Lee v. Kansas City Southern Railway Co.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

June 30, 2009

No. 08-30444 Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

MARCUS LEE

Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

KANSAS CITY SOUTHERN RAILWAY CO

Defendant - Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

Before JONES, Chief Judge, and WIENER and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

JACQUES L. WIENER, JR., Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff-Appellant Marcus Lee, who is African-American, was an engineer

for Defendant-Appellee Kansas City Southern Railway Co. (“KCS”) from 1993

until his employment was terminated in 2004 after he failed to observe and obey

a stop signal, thereby failing to stop the train he was operating in a Shreveport,

Louisiana railyard. Lee sued KCS, alleging (1) race-based employment

discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and 42 U.S.C. §

1981, and (2) retaliatory discharge for (a) his prior filing of complaints with the

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) or (b) his numerous

absences under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), or both.

No. 08-30444

In support of his claim of racially motivated employment discrimination,

Lee identified several other KCS employees who he contends were similarly

situated to him but were treated differently because they are white. The district

court determined that these comparators were not similarly situated to Lee and

granted summary judgment in favor of KCS, holding that Lee failed to establish

a prima facie case of employment discrimination. Convinced that Lee identified

at least one appropriate comparator, by virtue of which he established a prima

facie case, we reverse the district court’s judgment on Lee’s Title VII claim, but

affirm the remainder of the court’s summary judgment in favor of KCS,

dismissing the rest of Lee’s claims.

I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

A. Factual Background

Lee was an engineer for KCS for nine years until he was fired in

September 2004 1 following an incident that occurred that month while Lee was

operating a train in a railyard in Shreveport near the railroad bridge over the

Red River. He was attempting to move his train forward on one track and then

back the train onto a second track. After Lee pulled the train forward, the

conductor with whom Lee was working indicated that he should proceed to

reverse the train as planned. Neither Lee nor the conductor could see a red

“block signal” which was indicating that Lee’s train must stop because there

were trains parked on the second track. After receiving the conductor’s

instruction but before backing up the train, Lee should have radioed his

1

Lee, a member of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, joined KCS in 1993 as a

brakeman and was promoted to locomotive engineer in 1995. An engineer is in charge of

operating the train. When moving trains between tracks in a railyard — as was the situation

when Lee committed the final infraction among those for which he was fired — the engineer

works with a conductor, who is on the ground giving the engineer instructions, and

communicates via radio with a dispatcher, who authorizes each of the train’s movements.

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No. 08-30444

dispatcher to receive the all-clear to reverse.2 Lee failed to do so and ran

through the signal.

Lee’s conduct compounded two errors (the “Shreveport violations”): (1)

failing to stop at the red block signal, and (2) failing to radio his dispatcher for

permission to enter on to the second track. Although no damage or injury

resulted from Lee’s errors, KCS considers them to be among the most serious

type of moving violations for which termination may be appropriate. Following

the incident and the completion of an investigation, Lee’s supervisor, Mark

Redd, followed KCS’s appealable disciplinary policy by, inter alia, reviewing

Lee’s record of violations for the preceding three years. Redd determined that

not only were the Shreveport violations grave, but that they were even more

troubling because they occurred just six months after another serious offense for

which Lee had been given a 30-day suspension. In that instance, Lee had failed

to slow to 10 miles per hour as required when passing a “yellow board” signal.

These two serious violations in rapid succession, together with previous

incidents of misconduct, including another moving violation only eighteen

months earlier, persuaded Redd to fire Lee. Kathy Alexander, the railroad’s

director of labor relations, had final authority to grant leniency following Redd’s

decision to fire Lee, but she concluded that none was merited.

Lee exercised his right under his union’s collective bargaining agreement

to appeal the decision. This procedure culminated in a hearing before the Public

Law Board (the “PLB”), which found Lee’s firing appropriate.3 Lee later sought

to have the Federal Railroad Administration (“FRA”) reinstate his engineer’s

2

KCS likened this to an airplane pilot radioing air traffic control prior to entering a

runway.

3

A PLB is a creature of federal law which investigates adverse employment actions

against railroad employees covered by a collective bargaining agreement. It comprises three

members, one representing the union, one representing the railroad, and one member who is

independent. Its decisions are final and binding.

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No. 08-30444

license so that he could work elsewhere. The FRA conducted its own

investigation of the Shreveport violations, determining that under the

circumstances Lee could not have seen the block signal and had to rely on his

conductor who also could not see the block signal, a fact of which Lee was

unaware at the time of the incident. The FRA concluded that these

circumstances mitigated Lee’s error and reinstated his license.

Lee filed an EEOC complaint following the termination of his employment

by KCS, but it was dismissed by the EEOC. He had previously filed an EEOC

complaint in 2003 in connection with an unrelated incident, during which

another KCS employee had pulled a knife on him, an attack that Lee believed

was racially motivated. The resolution of that prior complaint was the subject

of some debate in the district court and is unclear to us from the record. It is

apparent, however, that as a general rule, KCS managers were made aware

when employees they supervise file EEOC claims.

Additionally, over the course of his employment with KCS, Lee regularly

requested and received time off under the FMLA. Lee’s wife suffered from

migraine headaches and his child had chronic asthma, requiring him to be at

home intermittently to care for them, including for 57 days in 2003. KCS kept

records of employees’ FMLA use and required that employees fully deplete their

vacation and sick days before seeking leave pursuant to the FMLA. Alexander

noted in her records that many of Lee’s FMLA requests were for days

immediately preceding or following weekends or holidays.

B. Proceedings

Lee filed this suit in November 2005, contending that KCS would have

offered him leniency, viz., he would not have been fired or, if fired, he would have

been reinstated, but for, e.g., his race, his use of FMLA, or the two complaints

that he filed with the EEOC. Through discovery, Lee sought to identify KCS’s

treatment of other engineers with violations and safety records similar to his

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No. 08-30444

own as proof that he was treated discriminatorily because of his race. Lee urged

that the evidence of KCS’s disparate treatment of more than a half-dozen

comparators supports his claim.

Following KCS’s motion for summary judgment, the district court focused

on two of Lee’s proffered comparators. It concluded that neither was similarly

situated to Lee and therefore offered no support for his claim of disparate

treatment based on race. The court ruled that Lee had failed to make out a

prima facie case of racial discrimination in violation of Title VII and that Lee

had adduced no evidence to support the existence of a causal connection between

his firing and either his use of the FMLA or his filing of EEOC complaints.

Following the district court’s grant of KCS’s motion for summary judgment, Lee

timely filed a notice of appeal.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review the grant of a motion for summary judgment de novo.4 A grant

of summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact

and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.5 In particular, we

here consider whether Lee raised a genuine factual issue as to his prima facie

case of racially motivated employment discrimination.6

III. ANALYSIS

Lee advances three contentions in this appeal. He asserts principally that

but for his race, he would not have been fired following the Shreveport

4

LaPierre v. Benson Nissan, Inc., 86 F.3d 444, 447 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Armstrong v.

City of Dallas, 997 F.2d 62, 65 (5th Cir. 1993)).

5

Id.; see FED . R. CIV . P. 56(c).

6

Culwell v. City of Fort Worth, 468 F.3d 868, 873 (5th Cir. 2006); see also Wyvill v.

United Cos. Life Ins. Co., 212 F.3d 296, 301 (5th Cir. 2000) (jury question exists when plaintiff

has raised reasonable inference that race rather than the employer’s proffered explanation

motivated the employer to take adverse action against employee).

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No. 08-30444

violations.7 He also contends that his firing was in retaliation for his use of the

FMLA, and his filing of EEOC complaints.

A. Retaliatory Discharge

Lee asserts that his EEOC claims influenced Redd’s decision to fire him

and that his numerous leave-takings under FMLA swayed Alexander’s decision

not to offer leniency.

1. EEOC Filings

There is no evidence in the record that Redd was even aware of Lee’s

EEOC filings. Although Redd stated in his deposition that managers generally

were made aware of employees’ EEOC filings, Redd testified that he did not

remember having any knowledge of Lee’s having filed any such complaints. Lee

merely reasons that because of Redd’s statement about managers’ generalized

knowledge of complaints and the fact that Redd had discussed Lee’s potential

firing with Alexander, Redd must have known about Lee’s EEOC complaints and

must have considered them when deciding that firing Lee was merited. Lee

offers only speculative inferences to support his assertion, which is insufficient

to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.8

2. Use of FMLA Leave

Lee next contends that his frequent taking of leave under the FMLA

landed him on a so-called “last supper” list of employees whose frequent

absences flagged them as candidates for firing or at least for reprimand. The

FMLA not only requires employers to permit employees to take leave under the

7

See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 282 n.10, 96 S.Ct. 2574

(1976); Jenkins v. State of La., Through Dep’t of Corrs., 874 F.2d 992, 997 (5th Cir. 1989) (in

employment discrimination suit, burden is on plaintiff to prove race was “but for” cause of

adverse employment decision).

8

Michaels v. Avitech, Inc., 202 F.3d 746, 754-55 (5th Cir. 2000).

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No. 08-30444

statutory framework, it prohibits employers from retaliating against employees

for doing so.9

Although there is evidence in the record of the existence of such a “last

supper” list, there is no evidence that Lee’s name was on it. KCS did track

employee leave — of all types — for payroll and employee record purposes,

including to monitor its rule that employees use their vacation and sick time

entirely prior to taking FMLA leave. Alexander stated that, in her capacity as

KCS’s liaison with the union, she recorded employee FMLA leave for those

reasons, but that she gave no consideration to Lee’s use of the FMLA when

deciding whether to grant him leniency. She conceded that she had been

suspicious of Lee’s use of FMLA because it often coincided with holidays and

weekends, but stated that she never pursued those suspicions and that, in any

case, Lee had ceased taking FMLA leave nearly a year before the Shreveport

violations. Lee offered no additional evidence that would create a genuine issue

of material fact of a nexus between his use of FMLA leave and his firing. We

affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment for KCS on this claim.

B. Title VII Violation

As noted, Lee’s principal complaint is that his firing by KCS was the result

of racial discrimination, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.10

He insists that white employees were not fired, or that they received leniency in

the form of reinstatement, for violations similar to his.

To establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination in employment, an

employee must demonstrate that (1) he is a member of a protected class, (2) he

was qualified for the position at issue, (3) he was the subject of an adverse

employment action, and (4) he was treated less favorably because of his

9

Bocalbos v. Nat’l W. Life Ins. Co., 162 F.3d 379, 383 (5th Cir. 1998).

10

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).

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No. 08-30444

membership in that protected class than were other similarly situated employees

who were not members of the protected class, under nearly identical

circumstances.11 Once an employee has made out a prima facie case, an

inference of intentional discrimination is raised 12 and the burden of production

shifts to the employer, who must offer an alternative non-discriminatory

explanation for the adverse employment action.13 If the employer can provide

a legitimate nondiscriminatory explanation, the inference of discrimination

drops out and the burden shifts back to the employee to demonstrate that the

employer’s explanation is merely a pretext for racial bias.14

The first three elements of a prima facie case of race-based discrimination

are not in dispute in this appeal; we consider only the fourth, as did the district

court. Lee asserts that white KCS engineers with similar safety records were

not fired despite similar violations of equal magnitude. Lee identified for the

district court some half-dozen putative comparators. Only two, Greggory

Bickham and James McClure,15 are the focus of this appeal.

1. “Similarly Situated”

The question whether Lee presented a prima facie case of racial

discrimination turns here on whether either or both of the white engineers

11

See, e.g., Abarca v. Metro. Transit Auth., 404 F.3d 938, 941 (5th Cir. 2005); see also

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817 (1973) (establishing the

burden-shifting framework and explaining that as the facts will vary from case to case, so too,

will the specific prima facie proof required).

12

LaPierre v. Benson Nissan, 86 F.3d 444, 448 (5th Cir. 1996).

13

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. Notwithstanding the burden-shifting explained

in McDonnell Douglas, the burden of proof remains with the plaintiff throughout. Tex. Dep’t

of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089 (1981).

14

Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255-56.

15

KCS refers to McClure as Charles McClure; both Lee and the district court refer to

him as James McClure. We will refer to him as James McClure (or “McClure”) to be consistent

with the district court.

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No. 08-30444

identified by Lee as comparators were similarly situated to him. If Lee

established this fourth element of his prima facie discrimination case, the

burden shifts to KCS to demonstrate that it had a legitimate nondiscriminatory

reason for taking the adverse action against Lee.16 We have considered the

requirement for one employee to be similarly situated to another on any number

of occasions. Employees with different supervisors, who work for different

divisions of a company or who were the subject of adverse employment actions

too remote in time from that taken against the plaintiff generally will not be

deemed similarly situated.17 Likewise, employees who have different work

responsibilities or who are subjected to adverse employment action for dissimilar

violations are not similarly situated.18 This is because we require that an

employee who proffers a fellow employee as a comparator demonstrate that the

employment actions at issue were taken “under nearly identical

circumstances.”19 The employment actions being compared will be deemed to

have been taken under nearly identical circumstances when the employees being

compared held the same job or responsibilities,20 shared the same supervisor or

had their employment status determined by the same person, 21 and have

essentially comparable violation histories.22 And, critically, the plaintiff’s

16

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.

17

Wyvill v. United Cos. Life Ins. Co., 212 F.3d 296, 302 (5th Cir. 2000) (considering

sufficiency of evidence sustaining jury verdict).

18

Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores (No. 471), 891 F.2d 1177, 1180 (5th Cir. 1990).

19

Little v. Republic Ref. Co., Ltd., 924 F.2d 93, 97 (5th Cir. 1991) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

20

Wallace v. Methodist Hosp. Sys., 271 F.3d 212, 221-22 (5th Cir. 2001).

21

Barnes v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 778 F.2d 1096, 1101 (5th Cir. 1985).

22

Okoye v. Univ. of Tex. Houston Health Sci., 245 F.3d 507, 514 (5th Cir. 2001).

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No. 08-30444

conduct that drew the adverse employment decision must have been “nearly

identical” to that of the proffered comparator who allegedly drew dissimilar

employment decisions.23 If the “difference between the plaintiff’s conduct and

that of those alleged to be similarly situated accounts for the difference in

treatment received from the employer,” the employees are not similarly situated

for the purposes of an employment discrimination analysis.24

We do not, however, interpret “nearly identical” as synonymous with

“identical.” 25 Applied to the broader circumstances of a plaintiff’s employment

and that of his proffered comparator, a requirement of complete or total identity

rather than near identity would be essentially insurmountable, as it would only

be in the rarest of circumstances that the situations of two employees would be

totally identical.26 For example, it is sufficient that the ultimate decisionmaker

23

Perez v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 395 F.3d 206, 213 (5th Cir. 2004); see, e.g.,

Bouie v. Equistar Chems. LP, 188 F. App’x 233, 237 (5th Cir. 2006) (unpublished) (per curiam)

(plaintiff discharged for violating two safety protocols could not use comparator who only

violated one safety protocol); Dodge v. Hertz Corp., 124 F. App’x 242, 244 (5th Cir. 2005)

(unpublished) (per curiam) (that plaintiff’s and proffered comparator’s acts were both

“dishonest” is insufficient to make misconduct nearly identical); Trotter v. BPB Am., Inc., 106

F. App’x 272, 276-77 (5th Cir. 2004) (unpublished) (per curiam) (misconduct of employees who

fought with other employees was not nearly identical to plaintiff, who fought with union

president). We note that unpublished cases are not precedential in this court except for the

limited reasons stated in our 5TH CIR . R. 47.5. We cite them here only to demonstrate the

consistency of our jurisprudence.

24

Wallace, 271 F.3d at 221 (emphasis added).

25

Lee perceives tension in our case law between the “nearly identical” standard in Perez

and the “comparable seriousness” standard explicated by the Supreme Court in McDonald v.

Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co. 427 U.S. 273, 283 n.11, 96 S.Ct. 2574 (1976) (quoting

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804, 93 S.Ct. 1817 (1973)). We emphasize

today that this Circuit’s “nearly identical” standard is not equivalent to “identical.”

Furthermore, in this case, we focus on the totality of the circumstances of Lee’s employment

as compared with Bickham’s; the similitude of their ultimate infractions — on which Perez

turned — is not our focus, as they were essentially the same, i.e., failing to obey a stop signal.

Perez, 395 F.3d at 214.

26

When we have found employees not to be similarly situated, the cases have presented

marked distinctions between the employees, not the marginal differences at issue here. See,

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No. 08-30444

as to employees’ continued employment is the same individual, even if the

employees do not share an immediate supervisor. Each employee’s track record

at the company need not comprise the identical number of identical infractions,

albeit these records must be comparable.27 As the Supreme Court has

instructed, the similitude of employee violations may turn on the “comparable

seriousness” of the offenses for which discipline was meted out 28 and not

necessarily on how a company codes an infraction under its rules and

regulations. Otherwise, an employer could avoid liability for discriminatory

practices simply by coding one employee’s violation differently from another’s.

2. Comparators

In this case, the district court determined that Lee did not satisfy his

initial burden of establishing a prima facie case because he did not demonstrate

that he had been treated disparately from any other similarly situated KCS

engineer. When we apply the foregoing factors to Lee’s proffered comparators,

McClure and Bickham, we find that we are in partial disagreement with the

district court. With respect to McClure, who was fired for dishonesty and misuse

of company property, we agree that his offenses and his employment history are

too dissimilar to those for which Lee was fired to render him similarly situated

to Lee. With respect to Bickham, however, we hold that he is an appropriate

comparator.

e.g., Amezquita v. Beneficial Tex., Inc., 264 F. App’x 379, 385-86 (5th Cir. 2008) (unpublished)

(per curiam) (plaintiff, who was fired for lying, was not similarly situated to her supervisor

who was demoted for poor managerial performance); McKinney v. JB Hunt Transp. Inc., 193

F. App’x 373, 374 (5th Cir. 2006) (unpublished) (per curiam) (plaintiff had numerous

complaints against her and instances of unprofessional conduct unlike her proffered

comparator).

27

The relevant perspective is that of the employer at the time of the adverse

employment decision. Perez, 395 F.3d at 210.

28

McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail, 427 U.S. at 283 n.11 (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411

U.S. at 804).

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No. 08-30444

Lee was fired for (1) disregarding a block signal that indicated he had to

stop the train and (2) failing to contact his dispatcher for authorization to

proceed. Six months prior to his firing, Lee had committed another moving

violation — failing to slow his train in compliance with a signal — for which he

received a 30-day suspension. And, eighteen months earlier, Lee had committed

yet another moving violation for which he had received a five-day suspension.

On this record, Redd decided to fire Lee, and, crucially, Alexander decided not

to grant Lee leniency, which, if granted, would have led to his reinstatement.

Also in late 2004, Bickham had failed to halt his train at a stop signal; yet,

even though he was fired, Alexander granted him leniency and reinstated him.

Bickham had committed a like number of moving violations as had Lee. During

the same period over which Lee’s previous violations were accumulated,

Bickham had (1) failed to inspect a train in compliance with a trackside warning

signal, for which he received a 30-day suspension; (2) improperly handled a train

that separated as a result, for which he received a 5-day suspension; and (3)

occupied a main track without authority, for which he was fired, only to be

reinstated by Alexander. We are satisfied that employment histories marked by

a comparable number of serious moving violations by train engineers who

perform the same job are sufficiently similar to require comparison of the two

when, as here, the final violations — failing to obey a stop signal — are

indistinguishable.

KCS points to a host of distinctions between Bickham’s situation and

Lee’s: Bickham did not have a similarly serious infraction just six months before

his failure to stop as did Lee; Bickham’s failure to stop was excused by foggy

conditions and took place in a rural area where potential damage to persons and

property was minimal; Bickham and Lee had different supervisors, and it was

those different supervisors who made the decisions to fire these engineers. We

are not persuaded that these distinctions add up to a difference, at least not one

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No. 08-30444

sufficient to eschew comparison. Alexander stated that she reviewed an

employee’s entire history with the company, not merely the previous six months.

Redd stated that he reviewed Lee’s record going back three years, and Bickham’s

violations over this longer period are equally grave and similar in number. KCS

would emphasize the comparison of the preceding six-month periods to distance

Bickham from Lee, but that was not the only period considered at the time the

firing and leniency decisions were made. Further, just as Bickham’s vision was

obscured by fog, Lee, too, could not see the signal that he failed to obey. And,

although KCS tries to make much of the fact that Lee’s infraction took place in

downtown Shreveport rather than in a rural setting as did Bickham’s, we note

that the Lee incident occurred inside a railyard, not out on the city streets where

members of the general public might have been endangered directly. Finally,

although these two men had different supervisors, Alexander oversaw leniency,

which Bickham received and Lee did not, so the ultimate decisionmaker on

rehiring after firing was the same person for both engineers.

On this analysis, we conclude that Lee and Bickham are similarly situated

making Bickham a proper comparator whom the district court nevertheless

rejected. They held identical positions at KCS, compiled a similar number of

serious moving violations over a similar period of time, including an identical

infraction for which Lee was fired and Bickham was granted leniency, and their

ultimate employment status rested with the same person. We should not be

understood to say that the distinctions noted by KCS are not relevant; indeed

they might very well prove to be relevant in the event that KCS proffers a

legitimate nondiscriminatory explanation for the disparate results in Lee’s and

Bickham’s cases. But our sole task today is to determine whether Lee satisfied

his burden of establishing a prima facie case; and we hold that, by validly

identifying Bickham as a comparator, he has.

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No. 08-30444

IV. CONCLUSION

As we conclude that Bickham is a satisfactory comparator, we hold that

Lee established a prima facie case of Title VII racial discrimination. We

therefore REVERSE the judgment of the district court and REMAND the case

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We AFFIRM the remainder

of that court’s summary judgment, dismissing Lee’s FMLA and EEOC

retaliation claims.

14