United States v. Tracy Lamont Miles

USCA11 Case: 20-13174 Date Filed: 07/22/2022 Page: 1 of 18

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 20-13174

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

TRACY LAMONT MILES,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cr-20687-JEM-1

____________________

USCA11 Case: 20-13174 Date Filed: 07/22/2022 Page: 2 of 18

2 Opinion of the Court 20-13174

Before WILSON, JILL PRYOR, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Tracy Miles appeals his conviction for being a felon in pos-

session of a firearm, in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). There are

three issues on appeal. First, Miles argues that the district court

erred in finding a government witness credible at a hearing and

denying his motion to suppress based on the witness’s testimony.

Second, he contends that the cumulative effect of multiple errors

at trial, including prosecutorial misconduct and evidentiary errors,

deprived him of his right to a fair trial under the Sixth Amendment.

Third, he asserts that his 108-month sentence must be vacated be-

cause his prior conviction1 under Fla. Stat. § 893.13(1)(a)(2) did not

involve a “controlled substance offense” for purposes of the career

offender sentencing enhancement under § 4B1.2(b) of the Sentenc-

ing Guidelines. After thorough review, we find no reversible error

and therefore affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Because Miles raises challenges to three parts of his criminal

proceedings, we discuss the relevant facts of each part in turn.

1 Miles’s motion to supplement the record with a certified judgment of his

prior Florida conviction is GRANTED.

USCA11 Case: 20-13174 Date Filed: 07/22/2022 Page: 3 of 18

20-13174 Opinion of the Court 3

A. Suppression Hearing

A grand jury indicted Miles on one count of possession of a

firearm by a convicted felon. Before trial, he moved to suppress the

firearm, arguing that his arrest and subsequent search were unlaw-

ful under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. A magistrate

judge conducted an evidentiary hearing at which Miami Dade Po-

lice Department (“MDPD”) Detectives Jonathan Ortiz and Yuneski

Arriola testified about the events leading to Miles’s arrest and the

search that produced the firearm.

Ortiz was in an unmarked vehicle on an undercover proac-

tive detail near Broadway Park, an area officers knew to be high in

crime, particularly violent crimes and drug offenses. Ortiz testified

that, as he pulled up to the park, he saw an unknown individual

approach Miles. Ortiz was around 150 feet away, but his view was

unobstructed, and it was light outside. Ortiz observed the pair en-

gage in a conversation. Then, the individual extended his hand to

Miles while holding something. Miles took the item, put it in his

front right pants pocket, and extended his hand—which was also

holding an object—back toward the individual. The individual

took the object and then walked away, and detectives never appre-

hended the individual.

Based on his training and experience, Ortiz concluded that

he had witnessed a hand-to-hand drug transaction. Ortiz began to

move closer to Miles, but Miles, with his eyes on Ortiz, stepped

back and reached in a grabbing motion toward the right rear side

of the waistband of his pants. Given Miles’s movements and Ortiz’s

USCA11 Case: 20-13174 Date Filed: 07/22/2022 Page: 4 of 18

4 Opinion of the Court 20-13174

experience that people conducting drug transactions often carry

firearms, Ortiz believed that Miles had a firearm in his waistband.

After Miles removed his hand from his waistband, Ortiz called for

backup and gave a description of Miles, adding that Miles was

armed.

Arriola, also in an unmarked vehicle, arrived quickly. He tes-

tified that, as he approached the scene, Miles was holding the right

rear side of his waistband as if he had a firearm. Arriola then turned

on his vehicle’s lights to show that he was law enforcement, and

Miles stopped clutching at his side. Arriola drew his firearm as he

exited his vehicle and ordered Miles to put his hands up. Miles

stepped back, looking behind himself. When he saw other officers

arriving behind him, Miles stopped and put his hands up. Arriola

then took Miles to the ground.

Arriola conducted a pat-down and recovered a firearm from

the right rear side of Miles’s waistband, the same area where Ortiz

and Arriola had observed Miles reaching. After finding the firearm,

the detectives also conducted a full search of Miles’s person, recov-

ering currency from his front right pants pocket that was separated

into “quick-count bundles,” consistent in the officers’ experience

with hand-to-hand drug transactions. Doc. 46 at 27. 2 The detectives

also recovered a wallet with cash in it from Miles’s left rear pocket.

2 “Doc.” numbers refer to the district court’s docket entries.

USCA11 Case: 20-13174 Date Filed: 07/22/2022 Page: 5 of 18

20-13174 Opinion of the Court 5

During the suppression hearing, defense counsel introduced

photographs of the park. Ortiz testified that the photographs failed

to depict the exact vantage point where he was positioned. He re-

asserted that he had observed the hand-to-hand drug transaction

clearly.

Following the evidentiary hearing, the magistrate judge en-

tered a report and recommendation (“R&R”), recommending that

the district court deny the motion to suppress. The magistrate

judge found Ortiz’s and Arriola’s testimony credible and, based on

that testimony, found that the detectives had reasonable suspicion

to detain Miles and pat him down.3 The magistrate judge also

found that Ortiz could see clearly because he was 150 feet away

from Miles with an unobstructed view and it was light outside. The

magistrate judge noted the photographic evidence but rejected

Miles’s argument—that Ortiz was not credible because it was im-

possible for him to have seen a hand-to-hand transaction from his

location—because Miles offered only speculation, with no support-

ing evidence to counter Ortiz’s credible testimony. Over Miles’s

objections, the district court adopted the R&R and denied the mo-

tion to suppress.

3 The magistrate judge did not address Miles’s argument about the legality of

the subsequent search of his person. Miles did not pursue the argument fur-

ther, however, in his objections to the R&R or by otherwise raising it to the

district court.

USCA11 Case: 20-13174 Date Filed: 07/22/2022 Page: 6 of 18

6 Opinion of the Court 20-13174

B. Trial

Miles proceeded to trial. During opening statements, the

government explained that the detectives who arrested Miles were

patrolling Broadway Park to prevent crime. Ortiz and Arriola tes-

tified, reiterating their testimony from the suppression hearing.4

During Ortiz’s direct examination, the prosecutor asked

questions about the detectives’ actions and observations during

their search of Miles’s person following his arrest. While examining

Ortiz, the prosecutor several times used the pronoun “we” to refer

to law enforcement.5 Ortiz responded to the questions on direct

examination in a manner consistent with his testimony at the sup-

pression hearing. Ortiz also testified that, after Miles was arrested

and transported to the police station, Miles asked what he was be-

ing charged with. After Ortiz advised him of the charge—being a

felon in possession of a firearm—Miles responded that he “knew it

was hot and he wasn’t looking for [serial] numbers.” Doc. 85 at 59.

Ortiz testified that he believed the term “hot” to mean something

that was contraband or illegal and understood Miles to be referring

to the firearm recovered during the arrest.

4 Two additional responding MDPD officers testified about Miles’s arrest.

Both MDPD officers testified that they observed the firearm in Miles’s waist-

band once he was arrested.

5 For example, the prosecutor asked, “did we find any drugs on [Miles]?”

Doc. 85 at 53-54.

USCA11 Case: 20-13174 Date Filed: 07/22/2022 Page: 7 of 18

20-13174 Opinion of the Court 7

Next, Arriola testified that he had conducted over 100 inves-

tigations involving narcotics and had received training relating to

narcotics. He testified that when he arrived at the park, he observed

Miles holding the right rear side of his waistband. The prosecutor

asked, “based on your training and experience, how common is it

for firearms to be . . . concealed in this area of the body?” Id. at 126.

Miles objected on the ground that the answer would call for expert

opinion. The district court overruled the objection, stating, “[h]e’s

an expert based on his experience and training. I’ll permit it.” Id.

Arriola responded that, in his experience, it was very common for

people to carry firearms in their waistbands. In testifying that he

recognized a photograph of the firearm, he stated that he remem-

bered that the serial number on the firearm found in Miles’s waist-

band was scratched off.

The prosecutor asked Arriola why people who sell drugs

separate money into different pockets. Miles objected based on a

lack of foundation and because the answer would call for specula-

tion. The district court overruled the objection. Arriola answered

that, based on his experience, individuals will split the money into

multiple pockets “because either they’re separating the money for

the different type of drugs that they have, or also if they’re working

for somebody, the money that belongs to the owner of the drugs

and the money that belongs to the individual selling the drugs.” Id.

at 138. Arriola also testified that he understood the term “hot,” as

used by Miles, to mean that the firearm was probably stolen or used

in another crime.

USCA11 Case: 20-13174 Date Filed: 07/22/2022 Page: 8 of 18

8 Opinion of the Court 20-13174

After the government rested, Miles did not offer any evi-

dence. In closing argument, the prosecutor stated that the only is-

sue in the case was whether Miles possessed a firearm and that ev-

idence of the alleged drug transaction was only offered for context

as to why the officers investigated Miles. In Miles’s closing argu-

ment, he asserted that the officers who testified at the trial were

lying about his possessing the firearm, implying that the officers

planted the weapon on him. The prosecutor’s rebuttal refuted that

assertion, and Miles objected several times throughout. The jury

ultimately returned a guilty verdict.

C. Sentencing

The U.S. Probation Office prepared a presentence investiga-

tion report (“PSR”) to assist the district court in determining Miles’s

sentence. The PSR calculated a base offense level of 24, under

§ 2K1.2(a)(2) of the Sentencing Guidelines, because Miles commit-

ted the instant offense after sustaining two felony convictions for a

crime of violence or a controlled substance offense. One of the two

felony convictions was for a controlled substance offense: a prior

conviction in Florida for “Possession with Intent to Sell, Manufac-

ture, or Deliver a Controlled Substance (Cocaine).” But the certi-

fied judgment for that offense, with which Miles supplements the

record on appeal, shows that Miles was convicted under Fla. Stat.

§ 893.13(1)(a)(2), which does not include cocaine. Miles now argues

that his prior conviction is not a “controlled substance offense” un-

der the Sentencing Guidelines. But Miles failed to object to his base

offense level calculation at sentencing. With a criminal history

USCA11 Case: 20-13174 Date Filed: 07/22/2022 Page: 9 of 18

20-13174 Opinion of the Court 9

category of III, Miles’s guideline range was 97 to 120 months’ im-

prisonment. The district court sentenced Miles to 108 months’ im-

prisonment. Miles now appeals.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

We apply a mixed standard of review to a district court’s de-

nial of a motion to suppress, reviewing the district court’s factual

findings for clear error and its legal determinations de novo. United

States v. McCullough, 851 F.3d 1194, 1199 (11th Cir. 2017). The ev-

idence is viewed in the light most favorable to the party that pre-

vailed on the motion. Id.

We ordinarily review claims of prosecutorial misconduct de

novo. United States v. Merrill, 513 F.3d 1293, 1306 (11th Cir. 2008).

But when a defendant does not object at trial to the prosecutor’s

conduct, we review only for plain error. See id. at 1306–07.

To show plain error, the defendant must show that: (1) an

error occurred; (2) the error was plain; and (3) the error affected his

substantial rights. United States v. Smith, 459 F.3d 1276, 1283 (11th

Cir. 2006). Further, if the first three conditions are met, we may

correct a forfeited error only if the error seriously affected the fair-

ness or integrity of judicial proceedings. Id. “An error is not plain

unless it is contrary to explicit statutory provisions or” controlling

precedent from either the Supreme Court or this Court. United

States v. Schultz, 565 F.3d 1353, 1357 (11th Cir. 2009).

We ordinarily review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of dis-

cretion. United States v. U.S. Infrastructure, Inc., 576 F.3d 1195,

USCA11 Case: 20-13174 Date Filed: 07/22/2022 Page: 10 of 18

10 Opinion of the Court 20-13174

1208 (11th Cir. 2009). “An abuse of discretion occurs where the dis-

trict court’s decision rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact,

an errant conclusion of law, or an improper application of law to

fact.” Adams v. Austal, U.S.A., L.L.C., 754 F.3d 1240, 1248 (11th

Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). We will “overturn

evidentiary rulings only when the moving party has proved a sub-

stantial prejudicial effect.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

But when a party raises a claim of evidentiary error for the first

time on appeal, it is reviewed only for plain error. United States v.

Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1280 (11th Cir. 2003).

We typically review de novo whether a prior conviction is a

controlled substance offense under § 4B1.2(b) of the Sentencing

Guidelines. United States v. Lange, 862 F.3d 1290, 1293 (11th Cir.

2017). But such arguments raised for the first time on appeal are

reviewed for plain error. See id.

III. ANALYSIS

We first discuss the district court’s finding that Ortiz was

credible, which led to the court’s denial of Miles’s motion to sup-

press. Second, we examine Miles’s arguments about prosecutorial

misconduct and evidentiary errors and whether the cumulative ef-

fects of such errors rendered Miles’s trial unfair. Third, we take up

Miles’s challenge to the base offense level that the court used to

sentence him.

A. Suppression Motion

Miles challenges the district court’s finding that Ortiz was

credible, arguing that the photographs of the park the defense

USCA11 Case: 20-13174 Date Filed: 07/22/2022 Page: 11 of 18

20-13174 Opinion of the Court 11

introduced show that Ortiz could not have seen a drug transaction

from where he was positioned. See Docs. 31-2; 61-1 at 3. He con-

tends that, because any reasonable suspicion for stopping and

searching him was predicated on Ortiz’s incredible testimony, the

court erred in denying his suppression motion.

We accept a factfinder’s credibility determination “unless it

is contrary to the laws of nature, or is so inconsistent or improbable

on its face that no reasonable factfinder could accept it.” United

States v. Holt, 777 F.3d 1234, 1255–56 (11th Cir. 2015) (internal

quotation marks omitted). “Thus, we defer to the district court’s

factual determinations unless the district court’s understanding of

the facts is ‘unbelievable.’” Id. at 1256.

Here, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

government, the prevailing party, the district court did not clearly

err in finding Ortiz’s testimony credible. See McCullough, 851 F.3d

at 1199. Ortiz testified that he viewed, unobstructed and in daylight

from 150 feet away, what he believed to be a hand-to-hand drug

transaction. The court rejected Miles’s argument that Ortiz was

not credible based on the photographic evidence because, accord-

ing to Ortiz, the photographs depicted a different location or angle

from where Ortiz stood, and Miles presented no evidence to the

USCA11 Case: 20-13174 Date Filed: 07/22/2022 Page: 12 of 18

12 Opinion of the Court 20-13174

contrary. Thus, we cannot say that the district court’s determina-

tion was “unbelievable.” See Holt, 777 F.3d at 1256. 6

B. Cumulative Error

Miles argues that cumulative trial errors deprived him of his

right to a fair trial. He points to a host of trial errors, which broadly

fall into two broad groups: (1) challenges to the government’s con-

duct and (2) evidentiary errors. We discuss the two groups of errors

in turn, and then consider (3) whether the cumulative effect of such

errors violated Miles’s right to a fair trial.

1. Prosecutorial Misconduct

We have adopted a two-part test for determining whether a

prosecutor’s remarks during trial constitute misconduct, focusing

on “whether the remarks were improper and whether they preju-

dicially affected the defendant’s substantial rights.” United States v.

Lacayo, 758 F.2d 1559, 1565 (11th Cir. 1985). To show that his sub-

stantial rights have been affected, the defendant must show that

“there is a reasonable probability that, but for the remarks, the out-

come would [have been] different.” United States v. Adams,

74 F.3d 1093, 1097 (11th Cir. 1996).

6 Because Miles failed to argue on appeal that Ortiz’s testimony, if credible,

did not establish reasonable suspicion to stop him, we deem this argument

abandoned. See Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 680 (11th

Cir. 2014). Even if we were to reach its merits, however, we would affirm the

district court because, based on Ortiz’s observations, the officers had reasona-

ble suspicion to stop Miles and pat him down.

USCA11 Case: 20-13174 Date Filed: 07/22/2022 Page: 13 of 18

20-13174 Opinion of the Court 13

Miles asserts that the government weaved an inflammatory

narrative about community safety into its prosecution by implying

that Miles’s arrest prevented a shooting or other serious crime. He

also contends that the government bolstered its witnesses by using

the term “we” when discussing their actions at Miles’s arrest. Be-

cause Miles did not raise these issues before the district court, we

review them for plain error. See Merrill, 513 F.3d at 1306–07. But

no plain error occurred: neither asserted error is contrary to prece-

dent from either the Supreme Court or this Court. See Schultz,

565 F.3d at 1357.

Miles also argues, as he did before the district court, that the

government committed misconduct during its closing argument

by making statements that improperly bolstered its witnesses, den-

igrated the defense, inserted facts not in evidence, and placed itself

in the jury box. Assuming for the sake of argument that such re-

marks were improper, the government’s statements did not

amount to prosecutorial misconduct because Miles failed to show

that, but for the remarks during closing arguments, he would not

have been convicted. See Adams, 74 F.3d at 1097. The government

offered substantial evidence of Miles’s guilt through multiple

MDPD officers’ testimony.

2. Evidentiary Errors

Miles asserts that the government elicited improper lay

opinions from Ortiz and Arriola. Specifically, Miles challenges

Ortiz’s and Arriola’s testimony about what they understood “hot”

USCA11 Case: 20-13174 Date Filed: 07/22/2022 Page: 14 of 18

14 Opinion of the Court 20-13174

to mean. Miles failed to object to this testimony before the district

court.

He also challenges Arriola’s testimony that it was common

for people conducting drug transactions to separate money into dif-

ferent pockets. Miles objected to this testimony, but on a different

basis. See United States v. Gallo-Chamorro, 48 F.3d 502, 507 (11th

Cir. 1995) (“To preserve an issue for appeal . . . an objection on

other grounds will not suffice.”).

Thus, we review both these challenges for plain error. See

Jernigan, 341 F.3d at 1280.

Miles cannot show error, let alone plain error, because the

testimony in question was based on their professional experience

as police officers. See United States v. Novaton, 271 F.3d 968,

1008–09 (11th Cir. 2001) (affirming, based on law enforcement

agents’ experience as police officers, the admission of their testi-

mony about the meaning of code words used by the defendants).

For the same reason, Miles’s preserved challenge to Arriola’s

testimony—that it was common for individuals to carry their guns

in the area that he observed Miles holding—fails. See id. Miles fur-

ther contends that the district court compounded its error by call-

ing Arriola an expert. Even if the district court abused its discretion

by calling Arriola an expert, Miles failed to show that the comment

had a substantial prejudicial effect, as Arriola’s testimony was cor-

roborated by other witnesses’ testimony. See Austal, U.S.A.,

L.L.C., 754 F.3d at 1248.

USCA11 Case: 20-13174 Date Filed: 07/22/2022 Page: 15 of 18

20-13174 Opinion of the Court 15

In addition, Miles challenges the district court’s admission of

parts of Arriola’s testimony that he contends implicated him in

other crimes and thus was improper evidence of prior bad acts in

violation of Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). Specifically, he chal-

lenges Arriola’s testimony (1) about the meaning of “hot,” (2) that

the serial number on the firearm was altered, and (3) about why

someone might separate money in pockets. Because Miles did not

raise these challenges before the district court, we review them for

plain error. See Jernigan, 341 F.3d at 1280.

No plain error occurred because the challenged testimony

was relevant and “necessary to complete the story of the crime” or

“inextricably intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged

offense.” United States v. Edouard, 485 F.3d 1324, 1344 (11th Cir.

2007) (explaining that evidence of criminal activity other than the

charged offense falls outside the scope of Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) in

these circumstances). The officers’ testimony about the meaning

of “hot,” as used by Miles, and about separating money was neces-

sary to complete the story of the crime. This testimony refuted

Miles’s implicit assertion that the officers planted the gun on him

and supported Ortiz’s testimony that he observed a hand-to-hand

drug transaction—the observation that led to Miles’s arrest for the

instant conviction. The testimony about the serial number was in-

extricably intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged of-

fense, as demonstrated by Arriola’s testimony that he recalled the

serial number being scratched off when he explained how he rec-

ognized a photograph of the firearm introduced at trial.

USCA11 Case: 20-13174 Date Filed: 07/22/2022 Page: 16 of 18

16 Opinion of the Court 20-13174

3. Cumulative Error

Miles next contends that the cumulative impact of the errors

discussed above prejudicially affected his substantial rights, but

again we disagree. Under the cumulative error doctrine, even if in-

dividual judicial errors would be insufficient to warrant reversal,

the defendant may have been denied a fair trial when the effect of

all the errors is evaluated cumulatively. United States v. Lopez,

590 F.3d 1238, 1258 (11th Cir. 2009). “In addressing a claim of cu-

mulative error, we must examine the trial as a whole to determine

whether the appellant was afforded a fundamentally fair trial.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted). Assuming the district court

erred in some of these respects, we nonetheless conclude, from our

review of trial as a whole, that Miles was not deprived of a funda-

mentally fair trial.

C. Sentencing

Miles argues that his previous Florida conviction under

Fla. Stat. § 893.13(1)(a)(2) was not a “controlled substance offense”

under the Sentencing Guidelines. First, he asserts that his statute of

conviction did not include cocaine. Second, he contends that, be-

cause § 4B1.2(b) of the Sentencing Guidelines does not define the

term “controlled substance,” we should look to the definition in

the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”), 21 U.S.C. § 802(6). He ar-

gues that Fla. Stat. § 893.13(1)(a)’s definition of a controlled sub-

stance is broader than the CSA because Fla. Stat. § 893.13(1)(a)

USCA11 Case: 20-13174 Date Filed: 07/22/2022 Page: 17 of 18

20-13174 Opinion of the Court 17

includes propylhexedrine, which is not a federally-scheduled sub-

stance.

A defendant may be classified as a career offender if: (1) he

is at least 18 years old at the time of the instant offense of convic-

tion; (2) the instant offense of conviction is either a “crime of vio-

lence” or a “controlled substance offense”; and (3) he has at least

two prior convictions of either a “crime of violence” or a “con-

trolled substance offense.” U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual

§ 4B1.1(a) (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 2021). A “controlled substance of-

fense” is an offense under federal or state law, punishable by more

than one year of imprisonment, that prohibits the manufacture,

import, export, distribution, or dispensing of a controlled sub-

stance, or possession of a controlled substance, with intent to man-

ufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense. U.S. Sent’g Guide-

lines Manual § 4B1.2(b) (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 2021).

Miles’s arguments are foreclosed by precedent. In United

States v. Smith, we held that a conviction under Fla. Stat. § 893.13

is a “controlled substance offense” under § 4B1.2(b) of the Sentenc-

ing Guidelines. 775 F.3d 1262, 1268 (11th Cir. 2014). We rejected

the argument that Fla. Stat. § 893.13’s definition of a controlled sub-

stance was too broad and must be tied to statutory federal ana-

logues or generic federal definitions. Id. at 1267; see also United

States v. Pridgeon, 853 F.3d 1192, 1200 (11th Cir. 2017) (rejecting

the argument that Smith was wrongly decided and affirming

Smith’s holding that convictions under Fla. Stat. § 893.13 qualify as

“controlled substance offenses” under the Sentencing Guidelines).

USCA11 Case: 20-13174 Date Filed: 07/22/2022 Page: 18 of 18

18 Opinion of the Court 20-13174

Under the prior panel precedent rule, we are bound by a

published prior panel decision “unless and until it is overruled by

us sitting en banc or by the Supreme Court.” United States v.

Cruickshank, 837 F.3d 1182, 1187 (11th Cir. 2016).

Because Miles did not object in the district court to the de-

termination that he was a career offender under the Guidelines, we

review his claim for plain error. See Lange, 862 F.3d at 1293. The

district court did not plainly err in determining that Miles’s prior

Florida conviction qualified as a controlled substance offense under

the Sentencing Guidelines. To the contrary, our prior decisions in

Smith and Pridgeon foreclose any argument that a conviction un-

der Fla. Stat. § 893.13 is not a “controlled substance offense” under

§ 4B1.2(b) of the Sentencing Guidelines, or that Fla. Stat. § 893.13’s

definition of a controlled substance is overbroad or must be tied to

a federal analogue. See Pridgeon, 853 F.3d at 1198, 1200; Smith,

775 F.3d at 1267–68. We are bound by these holdings under the

prior panel precedent rule. See Cruickshank, 837 F.3d at 1187.

Thus, Miles’s prior Florida conviction under Fla. Stat.

§ 893.13(1)(a)(2) qualified as a “controlled substance offense” under

§ 4B1.2(b) of the Sentencing Guidelines, and the district court did

not err in imposing the career offender enhancement. See U.S.

Sent’g Guidelines Manual § 4B1.1(a).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court on all

grounds.

AFFIRMED.