The opinion
United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
No. 94-7019.
Gary MASON, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Ricky STALLINGS, C.L. St. Clair, Jr., Charles Burkhalter, Harold
Woodall, Phillip Jordan, all individually, Defendants-Appellants.
May 9, 1996.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Alabama. (No. CV 93-AR-1725-M), William M. Acker, Jr.,
Judge.
Before ANDERSON and COX, Circuit Judges, and RONEY, Senior Circuit
Judge.
RONEY, Senior Circuit Judge:
The sole issue on this appeal is qualified immunity. Although
all defendants appealed an order denying summary judgment, this
Court dismissed the appeal except the denial of qualified immunity
to those defendants sued for personal liability as individuals.
Mason v. Cherokee County, Alabama, No. 94-7019, (N.D.Ala. Filed
July 21, 1995). We are in accord with the decision of that panel
that the issue of qualified immunity was sufficiently raised in
motion, pleading, and memorandum before the trial court, even
though not specifically referenced in the motion for summary
judgment itself.
Plaintiff Mason Stallings alleges a cause of action under the
Americans with Disabilities Act. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111, et seq.
(Supp. IV 1992). Mason, a laborer with the Cherokee County Road
Department, alleged that he was not properly accommodated under the
Disabilities Act after two injuries on the job which resulted in
permanent injury and disability.
Mason sued Cherokee County, Alabama, the Cherokee County
Commission, and the County Commissioners in both their official and
their individual capacities. The district court denied without
opinion the County Commissioners' motion for summary judgment on
the claim against them individually, which was argued to include a
ground of qualified immunity from suit. Only the qualified
immunity issue is before us.
We hold that the Disabilities Act does not provide for
individual liability, only for employer liability. The Seventh
Circuit appears to be the only Circuit thus far to rule directly
that only the employer, not individual employees, can be liable
under the Americans with Disabilities Act. EEOC v. AIC Sec. Inv.,
55 F.3d 1276, 1279-82 (7th Cir.1995). We follow that holding and
the reasoning of Judge Michael S. Kanne's thorough opinion for that
court.
The definition of "employer" in the Disabilities Act is like
the definitions in Title VII of the 1994 Civil Rights Act, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(b), and in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
29 U.S.C. § 630(b). This Circuit has previously held that there is
no individual responsibility under either of those Acts. Busby v.
City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 772 (11th Cir.1991) ("The relief
granted under Title VII is against the employer, not individual
employees whose actions would constitute a violation of the Act.").
Smith v. Lomax, 45 F.3d 402, 403 n. 4 (11th Cir.1995) (Individuals
"cannot be held liable under the ADEA or Title VII."). The Smith
Court relied on Busby for Title VII, and Fourth and Ninth Circuit
decisions for ADEA. Birkbeck v. Marvel Lighting Corp., 30 F.3d
507, 511 (4th Cir.) ("[T]he ADEA limits civil liability to the
employer...."), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 666, 130
L.Ed.2d 600 (1994); Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l Inc., 991 F.2d 583
(9th Cir.1993) (Title VII and ADEA), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----,
114 S.Ct. 1049, 127 L.Ed.2d 372 (1994).
The plaintiff argues for individual liability because the
definition of employer includes "any agent of such person." We
agree with the Seventh Circuit that the "agent" language was
included to ensure respondeat superior liability of the employer
for the acts of its agents, a theory of liability not available for
42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims. See also Thompson v. City of Arlington,
Tex., 838 F.Supp. 1137, 1151 (N.D.Tex.1993) ("Only when a public
official is working in his official capacity can the official be an
agent of the government.").
As to individual liability, there is no sound reason to read
the Disabilities Act any differently from this Court's reading of
Title VII and the Age Discrimination Act. The County Commissioners
could not be held liable in their individual capacities for any
violation of the Disabilities Act.
This creates a problem as to the appropriate disposition of
this appeal. The lack of any law upon which to base a claim
against a defendant calls for dismissal for failure to state a
claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) or for summary judgment for
defendant on that ground. Although denial of qualified immunity on
summary judgment is immediately appealable, a denial of relief for
failure to state a claim is not immediately appealable, whether in
the form of a denial of summary judgment or a motion to dismiss,
absent certification by the trial court under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
The district court in this case denied a § 1292(b) certification.
Therefore, it is not open to us to reverse the denial of summary
judgment on a "failure to state a claim ground."
Judicially created qualified immunity enables a public
official to avoid suit on an alleged constitutional or federal law
violation where the law governing the claimed right was not clearly
established at the time of the official's conduct. Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982).
The relevant question on a motion for summary judgment based
on a defense of qualified immunity is whether a reasonable
official could have believed his or her actions were lawful in
light of clearly established law and the information possessed
by the official at the time the conduct occurred.
Stewart v. Baldwin County Bd. of Educ., 908 F.2d 1499, 1503 (11th
Cir.1990). In such cases, if the law was clear, there would be no
"qualified" immunity and the individual liability claim could
proceed on whatever other defenses the defendant might have. Even
if the law was clearly established as to what defendants should
have done in their official capacities in this case, however, there
could not be any claim against them individually. This, then is
not the kind of case for which "qualified" immunity from suit was
designed.
Thus, it appears that the denial of qualified immunity is
correct. The decision we make here in considering the doctrine of
qualified immunity, however, becomes the law of this case. Having
decided the individual liability issue, it is only fair for the
parties and the district court to understand that the issue has
been resolved in this case, so that no further time need be
expended litigating the point in the district court.
Therefore, we affirm the denial of summary judgment based on
qualified immunity, and remand to the district court for further
proceedings in view of the plaintiff's failure to state a cause of
action against County Commissioners in their individual capacities.
AFFIRMED and REMANDED.