concluding that plaintiff’s excessive force claim -- based on the officer’s grabbing plaintiff’s shoulder, pushing plaintiff against a van, and handcuffing plaintiff -- was subsumed in plaintiff’s claim for false arrest where plaintiff argued only that “there was no need for any force as the force was used to accomplish an unlawful arrest.” (emphasis in original)
How later courts described this case
- concluding that plaintiff’s excessive force claim -- based on the officer’s grabbing plaintiff’s shoulder, pushing plaintiff against a van, and handcuffing plaintiff -- was subsumed in plaintiff’s claim for false arrest where plaintiff argued only that “there was no need for any force as the force was used to accomplish an unlawful arrest.” (emphasis in original)
- holding that a claim that any force during a false arrest is excessive is subsumed into the false arrest claim itself because damages for false arrest include damages for use of force to effect that false arrest
- holding that a claim that any force during a false arrest is excessive is subsumed in the false arrest claim itself because damages for false arrest include damages for use of force to effect that false arrest
- reversing grant of officer’s summary judgment motion on qualified immunity grounds because no reasonable officer could have believed, based only on the information he had, that the arrestee committed a crime by taking photographs at a festival
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
No. 94-2337.
Gerald WILLIAMSON, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
F.H. MILLS, individually and in his capacity as an agent/employee
of the Florida Department of Business Regulation; Florida
Department of Business Regulation, Defendants-Appellees.
Sept. 27, 1995.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Florida. (No. GCA 93-10032-MMP), Maurice Mitchell Paul,
Chief Judge.
Before COX, BLACK and BARKETT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Gerald Williamson sued Lieutenant Frederick Mills, an agent of
the Florida Department of Business Regulation, Division of
Alcoholic Beverages, for violations of Williamson's First, Fourth,
Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights resulting from
Mills's detention of Williamson at Fourth of July festivities in
1991. Concluding that Mills is individually entitled to qualified
immunity, the district court granted him summary judgment.
Williamson appeals. We reverse and remand.
I. Background
The core facts are essentially undisputed. On July 4, 1991,
the Florida Freedom Festival and Parade was held in Tallahassee to
honor veterans of the Vietnam War. Williamson, a veteran, was
invited to attend. He came to the Festival with his camera,
accompanied by several other members of a group called Veterans for
Peace. The group set up an information table in the ceremony area
and planned to march under a banner in the parade.
Security was tight because several dignitaries, including
Governor Lawton Chiles, were attending the Festival. Among the
plainclothesmen and women present were Mills and Elaine Pavan, an
agent of the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco. A death
threat was outstanding against Pavan in connection with her
undercover investigation of biker gangs, and Mills was aware of the
threat. Several other undercover law officers besides Pavan were
in the security force.
During the festivities, Mills noticed that Williamson was
taking pictures of some of the undercover officers. Mills knew
that a photograph of Pavan would enable a hit man to identify her.
He also was aware that photographs of other undercover officers are
saleable to organized crime groups, which use such photographs to
detect undercover infiltration.1 Williamson and others in his
group, for their part, believed that the plainclothesmen and women
were surveilling them too closely, and they feared that the
plainclothesmen were members of a subversive group. Williamson was
taking photographs of the plainclothesmen to show to Veterans for
Peace members who were not attending the Festival. Williamson in
fact succeeded in taking, along with a few pictures of the
festivities, frontal photographs of several undercover officers,
but not of Pavan.
As Williamson and other members of Veterans for Peace walked
to Williamson's car to get their parade banner, Mills stopped
1
We now know that Williamson was not taking the photographs
for any improper purpose.
Williamson, flashed his laminated badge, and demanded the film from
Williamson's camera. Williamson refused, and Mills threatened to
arrest him. Williamson asked on what charges, and Mills replied
that the charge was threatening the life of a police officer.
Williamson still refused to turn over the film, and this colloquy
repeated itself several times.
As Williamson finally turned to leave, Mills grabbed
Williamson's shoulder, pushed him against a van, and handcuffed one
hand. Mills then forced Williamson against a car hood and
handcuffed his other hand. As a crowd including Television news
cameras began to form, Mills put Williamson in the back of a police
van and took him to a nearby parking lot. Mills continued to
demand, and Williamson to refuse, the film from Williamson's
camera. While in the parking lot, Mills pushed Williamson, still
handcuffed, against the police van and tried to take the camera by
force. Williamson protested, and Mills again tried to persuade
Williamson to surrender the film. Finally, a Tallahassee policeman
told Williamson to hand over the film because the camera would be
taken when Williamson was arrested, anyway. Williamson agreed to
turn over the film. Mills removed the handcuffs. Williamson
removed the film from the camera, and Mills gave him five dollars
to reimburse him for the cost of the film. The entire encounter
lasted thirty or forty minutes.
Williamson sued Mills, the City of Tallahassee, the Florida
Department of Business Regulation, and two Tallahassee Police
Department officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting violation of
several constitutional rights. The district court dismissed the
claims against Tallahassee, the Florida Department of Business
Regulation, and the officers in their official capacities, holding
that the Eleventh Amendment bars these claims. The court granted
summary judgment for Mills in his individual capacity based on
qualified immunity, focusing on Williamson's false arrest claim.
Williamson appeals only the summary judgment for Mills, and he
bases his argument only on the Fourth Amendment claim.
II. Issue and Standard of Review
The primary issue on appeal is whether Mills is entitled to
summary judgment based on qualified immunity on Williamson's Fourth
Amendment claim. We review summary judgments de novo. Hardin v.
Hayes, 957 F.2d 845, 848 (11th Cir.1992).
III. Discussion
We conclude that Mills does not merit qualified immunity
against the Fourth Amendment false arrest claim. An official sued
as an individual is entitled to qualified immunity, and therefore
summary judgment, if his conduct "does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). "For
qualified immunity to be surrendered, pre-existing law must
dictate, that is, truly compel (not just suggest or allow or raise
a question about), the conclusion for every like-situated,
reasonable government agent that what defendant is doing violates
federal law in the circumstances. " Lassiter v. Alabama A & M
Univ., 28 F.3d 1146, 1150 (11th Cir.1994) (en banc). "Public
officials are not obligated to be creative or imaginative in
drawing analogies from previously decided cases." Adams v. St.
Lucie County Sheriff's Dep't, 962 F.2d 1563, 1575 (11th Cir.1992)
(Edmondson, J., dissenting), approved en banc, 998 F.2d 923 (11th
Cir.1993). "If case law, in factual terms, has not staked out a
bright line, qualified immunity almost always protects the
defendant." Kelly v. Curtis, 21 F.3d 1544, 1550 (11th Cir.1994)
(quoting Post v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 7 F.3d 1552, 1557 (11th
Cir.1993)).
Even under these stringent standards, Mills is not entitled to
qualified immunity from Williamson's claim of false arrest because
a reasonable official in Mills's shoes, possessing the information
Mills possessed, could not have believed that his conduct comported
with the Fourth Amendment. In particular, pre-existing law compels
the conclusion that Mills arrested Williamson without probable
cause.2
The Fourth Amendment permits warrantless arrests if made with
2
The district court determined that Mills's detention had
crossed the hazy boundary between an investigative stop
(requiring only a reasonable suspicion under Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), and its progeny)
and an arrest (requiring probable cause). We agree with the
court's analysis—and indeed it goes unchallenged in this
appeal—but believe that the court asked the wrong question. The
relevant question is not whether the detention amounted to an
arrest, but whether precedent compelled a reasonable official in
Mills's shoes, possessing the information he possessed, to
conclude that his detention of Williamson was an arrest rather
than an investigative stop. In a case such as this in which the
level of Fourth Amendment protection is a possible issue,
determination of the investigative stop-arrest boundary
necessarily enters into the legal analysis we ascribe to the
defendant to determine whether "what [he] is doing violates
federal law in the circumstances." Lassiter, 28 F.3d at 1150.
See United States v. Espinosa-Guerra, 805 F.2d 1502, 1506 (11th
Cir.1986); United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583, 591 (5th Cir.
Unit B 1982) (en banc).
probable cause. E.g., United States v. Espinosa-Guerra, 805 F.2d
1502, 1506 (11th Cir.1986). "A law enforcement officer has
probable cause to arrest a suspect if the facts and circumstances
within the officer's knowledge, of which he or she has reasonably
trustworthy information, would cause a prudent person to believe,
under the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is
committing, or is about to commit an offense." Von Stein v.
Brescher, 904 F.2d 572, 578 (11th Cir.1990). Critical to probable
cause is some information identifying the subject of the arrest as
the perpetrator of the suspected criminal conduct. See, e.g., Wong
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 480-482, 83 S.Ct. 407, 413-414,
9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963).
Qualified immunity shields Mills against a claim of arrest
without probable cause if a "reasonable officer could have believed
[the arrest] to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and
the information the [arresting] officers possessed." Hunter v.
Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227, 112 S.Ct. 534, 536, 116 L.Ed.2d 589
(1991) (second brackets in original) (quoting Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3040, 97 L.Ed.2d 523
(1987)). "Even law enforcement officials who "reasonably but
mistakenly conclude that probable cause is present' are entitled to
immunity." Id. (quoting Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641, 107 S.Ct. at
3039). As this court has put it, to enjoy qualified immunity Mills
need only have had arguable probable cause to arrest Williamson.
Post v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 7 F.3d 1552, 1558 (11th Cir.1993).
An officer in Mills's shoes could not have reasonably
concluded that he had probable cause to arrest Williamson. It is
true that Mills had reason to believe criminal activity may have
been afoot. He knew of the death threats against Pavan. Mills
also knew of the recent convictions of the makers of another death
threat against Pavan, and this could reasonably have led Mills to
believe that the current death threats were real. He knew that
photographs of Pavan could be useful in carrying out any death
threats. Moreover, Mills was aware that criminal organizations
prize photographs of undercover officers because of the help the
photos give them in weeding out law enforcement infiltration.
What was fatally missing from Mills's knowledge, however, was
a link between the suspected criminal activity and Williamson. Cf.
Swint v. City of Wadley, Ala., 51 F.3d 988, 996 (11th Cir.1995)
(holding that no arguable probable cause existed to raid a
nightclub when law enforcement officials lacked any information
that employees, owners, or patrons of the club were involved in
suspected drug activity). Taking photographs at a public event is
a facially innocent act. The mere fact that Williamson's
photographs could have been used for unlawful activity—such as
carrying out a death threat against Pavan—is not enough to
establish even arguable probable cause for Williamson's arrest
unless Mills had some datum to connect Williamson to the death
threats or other crime. Not only did Mills lack this information;
the record discloses no effort at any time to find out who
Williamson was, check his criminal record, or otherwise find out if
Williamson was connected to biker gangs or organized crime.
Because Mills lacked even arguable probable cause to arrest
Williamson, Mills was not entitled to qualified immunity against
Williamson's claim of false arrest. The district court concluded
to the contrary that Mills did merit qualified immunity, and thus
it did not reach the merits of the Fourth Amendment claim. Rather
than considering the claim ourselves, we remand for the district
court to address the merits.
The district court's opinion treats Williamson's Fourth
Amendment excessive force claim as a discrete claim, and concludes
that Mills is also due summary judgment on this claim based upon
qualified immunity. On appeal, Williamson does not argue that the
force used was more than that reasonably necessary to effect the
arrest. He argues that "[t]here was no need for any force as the
force was used to accomplish an unlawful arrest." (Appellant's Br.
at 15) (emphasis added). In this case, damages recoverable on
Williamson's false arrest claim include damages suffered because of
the use of force in effecting the arrest. See Hamm v. Powell, 874
F.2d 766, 770 (11th Cir.1989). Under these circumstances,
Williamson's excessive force claim is subsumed in his false arrest
claim, and thus we find no reversible error in the district court's
grant of summary judgment on the excessive force claim as a
discrete claim.
IV. Conclusion
Because the law was clearly established that Mills's actions,
based on the facts at his disposal, violated Williamson's Fourth
Amendment rights not to be arrested without probable cause, Mills
is not entitled to qualified immunity against this claim. We
therefore REVERSE the district court's grant of summary judgment in
Mills's favor on the Fourth Amendment claim of false arrest and
REMAND for further proceedings. The judgment is otherwise
AFFIRMED.
AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED and REMANDED in part.