Sept. 29, 2014). The parties in this case assert arguments on the admissibility of Dr. Barker’s expert opinion that I addressed in Sanchez . To the extent that there are differences in fact or exhibits, the court does not find them sufficiently material to this case. Thus, I ADOPT my prior ruling on Dr. Barker as follows and thereby GRANT BSC’s motion. I will address additional arguments raised by the parties in this case below.

1. Qualifications

BSC challenges Dr. Barker’s qualifications. In Sanchez , I found Dr. Barker qualified to opine as to the properties of polypropylene, and I ADOPT the same reasoning here:

Dr. Barker holds a Ph.D. in biomedical engineering and is currently on the fac *545 ulty of a joint department within the Georgia Institute of Technology and Emory University School of Medicine. He states in his expert report that his research focuses on

the effects of mechanical forces and tissue/material mechanical properties (e.g. stiffness) on the host response. I am trained and have extensive expertise in the evaluation of biomaterial mechanical properties, biomaterial/im-plant design, the foreign body host response, and human tissues under repair and fibrosis, including analyses of cell/molecular biological outcomes.

([Barker Report [Docket 71-1],] at 2). He conducted postdoctoral research focusing on “exploring the mechanisms of biomaterial associated fibrosis (e.g. the foreign body response).” (Id.). Additionally, Dr. Barker has authored several book chapters and peer-reviewed articles oh biomaterials and biomedical engineering. (See id.).

Sanchez, 2014 WL 4851989 , at *5-6. As I note in Sanchez , even though Dr. Barker is qualified, I must still determine that his method is reliable. Id. at *6.

2. Admissibility of Opinions Based on Dr. Barker’s Mechanical Testing

BSC argues that Dr. Barker’s opinions based on his mechanical testing are unreliable and irrelevant. In particular, BSC argues that Dr. Barker’s testing is flawed because it “1) does not replicate the published protocol he claims to have followed; 2) fails to utilize a sufficient sample size; 3) fails to meet the standards required for publication in a peer-reviewed journal; and 4) does not replicate the physiological environment or forces experienced in the female pelvic floor.” (Def. BSC’s Mem. of Law in Supp. of Its Mot. to Exclude the Ops. and Test, of Thomas H. Barker, Ph.D. (“BSC’s Mem. re: Barker”) [Docket 224], at 5). In Sanchez , BSC raised the same arguments.

a. Dr. Barker Failed to Follow Published Protocols

BSC argues that Dr. Barker’s failure to soak the pieces of mesh in a saline bath, contrary to published protocols, is unreliable. The Shepherd and Moalli protocols call for the use of a saline bath as part of testing to help better replicate the physiological environment of the human body. In Sanchez , I found that this deviation from protocols without a scientific basis rendered his method flawed:

His only reasoning was that Georgia Tech denied him permission to submerge its equipment in saline, a “potentially corrosive” solution. (Id. at 197:20-198:21). The difference in the results obtained by Dr. Barker and by Drs. Shepherd and Moalli further demonstrate the unreliability of his method. Dr. Barker’s tests revealed two to four times more relative elongation of the mesh than Drs. Shepherd and Moalli’s tests. (See Shepherd, supra, at 617; Moalli, supra, at 662; Barker Report [Docket 71-1], at 21).

Sanchez, 2014 WL 4851989 , at *7. Moreover, I found that the use of a saline bath to replicate the human body was particularly important because Dr. Barker seeks to opine as to the in vivo effects of mesh. See id.

In this case, the plaintiffs in response raise an additional argument as to this matter. They submit an exhibit that seems to refute my finding. (See Pis.’ Ex. D [Docket 267-4]). The plaintiffs provide a portion of Dr. Barker’s testimony “in a recent trial pelvic mesh trial[,][sic]” where he explains that he did follow a published testing protocol and that he did, in fact, soak the mesh in a saline bath for testing. (Pis.’ Resp. to Def.’s Mot. to Exclude the *546 Ops. And Test. of Dr. Barker (“Pis.’ Resp. re: Barker”), [Docket 267], at 14; see Pis.’ Ex. D [Docket 267-4], at 1073:5-12, 1073:19-1074:4). In their response, the plaintiffs also assert that “Dr. Barker pre-soaked the mesh in a saline solution to mimic the bodily fluids, just as performed by Dr. Moalli at the University of Pittsburgh.” (Pis.’ Resp. re: Barker [Docket 267], at 14).

However, this prior testimony is at odds with Dr. Barker’s expert report and deposition in this case. In his expert report, Dr. Barker writes that, “[p]rior to this case, I have never given sworn testimony in a litigation proceeding.” (Barker Report [Docket 267-1], at 3). Therefore, it is unclear when and why Dr. Barker provided the testimony that the plaintiffs attached in their Exhibit D [Docket 267-4]. Also, the plaintiffs provide very minimal information about his previous testimony. Exhibit D contains merely three pages of a transcript and contains no case name. The only identification of the case is in the plaintiffs’ response, where they reference “Ex. D; pgs. 1072-1074 of Albright v. BSC.” (Pis.’ Resp. re: Barker [Docket 267], at 14). The plaintiffs provide no citation number for “Albright v. BSC ” and give no information about whether Dr. Barker conducted additional testing for Al-bright or submitted a different expert report in Albright.

Furthermore, the plaintiffs attached portions of Dr. Barker’s deposition for this case which contradict his Albright testimony. In his deposition for this case, Dr. Barker testifies that he did not soak the mesh that he tested in a saline bath:

Q: It goes on to say that, [t]he mesh was allowed to sit in the 37-degree Celsius saline bath for 10 minutes prior to testing. Correct?

A: Correct.

Q: Obviously, in your test the mesh did not sit in any 37-degree Celsius saline bath prior to testing; is that right?

A: That’s correct.

(Barker Dep. [Docket 267-2], at 202:13-21). Also, in their response, the plaintiffs actually reference the fact that Dr. Barker failed to use a saline bath. (See, e.g., Pis.’ Resp. re: Barker [Docket 267], at 14 (“Moreover, the only reason Dr. Barker did not submerge BSC’s meshes in a saline bath was because Georgia Tech ... has a policy that forbids the submersion followed in the Moalli Protocol”) (citations omitted)). As a result, the plaintiffs’ argument is inconsistent and unavailing.

For the reasons stated above and in Sanchez , I find Dr. Barker’s methodology to be unreliable.

b. Dr. Barker Failed to Use a Sufficient Sample Size

BSC next argues that Dr. Barker failed to use a sufficient sample size when he tested one piece of Obtryx mesh and 2 pieces of Pinnacle mesh. In Sanchez , I agreed with this argument, especially since Dr. Barker admitted that a statistical test cannot be performed on a sample size of one:

Dr. Barker admits that having a sample size of one is “insufficient to perform statistical analysis.” (Dr. Barker Dep. [Docket 71-4], at 233:17-234:5). As a result, it is difficult to predict whether his results were merely chance occurrences. Dr. Barker explains that he wanted additional materials and he would have conducted additional testing if they had been provided:

Q: In fact, a lot of the results that Dr. Moalli has published that are different than your results, don’t you think you need to test another piece of Obtryx mesh to confirm or not con *547 firm the results that you got based on your N equals 1?

A: I would have liked to have been provided with materials, additional materials to do additional testing.

(Id. at 233:3-12) (objections omitted).

Sanchez, 2014 WL 4851989 , at *7-8. As a result, Dr. Barker’s sample size was a flaw in his method.

c.Dr. Barker’s Testing Failed to Meet Peer Reviewed Standards

BSC argues that Dr. Barker’s testing was flawed because it was not up to peer-reviewed standards. In Sanchez , I noted that Dr. Barker admits to this in his deposition testimony:

Q: Would you agree with me that your testing that you performed on the Obtryx with an N of 1 wouldn’t meet standards to be published in a peer-reviewed journal?

A: I would.

Q: And would you agree with me that your testing that you did on Pinnacle with an N of 2 wouldn’t meet the standards to be published in a peer reviewed journal?

A: I would agree.

Id. at *8 (citing Barker Dep. in Sanchez [Docket 71-4], at 301:20-302:5). I ADOPT this same reasoning here and find that this factor weighs against finding Dr. Barker’s method reliable.

d.Dr. Barker’s Testing Did Not Replicate In Vivo Conditions

BSC argues that Dr. Barker’s method is flawed because it failed to replicate the physiological multi-directional forces in the female pelvic floor. In Sanchez , I agreed that Dr. Barker’s uniaxial testing was unreliable to base opinions on the behavior of the mesh in vivo:

[Bjecause Dr. Barker’s method did not account for the multi-directional forces inside of the female pelvis, his opinions about the effect of the mesh once implanted in vivo are unreliable and do not survive Daubert scrutiny. Even Drs. Shepherd and Moalli note that their studies do not conclusively reveal the mesh’s behavior in the human body. (See Shepherd, swpra, at 619 (stating that “this experimental setup allows us to draw only preliminary conclusions about the various meshes”); Moalli, supra, at 663 (noting that “the behavior of these slings in vivo and after incorporation into host tissue may be inferred, but is not directly apparent from these studies”)).

Sanchez, 2014 WL 4851989 , at *9. I ADOPT this reasoning from Sanchez here, and based on the above four arguments I FIND Dr. Barker’s method to be unreliable.

e.Plaintiffs Argue that Dr. Barker’s Method Was Generallg Accepted

In this case, the plaintiffs raise an additional argument as to the reliability of Dr. Barker’s method. The plaintiffs contend that Dr. Barker’s testing was generally accepted within the scientific community. (Pis.’ Resp. re: Barker [Docket 267], at 11-12). In support, the plaintiffs point to Dr. Barker’s deposition testimony, where he explains that his general method of testing material — reading relevant scientific literature, developing a testing protocol, and then conducting “cyclic tensile testing and stress deformation analyses” in accordance with the developed testing protocol — is generally accepted within his field. (Barker Dep. [Docket 267-2], at 324:7-327:16). The plaintiffs argue that general acceptance “definitively forecloses a Dau-bert challenge.” (Pis.’ Resp. re: Barker [Docket 267], at 12).

*548 The trial judge must “ensur[e] that an expert’s testimony ... rests on a reliable foundation” and has “flexibility]” in making this assessment. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594, 597 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 . Even if cyclic tensile testing and stress deformation analyses are generally accepted in the bioengineering field, the plaintiffs’ argument does not cure the fatal deficiency in Dr. Barker’s method — that he failed to take measures to replicate the human body when forming and providing opinions as to the mesh’s behavior in vivo. For the reasons stated above and in Sanchez , I find Dr. Barker’s methodology to be unreliable. See Sanchez, 2014 WL 4851989 , at *5-10.

Therefore, as I concluded in Sanchez , Dr. Barker’s method was unreliable and his opinions based on this method are EXCLUDED.

3.Admissibility of Opinion Regarding the Mechanical Mismatch Between the Mesh and the Human Body

BSC challenges Dr. Barker’s opinion regarding a mechanical mismatch between the mesh and the human body and the adverse in vivo effects resulting from that mismatch. BSC argues that it is unreliable. In Sanchez , I agreed because Dr. Barker based his calculation as to the mesh on his unreliable testing:

[H]e based his elastic modulus calculations of the Pinnacle mesh on his methodologically flawed and unreliable testing ... Furthermore, as explained above, Dr. Barker’s testing does not replicate the forces and environment of the human body and, therefore, his opinions regarding the mesh’s effects in vivo are unreliable.

Id. at *9. I ADOPT this reasoning here and find that Dr. Barker’s opinions based on the mechanical mismatch are unreliable and, thus, EXCLUDED.

4.BSC Argues that Dr. Barker’s Opinions are Litigation Driven

BSC also argues that “Dr. Barker’s opinions are unreliable because they are litigation driven[.]” (BSC’s Mem. re: Barker [Docket 224], at 2). BSC raised this same argument in Sanchez , and, thus, I ADOPT my reasoning:

[Otherwise reliable expert testimony. will be admitted even if litigation driven. Because I find Dr. Barker’s opinions to be otherwise unreliable and inadmissible, I need not address this argument.

Sanchez, 2014 WL 4851989 , at *9.

5.Relevancy of Dr. Barker’s Opinions Based on His Testing of the Pinnacle

Dr. Barker tested both the Pinnacle and Obtryx products. The Obtryx is a product at issue in this case, but the Pinnacle device is not at issue in this case. Because I find his opinions to be unreliable, I need not address the relevancy of Dr. Barker’s opinions based on his testing of the Pinnacle device. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594-95 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 (noting reliability and relevancy requirement for expert testimony).

6.Plaintiffs’ Relevancy Argument Regarding Lewis v. Ethicon

In this case, the plaintiffs raise an additional argument as to the relevancy of Dr. Barker’s testimony. The plaintiffs argue that “[t]he crux of Dr. Barker’s opinions, and hence his role in this case, is to provide expert evidence of the precise design engineering failure in BSC’s meshes.” (Pis.’ Resp. re: Barker, [Docket 267], at 17). As a result, the plaintiffs contend that “Dr. Barker’s opinions provide the precise evidence that the plaintiff in Lewis v. Ethicon lacked and warranted a directed verdict[,]” and that, therefore, his testi *549 mony is helpful to a jury. (Id. (citing Lewis trial transcript)).

As I explained in Sanchez , I find Dr. Barker’s method to be unreliable, and I exclude his opinions on this basis. As a result, I do not need to address the relevancy of Dr. Barker’s testimony. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594-95 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 (noting requirement that expert testimony be both reliable and relevant). However, I note that the portions of the Lewis trial transcript in which the plaintiffs cite in support of their argument refer to specific causation. (See Pls.’ Ex. E Lewis Trial Tr. [Docket 267-5], at 60:5-22, 62:10-15). Dr. Barker does not offer specific causation opinions here.

7. Dr. Barker’s Proposed State of Mind Testimony

BSC argues that Dr. Barker is unqualified to opine as to product design or testing and that his proposed state of mind testimony is inadmissible. In Sanchez , BSC made these same arguments. However, I did not reach the issue of Dr. Barker’s qualifications as to product design or testing because I found his state of mind testimony to be impermissible expert testimony:

Dr. Barker contends that “BSC designed the Pinnacle ... to meet the specification of substantial similarity to products pre-existing on the market, rather than engage in the engineering and design process of development of a safe and effective medical product (even for one similar to a pre-existing product in the market)” and that this “is inconsistent with appropriate medical device design principles.”

(Barker Report [Docket 71-1], at 4, 15). These opinions relate to the state of mind of BSC and are, thus, EXCLUDED.

Sanchez, 2014 WL 4851989 ;' at *10. I ADOPT this reasoning from Sanchez in this case.

Therefore, I GRANT BSC’s Motion to Exclude the Opinions and Testimony of Thomas H. Barker, Ph.D. on the grounds explained above and in Sanchez. See id. at *5-10.

G. Motion to Exclude the Opinions and Testimony of Donald R. Ost-ergard, M.D.

As one of the five founders of the American Urogynecological Society, Dr. Oster-gard is a seasoned obstetrician and gynecologist, having practiced in the field since 1970. He has also assumed several academic roles, most recently serving as a professor of obstetrics, gynecology, and women’s health at the University of Louisville. The plaintiffs offer Dr. Ostergard to testify as an expert witness on the properties of polypropylene; the design of the Obtryx sling; the regulatory process of the FDA, specifically with regard to product labeling; and the motives and ethics of BSC. (See generally Ostergard Report [Docket 217-2]). BSC seeks to exclude Dr. Ostergard’s expert opinions under Daubert. I address BSC’s arguments in turn.

1. Dr. Ostergard’s Qualifications

Although Dr. Ostergard has an impressive background as a physician, BSC argues that his medical training does not qualify him under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 to render the opinions set forth in his expert report.

a. Opinions on the Properties of Polypropylene and the Obtryx Product Design

First, Dr. Ostergard offers opinions on the “defective” qualities of the polypropylene mesh used in the Obtryx sling, such as its “impurity” and its tendency to *550 shrink, degrade, and oxidize. (Ostergard Report [Docket 217-2], ¶ 10). BSC moves to exclude these opinions because Dr. Ost-ergard’s clinical experience “does not qualify him to testify as to the specific chemical composition and attributes of polypropylene.” (BSC’s Mem. of Law in Supp. of Its Mot. to Exclude the Ops. and Test, of Donald R. Ostergard, M.D. (“BSC’s Mem. re: Ostergard”) [Docket 218], at 5). In short, BSC argues that because Dr. Oster-gard is not a biomaterials expert, he cannot testify about the properties of polypropylene.

I can dispose of BSC’s objection by referring back to my ruling on a prior Dau-bert challenge brought against Dr. Oster-gard:

It is difficult to deride Dr. Ostergard’s qualifications generally. He has performed thousands of pelvic organ prolapse surgeries. He has used a variety of synthetic and biologic materials in pelvic reconstruction, including polypropylene mesh. He has extracted polypropylene mesh products from patients. He has treated them for mesh-related complications. He also performed preliminary theoretical work on a new pelvic mesh device for American Medical Systems.

Dr. Ostergard has conducted scanning electron microscope imaging of mesh. He is also participating in an on-going study of its degradation characteristics in conjunction with his University of Louisville colleagues. Finally, Dr. Ost-ergard has published, in a peer reviewed setting, on a variety of synthetic and natural materials used in pelvic reconstruction surgery dating back to the 1980s. I conclude that Dr. Ostergard’s qualifications are sufficient to testify about 'polypropylene.

(Jones v. Bard, Inc., et al., No. 2:11-cv-00114 [Docket 391], at 6 (S.D.W.Va. Jan. 6, 2014) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added)).

Dr. Ostergard also opines about the “procedure design promoted by BSC.” (Ostergard Report [Docket 217-2], ¶ 12). He concludes that insertion of the Obtryx through the vagina, a “contaminated surgical field,” is “dangerous” and that the proximity of the Obtryx to various pelvic organs and vessels creates a “risk of injury.” (Id.). BSC argues that Dr. Oster-gard has no experience in designing mesh products, and consequently, he lacks the qualifications necessary to opine on alleged design defects of the Obtryx. The plaintiffs respond by pointing to Dr. Oster-gard’s extensive knowledge of the pelvic anatomy and pelvic reconstructive surgery. Furthermore, the plaintiffs emphasize Dr. Ostergard’s published research on polypropylene materials, as well as his experience with the development of other mesh devices.

After reviewing Dr. Ostergard’s curriculum vitae, I conclude that Dr. Ostergard is qualified to provide opinion testimony on the design of polypropylene slings. He has performed countless pelvic reconstruction surgeries, instructed others on the performance of these surgeries, participated in the development of pelvic mesh devices, and authored several peer-reviewed articles on the safety and efficacy of polypropylene mesh products. As I explained in Jones, any challenge to his demonstrated expertise is “better suited for cross examination.” (Jones, No. 2:11-cv-00114 [Docket 391], at 9).

In conclusion, I FIND that Dr. Oster-gard is qualified to opine on the properties of polypropylene and the design of the Obtryx sling.

b. Opinions on FDA Regulatory Requirements and Product Labeling

Dr. Ostergard also comments on BSC’s alleged noncompliance with FDA *551 regulations, particularly as they relate to product labeling. BSC disputes Dr. Oster-gard’s qualifications to opine on these matters, asserting that his “familiarity” with the warnings on mesh implant products does not rise to the level of expertise under Daubert. (BSC’s Mem. re: Oster-gard [Docket 218], at 7). The plaintiffs, on the other hand, contend that Dr. Oster-gard’s experience as a urogynecological surgeon makes him “extremely well suited” to describe the information that BSC should have included on the directions for use and brochure for the Obtryx sling. (Pis.’ Opp. to BSC’s Mot. to Exclude Dr. Ostergard (“Pis.’ Resp. re: Ostergard”) [Docket 286], at 8). Moreover, Dr. Oster-gard has “taken a course on the FDA process” and reviewed internal BSC documents that, in the plaintiffs’ view, give him the knowledge of the regulatory process needed to support his opinions. (Id.).

Without more, however, Dr. Ostergard’s distinguished career as a urogynecologist cannot uphold his opinions on product warnings and FDA compliance. First, Dr. Ostergard admitted that he is “not an expert in FDA regulations.” (Ostergard Dep. [Docket 217-1], at 395:28-25). Second, his understanding of medical device warnings does not exceed the knowledge of physicians in general. That is, he has never drafted a device warning, and he only knows the “information that would be useful to the physician and his counseling of patients.” (Id. at 402:15, 20-23). 9 This minimal experience with medical device warnings and FDA regulations does not satisfy the “knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education” required under Rule 702. See, e.g., In re C.R. Bard, Inc., 948 F.Supp.2d 589, 611 (S.D.W.Va.2013) (“Despite his stellar qualifications as a uro-gynecologist, Dr. Shull is unqualified to testify on the specific issue of product warnings, as evidenced by his lack of familiarity with the process.”). Accordingly, I EXCLUDE Dr. Ostergard’s opinion testimony as it relates to product labels, the Obtryx’s directions for use, and FDA compliance.

Having excluded Dr. Ostergard’s FDA opinions for insufficient expertise, I do not need to consider Daubert’s follow-up question of whether these opinions would be helpful to the jury. My ruling in Sanchez , however, provides an analysis on the issue that I could easily apply here. See Sanchez et al. v. Boston Scientific Corp., No. 2:12-cv-05762, 2014 WL 4851989 , at *35 (S.D.W.Va. Sept. 29, 2014) (“Given that the probative value of expert testimony on FDA requirements is substantially outweighed by the risk of jury confusion, I cannot admit Dr. Pence’s testimony as it relates to the FDCA or FDA regulations.”).

2. Reliability of Dr. Ostergard’s Opinions on Polypropylene

Next, BSC argues that this court should exclude Dr. Ostergard’s opinions on polypropylene — that it is toxic, impure, and subject to degradation and shrinkage — because his opinions do not satisfy Daubert’s reliability prong. Specifically, according to BSC, these opinions are unreliable because (1) they are not generally accepted in the medical community; (2) Dr. Ostergard has not conducted testing to support these theories; and (3) Dr. Oster-gard has based his opinions on selective review of scientific literature. The plaintiffs claim that BSC’s objections concern *552 the weight, not the admissibility, of Dr. Ostergard’s opinions.

As an initial matter, general acceptance is merely one factor a court should consider in determining admissibility of expert testimony. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 151 , 119 S.Ct. 1167 , 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999) (“[Daubert’s ] list of factors was meant to be helpful, not definitive. Indeed, those factors do not all necessarily apply even in every instance in which the reliability of scientific testimony is challenged.”). Here, although Dr. Ostergard’s opinions conflict with the position statements of several urogynecological professional societies, he nevertheless finds support for his opinions in several peer-reviewed articles. (See Ostergard Report [Docket 217-2], at ¶ 10 (citing to various publications that corroborate his opinions on polypropylene mesh)). Consequently, that Dr. Ostergard belongs to the minority does not, in itself, render his opinion unreliable. Instead, I defer to the other Daubert factors and leave the profession’s acceptance (or lack thereof) of Dr. Ostergard’s opinions as a possible basis for impeachment at trial.

Further challenging the reliability of Dr. Ostergard’s opinions, BSC contends that Dr. Ostergard has “conducted no testing on whether Boston Scientific mesh products in fact display the defects he describes.” (BSC’s Mem. re: Ostergard [Docket 218], at 9). An expert, however, may support his opinions with resources other than the results of his scientific experimentation or testing. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 (“Unlike an ordinary witness, an expert is permitted wide latitude to offer opinions, including those that are not based on firsthand knowledge or observation.” (internal citations omitted)). In fact, “numerous courts have held that reliance on scientific test results prepared by others may constitute the type of evidence that is reasonably relied upon by experts.” Monsanto Co. v. David, 516 F.3d 1009, 1015 (Fed.Cir.2008) (listing relevant case law). In Jones, I ruled that Dr. Ostergard’s reliance on the analyses of others, when considered alongside his own peer-reviewed research, satisfied the reliability requirements of Daubert. (See Jones, No. 2:11-cv-00114 [Docket 391], at 8). Revisiting Dr. Oster-gard’s list of publications on polypropylene mesh, (see Ostergard Curriculum Vitae [Docket 286-2], at 24), I again conclude that Dr. Ostergard’s opinions have reliable support.

Finally, BSC asserts that Dr. Ostergard has “misinterpreted” the medical articles he relied on in reaching his opinions, and as a result, his opinions are unreliable. (BSC’s Mem. re: Ostergard [Docket 218], at 10). BSC’s argument misplaces my role under Daubert. As the gatekeeper of expert testimony, I need not concern myself with the “correctness of the expert’s conclusions” and should instead focus on the “soundness of his methodology.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311 , 1318 (9th Cir.1995) (“Daubert II”). As explained above, the review of other professionals’ research can form a sound and reliable basis for an expert opinion. Here, Dr. Ostergard conducted a thorough review of others’ medical research in establishing his opinions. (See Ostergard Curriculum Vitae [Docket 217-2], at 148-56 (providing a list of medical literature that Dr. Ostergard considered in writing his expert report)). Whether Dr. Ostergard correctly interpreted this research has no bearing on the admissibility of his opinions. Accordingly, BSC’s objection has no merit, and I FIND that Dr. Ostergard’s opinions on the properties of polypropylene are reliable. 10

*553 This holding, however, does not apply to Dr. Ostergard’s opinion on the carcinogenicity of polypropylene. Although the plaintiffs point to several studies connecting polypropylene to cancer, (see Pis.’ Resp. re: Ostergard [Docket 286], at 15 n. 74), none of the plaintiffs in this case have claimed that the Obtryx sling caused cancer. Thus, “[t]he mention of cancer in the context of this case ... would, at a minimum, offend Rule 702 and confuse the jury on a matter with scant probative value.” (Jones, No. 2:11-cv-00114 [Docket 391], 8 n. 4). All of Dr. Ostergard’s opinions on the carcinogenicity of polypropylene are EXCLUDED.

3. Admissibility of Dr. Ostergard’s Opinions on BSC’s State of Mind

BSC asserts that a majority of Dr. Ost-ergard’s expert report consists of impermissible opinion testimony on the “intentions and motivations of Boston Scientific.” (BSC’s Mem. re: Ostergard [Docket 218], at 13). The plaintiffs admit that Dr. Ost-ergard seeks to provide insight into BSC’s “intent, motives (including financial motives), or ethics” for the purpose of opining on “what information BSC should have known” and “should have done” as a manufacturer of mesh devices. (Pis.’ Mem. re: Ostergard [Docket 286], at 16). In the plaintiffs’ view, such opinion testimony is admissible because it is relevant to the issue of punitive damages and will help the jury understand the medical language in many of BSC’s internal documents. (Id.).

I disagree. As I have consistently held throughout these MDL cases, the defendant’s “knowledge, state of mind, or other matters related to corporate conduct and ethics are not appropriate subjects of expert testimony because opinions on these matters will not assist the jury.” Lewis, 2014 WL 186872 , at *6 (citing to In re Rezulin Prods. Liab. Litig., 309 F.Supp.2d 531, 547 (S.D.N.Y.2004), which ruled that “the question of intent is a classic jury question and not one for the experts”). Accordingly, Dr. Ostergard’s opinions related to BSC’s intent, motives, ethics, and corporate conduct — including any comments about what BSC “knew or should have known” — are EXCLUDED.

In sum, BSC’s Motion to Exclude the Opinions and Testimony of Dr. Ostergard [Docket 217] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

H. Motion to Exclude the Opinions and Testimony of Vladimir Iakov-lev, M.D.

BSC seeks to exclude the opinions of Dr. Vladimir Iakovlev. Dr. Iakovlev is an anatomical pathologist and director of Cytopa-thology at the Department of Laboratory Medicine at St. Michael’s Hospital in Toronto, Canada. (Iakovlev Report [Docket 225-1], at 1). In his expert report, Dr. Iakovlev describes a study he participated in with Dr. Robert Bendavid beginning in 2012, “to investigate the morphological specifics of tissue before and after the inguinal hernia surgery, with and without the use of the mesh.” (Id. at 2). Based on this study, as well as his analysis of published literature and patient records, *554 Dr. Iakovlev concludes that complications of mesh placement in the body include: (1) pain; (2) urinary symptoms; (3) mesh hardening, deformation, and formation of nodule/mass; and (4) mucosal lesions and/or post-coital bleeding. (Id. at 3). BSC argues that Dr. Iakovlev’s general causation opinions and “stretch test” are scientifically unreliable. (BSC’s Mem. of Law in Supp. of its Mot. to Exclude the Ops. & Test. of Vladimir Iakovlev, M.D. (“Def.’s Mem. re: Iakovlev”) [Docket 226], at 1-2). Additionally, BSC contends that, as a pathologist, Dr. Iakovlev is unqualified to opine on mesh design, mesh deformation, and polypropylene degradation. (Id.). For the reasons discussed below, BSC’s motion [Docket 268] is GRANTED.

1. Qualifications as a Pathologist

BSC argues that Dr. Iakovlev is unqualified to render opinions on mesh design, mesh deformation, and polypropylene degradation. (Def.’s Mem. re: Iakov-lev [Docket 226], at 7-9). Dr. Iakovlev is a pathologist. BSC argues that because Dr. Iakovlev does not have a degree in physics, engineering, or biomaterials and only recently became familiar with the basic manufacturing principles for synthetic mesh, he is not qualified to opine on the design, deformation, and degradation of mesh ex-plants. (Id.).

A pathologist is a clinician who provides diagnoses for patient care based on the examination of specimens they receive and relevant clinical information. Edwards v. Ethicon, No. 2:12-cv-09927, 2014 WL 3361923 , at *24 (S.D.W.Va. July 8, 2014) (citation omitted). In his expert report, Dr. Iakovlev states that his “professional activities include diagnostic examination of specimens removed surgically or by biopsies from the human body, where [his] annual practice volume amounts to 5000 cases.” (Iakovlev Expert Report [Docket 225-1], at 1). Dr. Iakovlev also teaches a course on anatomic pathology and cytology. (Id. at 29). BSC does not question Dr. Iakovlev’s pathology credentials; rather, it only argues that as a pathologist, he is unqualified to render these opinions. However, throughout these MDLs, I have allowed numerous pathologists to testify regarding the properties of polypropylene mesh. See, e.g., Sanchez, 2014 WL 4851989 , at *19-20 (discussing Dr. Richard W. Trepeta); In re C.R. Bard, Inc., 948 F.Supp.2d 589, 621 (S.D.W.Va.2013) (discussing Dr. Bernd Klosterhalfen). In fact, in Edwards , I determined that Dr. Iakovlev was qualified to render an opinion regarding polypropylene degradation based on his experience as a pathologist. See Edwards, 2014 WL 3361923 , at *24-25. The fact that Dr. Iakovlev took the time to familiarize himself with BSC’s manufacturing process in no way diminishes his qualifications. Therefore, I FIND that Dr. Ia-kovlev is qualified to testify regarding mesh design, mesh deformation, and polypropylene degradation. 11

2. General Causation Opinions Related to Bendavid Study

Next, BSC argues that Dr. Iakov-lev lacks reliable methodology for his general causation opinions related to his review of explanted mesh as part of the Bendavid study. In preparing his expert report, Dr. Iakovlev examined over 100 mesh explants, approximately twenty percent of which were polypropylene and some fraction of which were transvaginal. (Iakovlev Report [Docket 225-1], at 2; Iakovlev Dep. [Docket 225-3], at 55, 243). The explanted mesh types included woven, *555 knitted, printed, GoreTex, combined designs of different manufacturers, and 21 samples from BSC. (Iakovlev Report [Docket 225-1], at 2; Iakovlev Dep. [Docket 225-3], at 320). BSC argues that because the study was not confined to polypropylene mesh and Dr. Iakovlev provides no information on how the mesh explants were chosen, the results are irrelevant and unreliable. The plaintiffs contend that Dr. Iakovlev’s independent scientific testing is grounded in reliable methodology because he saw nerve entrapment, nerve ingrowth and degradation in 100% of the BSC explants. (Pis.’ Opp. to Def.’s Mot. to Exclude the Ops. & Test, of Vladimir Iakovlev, M.D. (“Pis.’ Opp. re: Iakovlev”) [Docket 268], at 9).

Although BSC fails to cite to any testimony from Dr. Iakovlev supporting its premise, I agree that Dr. Iakovlev provides no information on how the mesh explants were chosen or prepared for examination. (Defi’s Mem. re: Iakovlev [Docket 226], at 5-6). Dr. Iakovlev testified that the 21 BSC samples he examined were provided by plaintiffs’ counsel. (Iakovlev Dep. [Docket 268-2], at 42). I also note, in his deposition for Edwards , Dr. Iakovlev further testified that he requested all available meshes for examination, but had no way of knowing what methodology the plaintiffs’ lawyers employed in providing him with the number of meshes they did. (Id. at 157-61). Dr. Iakovlev “has given no explanation as to whether [his] is a representative sample size or how he chose the particular explants analyzed.” Lewis, 2014 WL 186872 , at *8. “Therefore, I have no information as to the ‘potential rate of error’ inherent in [his] observations.” Id. (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 ). By simply highlighting the fact that Dr. Iakovlev performed an independent analysis, the plaintiffs have not demonstrated that Dr. Iakovlev’s opinions regarding pelvic mesh explants were derived using scientific methods. Therefore, Dr. Iakovlev’s general causation opinions related to the Bendavid study are EXCLUDED. 12

Unlike his opinions in Edwards , it is unclear which of Dr. Iakovlev’s opinions relate to specific plaintiffs in the current litigation or whether he reviewed samples separate from the Bendavid study. In Edwards, 1 allowed Dr. Iakovlev to testify regarding Ms. Edward’s mesh because his specific causation opinions did not present the same reliability concerns as his general causation opinions. 2014 WL 3361923 , at *23 (“Dr. Iakovlev may not testify regarding his general conclusions about mesh because his choice of samples lacks scientific methodology. However, this is not a reason to exclude his testimony about Ms. Edward’s mesh, which was made after a review of her explant.”). Here, when discussing polypropylene degradation and his polarization technique, Dr. Iakovlev refers to the 21 BSC samples provided to him by plaintiffs’ counsel. (Iakovlev Dep. [Docket 225-3], at 412). In his expert report, when discussing mesh design, Dr. Iakovlev states he examined a “variety” of BSC devices, but fails to indicate their source. Without more information, I must assume that Dr. Iakovlev’s additional opinions are based on his general review of mesh ex-plants as part of the Bendavid study, which I have determined to be unreliable. Therefore, I FIND that Dr. Iakovlev’s opinions on mesh design, mesh deformation, and polypropylene degradation should also be EXCLUDED. 13

*556 3. Deformation. Opinions Based on Stretch Test

BSC challenges the reliability of Dr. Iakovlev’s opinions drawn from his mechanical testing of BSC slings. Dr. Ia-kovlev tested one sling and one Uphold. (Iakovlev Dep. [Docket- 225-3], at 349). Dr. Iakovlev performed a “stretch test” on the mesh to simulate forces acting on the device in the body and confirm his hypothesis that mesh deforms after stretching forces are applied to it. (Iakovlev Report [Docket 225-1], at 7; Iakovlev Dep. [Docket 225-3], at 350). Dr. Iakovlev placed the mesh on a flat surface against a scale and secured the ends with clamps. (Iakovlev Dep. [Docket 225-3], at 345). Then, by pulling the clamps apart, he stretched the mesh to 120% of its original length. (Id.). Dr. Iakovlev observed permanent bowing, lengthening, and raised edges, which he opines is similar to the natural deformation that takes place inside the human body. (Iakovlev Report [Docket 225-1], at 7). Dr. Iakovlev also points out that when the clamps were released the mesh did not return to its original length and shape. (Id. at 7-8).

In particular, BSC makes the following arguments as to why Dr. Iakovlev’s testing was methodologically flawed: (1) his testing method was not based on any testing standards and did not have a written protocol; (2) he did not regulate or measure how much force he applied to the mesh samples; (3) he set clamps on the mesh, but cannot provide measurements; (4) he intended to stretch the mesh to reach 120% of the original length, but does not know how he arrived at that result or how to repeat the test; (5) he could not describe or comprehend how he controlled his test for confirmation bias; (6) he does not know whether mesh responds to stretching with clamps the same way it does when implanted in the human body, nor has he done mechanical testing on mesh in the body; (7) he cannot validate that stretching mesh on a machine replicates the behavior of mesh in the body because he only measured unilateral forces, and not forces from multiple directions or the amount of force used; and (8) he has no knowledge of any general acceptance of his methodology in the scientific community. (Def.’s Mem. re: Iakov-lev [Docket 226], at 7). BSC’s objections can be divided into two categories: (1) testing standards and (2) in vivo environment.

a. Testing Standards

Many of BSC’s arguments incorporate Dr. Iakovlev’s failure to adhere to testing standards or a written protocol. 14 In his deposition, Dr. Iakovlev states that he developed the stretch test method; however, he failed to follow a written protocol other than the brief description included in his expert report. (Iakovlev Dep. [Docket 225-3], at 345). When describing the methodology he employed, Dr. Iakovlev admits that he did not wear gloves, clean or sterilize the mesh, or use machinery to regulate the amount of force exerted. (Id. at 347-48)., Dr. Iakovlev insists that because the criterion for the test was length rather than force, the regulation of force was irrelevant. (Id. at 348). Nevertheless, Dr. Iakovlev readily admits that he developed and performed the stretch test himself, without taking care to standardize his method or the results. (Id. at 345, 350). Additionally, Dr. Iakovlev has no knowledge of whether his methodology is *557 generally accepted in the medical community. (Id. at 350). Finally, when asked how he can be sure his results were not caused by the way he pulled the mesh, Dr. Iakovlev’s only response is that the stretch test was a simulation, which I FIND insufficient to establish reliability. (Id. at 351-52).

b. In Vivo Environment

BSC’s remaining two arguments are in regard to Dr. Iakovlev’s failure to replicate an in vivo environment. 15 Although Dr. Iakovlev states that he performed the stretch test to simulate forces acting on the device in the body, BSC contends that Dr. Iakovlev has no way of knowing whether mesh responds to stretching with clamps the same way it does when implanted inside of a woman. (Defi’s Mem. re: Iakovlev [Docket 226], at 7). BSC further argues that Dr. Iakovlev’s tests failed to replicate the forces in the female pelvic floor because he measured uniaxial forces, while the forces in the female pelvic floor are generally multi-directional. (See id.).

The mere fact that Dr. Iakovlev’s study was uniaxial does not alone render his methodology unreliable; however, the fact that he did not account for multi-directional forces inside of the female pelvis weighs heavily against admissibility. Much like his response to BSC’s question regarding confirmation bias, when asked about the way mesh responds inside and outside of the body, Dr. Iakoylev states that “the assumption is that if the forces are similar, the behavior will be similar. That’s á limitation of all experimental studies.” (Ia-kovlev Dep. [Docket 225-3], at 352). Dr. Iakovlev’s “assumption” that the force he applied by pulling on the clamps accurately represents the forces inside the human body is hardly sufficient to survive Dau-bert scrutiny. Accordingly, I FIND that Dr. Iakovlev’s opinions based on his “stretch test” are unreliable and thus, EXCLUDED.

I. Motion to Exclude the Opinions and Testimony of Jerry Blaivas, M.D.

Dr. Jerry Blaivas is a pelvic surgeon and urologist. The plaintiffs offer Dr. Blaivas to opine as to general and specific causation. He seeks to offer opinions regarding the complications of synthetic slings and prolapse kits, BSC’s warnings to physicians and patients, the removal of slings, the safety and efficacy of pubovaginal slings using autologous fascia and native tissue prolapse repair, and BSC’s awareness of complications relating to its products. (See Blaivas Report [Docket 239 — i], at 3-4).

BSC contends that Dr. Blaivas’s testimony should be excluded as unreliable. In particular, BSC makes the following arguments: (1) his opinions are not generally accepted within his field; (2) he improperly discounted contrary studies; (3) he fails to support his opinions with peer-reviewed literature; and (4) he failed to consider any studies using the Obtryx. (BSC’s Mem. in Supp. of Its Mot. to Exclude the Ops. and Test, of Jerry Blaivas, M.D. (“BSC’s Mem. re: Blaivas”) [Docket 240], at 1-2). Also, BSC argues that Dr. Blaiv-as’s specific causation opinions as to Ms. Hendricks should be excluded because he did not perform a proper differential diagnosis. (See id. at 2). Finally, BSC argues that “Dr. Blaivas seeks to offer opinions that (1) constitute legal opinions, (2) fall outside the scope of his expertise; or (3) consist of speculation regarding Boston Scientific’s knowledge, intent, and/or state of mind.” (Id.).

*558 1. Opinion that Polypropylene Mid-Urethral Slings Are Not Safe In the Treatment of SUI

BSC challenges Dr. Blaivas’s opinion that polypropylene mid-urethral slings are not safe to treat SUI. BSC makes several sub-arguments as to this point.

a. General Acceptance

First, BSC argues that the opinion “is unreliable because it is not generally accepted in the relevant medical and scientific communities and ... conflicts with the findings of a FDA Advisory Panel and leading urogynecological and urological organizations” of which is he a member (Id. at 5). BSC notes that the FDA Advisory Panel and organizations, including the American Urogynecologic Society (“AUGS”) and the American Urological Association (“AUA”), have released findings and statements stating that polypropylene slings are safe and effective and are the “worldwide standard of care for the surgical treatment of stress urinary incontinence.” (I'd. at 5-6). BSC contends that Dr. Blaivas discounts these findings and statements with unfounded accusations of bias. (See id. at 6). Also, at his deposition, Dr. Blaivas testified that the majority of physicians performing surgery to treat SUI use synthetic mesh slings and think that using polypropylene mesh slings are safe. (See Blaivas Dep. II [Docket 239-6], at 511:12-23).

“ ‘General acceptance’ is not a necessary precondition to the admissibility of scientific evidence under the Federal Rules of Evidence.... ” See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 . As a result, even if Dr. Blaivas’s opinion is not generally accepted, that factor alone does not dictate a finding of unreliability. Furthermore, as I explain above in my ruling on BSC’s Motion to Exclude Plaintiffs’ Experts’ Opinion that Polyproylene Mid-Urethral Slings are Defective [Docket 227], BSC is seeking to challenge Dr. Blaivas’s conclusion rather than his methodology. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 (“The focus, of course, must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.”). Therefore, this argument has no merit.

b. Failing to Consider Contrary Scientifíc Literature

Second, BSC argues that “Dr. Blaivas inexplicably dismisses and fails to consider published, peer-reviewed literature demonstrating polypropylene mid-urethral slings are safe and effective.” (BSC’s Mem. re: Blaivas [Docket 240], at 5). In particular, BSC contends that Dr. Blaivas discounts the Nilsson study, the Delorme study, and the Ulmsten study with unsupported allegations of bias. (See id. at 9-10).

An expert’s opinion may be unreliable if he fails to account for contrary scientific literature and instead “selectively [chooses] his support from the scientific landscape.” In re Rezulin Products Liab. Litig., 369 F.Supp.2d 398, 425 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (quotations omitted). “[I]f the relevant scientific literature contains evidence ' tending to refute the expert’s theory and the expert does not acknowledge or account for that evidence, the expert’s opinion is unreliable.” Id.; see also Abarca v. Franklin Cnty. Water Dist., 761 F.Supp.2d 1007 , 1066 n. 60 (E.D.Cal.2011) (“A scientist might well pick data from many different sources to serve as circumstantial evidence for a particular hypothesis, but a reliable expert would not ignore data, misstate the findings of others, make sweeping statements without support, and cite papers that do not provide the support asserted.” (quotations omitted)); Rimbert v. Eli Lilly & Co., CIV 06-0874 JCH/LFG, 2009 WL 2208570 , at *14 n. 19 *559 (D.N.M. July 21, 2009) aff'd, 647 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir.2011) (“[A]n expert who chooses to completely ignore significant contrary epidemiological evidence in favor of focusing solely on non-epidemiological studies that support her conclusion engages in a methodology that courts find unreliable.”).

However, contrary to BSC’s contentions, Dr. Blaivas provided more than mere blanket accusations of bias for discounting these studies. He explained why he suspected bias. Dr. Blaivas explained that Dr. Delorme was an inventor of the approach being studied and stated that “to conclude after [looking at] 32 patients by the inventor of the operation that it’s safe and effective stretches credibility in my judgment.” (Blaivas Dep. I [Docket 239-4], at 293:20-22; see id. at 292:9-294:19). Similarly, Dr. Blaivas claims that the Ulmsten study was “one of the studies I referred to that I believe to be completed and to get paid had to show a complication rate that was comparable to the last study ... I think this study is ethically challenged.” (Id. at 287:15-20). In regards to the Nilsson follow-up study, Dr. Blaivas testified that its methodology was, in fact, problematic because “[t]wenty-one of the patients were lost to follow-up.” (Blaivas Dep. II [Docket 239-6], at 392:5). He explained further:

A: ... All those patients that they did follow-up, no complications, no serious complications in all of their patients but one that had a minor complication, yet, there’s 21 patients that they cannot account for and we are to assume that it’s safe because they didn’t include them. All 21 of them could have had another operation for the same thing. All 21 of them could have died from an infection from this. We don’t know that. How can we possibly say that that’s safe.

(Id. at 392:9-17). If BSC seeks to challenge Dr. Blaivas’s allegations of bias as to these studies, it may do so on cross examination. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 (“Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.”).

c. Not Based on Scientifíc Literature

In another section of its memorandum, BSC argues that Dr. Blaivas’s opinion that polypropylene mid-urethral slings are not safe to treat SUI is based only on his experience. (BSC’s Mem. re: Blaivas [Docket 240], at 5-6). Dr. Blaivas testifies that he “remember[s] [his] opinions about the safety were not based predominantly on the medical literature.” (Blaivas Dep. II [Docket 239-6], at 434:22-23). In support of its argument, BSC further cites to Dr. Blaivas’s deposition testimony demonstrating that he could not identify which articles on his list he relied upon in forming this opinion and explained that “I guess I can’t answer your question fairly without looking at each article, but I do believe that I will find some.” (Blaivas Dep. I [Docket 239-4], at 150: 3-5; see BSC’s Mem. re: Blaivas [Docket 250], at 12).

Dr. Blaivas’s failure to recall which articles supported his opinion as to safety is an insufficient reason to find his methodology unreliable. Dr. Blaivas has extensive experience, (see Blaivas Report [Docket 239-1], at Ex. A (Dr. Blaivas’s curriculum vitae)), has authored peer-reviewed articles on this subject (see Blaivas Dep. I [Docket 239-4], at 149:16-23), and considered scientific literature in forming his opinions as evidenced by his relied upon list (see Blaivas Report [Docket 239-1], at Ex. B). The fact that the scientific literature was not the “predominante ]” basis of *560 his opinion does not thereby render it unreliable. (Blaivas Dep. II [Docket 239-6], at 434:23).

Therefore, I FIND that Dr. Blaivas’s opinion that polypropylene mid-urethral slings are not safe in the treatment of SUI is sufficiently rehable to pass Daubert scrutiny.

2. Failure to Base Opinion on Published, Peer-Reviewed Literature

BSC also argues that Dr. Blaivas did not base his opinions on peer-reviewed literature. (BSC’s Mem. re: Blaivas [Docket 240], at 10). In support, BSC cites to portions of Dr. Blaivas’s testimony where he discusses his relied upon list in another case, Hall. (See id. at 11; Blaivas Dep. I [Docket 239-4], at 105:10-11). It does not reveal that he based his opinions on experience alone:

Q: Okay. And you said that your opinions in these matters are based upon the 36 medical literature items that you’ve attached, correct?

A: No, I don’t think I said that. What I said is that these are supporting documents for my opinions. Many, if not most of my opinions come from my own experience with patients, talking to other doctors, particularly other experts about what they’re seeing and, you know, conducting courses, inviting speakers, listening to lectures, et cetera. That’s where — and—and having lived through the evolution of — the evolution of slings. In fact, I think that — I think these papers were mostly chosen as the best we could find in the peer-review literature to support those — my opinions, but I would not at all rely on these papers to substantiate my opinions, 'if none of these papers existed, my opinions would be the same.

(Id. at 106:5-107:1) (objection omitted). This demonstrates that Dr. Blaivas at least reviewed and considered the literature on his list. These studies supported his opinions. Whether or not his conclusions exactly comport with the conclusions reached in the studies is not determinative of my Daubert analysis. I am to assess the reliability of Dr. Blaivas’s method, not the accuracy of the conclusions that he reaches. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 (“The focus, of course, must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.”).

Next, BSC challenges Dr. Blaivas’s opinion that “[p]ubovaginal slings using autolo-gous fascia are a safer alternative to synthetic slings[.]” (Blaivas Report [Docket 239-1], at 4). In support of its argument, BSC cites to Dr. Blaivas’s deposition testimony, where he states that “there are no head-to-head studies” comparing the two slings and that he was unable to name studies finding that pubovaginal slings are safe. (Blaivas Dep. II [Docket 239-6], at 380:25). As I explain above, I do not find this deposition testimony to be dispositive. Therefore, I FIND Dr. Blaivas’s opinion that pubovaginal slings are safer than polypropylene slings survives Daubert scrutiny.

3. Dr. Blaivas’s Qualifications to Opine on the Design of the Obtryx Slings or the Adequacy of Its Warnings

BSC argues that Dr. Blaivas is unqualified to opine as to the design of the Obtryx or the adequacy of its warnings. BSC challenges several opinions in Dr. Blaivas’s report:

BSC did not warn physicians and patients about the possibility of serious and life-style altering complications including, chronic, debilitating pain, dys-pareunia, nerve injuries, vaginal scarring, bladder dysfunction, the need for *561 multiple corrective surgeries, and others.

BSC did not warn physicians about the possibility that these complications could occur months, years, or decades after placement of the devices, such as the Pinnacle and Advantage.

BSC did not warn doctors and patients about the difficulty removing their products and the less than optimal results when excision or revision became warranted due to complications.

A permanent device, such as BSC Advantage and Pinnacle, should not have been designed to be placed in a surgically contaminated field ...

(Blaivas Report [Docket 239-1], at 3-5; see BSC’s Mem. re: Blaivas [Docket 240], at 13-14). I have previously found Dr. Blaivas qualified to testify as to the adequacy of warnings. See Huskey, et al. v. Ethicon, Inc., et al., 29 F.Supp.3d 691, 719-20 , No. 2:12-cv-05201, 2014 WL 3362264, at *20 (S.D.W.Va. July 8, 2014). As I explained in Huskey with respect to a different product’s warnings:

[A]s a urologist, Dr. Blaivas is qualified to testify about the risks of implanting the TVT-0 and whether those risks were adequately expressed on the TVT-O’s IFU. Dr. Blaivas is qualified to render an opinion as to the completeness and accuracy of Ethicon’s warnings and — “it follows from that — the extent to which any inaccuracies or omissions could either deprive a reader or mislead a reader of what the risks and benefits” of the TVT-0 was when the warnings were published.

Id. at 719 , 2014 WL 3362264, at *20 (citation omitted). Here, the same reasoning applies. Therefore, I FIND Dr. Blaivas qualified to testify as to the adequacy of the Obtryx warnings.

As for product design, BSC contends that Dr. Blaivas lacks design experience and has not implanted an Obtryx sling or BSC pelvic mesh product. (See BSC’s Mem. re: Blaivas [Docket 240], at 13; Blaivas Dep. I [Docket 239-4], at 26:22-23 (“Q: Have you ever done an Obtryx surgery? A: Have not.”)). Dr. Blaivas’s experience removing SUI devices and observing complications during the removal process does not alone render him qualified to opine as to design. Dr. Blaiv-as worked in developing the autologous rectus fascial sling operation. However, this experience in developing procedures does not make him an expert in the design of a medical device. (See Blaivas Report [Docket 239-1], at 1-2). As a result, Dr. Blaivas lacks the “knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education” as to product design that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 requires. Fed.R.Evid. 702. His opinions related to product design are EXCLUDED.

4. BSC Argues Dr. Blaivas’s Opinions Are Legal Conclusions

BSC argues that Dr. Blaivas seeks to offer opinions that are legal conclusions. BSC challenges only one opinion: “Claims that make the procedure appear safer and easier to perform than it actually is are misleading.” (Blaivas Report [Docket 239-1], at 4). The plaintiffs interpret this opinion as Dr. Blaivas commenting “that BSC downplayed the difficulties associated with the surgical implantation of the Ob-tryx device.” (Pis.’ Opp’n to Def. BSC’s Mot. and Mem. of Law in Supp. of its Mot. to Exclude the Ops. and Test, of Jerry Blaivas, M.D. (“Pis. Resp. re: Blaivas”) [Docket 279], at 17). I recently explained that Dr. Blaivas’s opinion on downplaying complications based on his personal experi *562 ence is not an expert opinion and declined to address its admissibility. See Huskey, 29 F.Supp.3d at 721 , 2014 WL 3362264, at *22 . Therefore, I will not address the admissibility of this testimony here.

5.BSC Argues Dr. Blaivas’s Opinions Are Outside of His Expertise

BSC argues that Dr. Blaivas’s opinions as to polypropylene mesh shrinkage and degradation are beyond his expertise because Dr. Blaivas admits in his deposition that he is not an expert in biomaterials and that he read and relied upon other experts’ depositions in educating himself on degradation. (See Blaivas Dep. II [Docket 239-6], at 482:12-13 (testifying “I mean, the biochemistry and stuff was over my head”); id. at 481:4-484:3). BSC also cites to Dr. Blaivas’s deposition testimony which reveals that he has not performed tests on shrinkage, he has “never looked for any” studies finding that mesh shrinks asymmetrically, and he could not recall the details of a particular study on mesh shrinkage. (See id. at 458:12-14, 459:6-8, 465:8-466:2). In response, the plaintiffs point to Dr. Blaivas’s experience removing SUI devices and personally observing degradation. (See Pls. Resp. re: Blaivas [Docket 279], at 14).

In Huskey , I found that Dr. Blaivas was unqualified to opine as to mesh shrinkage and degradation due to his failure to disclose his particular experience with these matters in his expert report. 29 F.Supp.3d at 722-23 , 2014 WL 3362264, at *23-24 . I ADOPT this reasoning here. Therefore, I FIND that Dr. Blaivas is not qualified to opine as to these matters.

6.Dr. Blaivas’s State of Mind Testimony

BSC argues that Dr. Blaivas seeks to offer state of mind testimony. (See BSC’s Mem. re: Blaivas [Docket 240], at 17-18). As I explain above, this testimony is impermissible expert testimony. The plaintiffs concede that Dr. Blaivas will not offer state of mind testimony. (See Pis. Resp. re: Blaivas [Docket 279], at 17). Therefore, BSC’s motion with regard to this matter is DENIED AS MOOT.

7. BSC Argues That Dr. Blaivas’s Opinions Do Not Fit the Facts of the Case

BSC also argues that Dr. Blaivas’s opinions do not fit the facts of the case because he cannot recall whether he has reviewed any studies concerning the safety and efficacy of the Obtryx. (See Blaivas Dep. I [Docket 239-4], at 334:20-25). Even if this is the case, Dr. Blaivas’s opinions as to polypropylene mesh slings generally are still helpful to a jury here.

8. Dr. Blaivas’s Specific Causation Opinions as to Ms. Hendricks

BSC challenges Dr. Blaivas’s specific causation opinions as to Ms. Hendricks. Ms. Hendricks is no longer a plaintiff in this case. Therefore, BSC’s motion with respect to this matter is DENIED AS MOOT.

9.Dr. Blaivas’s References to POP and the Pinnacle

Dr. Blaivas’s report contains references to POP, the Pinnacle device, and the Advantage product. (See, e.g., Blaivas Report [Docket 239-1], at 3-4). In this case, the product at issue is the Obtryx which is used to treat SUI. I find that Dr. Blaivas’s references to POP, the Pinnacle, and the Advantage are immaterial to my Daubert ruling here. Many of his opinions apply to both synthetic slings and prolapse kits and merely refer to the Pinnacle and Advantage devices as examples of such. (See, e.g., id. at 3 (opining that “[s]ynthetic slings and prolapse kits, such as [BSC’s] Pinnacle and Advantage devices, cause *563 serious and life-style altering complications

Therefore, BSC’s Motion to Exclude the Opinions and Testimony of Jerry Blaivas, M.D., is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

J. Motion to Exclude the Opinions and Testimony of Alison Vreden-burgh, Ph.D., CPE

Dr. Vredenburgh works as a consultant and researcher in the field of “human factors,” providing business guidance on matters such as product warning design, injury prevention, risk management, and warning effectiveness. (See Vredenburgh Curriculum Vitae [Docket 241-1], at 2 (describing Dr. Vredenburgh’s current consulting position)). The plaintiffs offer Dr. Vredenburgh to provide expert testimony on “BSC’s management of hazards related to its transvaginal mesh products.” (Pis.’ Opp. to BSC’s Mot. to Exclude Dr. Vre-denburgh (“Pis. Mot. re: Vredenburgh”) [Docket 284], at 2). In sum, Dr. Vreden-burgh opines that “BSC failed to effectively control the hazards present in its tran-svaginal mesh products at issue in this litigation, includin

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