The opinion
United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
No. 94-6316.
Jerroll RICHARDSON, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
LEEDS POLICE DEPARTMENT; Leeds, City of, Defendants-Appellees.
Dec. 15, 1995.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Alabama. (No. CV-92-AR-1588-S), William M. Acker, Jr.,
Judge.
Before EDMONDSON and BIRCH, Circuit Judges, and HENDERSON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
PER CURIAM:
Jerroll Richardson, a former police officer for the City of
Leeds, Alabama ("City"), appeals from the judgment of the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama
dismissing this action alleging racial discrimination in violation
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et
seq., 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We reverse and remand
for further proceedings.
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Richardson, an African American, was an officer of the Leeds
Police Department ("Department") from January 1989 until he
resigned in May 1991. A short time after leaving the Department he
changed his mind and sought reinstatement. His efforts were
unsuccessful. On July 29, 1991, he filed an administrative
complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC")
alleging that he resigned because of disparate treatment in job
assignments during his period of employment. He also accused the
Department of refusing to rehire him because of his race. After
receiving a right to sue letter from the EEOC, Richardson commenced
this action in the district court against the City and the Chief of
Police, Thomas W. McDonald. He alleged in deposition testimony
that his resignation amounted to a constructive discharge because
it stemmed from the denial of opportunities for advancement while
employed by the City, as well as racial slurs directed at him by a
fellow officer and general hostility within the Department toward
black citizens. He also claimed that he was not restored to his
former position with the Department on account of his race and
because he complained that black citizens were treated more
severely by the City's police officers than were white citizens.
The complaint as amended included causes of action for alleged
violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("1964
Act"), § 1981 and § 1983.1 He sought declaratory and injunctive
1
The petition did not specify the provision or provisions of
Title VII relied upon by Richardson. Section 2000e-2(a)(1) of
the 1964 Act, however, clearly applies to the allegations. It
states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer—
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin....
Section 1981 bars racial discrimination in the making and
enforcement of contracts. Richardson's cause of action
under § 1983, which prohibits the deprivation of federal
rights, privileges or immunities under color of state law,
was based upon charges that the defendants violated his
equal protection rights protected by the United States
Constitution.
relief, backpay, compensatory and punitive damages and
reinstatement to the position he would have held absent the
purported discrimination.2
2
The complaint also invoked the Civil Rights Act of 1991
("1991 Act" or "Act"), which expanded the scope of § 1981 and
provided for the recovery of compensatory and punitive damages
for certain violations of Title VII, as well as the right to a
jury trial when such damages are sought. The 1991 Act did not
apply to the defendants' conduct alleged here, however, because
it occurred prior to the Act's November 21, 1991 effective date.
Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128
L.Ed.2d 229 (1994); Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. --
--, 114 S.Ct. 1510, 128 L.Ed.2d 274 (1994); Goldsmith v. City of
Atmore, 996 F.2d 1155, 1159 (11th Cir.1993). Consequently, under
this court's precedent, which construed Title VII claims as
equitable in nature, Richardson was not entitled to a jury trial
on his Title VII cause of action. Lincoln v. Board of Regents of
the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 697 F.2d 928, 934 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 826, 104 S.Ct. 97, 78 L.Ed.2d 102 (1983). Nor
was he permitted to seek Title VII compensatory or punitive
damages. Walker v. Ford Motor Co., 684 F.2d 1355, 1364 (11th
Cir.1982). Moreover, Richardson's § 1981 allegations were
governed by the pre-1991 Act rule of law announced in Patterson
v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d
132 (1989), in which the Court held that the reach of § 1981 was
limited to discriminatory actions taken during the initial
formation of a contract and conduct designed to impair the
enforcement of contracts through the legal process. Id. at 179-
80, 109 S.Ct. at 2374, 105 L.Ed.2d at 152. Accordingly,
Richardson's complaints of constructive discharge and disparate
treatment during the course of his employment were not actionable
under that statute, but only under Title VII and § 1983. We need
not decide whether Richardson's claim for failure to rehire was
cognizable under § 1981 as interpreted by Patterson, see Wall v.
Trust Co. of Ga., 946 F.2d 805, 808 (11th Cir.1991) (test is
whether a "new and distinct" relationship would be formed),
because the procedures and relief available under that law,
including the right to have a jury determine compensatory and
punitive damages, are duplicative of those afforded by § 1983
when, as here, state actors are sued as defendants. See Johnson
v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 460, 95 S.Ct.
1716, 1720, 44 L.Ed.2d 295, 301 (1975) (§ 1981 plaintiffs may
seek both equitable and legal relief, including compensatory
damages and, in limited circumstances, punitive damages); Smith
v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 103 S.Ct. 1625, 75 L.Ed.2d 632 (1983) (both
compensatory and punitive damages are available under § 1983);
but see City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247,
271, 101 S.Ct. 2748, 2762, 69 L.Ed.2d 616, 634-35 (1981)
(punitive damages may not be assessed against municipalities).
We therefore treat the complaint as alleging infractions of Title
The City subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment on
all charges against it. The district court granted the motion with
respect to the claim for constructive discharge, finding that
Richardson's reapplication for his old position foreclosed a
conclusion that he resigned because of unbearable working
conditions. See Morgan v. Ford, 6 F.3d 750, 755-56 (11th Cir.1993)
(employee who involuntarily resigns to escape illegal
discrimination must prove that his employment situation was so
intolerable that a reasonable person his position would have felt
compelled to leave), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 2708,
129 L.Ed.2d 836 (1994). The court denied summary judgment on all
other claims. The court then, on July 23, 1993, entered final
judgment for the City on the constructive discharge issue pursuant
to Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b).3 Richardson did not appeal.
A jury trial on the § 1983 cause of action stemming from the
alleged disparate treatment during the course of employment and in
rehiring was held in 1994. At the conclusion of Richardson's
case-in-chief, the defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law
in compliance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 50. The district court denied the
motions and continued with the trial. After the close of all the
evidence, the defendants renewed their Rule 50 motions. The court
took the motions under advisement and submitted the case to the
jury, which was instructed to respond to a set of interrogatories
VII and § 1983.
3
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an
action, Rule 54(b) permits the entry of final judgment on a
single count "upon an express determination that there is no just
reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of
judgment."
as part of its deliberations. By its answers the jury exonerated
McDonald of all alleged wrongdoing. It also found that the City
did not discriminate against Richardson during his tenure with the
Department. It could not reach a verdict, however, on the question
of whether Richardson's race played a part in the City's refusal to
rehire him. The district court announced that it would enter
orders on the partial verdict and released the jury.
Thereafter, in a memorandum opinion, the court granted the
City's motion for judgment as a matter of law on the reinstatement
claim. In arriving at this decision, the court found that
Richardson failed to prove a prima facie case of discrimination in
the rehiring context because, unlike other white officers who were
reemployed after they resigned, Richardson indicated when he left
the Department that he was "burned out." The court consequently
determined that Richardson was not similarly situated to the
nonminority officers who were restored to their former positions.
The court found further that, even assuming Richardson carried his
initial burden of proof, he did not actually want the job for which
he made application. In support of this finding the court relied
on the jury's negative response to interrogatory number five, which
inquired whether Richardson "presently" desired a position with the
City as a police patrolman.4 The court concluded that Richardson
4
Richardson testified as follows:
Q. Do you wish to go back to work for the City of Leeds
as a police officer if you win this case?
A. I'm afraid.
Q. Afraid of what?
could not prevail on the claim for reinstatement under any theory
of recovery given this circumstance. The court found additionally
that, to the extent that the evidence presented an issue of
credibility, Richardson's admission that he resigned because he was
"burned out" was a legitimate reason for declining to rehire him
which was not pretextual.
Pursuant to the jury's partial verdict and the ruling on the
motion for judgment as a matter of law, the district court
dismissed the action in its entirety against both defendants.
A. I have put so many people in prison for drugs that
it would be too easy for a while on the night shift or
patrolling or an abandoned car stop for someone to
shoot me. I'm not necessarily saying that it would be
an individual that I had arrested. But when the
investigation took place, then that, that is what would
probably come out.
....
Q. ... you said you didn't think you wanted your job
back, that you were afraid to go back?
A. No, sir, that's not what I said. I did not say that
I didn't want my job back. I still want my job back.
I'm just afraid, and that fear is a fear that I did not
have at the time that I went and asked to be rehired.
Q. You say that whatever that fear is, you still want
your job back now?
A. After taking certain precautions, yes, sir.
Q. So that fear, whatever it is, was not so great that
you don't want your job back now?
A. Sir?
Q. You want it back? You want to go back to work with
the City of Leeds doing what you were doing?
A. I want to go back to work for the City of Leeds,
yes, sir.
(R4 at 196-97, 325-26).
Richardson subsequently filed this appeal in which he challenges
only the judgment rendered as a matter of law in favor of the City
on the § 1983 and Title VII causes of action arising from the
failure to restore him to his former position.
II. DISCUSSION
We review a decision to grant a judgment as a matter of law
de novo, applying the same standards utilized by the district
court. Daniel v. City of Tampa, Fla., 38 F.3d 546, 549 (11th
Cir.1994), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 2557, 132 L.Ed.2d
811 (1995). A judgment as a matter of law is warranted "[i]f
during a trial by jury a party has been fully heard on an issue and
there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable
jury to find for that party on that issue." Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a)(1).
When evaluating a Rule 50 motion, the court must consider all of
the evidence and reasonable inferences arising therefrom in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Beckwith v. City of
Daytona Beach Shores, Fla., 58 F.3d 1554, 1560 (11th Cir.1995). A
judgment as a matter of law may be affirmed only when " "the facts
and inferences point so overwhelmingly in favor of the movant ...
that reasonable people could not arrive at a contrary verdict.' "
Pulte Home Corp. v. Osmose Wood Preserving, Inc., 60 F.3d 734, 739
(11th Cir.1995) (quoting Roboserve, Ltd. v. Tom's Foods, Inc., 940
F.2d 1441, 1448 (11th Cir.1991)).
In a case such as this alleging disparate treatment, in which
§ 1983 is employed as a remedy for the same conduct attacked under
Title VII, " "the elements of the two causes of action are the
same.' " Cross v. State of Ala., 49 F.3d 1490, 1508 (11th
Cir.1995) (quoting Hardin v. Stynchcomb, 691 F.2d 1364, 1369 n. 16
(11th Cir.1982)). In both instances, the plaintiff must prove that
the defendant acted with discriminatory intent. Hardin, 691 F.2d
at 1369 n. 16.
Identical methods of proof, as described in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973),
are also employed. See St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S.
----, ---- n. 1, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2746 n. 1, 125 L.Ed.2d 407, 415 n.
1 (1993) (assuming that the McDonnell Douglas analysis applies
equally to § 1983 and Title VII claims of discrimination). First,
the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case, which raises a
presumption that the employer's decision was more likely than not
based upon an impermissible factor.5 McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411
U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d at 677; Texas Dep't of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254, 101 S.Ct. 1089,
1094, 67 L.Ed.2d 207, 216 (1981). The defendant may rebut this
presumption by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for its decision. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802, 93
S.Ct. at 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d at 678; Texas Dep't of Community
Affairs, 450 U.S. at 254-55, 101 S.Ct. at 1094, 67 L.Ed.2d at 216.
If the defendant meets this burden, the plaintiff must then have
5
The proof required to establish a prima facie case will
vary depending on the circumstances. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,
411 U.S. at 802 n. 13, 93 S.Ct. at 1824 n. 13, 36 L.Ed.2d at 677
n. 13. In McDonnell Douglas Corp., in which the plaintiff
likewise alleged that his former employer refused to rehire him
on account of his race, the Court stated that this initial burden
may be satisfied with evidence that (1) the applicant belonged to
a racial minority; (2) he applied and was qualified for the job;
(3) he was rejected; and (4) after his rejection, the position
remained open and the employer continued to seek qualified
applicants. Id. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d at 677.
the opportunity to persuade the trier of fact, through the
presentation of his own case and by cross-examining the defendant's
witnesses, that the reason proffered was not the real basis for the
decision, but a pretext for discrimination. McDonnell Douglas
Corp., 411 U.S. at 804, 93 S.Ct. at 1825, 36 L.Ed.2d at 679; St.
Mary's Honor Center, 509 U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2747, 125
L.Ed.2d at 416.
The distinction between the Title VII and § 1983 causes in
the present case was in the availability of a jury trial and
compensatory damages under § 1983, but not with respect to the
Title VII equitable claims, which were tried to the court. See
supra note 2. When legal and equitable causes are joined in one
action, the legal issues must be decided first. Dairy Queen, Inc.
v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 479, 82 S.Ct. 894, 900-01, 8 L.Ed.2d 44, 52
(1962). To the extent that the elements of the two types of claims
mirror one another, the jury's findings on the legal questions are
binding in resolving the equitable issues. Lincoln v. Board of
Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 697 F.2d 928, 934 (11th Cir.),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 826, 104 S.Ct. 97, 78 L.Ed.2d 102 (1983).
Richardson argues on appeal that the district court erred by
visiting whether he had established a prima facie case of
discrimination after the action was fully tried on the merits, in
violation of United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens,
460 U.S. 711, 103 S.Ct. 1478, 75 L.Ed.2d 403 (1983). We agree that
it was wrong for the court to follow this procedure. In Aikens,
the Supreme Court held that
when the defendant fails to persuade the district court to
dismiss the action for lack of a prima facie case, and
responds to the plaintiff's proof by offering evidence of the
reason for the plaintiff's rejection, the factfinder must then
decide whether the rejection was discriminatory within the
meaning of Title VII.
Id. at 714-15, 103 S.Ct. at 1481, 75 L.Ed.2d at 410 (footnote
omitted). When the trier of fact has before it all the evidence
needed to decide the ultimate issue of whether the defendant
intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff, the question of
whether the plaintiff properly made out a prima facie case "is no
longer relevant." Id. at 715, 103 S.Ct. at 1482, 75 L.Ed.2d at
410; see also Wall v. Trust Co. of Georgia, 946 F.2d 805, 809-10
(11th Cir.1991).
The district court's reliance on Richardson's statement that
he was "burned out" to find that he failed to establish a prima
facie case was substantively flawed as well. "The burden of
establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment is not
onerous." Texas Dep't of Community Affairs, 450 U.S. at 253, 101
S.Ct. at 1094, 67 L.Ed.2d at 215; see also Howard v. BP Oil Co.,
Inc., 32 F.3d 520, 524 (11th Cir.1994) (characterizing the
requirements of demonstrating a prima facie case as "minimal"). To
raise an inference of discrimination, it was not necessary for
Richardson to show that he and the nonminority applicants who were
rehired gave the same reason or reasons for resigning. Rather, it
was sufficient for him to show that he belonged to a racial
minority, that he applied for and was qualified for the job and
that after his rejection, the position remained open and the
Department continued to seek qualified applicants. See supra note
5.
The district court also decided that Richardson's admission of
"burn out" was a legally acceptable ground for the City's decision,
which was not pretextual. Richardson urges us to hold that the
evidence relating to pretext was sufficient to create a jury
issue.6 After reviewing the trial transcript, we agree that the
district court could have reached its conclusion only by improperly
resolving conflicting inferences arising from the evidence in the
light most favorable to the City.
The proof at the trial established that Richardson worked
initially in the detective division as an undercover narcotics
officer, which he understood would be a temporary assignment. In
April 1989, after the undercover detail ended, he was reassigned to
patrol duty. While working the 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. shift, he
was required to testify during the day in court proceedings
resulting from his prior undercover work. During this time he was
also "loaned" to several other police departments to assist in
narcotics work conducted in nearby counties. After certain
6
Richardson argues on appeal that Lynn Maxey, the City's
mayor with whom the decision ultimately rested, never proffered
Richardson's "burnout" as a reason for not rehiring him. Maxey
testified, however, that he was aware that Richardson complained
of being "burned out" when he resigned. (R6 at 674-75).
Although Maxey did not directly state that this influenced his
decision, the jury could have inferred that it did. Maxey cited
additional reasons for not rehiring Richardson, chief among them
that he already had someone else in mind for the position when
Richardson expressed an interest. Richardson maintains that the
evidence reveals the existence of an issue of fact as to whether
the other grounds given by the mayor were also pretextual. The
district court specifically declined to consider these various
explanations, however (R2-96 at 4), and rested its judgment
solely on its finding that Richardson was "burned out" (id. at
9). We confine our review, therefore, to whether this particular
motive cited by the district court must lead inexorably to a
finding of no discrimination. We also note that the City's
contention on appeal that Richardson failed to demonstrate that
the mayor was the final decisionmaker for purposes of municipal
liability under § 1983 is without merit.
conversations with McDonald, Richardson expected to be considered
for the next available permanent position in the detective
division, which McDonald indicated would be filled by someone from
within the Department. Instead, the next opening went to a white
applicant from outside the Department. Richardson remained in a
patrol slot until his resignation.
Richardson testified that he left "basically due to the
adverse treatment, the type of double standards. I was, I was
burnt out." (R4 at 168). He explained that
between working narcotics, patrol, narcotics on loan, court
time, and all of this running together, trying to perform my
job the best that I could in patrol, that culminated with, at
the time that the position was filled in the detective
division, it was from outside and not from within. Also when
the DARE program came around, it was filled from the outside,
not from within.
When the subject that had went to the DARE program left,
leaving a slot open again, and two hires were made and then
the slot was filled by one of the hires coming in, it was just
all culminating. And at the time I felt that I was fighting
a losing battle.
(Id. at 170).7 He stated further that he informed McDonald of the
foregoing reasons when he submitted his letter of resignation.
(Id. at 183). Later, after time for reflection, he decided that he
wished to continue in his old job. (Id. at 184-85). After he was
turned down by the mayor, he sought out and obtained other police
work. (Id. at 191-93).
There was also evidence that the mayor reinstated three white
patrolmen after they had resigned. McDonald testified that one of
the officers left the Department because he was unhappy over the
7
Richardson had expressed an interest in participating in
DARE, which was a Department-sponsored drug awareness program for
teenagers.
denial of a promotion. (R5 at 403). Another was dissatisfied with
his pay and felt he had been treated unfairly with respect to a
request for military leave. ( Id. at 406-07, 416-17). The third
was rehired despite a poor work record and an evident lack of
interest in performing cooperatively with other members of the
force. (Id. at 424-25).
The district court apparently believed that the evidence
failed to create an issue of fact as to the decisionmaker's intent
with respect to Richardson because it was undisputed that
Richardson complained he was "burned out" when he left the
Department. Although the evidence would have permitted a
reasonable jury to infer an innocent motive on the City's part—that
the mayor viewed Richardson as a poor candidate for reemployment
because he was "burned out" by police work and no longer inspired
to perform to the best of his ability—a reasonable jury could also
have concluded that Richardson's professed "burn out" was not the
true reason he was not rehired. Like Richardson, two of the white
officers who were rehired voiced dissatisfaction with their
treatment within the Department. Richardson was arguably more
qualified than the third reinstated patrolman.8 Apart from
Richardson's race, the evidence did not demonstrate any
circumstances peculiar to his situation which set him apart from
the white officers who were restored to their jobs.9 In short, the
8
Although Richardson's record was not unblemished, he
received commendations for his undercover work. In addition,
McDonald recommended against rehiring the poorly qualified white
officer, but did not oppose Richardson's reapplication.
9
In each case, the applicant sought to return to the same
position he had vacated, a similar length of time elapsed between
evidence presented a question of fact as to whether the mayor's
decision not to rehire Richardson was racially motivated.
As additional support for the judgment, the district court
cited the jury's finding that Richardson did not "presently" desire
to be reinstated.10 This factor, of course, could not have served
as a rationale for the mayor's decision to reject Richardson's
application in 1991, because it came to light for the first time
during the trial in 1994. The district court construed this
circumstance, however, as interposing a complete obstacle to
granting any type of relief. In doing so the court confused the
issue of liability with the type of warranted relief.
According to an "Amended Damage List" which was filed in
support of the action, Richardson asked for backpay, reinstatement,
declaratory and injunctive relief, costs and attorney's fees under
Title VII. In his § 1983 suit he sought compensation for
"financial hardship, pain, suffering and mental anguish." (R2-49).
The jury's finding that, at the time of trial, Richardson no longer
wanted his old job, may well have been relevant to fashioning a
remedy in the event of the City's liability. See Goldstein v.
Manhattan Indus., Inc., 758 F.2d 1435, 1448 (11th Cir.) (the
decision of whether reinstatement should be ordered is within the
sound discretion of the district court), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
1005, 106 S.Ct. 525, 88 L.Ed.2d 457 (1985); Carmichael v.
the officer's departure and his request to be rehired and the
mayor made the final decision.
10
We reject without discussion Richardson's assertion that
the jury's finding was inconsistent with its deadlock on the
issue of whether the City's refusal to rehire him was motivated
by a discriminatory purpose.
Birmingham Saw Works, 738 F.2d 1126, 1136 (11th Cir.1984)
(injunction ordering employer to refrain from discriminatory
practices not justified where the plaintiff is not reinstated).
But it would not have foreclosed a declaratory judgment that the
City acted with bad intent, making it liable for backpay and
compensatory damages. The district court's alternative reasoning
for ordering judgment as a matter of law was therefore erroneous.
III. CONCLUSION
The judgment rendered as a matter of law in favor of the City
on Richardson's § 1983 and Title VII causes of action alleging he
was not rehired on account of his race is hereby VACATED. The case
is REMANDED to the district court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.