finding the ALJ’s credibility findings were supported by substantial evidence in the record
How later courts described this case
- finding the ALJ’s credibility findings were supported by substantial evidence in the record
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 09-10616 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
SEPTEMBER 23, 2009
Non-Argument Calendar
THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 08-00663-CV-G-S
THERMAN JERRY DAVIS,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
COMMISSIONER,
Michael J. Astrue,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
_________________________
(September 23, 2009)
Before BIRCH, BLACK and HULL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
The Commissioner of the Social Security Administration appeals the district
court’s order reversing the Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ’s) denial of benefits
to Therman Jerry Davis. The Commissioner contends substantial evidence
supported the ALJ’s determination Davis was not eligible for disability benefits,
and the district court erred in ruling to the contrary.
We review de novo a district court’s decision whether substantial evidence
supports the ALJ’s decision. Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir.
2002). “A clearly articulated credibility finding with substantial supporting
evidence in the record will not be disturbed by a reviewing court.” Foote v.
Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1562 (11th Cir. 1995). If the ALJ fails to articulate the
reasons for discrediting subjective testimony, however, the testimony is accepted
as true. Wilson, 284 F.3d at 1225; see also Holt v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1221, 1223
(11th Cir. 1991) (“[T]he ALJ’s discretionary power to determine the credibility of
testimony is limited by his obligation to place on the record explicit and adequate
reasons for rejecting that testimony.”).
“An individual claiming Social Security disability benefits must prove he or
she is disabled.” Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005). Social
security “regulations place a very heavy burden on the claimant to demonstrate
both a qualifying disability and an inability to perform past relevant work.” Id.
2
We apply a three-part pain standard when a claimant seeks to establish disability
through his own testimony regarding pain or other subjective symptoms. Holt, 921
F.2d at 1223 (“The pain standard requires (1) evidence of an underlying medical
condition and either (2) objective medical evidence that confirms the severity of
the alleged pain arising from that condition or (3) that the objectively determined
medical condition is of such a severity that it can be reasonably expected to give
rise to the alleged pain.”).
The ALJ provided in the record specific reasons for disbelieving Davis’s
testimony regarding his pain and physical limitations. Citing the medical records
provided by Davis, the ALJ noted that Davis’s respiratory, cardiovascular,
neurological, and musculoskeletal examinations were within normal limits,
notwithstanding Davis’s health complaints, which included shortness of breath,
dizziness, and acute hip pain. The ALJ likewise cited several specific findings
from the consultative physical examination performed on Davis, which he deemed
consistent with the remaining medical records, and inconsistent with Davis’s
subjective pain and limitation reports. Finally, medical records tracking Davis’s
blood pressure over the year following his cessation of work were highlighted by
the ALJ as indicative of a level of health inconsistent with that reported by Davis.
In sum, the ALJ provided a clear articulation of his reasons for rejecting Davis’s
3
testimony, and provided substantial supporting evidence for that finding, consistent
with our precedent. See Foote, 67 F.3d at 1562; Holt, 921 F.2d at 1223.
Admittedly, the ALJ also substantiated his credibility findings with
purported inconsistencies between Davis’s accounts of his daily living activities
and the ailments or limitations he reported. In overturning the ALJ’s ruling, the
district court ignored the several medical bases the ALJ articulated in his written
decision for denying Davis’s claim for benefits. The ALJ’s adverse determination
was supported by substantial evidence in the administrative record, and the district
court erred in reversing the ALJ. Thus, we reverse the district court.
REVERSED.
4