holding Fourth Amendment violated if seizure occurred and force used to effect the seizure was unreasonable
How later courts described this case
- holding Fourth Amendment violated if seizure occurred and force used to effect the seizure was unreasonable
- “This record shows only that Mathis was negligent and is devoid of any evidence that Mathis intended that Hightower’s car strike Evans. Therefore, Mathis is entitled to qualified immunity.”
- “In order to establish a Fourth Amendment violation, [plaintiff] must demonstrate that a seizure occurred and that it was unreasonable.” (citation omitted)
- “In order to establish a Fourth Amendment violation, [the plaintiff] must demonstrate that a seizure occurred and that it was unreasonable.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
No. 96-2062.
Morgan Luther EVANS, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Jenkins D. HIGHTOWER and James Mathis, and Dade City, Florida, Defendants-Appellants.
July 25, 1997.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. (No. 94-1307-CIV-
T-23C), Elizabeth A. Jenkins, Judge.
Before BARKETT, Circuit Judge, HILL, Senior Circuit Judge, and HOWARD*, Senior District
Judge.
BARKETT, Circuit Judge:
James Mathis and Jenkins Hightower appeal the district court's denial of their motion for
summary judgment on grounds of qualified immunity with respect to Morgan Luther Evans's Fourth
Amendment claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The following facts were before the district court on summary judgment and are not disputed.
On September 8, 1993, at approximately 8:55 p.m., Morgan Evans was walking down Robinson
Avenue in Dade City, Florida, after returning a pick-up truck to his employer's house. Evans was
about one block from his employer's house when James Mathis, a Dade City police officer, passed
him in a patrol car. Approximately ten minutes prior to seeing Evans, Mathis was notified by police
radio that an armed robbery had just occurred at St. Mary's Church, located two blocks from where
Evans was walking on Robinson Avenue. Responding to the call, Mathis began patrolling the area
around the church. The description of the perpetrator given to Mathis was that of a black male,
approximately 5' 7" to 5' 8", 150 pounds, wearing a light blue shirt, armed with a long-barreled gun
and fleeing on foot. After passing Evans, Mathis immediately backed up, stopped, and ordered
Evans to stop. Evans, a black male, 5' 9", weighing approximately 135 pounds, was wearing a grey
*
Honorable Alex T. Howard, Jr., Senior U.S. District Judge for the Southern District of
Alabama, sitting by designation.
shirt. Evans asked Mathis why he was stopped and Mathis informed him that he fit the description
of an armed robbery suspect. Mathis then ordered Evans down to the ground. Evans complied,
volunteering his name, social security number, date of birth, the name of his employer, and an
explanation of why he was in the vicinity. Evans offered to take Mathis back to his employer's
house to verify his story. Mathis removed his gun, ordered Evans to lie down in the middle of
Robinson Avenue in an "X" position with his arms and legs extended, and called for back-up.
Mathis testified at his deposition that this order to lie on the ground was given to ensure his safety
while he waited for assistance, as the suspect was reportedly armed. Responding to Mathis's call,
Jenkins Hightower, also a Dade City police officer, approached Robinson Avenue and ran over
Evans with his patrol car. As a result, Evans sustained serious injuries to his right foot and right
elbow. The time of ightower's response to Mathis's call was within five to ten minutes.
Evans filed suit under § 1983, alleging a violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free
from unreasonable seizures. Pendent to these federal claims, Evans alleged state claims of battery,
false arrest and negligence. Mathis and Hightower filed a motion for summary judgment claiming
qualified immunity, which the district court denied.1 This appeal followed.2
Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, "government officials performing discretionary
functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982).
This Circuit applies a two-part analysis to a defense of qualified immunity. First, the defendant
government official must prove that he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority
when the alleged wrongful act occurred. Hartsfield v. Lemacks, 50 F.3d 950, 953 (11th Cir.1995).
If the defendant meets this burden, the plaintiff must then demonstrate that the defendant violated
1
At oral argument, Evans conceded that for purposes of qualified immunity the evidence
against Hightower was only that of negligence and Hightower was entitled to qualified
immunity. Therefore, we reverse the denial of qualified immunity as to Hightower. Thus, we
only address Mathis's conduct.
2
We review a district court's denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity de
novo. Johnson v. Clifton, 74 F.3d 1087, 1090 (11th Cir.1996).
clearly established law based upon objective standards. Id. In order to meet this burden, the plaintiff
must demonstrate that the contours of his right were sufficiently clear so that reasonable officers
would have understood that their actions violated his rights. Swint v. City of Wadley, 51 F.3d 988,
995 (11th Cir.1995) (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039, 97
L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)).
In order to establish a Fourth Amendment violation, Evans must demonstrate that a seizure
occurred and that it was unreasonable. Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 599, 109 S.Ct.
1378, 1382-83, 103 L.Ed.2d 628 (1989). A seizure occurs when an officer restrains the freedom of
a person to walk away. Tennessee v.Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7, 105 S.Ct. 1694, 1694-99, 85 L.Ed.2d
1 (1985). The essence of Evans's claim is that Mathis effectuated an unreasonable seizure by
holding Evans at gunpoint while a patrol car ran over him. Evans also alleges that he was arrested
by virtue of being run over, and that the arrest was not supported by probable cause. Evans's claims
are unavailing because restraining a citizen's freedom for purposes of the Fourth Amendment must
be effectuated "through means intentionally applied." Brower, 489 U.S. at 597, 109 S.Ct. at 1381
(emphasis in original). The unintentional consequences of lawful government action cannot form
the basis for a Fourth Amendment violation. Id. at 596, 109 S.Ct. at 1381; Ansley v. Heinrich, 925
F.2d 1339, 1344 (11th Cir.1991) (holding that negligence, alone, absent any intentional government
conduct, cannot form the basis of a claim under § 1983 premised on the Fourth Amendment).
In this case, Evans failed to offer any evidence that the act of running him over with a patrol
car was intended as a means to seize him. In fact, Evans was seized prior to being hit by the car.
He was seized when Mathis ordered him at gunpoint to lie on the ground. The act of being run over
by Hightower's car was not part of the seizure, but was rather, "the accidental effect[ ] of otherwise
lawful government conduct." Brower, 489 U.S. at 596, 109 S.Ct. at 1381. This record shows only
that Mathis was negligent and is devoid of any evidence that Mathis intended that Hightower's car
strike Evans. Therefore, Mathis is entitled to qualified immunity. Accordingly, we REVERSE and
REMAND for proceedings consistent herewith.