The opinion
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Aug. 11, 2009
No. 09-10198 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 06-22565-CV-FAM
RONALD A. WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
DANIEL SANTANA, Det., et al.,
Defendants,
ROBERT PARKER,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(August 11, 2009)
Before BIRCH, HULL and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Miami-Dade Police Director Robert Parker appeals the district court’s denial
of his motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity. Parker argues that he was
entitled to qualified immunity because (1) he was acting within his discretionary
authority, and (2) Williams failed to allege, in his complaint, that Parker personally
participated in the alleged constitutional violation or that there was a causal
connection between Parker’s actions and the alleged constitutional violation. He
also argues that his alleged actions did not violate clearly established law. For the
reasons set forth below, we affirm.
I. Background
Ronald A. Williams, proceeding pro se, filed a “Second Third Amended
Complaint,” alleging constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in which he
named as defendants Parker, several Miami-Dade County police officers, and
Miami-Dade County. The only claim relevant to this interlocutory appeal is
Williams’s claim against Parker in his individual capacity.
In an amended complaint, Williams alleged that, on October 20, 2002,
unknown Miami-Dade police officers approached him and his girlfriend at
gunpoint, questioned them about a shooting, handcuffed them, and placed them in
the backseat of a police car. The officers questioned him about a shooting, told
him that he was under arrest, and transported him to a police station. Williams
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contended that he was interrogated by Detectives Santana and Barazal about the
shooting and that the detectives continued questioning him for hours, even after he
asked for a lawyer. Williams stated that he refused to have his picture taken, at
which point Santana “storm[ed] out [of] the room” and returned with an
ammonium packet. Barazal placed him in a headlock while Detective Santana
placed the ammonium packet under Williams’s nose and in Williams’s mouth.
This caused Williams to vomit and foam at the mouth. Williams alleged that
Barazal slapped him, punched him, knocked him to the floor, and kicked him
before leaving the interrogation room.
Regarding the background of his allegations that Parker was on notice of
Barazal’s violent history, Williams alleged that, between July 6, 1998 and August
9, 2002, Barazal had a “history of violent, irregular behavior and disregard[] [for]
citizen’s [sic] constitution[al] rights.” He asserted that Barazal received a written
reprimand on September 13, 2000, for violating a prisoner’s rights and conduct
unbecoming of an officer. Williams also cited eight other incidents, including the
case numbers of the incidents, involving the use of violence by Barazal, including
two incidents that occurred in the eight months prior to Williams’s encounter with
Barazal. Williams noted that “one of these incidents had merit[] because it was
sustained 1/ /03.” He asserted that Barazal’s September 13, 2000 written
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reprimand, along with the other eight incidents, put Parker on notice of the need to
improve Barazal’s training and supervise Barazal more closely. Williams
contended that, despite these prior incidents, the police department continued to
give Barazal commendations and recommendations, and ultimately placed
Williams in an interrogation room with Barazal.
Parker filed a motion to dismiss Williams’s claim against him, arguing that
(1) Williams’s complaint failed to “meet the heightened pleading standard
sufficient to overcome qualified immunity,” (2) the complaint failed to explain the
basis for imposing supervisory liability individually on Parker, and (3) Parker was
entitled to qualified immunity. Parker argued that Williams’s complaint failed to
allege that (1) Parker “personally participated in the alleged constitutional
violation,” or (2) “there [wa]s a causal connection between [Parker’s] actions and
the alleged constitutional violation.” He also asserted that Williams’s complaint
did not allege that Parker engaged in, directed, or knew of any unconstitutional
conduct by his subordinates, and there was no allegation of widespread prior abuse
that would have put Parker on notice of the need to better train or supervise his
subordinates. Finally, Parker argued that his actions did not violate clearly
established law.
The magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation, finding that
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Parker was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority, and that Supreme
Court case law, at the time of Williams’s arrest, clearly established that a
supervisor could be held liable under § 1983 for failing to adequately train or
supervise a subordinate. The magistrate concluded that it was “premature to
determine whether Parker may be not entitled to qualified immunity” and
recommended denying Parker’s motion to dismiss. Over Parker’s objections, the
district court adopted the magistrate’s report and recommendation and denied
Parker’s motion to dismiss Williams’s complaint.
II. Law & Analysis
We review the denial of qualified immunity de novo, accepting the factual
allegations in the complaint as true and construing the facts in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff. Dalrymple v. Reno, 334 F.3d 991, 994 (11th Cir. 2003).
To be entitled to qualified immunity, a defendant must first establish that he
was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority. Mathews v. Crosby,
480 F.3d 1265, 1269 (11th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S.Ct. 865 (2008). Once
the defendant has established that he was acting within his discretionary authority,
“the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that qualified immunity is not
appropriate.” Id. When evaluating a claim for qualified immunity, a court must
determine (1) whether the facts alleged, viewed in the light most favorable to the
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plaintiff, show that the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right, and (2)
whether, under the facts alleged, there was a violation of “clearly established law.”
See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. __, 129 S.Ct. 808, 820-21, 172 L.Ed.2d 565
(2009). Courts are no longer required to address the two prongs of this test in any
particular order. See id. (modifying Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121 S.Ct. 2151,
150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001)).
The district court found that Parker was acting within the scope of his
discretionary authority, and neither party challenges this finding on appeal. Thus,
the relevant inquiry becomes whether the facts Williams alleged show that Parker’s
conduct violated Williams’s “clearly established” constitutional rights. See
Pearson, 555 U.S. at __, 129 S.Ct. at 818.
A constitutional right is clearly established if
its contours [are] sufficiently clear that a reasonable
official would understand that what he is doing violates
that right. This is not to say that an official action is
protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in
question has previously been held unlawful, but it is to
say that in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness
must be apparent.
See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 2515, 153 L.Ed.2d 666
(2002) (internal citations omitted). The critical inquiry in determining whether law
is “clearly established” is whether the defendant had “fair warning” that his
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conduct was unlawful. Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1350 (11th Cir. 2002).
“[S]upervisors can be held liable for subordinates’ constitutional violations
on the basis of supervisory liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Mathews, 480 F.3d
at 1270. Specifically, “[s]upervisory liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 occurs when
the supervisor personally participates in the alleged constitutional violation or
when there is a causal connection between the actions of the supervising official
and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Id. (internal quotations omitted); see
also Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 671 (11th Cir. 1990). An inmate can
establish a causal connection by alleging that:
1) a history of widespread abuse put[] the responsible
supervisor on notice of the need to correct the alleged
deprivation, and he or she fail[ed] to do so; 2) a
supervisor’s custom or policy result[ed] in deliberate
indifference to constitutional rights; or 3) facts support an
inference that the supervisor directed subordinates to act
unlawfully or knew that subordinates would act
unlawfully and failed to stop them from doing so.
Mathews, 480 F.3d at 1270 (internal quotations omitted); see also Brown, 906 F.2d
at 671 (noting that “[t]he causal connection can be established when a history of
widespread abuse puts the responsible supervisor on notice of the need to correct
the alleged deprivation, and he fails to do so”). “The deprivations that constitute
widespread abuse sufficient to notify the supervising official must be obvious,
flagrant, rampant and of continued duration, rather than isolated occurrences.”
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Brown, 906 F.2d at 671.
Because Brown was decided in 1990, the law, at the time of the incident
alleged in Williams’s complaint, was clear that a supervisor could be held
responsible under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for constitutional violations committed by
subordinates if the supervisor personally participated in the constitutional violation
or if there was a causal connection between the supervisor’s actions and the alleged
constitutional deprivation. See id. Williams does not allege that Parker personally
participated in the violations; thus, the issue before us is whether the complaint
sufficiently alleged a causal connection between Parker’s failure to act and the
violations. Taking Williams’s allegations as true, as we must do at this stage of the
proceedings, see Dalrymple, 334 F.3d at 994, the numerous prior incidents
involving Barazal’s use of force were sufficient to put Parker on notice of
misconduct that was sufficiently “obvious, flagrant, rampant and of continued
duration” to require him to act. See Brown, 906 F.2d at 671; Danley v. Allen, 540
F.3d 1298, 1315 (2008) (noting that “[t]his Court has long recognized that
supervisors are liable for the excessive force . . . of their employees where the
supervisors received numerous reports of prior misconduct of that nature by those
same employees and did nothing to remedy the situation”). Williams alleged that
Barazal had a history of violence, irregular behavior, and violations of citizens’
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constitutional rights between July 1998 and August 2002. He listed eight specific
incidents involving Barazal’s use of violence. Although Parker asserts that one of
Barazal’s reprimands was “sustained’ in 2003, the facts alleged in Williams’s
complaint indicate that the violation actually occurred in 2002. Even though it is
not clear how the other complaints against Barazal were resolved, the fact that
eight claims of violence or deprivation of constitutional rights were lodged against
Barazal between July 1998 and August 2002 indicates that Parker was on notice of
a potential problem. See id. (noting that supervisor liability may be imposed where
a supervisor received numerous reports of prior misconduct by a specific
employee). Williams alleges that Parker failed to respond to these prior incidents
of misconduct by providing Barazal with increased training or supervision; thus,
Williams has alleged the necessary causal connection to hold Parker liable in his
supervisory capacity. Because Barazal has alleged that Parker violated his clearly
established constitutional rights, the district court did not err in denying qualified
immunity at the motion to dismiss stage of the proceedings. Only time will tell if
there is evidence to support these allegations. Accordingly, we affirm the court’s
denial of Parker’s motion to dismiss.
AFFIRMED.
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